



Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-1131-V2-2023-MA-02

Sensor 2185, Release 1.21

from

Continental Automotive Technologies GmbH



SOGIS
Recognition Agreement

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-1131-V2-2023 updated by Maintenance Procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-1131-V2-2023-MA-01 dated 31 May 2023.

The certified product itself did not change. The changes are related to an update of life cycle security aspects.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1131-V2-2023 dated 10 February 2023 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1131-V2-2023.



Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components
up to EAL 2

Bonn, 17 April 2024

The Federal Office for Information Security



Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the Sensor 2185, Release 1.21, Continental Automotive GmbH, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The changes are related to an update of life cycle security aspects. The ALC re-evaluation was performed by the ITSEF Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH. The procedure led to an updated version of the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [4]. The Common Criteria assurance requirements for ALC are fulfilled as claimed in the Security Target [5].

The focus of this ALC re-evaluation was on one additional production site in Dauchingen (Germany) operated by an external company. For the purpose of the ALC re-evaluation this site was audited for its security measures, which were tested for their effectivity during an on-site audit.

In result, the site

Hechinger Elektronik GmbH & Co. KG
Helmut-Hechinger-Straße 2
78083 Dauchingen

was added to the life cycle of the product certified under BSI-DSZ-CC-1131-V2-2023. This extension is also effective for the newer release of the product, Sensor 2185, Release 1.21, after a previous Maintenance Procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-1131-V2-2023-MA-01 dated 31 May 2023.

Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of life cycle security aspects. The change has no effect on product assurance.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1131-V2-2023 dated 10 February 2023 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG¹ Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [3] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

References

- [1] Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 2.2, 30 September 2021
Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: SOG-IS Requirements”, version 1.0, November 2019
- [2] Impact Analysis Report (IAR), Sensor 2185, Revision 1.3, 28 August 2023, Continental Automotive Technologies GmbH (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1131-V2-2023 for Sensor 2185 (KITAS 4.0), Revision 1.2 from Continental Automotive GmbH, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 10 February 2023
- [4] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1131-V2-MA-02, Sensor 2185 (KITAS 4.0), Release 1.20, Version 3.0, 19 March 2024, Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH (confidential document)
- [5] Security Target Lite for Sensor 2185 (KITAS 4.0), Revision 1.31, 28 March 2023, Continental Automotive Technologies GmbH