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CCRA - fragmentation or cohesion?

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Agenda

Introduction and Background

The Issues

Conclusions

CCRA - Component parts

Primary

 Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria in the Field of Information Technology Security

Supporting

- Multiple or commercial CBs MC policy procedure
- Time criteria to change from CCP to CAP MC policy
- Voluntary Periodic Assessment
- Conducting Shadow Certification

Growth of The Arrangement

- Then (Arrangement Dated May 2000)
 - 12 Participants
 - 6 Compliant CBs
- Now (http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org)
 - 24 Participants
 - 12 Compliant CBs

The Arrangement – Preamble

 The purpose contains four objectives shared by the participants, objective c being:

"to eliminate the burden of duplicating evaluations of IT products and protection profiles"

- Has this been achieved?
- Is it maintainable?

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CCRA is CC's "Ace"

- For a vendor who wishes to perform an independent eval, why is CC attractive? Because...
- Evaluate once, recognised everywhere
 - Saves repeating work
 - Saves time and money
 - More cost effective
- Makes the decision to do an evaluation at all more worthwhile

Perceived Issues

- Increasing member numbers.
- The EAL4 limit
- Article 3 Exceptions / additional requirements
- Impact of evaluations for non-CCRA members

Bigger is Better?

- Membership has doubled issuing and accepting
- Original membership of like minded participants, now an increasing geographical, ideological and political spread
- Newer members may have requirements that are not satisfied by current CCRA
- Further new members could increase the (perceived) differences?

The EAL4 limit

- Provides a simple go/no-go criterion for recognition but:
 - Why can't EAL5 automatically imply CCRA acceptance at EAL4?
 - Is this simplistic view still appropriate?
- The current implementation of EALs has itself been questioned in conference:
 - Rooted in TCSEC and ITSEC principles and time to move on
 - The selection of components needs to be looked at again e.g. less design trace, more VA and test
 - Additional things could be done by vendors now, but wouldn't have recognition

Article 3 / Additional Requirements

National Security Exemption

 A reasonable concept, but the range of systems or products should not be unnecessarily large.

National Requirements

 Participants who expect greater detail for their purposes than Certification Reports currently provide

Agency Requirements

 Specific government agencies having preference for 'local' evaluations either by inference or by specifying requirements over the CCRA recognition limit

Evaluations for non-CCRA members

- Still some significant non-members
- If vendors have to support other evaluation schemes for significant customers/nations, re-use benefit provided by CC can be diluted.
 - limited resources split between schemes but doing similar work.
 Thus, CCRA countries do ultimately lose out through missed opportunity
 - In extreme, could be performing 3 evaluations for acceptance in 3 or 4 countries, so less cost effective.
- Vendors can apply some pressure through industry associations and govt. affairs/lobbying, but:
 - CC has to be able to sell itself as better than indigenous schemes
 - Politics plays a large part
 - Consider diplomacy to invite in significant non-members?

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The Verdict

- Eliminating the burden of duplicating evaluations has, to a large degree, been achieved
- Some signs of fragmentation because of diversity of membership, though generally contained for now
- The basics of CCRA have remained unchanged through 3 versions of the CC. V4 is good time to compromise on differences so CCRA members are again united. Invite other countries to participate, don't await applications passively
- Because <u>CCRA is what makes the scheme worthwhile for vendors</u>

For More Information

Oracle Security Evaluations:

http://www.oracle.com/technology/deploy/security/seceval/

General Oracle Security information:

http://www.oracle.com/technology/security

http://www.oracle.com/solutions/security





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