

Communications

Centre de la sécurité Security Establishment des télécommunications

# CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CYBER SECURITY

## **COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT**

## NetApp StorageGRID 11.5

## 19 July 2022

## 565-LSS

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## FOREWORD

This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security Establishment (CSE).

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE). This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.

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## **OVERVIEW**

The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.

A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCTL.

The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

0 0 0.

E	(ECUTI	VE SUMMARY	6
1	Iden	tification of Target of Evaluation	7
	1.1	Common Criteria Conformance	7
	1.2	TOE Description	7
	1.3	TOE Architecture	7
2	Secu	rity Policy	8
3	Assı	Imptions and Clarification of Scope	9
	3.1	Usage and Environmental Assumptions	9
	3.2	Clarification of Scope	9
4	Eval	uated Configuration	.10
	4.1	Documentation	.10
5	Eval	uation Analysis Activities	.11
	5.1	Development	.11
	5.2	Guidance Documents	.11
	5.3	Life-Cycle Support	.11
6	Test	ing Activities	.12
	6.1	Assessment of Developer tests	.12
	6.2	Conduct of Testing	.12
	6.3	Independent Testing	.12
	6.3.1	Independent Testing Results	.12
	6.4	Vulnerability Analysis	.13
	6.4.1	Vulnerability Analysis Results	.13
7	Resu	Ilts of the Evaluation	.14
	7.1	Recommendations/Comments	.14
8	Supp	porting Content	.15
	8.1	List of Abbreviations	.15
	8.2	References	.15

## **LIST OF FIGURES**

Figure 1:	TOE Architecture	. 7
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## **LIST OF TABLES**

Table 1:	TOE Identification	7
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#### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**NetApp StorageGRID 11.5** (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from **NetApp Inc.**, was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section 1.2. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Section 1.1 for the evaluated security functionality.

**Lightship Security** is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on **19 July 2022** and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Program.

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report.

The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified Products list (CPL) for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).



#### 1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:

Table 1:	TOE	Identification
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TOE Name and Version	NetApp StorageGRID 11.5
Developer	NetApp Inc.

#### 1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.

The TOE claims the following conformance:

#### EAL 2+ (ALC\_FLR.1)

#### **1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION**

The TOE provides a software-defined object-based storage solution for various use cases involving unstructured data including large archives, media repositories, and web data stores. The TOE consists of several grid nodes running in a cluster that complete the StorageGRID system.

#### **1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE**

A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:




Figure 1: TOE Architecture



## 2 SECURITY POLICY

The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:

- Object Access Control
- Data Protection
- Security Management
- Security Audit
- Secure Communications

Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in section 8.2.

#### **3** ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE

Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product's installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.

#### 3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:

- The TOE is located within a secure facility with controlled physical access
- Administrators act in good faith during the course of their duties and follow all guidance, best practices, and policies
- The TOE is deployed on a local network that is protected from unauthorized access

#### 3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE

- Use of data-at-rest encryption in the SG5600 and SG5700 series appliances was not evaluated.
- The TOE does not incorporate CAVP/CMVP validated cryptography

The NetApp StorageGRID 11.5 software is also supported on the following hardware appliances, but was not tested as part of this evaluation:

- NetApp SG6000 Series Appliances
- NetApp SGF6000 Series Appliances

## 4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION

The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:

TOE Software/Firmware	NetApp StorageGRID v11.5.0.5 Bu	uild: 20211207.0815.1972031
TOE Hardware	Admin Node	<ul> <li>SG1000 Services Appliance</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>SG100 Services Appliance</li> </ul>
	Storage Node	• SG5612 Appliance
		<ul> <li>SG5660 Appliance</li> </ul>
		• SG5712 Appliance
		<ul> <li>SG5760 Appliance</li> </ul>
Environmental Support	• NTP Server	

#### 4.1 DOCUMENTATION

The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:

- a) NetApp StorageGRID 11.5 Administrator Guide, 215-15094\_2021-05\_en-us | May 2021
- b) NetApp StorageGRID 11.5 Tenant User's Guide, 215-15097\_2021-05\_en-us | May 2021
- c) NetApp StorageGRID 11.5 Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, v1.1 | July 2022

## 5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES

The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.

#### 5.1 **DEVELOPMENT**

The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.

#### 5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.

Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.

#### 5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT

An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.

The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the procedures required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.

## 6 TESTING ACTIVITIES

Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent tests, and performing a vulnerability analysis.

#### 6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS

The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer's test documentation and the functional specification was complete.

#### 6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING

The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.

#### 6.3 INDEPENDENT TESTING

During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional & penetration tests by examining design and guidance documentation.

All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and results. The following testing activities were performed:

- a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The evaluator repeated a subset of the developer's tests
- b. Secure Communication: The evaluator verified that the TOE provides secure communication between remote administrators and external applications using a known-good implementation
- c. TSF-initiated Termination: The evaluator verified that the session time-out can be configured by an administrator and is enforced
- d. Auditing: The evaluator verified that Swift API, REST API, and SSH use/events are logged

#### 6.3.1 INDEPENDENT TESTING RESULTS

The developer's tests and the independent tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.



#### 6.4 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

The vulnerability analysis focused on 4 flaw hypotheses.

- Public Vulnerability based (Type 1)
- Technical community sources (Type 2)
- Evaluation team generated (Type 3)
- Tool Generated (Type 4)

The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases and technical community sources (Type 1 & 2). Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform, and application layer vulnerabilities (Type 4). Based upon this review, the evaluators formulated flaw hypotheses (Type 3), which they used in their vulnerability analysis.

Type 1 & 2 searches were conducted on 15 March 2022 and included the following search terms:

NetApp StorageGRID	OpenSSH 7.9p1-10	Intel Xeon E5-1428L v2	Intel Xeon Silver 4210R
Apache 2.4.38	NTP 4.2.8p12	Intel Xeon D-1548	
Nginx 1.14.2	OpenSSL 1.1.1d	Intel Xeon Gold 6230	

Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:

National Vulnerability Database	NetApp Security Advisories
http://nvd.nist.gov/	https://security.netapp.com/advisory/
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)	OpenSSL Security Vulnerabilities
http://cve.mitre.org/	https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities-1.1.1.html
CVE Details	
https://www.cvedetails.com/	

#### 6.4.1 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS RESULTS

The vulnerability analysis did not uncover any security relevant residual exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.



## 7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION

The Information Technology product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. This certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration.

This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for this evaluation is **PASS**. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.

#### 7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS

It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.

Evaluator observed that NetApp proactively patches their product lines and keeps security advisories up to date for any vulnerabilities that may be used to exploit their products. Overall, the evaluator enjoyed working with NetApp. They are a responsive vendor genuinely interested in meeting the requirements of the Common Criteria.

#### 8 SUPPORTING CONTENT

#### 8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCTL Common C CMVP Cryptograp	hic Algorithm Validation Program riteria Testing Laboratory hic Module Validation Program
CMVP Cryptograp	
71 3 1	hic Module Validation Program
CSE Communica	
	ations Security Establishment
EAL Evaluation	Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation	Technical Report
IT Information	n Technology
SFR Security Fu	nctional Requirement
ST Security Ta	rget
TOE Target of E	valuation
TSF TOE Securi	ty Function

#### 8.2 **REFERENCES**

#### Reference

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.

Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.

Security Target NetApp StorageGRID 11.5, 19 July 2022, v1.1

Evaluation Technical Report NetApp StorageGRID 11.5, 19 July 2022, v1.2