

Common Criteria Certification Report

Belkin F1DN102MOD-BA-4, F1DN202MOD-BA-4, F1DN104MOD-BA-4,
F1DN204MOD-BA-4, F1DN108MOD-BA-4, F1DN208MOD-BA-4,
F1DN102MOD-HH-4, F1DN102MOD-PP-4, F1DN202MOD-HH-4,
F1DN202MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-HH-4, F1DN104MOD-PP-4,
F1DN108MOD-PP-4, F1DN204MOD-HH-4, F1DN204MOD-PP-4,
F1DN208MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-XX-4, F1DN204MOD-XX-4 Firmware
Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices



CAN-701-EWA

17 July 2026

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Communications Security
Establishment Canada
Canadian Centre
for Cyber Security

Centre de la sécurité des
télécommunications Canada
Centre canadien
pour la cybersécurité

Canada

Foreword

This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security Establishment (CSE).

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE). This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.

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Overview

The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for evaluating the security of IT products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.

A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target (ST). A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the ST, in addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCTL.

The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and ST are posted to the [Common Criteria portal](#) (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).



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Executive Summary CAN-701-EWA

Belkin F1DN102MOD-BA-4, F1DN202MOD-BA-4, F1DN104MOD-BA-4, F1DN204MOD-BA-4, F1DN108MOD-BA-4, F1DN208MOD-BA-4, F1DN102MOD-HH-4, F1DN102MOD-PP-4, F1DN202MOD-HH-4, F1DN202MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-HH-4, F1DN104MOD-PP-4, F1DN108MOD-PP-4, F1DN204MOD-HH-4, F1DN204MOD-PP-4, F1DN208MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-XX-4, F1DN204MOD-XX-4 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from **Belkin International, Inc.** , was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the following conformance claim: **PP-Peripheral Sharing Devices Version 4.0; PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0; PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0**

EWA-Canada is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on **17 July 2026** and was conducted in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Program.

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to consider the comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report.

The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the [Certified Products list](#) for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the [Common Criteria portal](#) (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).



Identification of Target of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:

Table 1: TOE Identification

TOE Name and Version	Belkin F1DN102MOD-BA-4, F1DN202MOD-BA-4, F1DN104MOD-BA-4, F1DN204MOD-BA-4, F1DN108MOD-BA-4, F1DN208MOD-BA-4, F1DN102MOD-HH-4, F1DN102MOD-PP-4, F1DN202MOD-HH-4, F1DN202MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-HH-4, F1DN104MOD-PP-4, F1DN108MOD-PP-4, F1DN204MOD-HH-4, F1DN204MOD-PP-4, F1DN208MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-XX-4, F1DN204MOD-XX-4 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices
Developer	Belkin International, Inc.

See the [Evaluated Configuration](#) section for more details on the evaluated configuration of the TOE.

Common Criteria Conformance

The evaluation was conducted using the following methodology:

Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5

The TOE claims the following conformance:

PP-Peripheral Sharing Devices Version 4.0; PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0; PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0

TOE Description

The TOE is a family of Peripheral Sharing Devices in the Modular Secure KVM Series product line. These modular KVM switches support keyboard, mouse, and video switching. The TOE performs internal video switching using HDMI and supports DisplayPort through proprietary protocol-conversion cables that form part of the TOE. These cables form part of the TOE.

TOE Architecture

The TOE consists of a modular KVM switch, a wired remote control, and proprietary host and console cables. A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:




Figure 1: TOE Architecture

Security Policy

The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:

- User Data Protection
- TOE Access
- Protection of the TSF

Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the [Security Target](#).



Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product's installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.

Usage and Environmental Assumptions

The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:

- Computers and peripheral devices connected to the PSD are not TEMPEST approved.
- The environment provides physical security commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it processes and contains.
- The environment includes no wireless peripheral devices.
- PSD Administrators and users are trusted to follow and apply all guidance in a trusted manner.
- Personnel configuring the PSD and its operational environment follow the applicable security configuration guidance.
- All PSD users are allowed to interact with all connected computers. It is not the role of the PSD to prevent or otherwise control user access to connected computers. Computers or their connected network shall have the required means to authenticate the user and to control access to their various resources.
- The computers connected to the TOE are not equipped with special analog data collection cards or peripherals such as analog to digital interface, high performance audio interface, digital signal processing function, or analog video capture function.

Clarification of Scope

All security features of this product were evaluated.



Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:

Table 2: Evaluated Configuration

TOE Peripheral Sharing Devices	• F1DN102MOD-BA-4 P/N CGA18717 • F1DN104MOD-BA-4 P/N CGA18715 • F1DN202MOD-BA-4 P/N CGA18718 • F1DN204MOD-BA-4 P/N CGA18247 • F1DN108MOD-BA-4 P/N CGA22661 • F1DN208MOD-BA-4 P/N CGA22662
TOE Remote Control Devices	• F1DN-MOD-REM2 P/N CMA19091 • F1DN-MOD-REM4 P/N CMA19085 • F1DN-MOD-REM8 P/N CMA28707
Cables	• F1DN1MOD-HC-H06 P/N CGA22622 • F1DN1MOD-HC-P06 P/N CGA22624 • F1DN2MOD-HC-H06 P/N CGA22626 • F1DN2MOD-HC-P06 P/N CGA22628 • F1DN1MOD-CC-H06 P/N CGA22623 • F1DN1MOD-CC-P06 P/N CGA22626 • F1DN2MOD-CC-H06 P/N CGA22627 • F1DN2MOD-CC-P06 P/N CGA20164
Environmental Support	• 2-8 general purpose computers • General purpose USB keyboard • General purpose USB mouse • Standard computer display (DisplayPort 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3) • Standard computer display (HDMI 2.0)



Documentation

The following documents are available to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:

- a) Quick Installation Guide 2/4/8 Port Single/Dual-Head Modular Secure KVM Switches, 8820-02949 Rev.J02, HLT28818
- b) Belkin F1DN102MOD-BA-4, F1DN202MOD-BA-4, F1DN104MOD-BA-4, F1DN204MOD-BA-4, F1DN108MOD-BA-4, F1DN208MOD-BA-4, F1DN102MOD-HH-4, F1DN102MOD-PP-4, F1DN202MOD-HH-4, F1DN202MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-HH-4, F1DN104MOD-PP-4, F1DN108MOD-PP-4, F1DN204MOD-HH-4, F1DN204MOD-PP-4, F1DN208MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-XX-4, F1DN204MOD-XX-4 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, Version 1.8



Evaluation Analysis Activities

The evaluation activities comprised a structured assessment of the TOE. Documentation and processes related to Development, Guidance Documentation, and Life-Cycle Support were reviewed and analyzed.

Development

The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.

Guidance Documents

The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators exercised the preparative and operational guidance and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.

Life-Cycle Support

An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.

The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the procedures required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.

Testing Activities

Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent tests, and performing a vulnerability analysis.

Assessment of Developer tests

The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer's test documentation and the functional specification was complete.

Conduct of Testing

The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate proprietary test results document.

Independent Testing

During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional & penetration tests by examining design and guidance documentation.

All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and results. The following testing activities were performed:

- a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the claimed PP;

Independent Testing Results

The testing produced the expected results, supporting the conclusion that the TOE correctly implements the functional requirements specified in the ST and the TOE functional specification.



Vulnerability Analysis

The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases, and technical community sources. Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform, and application layer vulnerabilities. Based upon this review, the evaluators formulated flaw hypotheses, which they used in their vulnerability analysis.

Public domain searches were conducted on **2 July 2026** and included the following search terms:

Belkin	HDMI	EDID
HEC	DisplayPort	HSL
HDMI CEC	High Sec Labs	Highseclabs
highseclabs KVM	highseclabs switch	44404-E7E7
peripheral sharing	STM32F44	M24C02
STM32F07	F1DN102MOD	F1DN202MOD
F1DN104MOD	F1DN204MOD	F1DN108MOD
F1DN208MOD	F1DN008	F1DN-MOD-REM
F1DN1MOD	F1DN2MOD	HDMI ARC
HDMI-ARC	HDMI-CEC	DVI-D
MCCS		

Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:

National Vulnerability Database https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search	Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
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Vulnerability Analysis Results

The vulnerability analysis did not uncover any security relevant residual exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.



Results of the Evaluation

The Information Technology product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. This certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration.

The overall verdict for this evaluation is **PASS**. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.

Recommendations/Comments

It is recommended that all guidance be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.



Supporting Content

List of Abbreviations

Term	Definition
CCTL	Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CSE	Communications Security Establishment
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
IT	Information Technology
PP	Protection Profile
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Function



References

Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
Belkin F1DN102MOD-BA-4, F1DN202MOD-BA-4, F1DN104MOD-BA-4, F1DN204MOD-BA-4, F1DN108MOD-BA-4, F1DN208MOD-BA-4, F1DN102MOD-HH-4, F1DN102MOD-PP-4, F1DN202MOD-HH-4, F1DN202MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-HH-4, F1DN104MOD-PP-4, F1DN108MOD-PP-4, F1DN204MOD-HH-4, F1DN204MOD-PP-4, F1DN208MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-XX-4, F1DN204MOD-XX-4 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices Security Target, Version 1.2, 17 July 2026
Evaluation Technical Report Common Criteria Evaluation of Belkin F1DN102MOD-BA-4, F1DN202MOD-BA-4, F1DN104MOD-BA-4, F1DN204MOD-BA-4, F1DN108MOD-BA-4, F1DN208MOD-BA-4, F1DN102MOD-HH-4, F1DN102MOD-PP-4, F1DN202MOD-HH-4, F1DN202MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-HH-4, F1DN104MOD-PP-4, F1DN108MOD-PP-4, F1DN204MOD-HH-4, F1DN204MOD-PP-4, F1DN208MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-XX-4, F1DN204MOD-XX-4 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices, Version 0.9, 17 July 2026
Assurance Activity Report Belkin F1DN102MOD-BA-4, F1DN202MOD-BA-4, F1DN104MOD-BA-4, F1DN204MOD-BA-4, F1DN108MOD-BA-4, F1DN208MOD-BA-4, F1DN102MOD-HH-4, F1DN102MOD-PP-4, F1DN202MOD-HH-4, F1DN202MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-HH-4, F1DN104MOD-PP-4, F1DN108MOD-PP-4, F1DN204MOD-HH-4, F1DN204MOD-PP-4, F1DN208MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-XX-4, F1DN204MOD-XX-4 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices, Version 0.9, 17 July 2026

