



The Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1 NGX Medium Robustness Evaluation

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
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- VPN-1 NGX is:
 - A Firewall
 - A VPN gateway
 - An IDS/IPS
 - A remote access gateway
 - ...
- Includes proprietary OS: SecurePlatform
- TOE hardware platforms produced by Check Point hardware partners





Evaluation Goals



- Customer-identified goals:
 - Medium robustness firewall PPs (proxy/traffic filter)
 - Fully evaluated IKE/IPSec functionality
 - IDS/IPS functionality
 - Hardware in TOE
 - Management server and GUIs in TOE
- Customers demanded **usable** and **secure** TOE:
 - Distributed
 - Remote management
 - IDS/IPS updates
 - Support for NTP, RADIUS, SecurID, LDAP, VLANs, ...
 - Support for Diffie Hellman groups 14 to 18, RSA 4096, ...
 - Certificate-based authentication for both end-users and administrators




Challenges



- Multiple (sometimes contradicting) PPs
- Complex, fully-functional product
- IKE/IPSec as claimed security functionality
- Hardware developed by Check Point partners

Project Coordination





IKE/IPSec Evaluation

- VPN SFRs (claimed and evaluated security functionality)
 - Cryptographic Algorithms (FCS_COP.1)
 - Confidentiality (3DES, AES)
 - Integrity (SHA-1)
 - Authentication (RSA)
 - Key exchange (Diffie Hellman)
 - VPN functionality
 - Confidentiality Protection (FDP_UCT.1)
 - Integrity Protection (FDP_UIT.1)
 - Trusted Channel (FTP_ITC.1)
 - VPN Protocols
 - IKE (FCS_CKM.1)
 - IPSec (FCS_COP.1)
 - In addition:
 - Random number generation
 - Certificate validation



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IKE/IPSec Evaluation



- Scheme required claimed cryptographic protocols (IKE, IPSec, TLS) to be evaluated via analysis and testing
- Analysis (ADV class)
 - ADV_FSP.2 requires **complete** details
 - Referencing RFC is insufficient (e.g. “SHOULD”)
 - Check Point provided complete description of TOE behavior for all IKE/ESP packet/payload types.
- Testing (ATE class)
 - Testing of protocol compliance
 - PD 0105 gives example of expectations for testing: behavior when receiving incorrect hash from peer
 - Check Point outsourced a large part of the IKE/IPSec protocol testing work to ICOSA Labs



Partner Evaluations



- Made extensive effort to assure that hardware partners could certify too – in the context of evidence development and testing:
 - Nokia and Resilience appliances will have their own certification
 - Included “commodity” H/W: IBM, Sun, HP, Crossbeam, Dell, Patriot, Siemens, SuperMicro, Toshiba



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Conclusions



- Customers are becoming CC-aware
 - Demanding higher assurance evaluations
 - Requiring useful boundaries of the TOE
 - Distinguishing between **claimed** and **included** functionality
- Schemes are becoming serious about providing value to the customer
- Vendors must adapt to this changing landscape in order to meet customers' needs



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Benefits of CC Evaluation



- PPs are a mechanism for customers to establish their generic security requirements
- Check Point customers receive value:
 - Third-party assurances for security functionality
 - Functionality added to meet new requirements
 - CC analysis helps vendor identify missing or desirable functionality
 - Improved delivery procedures
 - CC evaluated configuration guidance
- Evaluation results highlight Check Point product differentiators in relation to its competitors



Questions?




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