



## Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

**BSI-DSZ-CC-1124-V3-2023-MA-03**  
**CHERRY eHealth Terminal ST-1506,**  
**FW 4.0.47, HW 4.0.0**  
from  
**Cherry Digital Health GmbH**



SOGIS  
Recognition Agreement  
for components up to  
EAL 4

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-1124-V3-2023 updated by BSI-DSZ-CC-1124-V3-2023-MA-01 and BSI-DSZ-CC-1124-V3-2023-MA-02.



The change to the certified product is at the level of non-security-relevant changes in the source code. The identification of the maintained product is indicated by a new version number compared to the certified product.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.



Common Criteria  
Recognition Arrangement  
recognition for components  
up to EAL 2 and ALC\_FLR  
only

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1124-V3-2023 dated 6 June 2023 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1124-V3-2023.

Bonn, 8 May 2025

The Federal Office for Information Security



## Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the CHERRY eHealth Terminal ST-1506, FW 4.0.47, HW 4.0.0, Cherry Digital Health GmbH, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The CHERRY eHealth Terminal ST-1506, FW 4.0.47, HW 4.0.0 was changed due to a NTP-Client and an additional VPN Client which are both not part of the security functionality of the TOE. Configuration Management procedures required a change in the product identifier. Therefore the version number changed from FW 4.0.25, HW 4.0.0 to FW 4.0.47, HW 4.0.0.

This change also covers an update of the Firmware Image 4.0.47 with the new SHA-256-Hashsum:

2a0fa210703a8b3b3cced4671a84dad0c891e294b57e490f35ba9c262292d8c9

The Security Target [4] and the user guidance [6] were editorially updated.

## Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of non-security-relevant functions in the source code. The change has no effect on product assurance.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1124-V3-2023 dated 6 June 2023 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

### Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG<sup>1</sup> Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The foundation for usage of the certificate updated by this maintenance procedure is:

- Use of the latest version of the TOE guidance documentation, see [6].

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [3] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

## References

- [1] Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 3.1, 29 February 2024  
Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: SOG-IS Requirements”, version 1.2, March 2024
- [2] Common-Criteria-Dokument Auswirkungsanalyse – FW-Update eHealth Terminal ST-1506, Version 0.3, 2025-03-20, Cherry Digital Health GmbH (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1124-V3-2023 for CHERRY eHealth Terminal ST-1506, FW 4.0.0, HW 4.0.0, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 6 June 2023
- [4] Security Target EAL3+ for eHealth Terminal ST-1506, Version 5.6, 2025-03-03, Cherry Digital Health GmbH
- [5] Configuration list for the TOE, ALC\_CMS\_HW, 1.1.1, 2023-01-31, ALC\_CMS\_SW, V2.3, 2025-03-24, BOM, V4.0.0, 2023-02-01, Bibliography V5.7, 2025-03-03 (Confidential document)
- [6] Cherry eHealth Terminal ST-1506, Handbuch für Administratoren, Version: 09, 2025-03  
SHA-256-Hashsumme des Handbuchs:  
18b9e117c9d0ed9dd52512a16788cb31b02b0ff0672e95123bb036c889de77c3