



## Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

**BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V10-2024-MA-03**

**SMGW, Version 2.2.1**

from

**Power Plus Communications AG**



SOGIS  
Recognition Agreement  
for components up to  
EAL 4

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V10-2024 updated by BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V10-2024-MA-01 and BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V10-2024-MA-02.

The certified product itself did not change. The changes are related to an update of the life cycle security aspect ALC\_DEL.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V10-2024 dated 08 November 2024 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V10-2024.



Common Criteria  
Recognition Arrangement  
recognition for components  
up to EAL 2 and ALC\_FLR  
only



Bonn, 8 May 2026

The Federal Office for Information Security

## Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target [4] and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the SMGW, Version 2.2.1, Power Plus Communications AG, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The certified product itself did not change.

The changes are related to an update of the life cycle security aspect ALC\_DEL. A secure delivery variant was changed to include a new variant of a secure delivery box. The partial ALC re-evaluation was performed by the ITSEF TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The procedure led to an updated version of the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [6] and an editorial update of the Security Target [5].

The Common Criteria assurance requirements for ALC are fulfilled as claimed in the Security Target [5].

## Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of the life cycle security aspect ALC\_DEL. The change has no effect on product assurance, but the updated guidance documentation [7] has to be followed.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V10-2024 dated 08 November 2024 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

### Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

The foundation for usage of the certificate updated by this maintenance procedure is:

- Use of the latest version of the TOE guidance documentation [7].

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG<sup>1</sup> Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2).

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [3] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 2 December 2025, BGBl. 2025 , no. 301, p. 2

## References

- [1] Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 3.1, 29 February 2024  
Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: SOG-IS Requirements”, version 1.2, March 2024
- [2] IAR – Auswirkungsanalyse Verfahren zur Ergänzung der PYBOX in der Sicheren Auslieferung, 20 October 2025, Power Plus Communications AG (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V10-2024 for SMGW Version 2.2, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 08 November 2024
- [4] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V10-2024, Version 1.5, 2024-09-30, Security Target, SMGW Version 2.2, Power Plus Communications AG
- [5] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V10-2024-MA-03, Version 1.10, 2026-03-02, Security Target, SMGW Version 2.2.1, Power Plus Communications AG
- [6] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2026-03-27, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
- [7] Auslieferungs- und Fertigungsprozeduren, Anhang Sichere Auslieferung, Version 1.17, 2026-01-09, Power Plus Communications AG  
SHA-256:  
24746549d7abdb69f4b7a851ec3aa93b9aeee27f99ec0c78e2a300a98354f478