



Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V4-2025-MA-01

CASA 1.0 (SW: 31100000__X026c
HW: 10 301, 10 302, 10 303, 10 304)

CASA 1.1 (SW: 31100000__X026c
HW: 11 301, 11 302, 11 501, 11 502)

from

EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG



SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V4-2025.

The change to the certified product is at the level of the implementation representation. The identification of the maintained product is indicated by a new version number compared to the certified product.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V4-2025 dated 26 August 2025 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V4-2025.



Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only

Bonn, 8 April 2026

The Federal Office for Information Security



Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as referenced in [3].

The vendor for the CASA 1.0 (SW: 31100000__X026c, HW: 10 301, 10 302, 10 303, 10 304) and CASA 1.1 (SW: 31100000__X026c, HW: 11 301, 11 302, 11 501, 11 502), EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The CASA 1.0 (SW: 31100000__X026b, HW: 10 301, 10 302, 10 303, 10 304) and CASA 1.1 (SW: 31100000__X026b, HW: 11 301, 11 302, 11 501, 11 502) were changed to CASA 1.0 (SW: 31100000__X026c, HW: 10 301, 10 302, 10 303, 10 304) and CASA 1.1 (SW: 31100000__X026c, HW: 11 301, 11 302, 11 501, 11 502) to enhance the reliability of internal system processes and WAN-interface communication stability as well as to apply minor bug fixes. Configuration Management procedures required a change in the product identifier.

The Security Target [4] was editorially updated.

Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of the implementation representation. The change has no effect on product assurance, but the updated guidance documentation [5] has to be followed.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V4-2025 dated 26 August 2025 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG¹ Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The foundation for usage of the certificate updated by this maintenance procedure is:

- Use of the latest version of the TOE guidance documentation, see [5].

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [3] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 2 December 2025, BGBl. 2025 , no. 301, p. 2

References

- [1] Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 3.1, 29 February 2024
Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: SOG-IS Requirements”, version 1.2, March 2024
- [2] CASA 1.0 und CASA 1.1 – Maintenance-Verfahren 023 – Impact Analysis Report (IAR), Version 0.08, 06 March 2026 (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V4-2025 for CASA 1.0 and CASA 1.1, 26 August 2025, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
- [4] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V4-2025-MA-01, Version 3.14, 2026-03-05, CASA 1.0 and CASA 1.1 Security Target, EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG
- [5] Produkthandbuch für das Smart Meter Gateway CASA 1.0 und CASA 1.1
 - FÜR SERVICETECHNIKER
 - FÜR GATEWAY-ADMINISTRATOREN,Version 2.05, 2026-02-23, EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG
- [6] Configuration list for the TOE CASA-Konfigurationsliste, Version 24, 2026-03-06, EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG (confidential document)