

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0482-2008-MA-03

Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CLX800PE / m1581-a15, SLE66CLX800PEM / m1580-a15, SLE66CLX800PES / m1582-a15, SLE66CLX800PE / m1599-a15, SLE66CLX360PE / m1587-a15, SLE66CLX360PEM / m1588-a15, SLE66CLX360PES / m1589-a15 all with optional libraries RSA V1.5 and ECC V1.1 and all with specific IC dedicated software



Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement for components up to EAL4

from

Infineon Technologies AG

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements,* version 1.0, February 2004 and the developers Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0482-2008.

The change to the certified product is at the level of the improvement in the TOE firmware (Mifare component), a change that has no effect on assurance. The identification of the maintained product is indicated by a new version number compared to the certified product.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a <u>minor change</u> and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0482-2008 is maintained for this version of the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0482-2008.



Bonn, 5 March 2009

Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], the Security Target [4] and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CLX800PE / m1581-a15, SLE66CLX800PEM / m1580-a15, SLE66CLX800PES / SLE66CX800PE / m1599-a15, SLE66CLX360PE / m1587-a15. m1582-a15. SLE66CLX360PEM / m1588-a15, SLE66CLX360PES / m1589-a15 all with optional libraries RSA V1.5 and ECC V1.1 and all with specific IC dedicated software, Infineon Technologies AG, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in the document Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CLX800PE / m1581-a15, SLE66CLX800PEM / m1580-a15, SLE66CLX800PES / m1582-a15, SLE66CX800PE / m1599-a15. SLE66CLX360PE / m1587-a15. SLE66CLX360PEM / m1588-a15, SLE66CLX360PES / m1589-a15 all with optional libraries RSA V1.5 and ECC V1.1 and all with specific IC dedicated software was changed due to improvement of the TOE firmware (Mifare component). All changes are minor firmware (Mifare) changes only. The change is not significant from the standpoint of security, however Configuration Management procedures required a change in the version number from a14 to a15 and the RMS library version from RMS E V06 to RMS E V06 08. Note that not all derivates have been maintained from the basis certification of BSI-DSZ-CC-0482-2008.

Conclusion

The change to the certified product is at the level of the improvement in the minor mifare software, a change that has no effect on assurance. Examination of the evidence indicates that the changes performed are limited to the Mifare part of the RMS library. The Security Target [4] is still valid for the changed TOE. Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, BSI agrees that the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report [3] is maintained for this version of the product. This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

References

- [1] Common Criteria document CCIMB-2004-02-009 "Assuarance Continuity: CCRA Requirements", Version 1.0, February 2004
- [2] Impact Analysis, Chipcard and Security ICs, SLE66CLX800PE m1581 a15, SLE66CLX800PEM m1580 a15, SLE66CLX800PES m1582 a15, SLE66CX800PE m1599 a15, SLE66CLX360PE m1587 a15, SLE66CLX360PEM m1588 a15, SLE66CLX360PES m1589, Version 1.2, 2009-03-02, Infineon Technologies AG, (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0482-2008 for SLE66CLX800PE / m1581e13/a14, SLE66CLX800PEM / m1580-e13/a14, SLE66CLX800PES / m1582e13/a14, SLE66CX800PE / m1599-e13/a14, SLE66CLX360PE / m1587-e13/a14, SLE66CLX360PEM / m1588-e13/a14, SLE66CLX360PES / m1589-e13/a14, SLE66CLX180PE / m2080-a14, SLE66CLX180PEM / m2081-a14, SLE66CLX120PE / m2082-a14, SLE66CLX120PEM / m2083-a14, all optional with RSA2048 V1.5 and ECC V1.1 and all with specific IC dedicated software from Infineon Technologies AG, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 27 Mai 2008
- Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0482, SLE66CLX800PE / m1581-e13/a14, SLE66CLX800PEM / m1580-e13/a14, SLE66CLX800PES / m1582-e13/a14, SLE66CX800PE / m1599-e13/a14, SLE66CLX360PE / m1587-e13/a14, SLE66CLX360PEM / m1588-e13/a14, SLE66CLX360PES / m1589-e13/a14, SLE66CLX180PE / m2080-a14, SLE66CLX180PEM / m2081-a14, SLE66CLX120PE / m2082-a14, SLE66CLX120PEM / m2083-a14, all optional with RSA2048 V1.5 and ECC V1.1, Version 1.2, 2008-01-09, Infineon Technologies AG
- [5] Configuration Management Scope (ACM_SCP), Chipcard and Security ICs, SLE66CLX800PE m1581 a15, SLE66CLX800PEM m1580 a15, SLE66CLX800PES m1582 a15, SLE66CX800PE m1599 a15, SLE66CLX360PE m1587 a15, SLE66CLX360PEM m1588 a15, SLE66CLX360PES m1589, All with optional libraries RSA V1.5 and ECC V1.1, Version 1.0, 2009-02-26, Infineon Technologies AG (Confidential document)