CCRA - fragmentation or cohesion?

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Agenda

• Introduction and Background
• The Issues
• Conclusions
CCRA - Component parts

• Primary
  • Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria in the Field of Information Technology Security

• Supporting
  • Multiple or commercial CBs MC policy procedure
  • Time criteria to change from CCP to CAP MC policy
  • Voluntary Periodic Assessment
  • Conducting Shadow Certification
Growth of The Arrangement

• Then (Arrangement Dated May 2000)
  • 12 Participants
  • 6 Compliant CBs

• Now (http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org)
  • 24 Participants
  • 12 Compliant CBs
The Arrangement – Preamble

• The purpose contains four objectives shared by the participants, objective c being:

  “to eliminate the burden of duplicating evaluations of IT products and protection profiles”

• Has this been achieved?
• Is it maintainable?
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CCRA is CC’s “Ace”

- For a vendor who wishes to perform an independent eval, why is CC attractive? Because...

- Evaluate once, recognised everywhere
  - Saves repeating work
    - Saves time and money
    - More cost effective

- Makes the decision to do an evaluation at all more worthwhile
Perceived Issues

- Increasing member numbers.
- The EAL4 limit
- Article 3 Exceptions / additional requirements
- Impact of evaluations for non-CCRA members
Bigger is Better?

- Membership has doubled – issuing and accepting
- Original membership of like minded participants, now an increasing geographical, ideological and political spread
- Newer members may have requirements that are not satisfied by current CCRA
- Further new members could increase the (perceived) differences?
The EAL4 limit

- Provides a simple go/no-go criterion for recognition but:
  - Why can’t EAL5 automatically imply CCRA acceptance at EAL4?
  - Is this simplistic view still appropriate?

- The current implementation of EALs has itself been questioned in conference:
  - Rooted in TCSEC and ITSEC principles and time to move on
  - The selection of components needs to be looked at again - e.g. less design trace, more VA and test
    - Additional things could be done by vendors now, but wouldn’t have recognition
Article 3 / Additional Requirements

• National Security Exemption
  • A reasonable concept, but the range of systems or products should not be unnecessarily large.

• National Requirements
  • Participants who expect greater detail for their purposes than Certification Reports currently provide

• Agency Requirements
  • Specific government agencies having preference for ‘local’ evaluations either by inference or by specifying requirements over the CCRA recognition limit
Evaluations for non-CCRA members

- Still some significant non-members
- If vendors have to support other evaluation schemes for significant customers/nations, re-use benefit provided by CC can be diluted.
  - limited resources split between schemes but doing similar work. Thus, CCRA countries do ultimately lose out through missed opportunity
  - In extreme, could be performing 3 evaluations for acceptance in 3 or 4 countries, so less cost effective.
- Vendors can apply some pressure through industry associations and govt. affairs/lobbying, but:
  - CC has to be able to sell itself as better than indigenous schemes
  - Politics plays a large part
  - Consider diplomacy to invite in significant non-members?
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The Verdict

- Eliminating the burden of duplicating evaluations has, to a large degree, been achieved

- Some signs of fragmentation because of diversity of membership, though generally contained for now

- The basics of CCRA have remained unchanged through 3 versions of the CC. V4 is good time to compromise on differences so CCRA members are again united. Invite other countries to participate, don’t await applications passively

- Because **CCRA is what makes the scheme worthwhile for vendors**
For More Information

Oracle Security Evaluations:
http://www.oracle.com/technology/deploy/security/seceval/

General Oracle Security information:
http://www.oracle.com/technology/security
http://www.oracle.com/solutions/security
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