



## Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

**BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007-MA-07**

**NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD040V0B,  
P5CD020V0B, P5CD012V0B, P5CC040V0B,  
P5CC021V0B**

from

**NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH**



Common Criteria Recognition  
Arrangement

for components up to EAL4



The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements*, version 1.0, February 2004 and the developers Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007 updated by a re-assessment on September 13<sup>th</sup> 2010.

The change to the certified product is at the level of TOE configuration, documentation and production sites. The changes have no effect on assurance.

The certified product itself did not change. The changes are related to a change of the UID convention, to an update of the user guidance and the inclusion of an additional production site already certified in the scope of the site certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0003-2011. For similar usage the new site has also been included in product life cycle processes in the scope of the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0700-2011.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007 dated July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2007, updated by a re-assessment on September 13<sup>th</sup> 2010 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007.

Bonn, 10 October 2011



## Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD040V0B, P5CD020V0B, P5CD012V0B, P5CC040V0B, P5CC021V0B, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD040V0B, P5CD020V0B, P5CD012V0B, P5CC040V0B, P5CC021V0B was changed due to a change of the UID convention, to an update of the user guidance [6] and the inclusion of an additional production site already certified in the scope of the site certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0003-2011 [11]. The configuration list [5] and the data sheet [8] were updated to reflect the changes. The certified product itself did not change.

The Common Criteria assurance requirement

ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC\_CMC.4, ALC\_CMS-5, ALC\_DEL.1, ALC\_DVS.2, ALC\_LCD.1, ALC\_TAT.2)

is fulfilled for the following site (NedCard Wijchen) used for production:

NedCard B.V.  
Bijsterhuizen 25-29  
NL-6604LM Wijchen  
The Netherlands

## Conclusion

The changes to the TOE are at the level of TOE configuration, documentation and production sites. The changes have no effect on assurance. As a result of the changes the configuration list [5] as well as the data sheet [8] for the TOE have been updated. The Security Target [4] was editorially updated [7].

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, BSI agrees that the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report [3] is maintained for this version of the product.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-

DSZ-CC-0404-2007 dated July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2007, updated by a re-assessment on September 13<sup>th</sup> 2010 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. As a result of this re-assessment, the documents [9] and [10] are the current versions of the ETR for composite evaluation and the ETR itself.

**Additional obligations and notes for the usage of the product:**

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support Software or Embedded Software.

For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation which contains guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Embedded Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and which measures have to be implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE.

In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been correct and effectively implemented by the software. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [9].

According to the scheme rules, evaluation results outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation as listed above can usually be used for composite evaluations building on top, as long as the document ETR for composite evaluation is not older than one year and an attack assumed to be not feasible within the scope of these evaluations has not been performed successfully.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The Cryptographic Functionality 2-key Triple DES (2TDES) provided by the TOE achieves a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

## References

- [1] Common Criteria document CCIMB-2004-02-009 “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 1.0, February 2004
- [2] Impact Analysis report P5CD040/ P5CC040/ P5CD020/ P5CC021/ P5CD012 V0B, Rev. 1.1, July 15<sup>th</sup>, 2010 (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007 for “NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD040V0B, P5CC040V0B, P5CD020V0B and P5CC021V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software”, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2007
- [4] Security Target Lite, Evaluation of the P5CD040V0B, P5CC040V0B, P5CD020V0B and P5CC021V0B Secure Smart Card Controllers, NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification, Version 1.0, March 21<sup>st</sup>, 2007 (sanitized public document)
- [5] Configuration List, Evaluation of the NXP P5Cx012/02x/040/073/080/144 family of Secure Smart Card Controllers, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification, Version 2.0, July 14<sup>th</sup>, 2010 (Confidential document)
- [6] Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for the P5Cx012/02x/040/073/080/144V0B family of Secure Smart Card Controllers, NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification, Version 1.8, February 15<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- [7] Security Target Lite, Evaluation of the NXP P5CD040V0B Secure Smart Card Controller, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification, Version 1.8, July 14<sup>th</sup>, 2010 (sanitized public document)
- [8] Product Data Sheet, P5Cx012/02x/040/073/080/144 family, Secure dual interface and contact PKI smart card controller, NXP Semiconductors, Revision 3.7, Document Number: 126537, June 4<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- [9] ETR for composition, NXP P5CD040V0B Secure 8-bit Smart Card Controller, BSI-DSZ-CC-404, T-Systems GEI GmbH, Version 1.4, September 7<sup>th</sup>, 2010 (confidential document)
- [10] Evaluation Technical Report, NXP P5CD040V0B Secure Smart Card Controller, BSI-DSZ-CC-404, T-Systems GEI GmbH, Version 1.4, September 13<sup>th</sup>, 2010 (confidential document)
- [11] Site Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0003-2011 for NedCard Wijchen of NedCard BV, May 9<sup>th</sup>, 2011