Common Criteria v 3.1 Tutorial part I

9ICCC Korea, 24/09/2008
Contents

a. IT Security Evaluations

b. The Common Criteria

c. Key Concepts

d. Security Specifications
The security search

It is possible to determine the security of a product? NO. We can only demonstrate the insecurity of the products.

Then?
We can offer confidence degrees in the product security.

How to obtain this confidence?
If a method that generates secure products is followed and vulnerabilities have not been found, we will affirm that it is secure, BUT

What conviction do we have?
In relation to the effort applied searching vulnerabilities.
IT Security Evaluations

The security search

What method does generate secure products?

Any "generic" development method should be able to obtain secure products, if the security is a desirable attribute.
IT Security Evaluations

The certification process

Independent inspection of the results of the evaluation leading to the production of the final certificate.

The security evaluation is a perfect gear in the certification process
IT Security Evaluations

What does it mean a CC certificate?

a) The security specification is true.

b) The confidence level in this assertion.

A technical report determines

- if the evaluation of the security specifications and of the product have been satisfactory, and
- if the security assurance level have been obtained in the evaluation.
IT Security Evaluations

Certificates maintenance: “Assurance Continuity”

We have already certified a product. If we change the external colour does it lose the certification?

Out of the scope of CC
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The Common Criteria

What is the ISO 15408 standard?

• Is an international agreement on the secure development method and 7 discreet effort levels.

• Is a security architecture paradigm to which a coherent security functional requirements catalogue is applied allowing the establishment of a common language for the expression of the IT products and systems security.
The Common Criteria

Application of the CC

Specially useful for:

• Specifying security features in a product
• Assisting in the building of security features into a product
• Evaluating the security features of products
• Supporting the procurement of products with security features.
The Common Criteria

**CC structure: current version 3.1 R2 (Rome 2007)**

- Part 1: Introduction and general model (R1)
- Part 2: Security functional components (R2)
- Part 3: Security assurance components (R2)
- CEM - Evaluation methodology (R2)
- Supporting documents

**Target audience**

- Consumers
- Developer
- Evaluators ......
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Key Concepts

The security concept

Security is concerned with the protection of assets.

Maintenance and safeguard of three basic aspects:
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
The evaluation concept

“A detailed exam of the security aspects of an IT system or product performing in parallel the necessary tests to assure that it works correctly, it is effective and it doesn't show any logical vulnerability“.
Key Concepts

The Target of Evaluation

A **TOE** is a set of software, firmware and/or hardware accompanied by guidance documentation.

The evaluation of a TOE containing only part of an IT product should not be misrepresented as the evaluation of the entire IT product.

Multiple configurations are collective called “the TOE” and each configuration must meet the TOE requirements.
Key Concepts

Functionality
Defines the TOE security characteristics (SFRs)

Assurance
Confidence degree in the enforcement of the security objectives of a TOE (SARs) \(\Leftrightarrow\) Correctness & Effectiveness

Greater assurance results from the application of greater evaluation effort: Scope, Depth and Rigour
Key Concepts

Descriptive material: Security requirements expression

Component organization
Classes, Families, Components, Elements

Operations
Iteration, Assignment, Selection, Refinement

 Dependencies

Extended Components
Key Concepts

Security Specifications

CC Security Specifications:
- Protection Profile (PP)
- Security Target (ST)

The end result of an evaluation is never “this IT product is secure”, but is always “this IT product meets, or not, this security specification”
Key Concepts

The process vs. The product
Key Concepts

Vulnerability Analysis

Determines the existence of exploitable vulnerabilities in the TOE in its operational environment:

- the identification of potential vulnerabilities;
- penetration testing

Determines whether the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing an attack potential Basic, Enhanced basic, Moderate, High.
Key Concepts

The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs)

7 predefined assurance packages increasing assurance

The assurance is increased by replacing components of the same family by another of higher hierarchy

The notion of augmentation allows adding components of higher hierarchy

EALs are the base for the mutual recognition
Key Concepts

Evaluator Outputs

- OR: Observation Reports

The evaluator will report the conclusions of the evaluation, providing an overall verdict determined by all the constituent activities verdicts.
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Security Specifications

Definition

Protection Profile (PP): an implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type.

Security Target (ST): an implementation-dependent statement of security needs for an identified TOE.
Security Specifications

The role of the Security Specifications.

Two possibilities to buy a product:
- specification-based purchasing process.
- selection-based purchasing process.

Difficulty – hard to determine for a customer:
- what kind of IT security he needs
- the security of a product is sufficient to meet his needs
- the security properties declared in a product are true

an evaluation of the product using CC may be useful, and in this case, PPs and STs play an important role.
Security Specifications

The Process

1. Define Security Problem
   - SPD
     - Assumptions
   - Organisational Policies
   - Threats
2. Establish Security Objectives
   - Security Objectives
     - Operational Environment SEC-OBJ
     - TOE SEC-OBJ
3. Establish Security Requirements
   - Security Requirements Catalogue
     - Security Functional Requirements
     - Security Assurance Requirements
4. Write TOE Summary Specification
   - TSS
     - Only ST specification

Security Environment
- TOE physical environment
- Resources
- TOE Purpose

Purpose
- Security Environment
- Threats
- Assumptions
- Organisational Policies

TOE
- SPD
- Operational Environment SEC-OBJ
- TOE SEC-OBJ
Security Specifications

PP&ST. Content.

Protection Profile
- PP introduction
- Conformance claims
- Security problem definition
- Security objectives
- Extended components definition
- Security requirements

Security Target
- ST introduction
- Conformance claims
- Security problem definition
- Security objectives
  - Extended components definition
  - Security requirements
  - TOE summary specification
Security Specifications

Readable Parts.

Introduction

• PP/ST reference. TOE reference (only ST).
• TOE overview: usage, TOE type, non-TOE HW/SW/firmware
• TOE Description (only ST): physical and logical scope

Conformance claim
Conformance with the CC itself, PPs, Packages.

The PP conformance statement states how STs or other PPs must conform to that PP ("strict" or "demonstrable").
Security Specifications

Security Problem Definition

Many approaches: risk/threat analysis, threat DB, ...., a simple one:

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**Attack patterns** (agent, action,...)

discarded

derive

**OSP**

**Assumptions**

**TOE SO**

**OP ENV SO**
Conclusion

If all SFRs and SARs are satisfied and all SOs for the operational environment are achieved, then the security problem is solved.
Security Specifications

PP&ST for low assurance. Content.

Protection Profile (for low assurance)
- PP introduction
- Conformance claims
- Extended components definition
- Security requirements

Security Target (for low assurance)
- ST introduction
- Conformance claims
- Extended components definition
- Security requirements
- TOE summary specification
Security Specifications

Protection Profile

How a PP should be used
- part of a specification for a specific consumer
- part of a regulation from a specific regulatory entity;
- as a baseline defined by a group of IT developers.

How a PP should **NOT** be used
- a detailed specification;
- a complete specification;
- a specification of a single product.
Security Specifications

Security Target

How an ST should be used
- Before and during the evaluation, the ST specifies “what is to be evaluated”.
- After the evaluation, the ST specifies “what was evaluated”.

How an ST should NOT be used
- a detailed specification;
- a complete specification.
Security Specifications

How-to.

Classical Approach

Top-Down

General Threats

Security Environment

General Organisational Policies

Assumptions

Detailed Attacks

Detailed Policies

Security Objectives for the TOE

Security Objectives for the Environment

Security Functional Requirements

Security Assurance Requirements

Product Retrofit

Bottom-Up
Questions welcomed & Thanks!

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