



Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0513-V2-2018-MA-01

**CHERRY eHealth Terminal G87 - 1505 FW 3.0.1
HW1.1.1**

from

Cherry GmbH



SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements*, version 2.1, June 2012 and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0513-V2-2018.

The certified product itself did not change. The changes are related to an update of life cycle security aspects.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0513-V2-2018 dated 28 March 2018 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0513-V2-2018.



Common Criteria



Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only

Bonn, 7 September 2018

The Federal Office for Information Security



Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target [4] and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [6].

The vendor for the CHERRY eHealth Terminal G87 - 1505 FW 3.0.1 HW1.1.1, Cherry GmbH, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The certified product itself did not change.

The changes are related to an update of life cycle security aspects. The ALC re-evaluation was performed by the ITSEF TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The procedure led to an updated version of the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [6]. The Common Criteria assurance requirements for ALC are fulfilled as claimed in the Security Target [4]. Only the secure delivery-chain has been updated.

Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of the secure delivery-chain as part of ALC. The change has no effect on product assurance.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0513-V2-2018 dated 28 March 2018 [3] is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target [4] not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG¹ Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [3] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

References

- [1] Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 2.1, June 2012
- [2] IAR, Auswirkungsanalyse zur abweichenden Auslieferungsprozedur, Version 1.0, 20.06.2018, Cherry GmbH, (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0513-V2-2018 for CHERRY eHealth Terminal G87-1505, FW-Version 3.0.1 HW-Version 1.1.1 from Cherry GmbH, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 28.03.2018
- [4] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0513-V2-2018, Version 2.17, 28.02.2018, Common-Criteria 3.1-Dokument Security Target EAL3+ for G87-1505, Cherry GmbH
- [5] Update Configuration List (Konfigurationsliste), V1.51, 06.08.2018, Cherry GmbH, (confidential document)
- [6] ETR - Evaluation Technical Report Summary, Version 6, 06.08.2018, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)