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CANADIAN CENTRE FOR **CYBER SECURITY**

COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT

NetApp Element Software 12.2 on SolidFire Appliances

8 March 2022

550-LSS

FOREWORD

This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security Establishment (CSE).

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE). This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.

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OVERVIEW

The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.

A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCTL.

The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Project).



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

NetApp Element Software 12.2 on SolidFire Appliances (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from **NetApp, Inc.**, was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section 1.2. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Section 1.1 for the evaluated security functionality.

Lightship Security is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 8 March 2022 and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Program.

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report.

The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified Products list (CPL) for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).

1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:

Table 1: TOE Identification

TOE Name and Version	NetApp Element Software 12.2 on SolidFire Appliances
Developer	NetApp, Inc.

1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.

The TOE claims the following conformance:

EAL 2+ (ALC_FLR.2)

1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION

The TOE is the Element 12.2 software executing on the hardware devices (nodes) within a SolidFire Storage System – a scale-out, all-flash, highly-available clustered storage system. A cluster is made up of a collection of nodes that provide data storage and management.

1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE

A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:




Figure 1: TOE Architecture

2 SECURITY POLICY

The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:

- Volume Access Control
- Volume Rollback
- Data Protection
- Secure Administration
- Security Audit
- Self-tests

Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in section 8.2.

2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY

The following cryptographic implementation has been evaluated by the CAVP and is used by the TOE:

Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation

Cryptographic Module/Algorithm	Certificate Number
NetApp Cryptographic Security Module v1.0	C2114, A950

3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE

Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product's installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.

3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:

- The IT environment provides the TOE with the necessary reliable time
- The TOE, the storage nodes, storage clients, switches, storage and management networks, and NTP and LDAP servers are located within a controlled access facility
- The TOE software will be protected from unauthorized modification
- No malicious software is installed or running on the administrator workstation
- The cluster network is protected from unauthorized access

3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE

The TOE provides other security features that were not evaluated:

- Encryption At Rest – Encryption is used to encrypt data on SSDs (not enabled by default).
- Integrated Backup and Restore – volumes are backed up to and restored from external object stores.
- Remote Replication – an asynchronous process is used to connect two clusters for continuous data protection.
- Remote Syslog – audit data is forwarded to a remote syslog server.
- Deduplication – multiple copies of data are replaced with references to a shared copy in order to save storage space and/or bandwidth.
- Quality of Service (QoS) – guaranteed performance is provided by setting minimum, maximum, and burst parameters for volumes.
- SSH – the SSH protocol used for remote support of a customer's system.
- SNMP – the SNMP protocol is used to generate SNMP traps, or notifications, associated with audit events (not enabled by default).
- Multiple VLANs - multi-tenant environment connection to a cluster

4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION

The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:

TOE Software/Firmware	NetApp Element 12.2 Build: 12.2.0.777			
TOE Hardware	SF4805	SF38410	H410S-2	H610S-2F
	SF9605	H410S-0	H610S-1	H610S-4
	SF19210	H410S-1	H610S-2	
Environmental Support	Element software management node, LDAP Server, NTP Server, iSCSI clients			

4.1 DOCUMENTATION

The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:

- a) NetApp Element Software 12.2 on SolidFire Appliances Common Criteria Guide, v1.0, March 2022
- b) NetApp Element 12.2 Setup Guide, December 2020
- c) NetApp Element 12.2 User Guide, June 2021
- d) NetApp Element 12.2 API Reference Guide, November 2020
- e) [NetApp Element 12.2 Release Notes](#)
- f) NetApp H-Series Hardware – Installing and Setting up the H-series Storage Nodes, June 2020
- g) NetApp SF-Series Hardware – Installing and Setting up the SF-Series Hardware, 210-06660 A5

5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES

The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.

5.1 DEVELOPMENT

The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.

5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.

Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.

5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT

An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.

The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the procedures required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.



6 TESTING ACTIVITIES

Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent tests, and performing a vulnerability analysis.

6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS

The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer's test documentation and the functional specification was complete.

6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING

The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.

6.3 INDEPENDENT TESTING

During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional & penetration tests by examining design and guidance documentation.

All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and results. The following testing activities were performed:

- a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The evaluator repeated a subset of the developer's tests
- b. Degraded Fault Tolerance: The evaluator verified that that the TSF preserves a secure state and ensures the availability of user data when a node experiences a failure
- c. Authentication bypass: The evaluator attempted to bypass user authentication by navigating to URLs supposedly protected by authentication
- d. Multi-level Rollbacks: The evaluator confirmed that rollbacks perform as expected
- e. Trusted Path/Secure Administration: The evaluator verified that the TOE is capable of providing a secure administrative path using HTTPS over the available management interfaces
- f. Cryptographic Implementation Verification: The evaluator verified that the claimed cryptographic implementation was present in the TOE
- g. TUI usage: The evaluator verified that the Text User Interface (TUI) performs as required

6.3.1 INDEPENDENT TESTING RESULTS

The developer's tests and the independent tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.

6.4 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

The vulnerability analysis focused on 4 flaw hypotheses.

- Public Vulnerability based (Type 1)
- Technical community sources (Type 2)
- Evaluation team generated (Type 3)
- Tool Generated (Type 4)

The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases and technical community sources (Type 1 & 2). Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform, and application layer vulnerabilities (Type 4). Based upon this review, the evaluators formulated flaw hypotheses (Type 3), which they used in their vulnerability analysis.

Type 1 & 2 searches were conducted on **24 December 2021** and included the following search terms:

Element	Flash clustered storage system	CHAP	Intel Xeon E5
SolidFire	iSCSI	QoSIOIC vulnerabilities	Intel Xeon Gold
NetApp	JSON-RPC	port tcp "8080" vulnerabilities Netapp element solidfire	OpenSSL

Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:

NetApp Security Advisories (https://security.netapp.com/advisory/)	Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) (http://cve.mitre.org/)	National Vulnerability Database (http://nvd.nist.gov/)
OpenSSL Security Vulnerabilities (https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities-1.0.2.html)	CERT (https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/)	Google (www.google.ca)

6.4.1 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS RESULTS

The vulnerability analysis did not uncover any security relevant residual exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.

7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). This certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration.

This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for this evaluation is **PASS**. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.

7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS

It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.



8 SUPPORTING CONTENT

8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Term	Definition
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCTL	Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CM	Configuration Management
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE	Communications Security Establishment
CCCS	Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
GC	Government of Canada
IT	Information Technology
ITS	Information Technology Security
PP	Protection Profile
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Function

8.2 REFERENCES

Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Security Target NetApp Element Software 12.2 on SolidFire Appliances, 8 March 2022, v1.0
Evaluation Technical Report NetApp Element Software 12.2 on SolidFire Appliances, 8 March 2022, v1.4