

Rating Attack Potential for Smartcards

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The ISCI group

(International Security Certification Initiative)



Giesecke & Devrient



SERMA TECHNOLOGIES





ISCI objectives

- Standardize the evaluation practice for smartcards
 - Common understanding and interpretations
 - Comparable results of evaluations (including Vulnerability Analysis)
- Promote the evaluation/certification practice

Why a specific table for smartcards ?

- High challenging area
 - Smartcard is *the* security device
 - Intensively used in R&D for attack/protection
 - State of the art evolving extremely quickly
 - Powerful attacks not necessarily “*costly*”
- VLA.4 products must be secure
 - Resistant to known attacks
- Defining potential vs state of the art

Rating table



V2.0

Factors	Identification	Exploitation
Elapsed Time		
Expertise		
Knowledge of the TOE		
Access to TOE		
Equipment		
Open samples		

Modified factors
New factor
Exploitation and
Exploitation

V1.0

Factors	Identification	Exploitation
Elapsed Time		
Expertise		
Knowledge of the TOE		
Access to TOE		
Equipment		



Rating table

Factors	Identification	Exploitation
Elapsed Time		

V2.0

Expertise

Knowledge of th

Access to TOE

Equipment

Open samples

Rating

$$R_{\text{Final}} = R_{\text{Identification}} + R_{\text{Exploitation}}$$

Identification: Rate the effort to *demonstrate* that the attack is possible

- Produce a *script*
- Could be limited to a step (ex a subkey)

Exploitation: Rate the effort to *perform* the full attack (ie execute the script)

- Could be estimated

V1.0

Factors

Elapsed Time

Expertise

Knowledge of th

Access to TOE

Equipment



Rating table: Elapsed time

V2.0

Factors	< 1 hour	0	0
Elapsed Time	< 1 day		
Expertise	< 1 week	<p>Better definition of “Not practical”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Related to the attack path• Related to application specificities• Attacker’s time and not evaluator’s time• Removing the 3 months duration	
Knowledge of the T	< 1 month		
Access to TOE	> 1 month		
Equipment	Not practical		
Open samples			

V1.0

Factors	< 1 hour				
Elapsed Time	< 1 day				
Expertise	< 1 week	<p>Better definition of “Not practical”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Related to the attack path• Related to application specificities• Attacker’s time and not evaluator’s time• Removing the 3 months duration			
Knowledge of the T	< 1 month				
Access to TOE	1 m < time < 3 m				
Equipment	Not practical				
				0	0

Rating table: Expertise



V2.0

Factors	Layman	0	0
Elapsed Time			
Expertise	Proficient		
Knowledge of the TOE	Expert		
Access to TOE			
Equipment			
Open samples	Multiple Expert		

New level: **Multiple expert**

- Multi steps attacks
- Distinct expertises
- Ex: *hardware* and *cryptography*

V1.0

Factors			
Elapsed Time	layman		
Expertise			
Knowledge of the TOE	Proficient	2	2
Access to TOE			
Equipment	Expert	5	4



Rating table: Knowledge of the TOE

V2.0

Factors	Public	0	0
Elapsed Time	Restricted (FSP)	2	2
Expertise	Sensitive (HLD/LLD)	4	3
Knowledge of the TOE			
Access to TOE	Critical (IMP)	6	5
Equipment	Very critical hardware design	9	na
Open samples			

V1.0

Factors
Elapsed Time
Expertise
Knowledge of the TOE
Access to TOE
Equipment

Very critical hardware design

- For hardware, “source” data base requires the use of “bespoke” tools



Rating table: Access to the TOE

V2.0

Factors	< 10 samples	0	0
Elapsed Time			
Expertise	< 100 samples	2	4
Knowledge of the TOE			
Access to TOE	> 100 samples	3	6
Equipment			
Open samples	Not practical	*	*

V1.0

Factors	< 10 samples	0	0
Elapsed Time			
Expertise	< 100 samples	2	4
Knowledge of the TOE			
Access to TOE	> 100 samples	3	6
Equipment	Not practical	*	*



Rating table: Equipment

V2.0

Factors	None	0	0
Elapsed Time	Standard	1	2
Expertise		Specialized	3
Knowledge of the TOE	Bespoke		5
Access to TOE		Multiple Bespoke	7
Equipment			
Open samples			

V1.0

Factors
Elapsed Time
Expertise
Knowledge of t
Access to TOE
Equipment

Multiple equipments

- Apply only for *distinct* types of equipments
- Multiple specialized = Bespoke
- New level: Multiple bespoke



Rating table: Open samples

V2.0

Factors	Identification	Exploitation	
Elapsed Time			
Expertise			
Knowledge of the TOE	Public	0	
Access to TOE			
Equipment			
Open samples	Restricted	2	

V1.0

Factors	Sensitive	4	
Elapsed Time			
Expertise	Critical	6	
Knowledge of the TOE			
Access to TOE			
Equipment			

Open samples: Why ?

- Related to composite evaluations: SW put on certified HW
- 2 types
 - HW loaded with test software implementing no security features
 - Samples loaded with known secrets (or enabling loading)
- Objective:
 - Calibrate (or tune) the benches to be sure to test the SW countermeasures
 - Save evaluator's time
 - Split the complexity
 - Verify quickly the success of an attack (subkey)

Open samples: How to rate ?

- Values
 - Defined according to the classical protection rules (Public, Restricted, Sensitive, Critical).
 - Value is given by the IC evaluation (ETR Lite)
- Rating: **$R_{\text{Final}} = \text{MIN}(R_{\text{With}}, R_{\text{Without}})$**
 - Main effect on *time* factor
 - If needed both types could be included

R_{With}	R_{Without}
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Use resources <i>spent</i> by the evaluator• Add the “open sample” factor value	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Estimate the attackers resources• Don’t use “open sample” factor

Resistance: Unchanged

Range of values	Resistance to attacker with attack potential of	SOF rating	Compatible with
0 - 15	No rating	No rating	FAIL
16 - 24	Low	Basic	VLA.2
25 - 30	Moderate	Medium	VLA.3
≥ 31	High	High	VLA.4

Conclusion

- The rating table
 - Result of years of use by all the actors
 - Better reflects the state of the art (attacks, tests, evaluation practice)
- Extensive work done on examples
 - Verify the rating of “standard” attacks
 - Give landmarks
- A step for
 - Common understanding of evaluations practice
 - Standardization over various countries, CB, labs
- Future work
 - CC V3 compatibility
 - Continuous work

Thank you for your attention

Questions ?