

Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0338-2005-MA-02

Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CLX640P/m1523-a14 and
SLE66CLX641P/m1522-a14

both with RSA2048 V1.3 and specific IC Dedicated Software

from

Infineon Technologies AG



Common Criteria Arrangement for components up to EAL4

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements*, version 1.0, February 2004 and the developers Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0338-2005.

The change to the certified product is at the level of the implementation for the RF interface, an optimized hardware structure for yield improvement and the inclusion an already evaluated development and production site, changes that have no effect on assurance. The identification of the maintained product is indicated by a new version number compared to the certified product.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0338-2005 is maintained for this version of the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0338-2005.

Bonn, October 31st, 2006



Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified TOE [3], the Security Target [4] and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CLX640P/m1523-a14 and SLE66CLX641P/m1522-a14 both with RSA2048 V1.3 and specific IC Dedicated Software, Infineon Technologies AG, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes the changes made to the certified TOE, the evidence updated as a result of the changes and the security impact of the changes.

The SLE66CLX640P/m1523-a14 and SLE66CLX641P/m1522-a14 were changed due to the stability, ISO compliance, communication performance of the RF interface, a yield improvement in production and the inclusion of the already evaluated development and production site in Amkor, Philippines.

As a result of the certification BSI-DSZ-CC-0401-2006 for a similar product the following results regarding the development and production environment of the TOE apply:

The Common Criteria assurance requirements

- ACM Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.3),
- ADO Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
- ALC Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2),

are fulfilled for the additional development and production sites of the TOE:

- Amkor Technology Philippines, Km. 22 East Service Rd., South Superhighway, Muntinlupa City 1702, Philippines
- Amkor Technology Philippines, 119 North Science Avenue, Laguna Technopark, Binan, Laguna 4024, Philippines

The change is not significant from the standpoint of security, however Configuration Management procedures required a change in the version number from SLE66CLX640P/m1523-a11 and SLE66CLX641P/m1522-a11 to SLE66CLX640P/m1523-a14 and SLE66CLX641P/m1522-a14.

Conclusion

The change to the TOE is at the level of the implementation for the RF interface, an optimized hardware structure for yield improvement and included development and production sites, a change that has no effect on assurance. Examination of the evidence (see [5] and [6]) indicates that the changes required are limited to the inclusion of the additional development and production site and to the identification of the following items:

No	Туре	Identifier	Release	Date	Form of Delivery
1	HW	SLE66CLX640P / SLE66CLX641P Smart Card IC	GDS-file-ID: m1522a14 with production line indicator: "2" (Dresden)		Wafer or packaged module (with or without inlay antenna)
2	Doc	Status Report, List of all available application notes		09.2006	Hardcopy and pdf- file

The Security Target [4] is still valid for the changed TOE. Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, BSI agrees that the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report [3] is maintained for this version of the product. Regarding the additional development and production sites in Amkor, Philippines assurance as outlined in the Certification Report is also maintained for the product versions Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CLX640P/m1523-a12 and SLE66CLX641P/m1522-a12 both with RSA2048 V1.3 and specific IC Dedicated Software for that the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0338-2005 also applies. This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

References

- [1] Common Criteria document CCIMB-2004-02-009 "Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements", version 1.0, February 2004
- [2] SLE66CLX640P / m1523-a14 SLE66CLX641P / m1522-a14 Impact Analysis on Differences to the Forerunner Design Version a11 (a12) Reference Process 0338, Infinion Technologies AG, Version 1.1, 2006-09-07 (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0338-2005 for Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CLX640P/m1523-a11 and SLE66CLX641P /m1522-a11 both with RSA2048 V1.3 and specific IC Dedicated Software, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 2005-11-09
- [4] Infineon Technologies AG, Security and Chipcard Ics, SLE66CLX640P / m1523-a11, SLE66CLX641P / m1522-a11 both with RSA2048 V1.3, Security Target, Version 1.3, 9 September 2005
- [5] Configuration List, Configuration Management Scope (ACM_SCP) compared to the forerunner design –a11, Version 1.0, 2006-08-28 (confidential document)
- [6] Test Report M1522 A14, Infineon Technologies AG, Version 1.0, 2006-09-08 (confidential document)