



# Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module

## SECURITY TARGET

Used as a Standalone Device OR as an Embedded Device in Thales Luna  
Network HSM

COMMON CRITERIA / ISO 15408, EAL4+



**002-010985-001**  
**Rev. W**  
April 21, 2025

## Document Information

Document Part Number	002-010985-001
Release Date	April 21, 2025

## Revision History

Revision	Date	Reason
J	25 <sup>th</sup> September 2020	Final release
K	3 <sup>rd</sup> December 2021	Update to add firmware 7.7.1 and 7.7.2.
L	16 <sup>th</sup> February 2022	Add hardware part numbers 808-000048-003 and 808-000073-002
M	6 <sup>th</sup> May 2022	Updated AGD reference version numbers
N	9 <sup>th</sup> December 2022	Added BL 1.1.5, updated reference document version numbers.
P	20 <sup>th</sup> January 2024	Added FW 7.8.4, updated reference document version numbers.
R	20 <sup>th</sup> March 2024	Addressed lab comments
S	15 <sup>th</sup> August 2024	Addressed lab comments
T	9 <sup>th</sup> December 2024	Addressed lab comments
U	29 <sup>th</sup> January 2025	Update FW version to 7.8.5
V	12 <sup>th</sup> March 2025	Addressed lab comments
W	21 <sup>st</sup> April 2025	Updated AGD versions and 7.8.5 FW files.

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# TERMINOLOGY AND ACRONYMS

## Terminology

For the purposes of this document, the acronyms, terms, and definitions given in [CEN EN 419221-1] apply.

Common Criteria terms and definitions are given in [CC1].

Additional terms defined for the purposes of this document are listed below:

Term	Definition
Assigned Key	<p>A key (usually a secret key) with the 'Assigned Flag' attribute set to 'assigned', meaning that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; the 'Re-authorisation conditions' and 'Key Usage' attributes cannot be changed</li> <li>&gt; the Authorisation Data attribute can only be changed by presentation of the current Authorisation Data – it cannot be changed or reset by an Administrator</li> <li>&gt; the key cannot be imported or exported.</li> </ul> <p>These properties of an Assigned Key support the sole control of a key that is required for secret keys used to create digital signatures.</p>
Authorisation Data	<p>Data, including data particular to the user, which is used to control access to (and thus use of) a key.</p> <p>Data particular to the user may include data derived from a secret known only by the user, data derived from a device held by the user and/or data derived from biometric features of the user. Other parts of the authorisation data may include data held within the cryptographic module, data held by administrator(s) or data provided by the application.</p>
Electronic Seal	Data in electronic form which is attached to or logically associated with other data in electronic form to ensure the latter's origin and integrity.
Electronic Timestamp	Data in electronic form which binds other data in electronic form to a particular time establishing evidence that the latter data existed at that time.
Secret Key	Either a secret key used in symmetric cryptographic functions, or a private key used in asymmetric cryptographic functions.
Trust Service	<p>Electronic service which enhances trust and confidence in electronic transactions</p> <p>Such trust services are typically but not necessarily using cryptographic techniques or involving confidential material.</p>



## Acronyms and abbreviations

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API	Application Programming Interface
CC	Common Criteria
DTBS	Data To Be Signed
DTBS/R	Data to be signed or its unique representation
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
FM	Functional Module
HSM	Hardware Security Module
IT	Information Technology
PCB	Printed Circuit Board
PCI-E	Peripheral Component Interconnect Express
PP	Protection Profile
RNG	Random Number Generator
SAR	Security Assurance Requirements
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirements
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functions
TSFI	TSF Interface
TSP	Trust Service Provider



# 1 Security Target Introduction

## 1.1 Security Target Reference

**Title:** Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - Security Target  
**Version:** Rev W  
**Author:** Thales  
**Reference:** 002-010985-001

## 1.2 TOE Reference

**TOE name:** Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module  
**Firmware version:** 7.7.0, 7.7.1, 7.7.2, or 7.8.5  
**Bootloader version:** 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.4, or 1.1.5  
**Hardware versions<sup>1 2</sup>:**

808-000048-002	808-000066-001
808-000048-003	808-000069-001
808-000073-001	808-000070-001
808-000073-002	

### Guidance documentation

- > 007-013968-001, “Thales Luna K7(+) Cryptographic Module”, Common Criteria User Guidance – Part 1: Preparative Procedures”, Rev N, 21<sup>st</sup> April 2025.
- > 007-000465-001, “Thales Luna K7(+) Cryptographic Module” Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module, Common Criteria User Guidance – Part 2: Operational Guidance”, Rev T, 21<sup>st</sup> April 2025.
- > 007-000466-001, “Thales Luna K7(+) Cryptographic Module”, Common Criteria User Guidance – Part 3: eIDAS Guidance”, Rev M, 21<sup>st</sup> April 2025.
- > 007-000467-001, “Thales Luna K7(+) Cryptographic Module”, Common Criteria User Guidance – Part 4: Integration for use in Composite Evaluation”, Rev M, 21<sup>st</sup> April 2025.

<sup>1</sup> The hardware version listed identifies the Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module hardware alongside the non-reconfigurable firmware loaded during production. Non-reconfigurable firmware includes: (i) one-time programmable micro-code loaded onto the Andretta processor during manufacture. It is not possible for the user to identify the version of the micro-code loaded on Andretta 2.0 post manufacture independent of the hardware part number. Any modification to these elements made by Thales will result in a new part number.

<sup>2</sup> A single HW part number (i.e. 808-XXXXXX-XXX) identifies the TOE with 7 variants being covered by this Security Target where each unique variant replaces ‘XXXXXX-XXX’ with its unique variant identifier e.g. ‘000048-002’.

## 1.3 TOE Overview

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The Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module (i.e. the TOE) is a Hardware Security Module (HSM) in the form of a PCI-E card (Thales Luna PCIe HSM). It is operated in a controlled environment and can be used either as a standalone device to be inserted in a server, or as a device embedded in a Thales Luna Network HSM.

The TOE can fulfill general purpose HSM use cases, where assured cryptographic services alongside generation and management of cryptographic keys is required.

The TOE is also suitable for use in support of electronic signature and electronic sealing operations, certificate issuance and revocation, time stamp operations, and authentication services, as identified by the (EU) No 910/2014 regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (eIDAS). For that purpose, the present Security Target has been explicitly written to comply with the [CEN EN 419221-5] Protection Profile; the TOE supports Assigned Keys, External Key Storage and Key Import/Export operations as defined in the PP.

The TOE also supports the option for further customization of the HSM for a given integration through the ability to load 3<sup>rd</sup> party developed code in the form of Functional Modules (FM) onto the HSM<sup>3</sup>.

All TOE Security Functions are met by the Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module when installed in a suitable environment and configured as per the supplied CC User Guidance document [CC User Guidance].

### > CCS

The following non-TOE components are needed for the TOE to be operational in its environment:

- > If the TOE is configured to support PED authentication<sup>4</sup>:
  - PED model number PED-04-0103 with minimal PED Firmware version 2.7.4 or higher, or
  - PED model number PED-06-0001 with minimal PED firmware version 2.9.0 or higher
- > LUNA client version 10.3.0 or higher (to be installed on remote or local servers)

If the TOE is embedded in the network appliance: Thales Luna Network HSM with appliance software version 7.7.0 or higher.

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<sup>3</sup> Although kernel level application sandboxes are implemented to minimise the risk from loading 3<sup>rd</sup> party code onto the HSM, the isolation property is not assured as part of this certification.

<sup>4</sup> In addition to the two currently listed PED model numbers (PED-04-0103 and PED-06-0001), future PED hardware could be introduced and identified as compliant with Luna firmware 7.x.x by Thales.

## 1.4 TOE Description

### 1.4.1 TOE Boundaries

The TOE physical boundary is the PCI-E card of which an example embodiment is shown in Figure 1-1.

This Security Target considers the following hardware variants of the TOE:

**Table 1-1 – TOE hardware variants within evaluation scope**


Hardware part number	Description
808-000048-002 or 808-000048-003	Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module with Fans
808-000073-001 or 808-000073-002	Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module without Fans
808-000066-001	Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module without Fans (legacy part number)
808-000069-001	Thales Luna K7+ Cryptographic Module with Fans
808-000070-001	Thales Luna K7+ Cryptographic Module without Fans

The K7 and K7+ denomination is related to the type of shield providing physical protection of the TOE Printed Circuit Board (PCB):

**Table 1-2 – TOE shield naming**

Shield naming	Description
K7	Passive shield (epoxy coating)
K7+	Active shield (electrically wired)


**Figure 1-1 – Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module, fan variant without tamper wrap (808-000048-002 and 808-000048-003)**



Note: as mentioned in Section 1.3, the TOE can be used either as a standalone device to be inserted in a generic server, or as a device embedded in a Thales Luna Network HSM. In both cases, the generic server and the Thales Luna Network HSM represent the 'Hardware Appliance Boundary' illustrated in Figure 1-3.

The TOE logical boundary is the 'main' part of the firmware of the Figure 1-2:

**Figure 1-2 – Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module, TOE logical boundary**



As mentioned in Section 1.3 “TOE overview”, the TOE supports the ability to load 3rd party developed code in the form of Functional Modules (FM) onto the HSM. FMs are running in a dedicated ‘FM process’ which is distinct from the ‘main’ firmware process. An “FM support” component is implemented within the firmware to support the FM capability<sup>5</sup>.

For the present certification, no FMs are loaded within the HSM and the “FM support” piece of firmware is out of the TOE<sup>6</sup>.

Note that the guidance documentation [CC User Guidance] is also part of the TOE, as referenced in Section 1.2.

## 1.4.2 TOE Delivery

The TOE components are delivered to the end-user as follows:

- > **Hardware:** shipped by tracked courier directly to the end-user. Details of shipment tracking references, HSM serial number alongside serial numbers of all tamper labels used in the unit packaging are emailed to the customer on the confirmation of shipment.
  - Hardware can be identified as one of the valid HW part (808-000048-002, 808-000048-003, 808-000073-001, 808-000073-002, 808-000066-001, 808-000069-001, 808-000070-001) being shown on the product label.
- > **Firmware:** is either pre-loaded onto the Hardware<sup>7</sup> during manufacturing or alternatively may be downloaded from the Thales Customer Support Portal<sup>8</sup> as:

### 7.7.0

- ‘621-000192-010\_fwupdate\_7.7.0\_PCI\_HSM\_RevA.fuf’ (if TOE is used as a standalone device)
- ‘630-010740-007\_SPKG\_APPL\_Net\_HSM\_7.7.0\_FW-7.7.0\_BU\_G7-7.7.1\_BU\_G5-6.28.0\_RevA.tar’ (if TOE is embedded in a Thales Luna Network HSM)

### 7.7.1

- ‘621-000192-011\_fwupdate\_7.7.1\_PCI\_HSM\_RevA.fuf’ (if TOE is used as a standalone device)
- ‘630-010740-008\_SPKG\_APPL\_Net\_HSM\_7.7.1\_FW-7.7.1\_BU\_G7-7.7.1\_BU\_G5-6.28.0\_RevA.tar’ (if TOE is embedded in a Thales Luna Network HSM)

### 7.7.2

- ‘621-000192-012\_fwupdate\_7.7.2\_PCI\_HSM\_RevA.fuf’ (if TOE is used as a standalone device)
- ‘630-010741-009\_SPKG\_fwupdate\_7.7.2\_RevA.tar’ (if TOE is embedded in a Thales Luna Network HSM)

<sup>5</sup> The “FM support” component enables the FMs to run in a dedicated process. It also contains a library translating PKCS#11 commands into the set of commands natively supported by the HSM.

<sup>6</sup> Note that even if it is considered in the TOE environment, the “FM support” piece of firmware is provided to the Evaluator as an input to the TOE vulnerability analysis (to verify that it cannot be used by an attacker to threaten the TOE assets)

<sup>7</sup> Identified as ‘FW 7.7.0’ in the output either from the ‘hsm show’ LunaSH command or ‘hsm showinfo’ for the LunaCM interface.

<sup>8</sup> See [CC User Guidance] for further information on how to check and install firmware.

### 7.8.5

- '621-000192-020\_fwupdate\_7.8.5\_PCI\_HSM\_RevA.fuf' (if TOE is used as a standalone device)
- '630-010740-014\_SPKG\_APPL\_Net\_HSM\_7.8.5\_FW-7.8.4\_BU\_G7-7.7.2\_BU\_G5-6.28.0\_RevA.tar' (if TOE is embedded in a Thales Luna Network HSM)

> **Common Criteria User Guidance Documentation** [CC User Guidance] can be downloaded from the Thales Customer Support Portal as:

- '007-013968-001\_K7\_CC\_User\_Guidance\_Part1\_Rev\_N.pdf'
- '007-000465-001\_K7\_CC\_User\_Guidance\_Part2\_Rev\_T.pdf'
- '007-000466-001\_K7\_CC\_User\_Guidance\_Part3\_Rev\_M.pdf'
- '007-000467-001\_K7\_CC\_User\_Guidance\_Part4\_Rev\_M.pdf'

Details on accessing the Thales Customer Support Portal are provided with the shipment confirmation supplied on shipment of the TOE hardware.

## 1.4.3 TOE Architecture

The TOE is a set of configured software and hardware that fits the generic TOE architecture shown in Figure 1-3.

The TOE provides cryptographic functions that support trust services, and manages (and protects) the cryptographic keys used by these functions. Note that the TOE is not aware of the context in which a cryptographic function is used. Any such context is therefore the responsibility of client applications used by the trust service provider or operator, and these client applications need to use the cryptographic functions in an appropriate way. In general this will be achieved by suitable configuration of the TOE and its stored data<sup>9</sup>.

Local client applications reside in the same hardware appliance as the TOE, e.g. in the case of the TOE being a PCI-E card inside a server, local client applications are the applications running within the same server boundary and using the TOE's services through the PCI-E bus. Another example of local client application is an embedded application running inside the physical boundary of the TOE and using the Luna FM API. Note that the secure environment is considered sufficient to provide the authentication, confidentiality and integrity protection needed for communication between the TOE and local applications.


External client applications communicate remotely with the TOE through a network connection and over a secure channel identified as Secure Trusted Channel (STC) which provides authentication of its end-points and protection of confidentiality and integrity of data sent over the channel.

Secure channels may also exist between external and local client applications, but these are not covered within the scope of this Security Target.

In all cases, the Client Application is outside the scope of the TOE.

<sup>9</sup> For example: to ensure that secret keys intended for electronic signature creation are only available for use by the signatory to whom they are linked, the client application must follow an appropriate process to generate the key pair, to maintain sole control (if required) of the secret key by the intended signatory, and to ensure that the key can only be used for signing.

Figure 1-3: TOE Architecture



#### 1.4.4 Initialization

Before the module can be used to perform any cryptographic or key management functions, it must first be initialised. Initialisation causes the HSM to be zeroized<sup>10</sup> and creates the HSM Security Officer role (HSM SO) in the Admin Partition. The HSM SO must then set the configurable policies at the cryptographic module level and can create User Partitions with associated roles, to make the cryptographic module ready for use.

#### 1.4.5 Admin and User partitions

Cryptographic keys are stored and managed inside containers called partitions. The TOE supports two types of partitions:

<sup>10</sup> 'HSM zeroisation' means that all user information and user key material are erased. The bootloader, firmware and HSM own data (HSM keys and certificates) are not erased.



- > The Admin partition is mandatory. Its primary purpose is to support administrative tasks at the HSM level. Specific roles are defined in the Admin partition and there can be only one Admin partition inside the TOE.
- > User partitions are optional. The primary purpose of a User partition (also called Application partition) is to group all keys belonging to a same entity or application in a dedicated container isolated from the other partitions. Specific roles are supported at the user partition level, which are different from the roles defined in the Admin partition.

Any type of partition (Admin partition or User partition) can contain cryptographic keys. For a given partition, the management and usage of the related key material is restricted to the roles assigned to that partition, therefore enforcing a strict isolation between the different partitions managed inside the TOE.

The following section provides further details about the roles supported in partitions.

### 1.4.6 Sessions

Any user must access the module through a session. Sessions are initially opened as Public sessions and may remain Public or become Private (authenticated) following a successful user authentication. Session states are kept separate based on the user authentication state stored by the module. The module allows multiple user identities to be authenticated at a time. Once authenticated, a session becomes bound to the user identity and has access to all cryptographic operations appropriate to the user's role and may access private objects generated on behalf of the user in previous sessions. Although there may be many users authenticated to the cryptographic module, there is effectively only one thread of execution within the module and, therefore, only one command being executed from request through to response at any given time.

### 1.4.7 HSM roles

The following authenticated roles are supported by the HSM:

**Table 1-3 –HSM roles**

Role	Description
HSM Security Officer (HSM SO)	<p>– Admin partition role –</p> <p>Authorised to install and configure the TOE, set and maintain global HSM security policies, create and delete application partitions.</p> <p>The HSM SO can also create the Administrator role and reset the Administrator password (configuration dependent).</p> <p>The HSM SO can also perform key management tasks and cryptographic operations for the Admin partition. Note that the HSM SO can only use key objects if he/she can also successfully authenticate as the Key Owner.</p> <p>The TOE can have only one HSM SO.</p>

Role	Description
Administrator	<p>– Admin partition role –</p> <p>Optional Admin partition role, performs key management tasks and cryptographic operations for the Admin partition, without having privileges to unblock keys / assign keys / reset key authentication data.</p> <p>Note that the Administrator can only use key objects if he/she can also successfully authenticate as the Key Owner.</p>
Audit User	<p>– Admin partition role –</p> <p>Initializes the Audit container containing the secret key used to generate Message Authentication Code (MAC) for secure audit messages alongside configuring logging levels for the HSM.</p>
Application Partition Security Officer (Partition SO)	<p>– User partition role –</p> <p>Creates partition level roles, activates partition, sets and changes partition-level policies, option to reset Crypto Officer password (configuration dependent).</p>
STC User	<p>Implicit role whose main purpose is to authenticate remote client connections from outside the TOE hardware appliance boundary<sup>11</sup>.</p>
Application Partition Crypto Officer (Partition CO)	<p>– User partition role –</p> <p>Partition role authorised to create, use, destroy and transfer key objects for a given partition. Can optionally create the Partition Limited CO and Partition CU and perform initial assignment of key authorisation data.</p> <p>Note that the Partition CO can only use key objects if he/she can also successfully authenticate as the Key Owner.</p>
Application Partition Limited Crypto Officer (Partition Limited CO)	<p>– User partition role –</p> <p>Optional partition role authorised to create, use and delete key objects, and perform initial assignment of key authorisation data without having privileges to create Partition Limited CO or CU / reset login credentials.</p> <p>Note that the Partition Limited CO can only use and delete key objects if he/she can also successfully authenticate as the Key Owner.</p>

<sup>11</sup> Usage of the STC is mandatory to authenticate remote client applications. Note that local client applications can be authenticated through the STC as well, although this is not mandatory - as explained in section 7.5 “Trusted Channel”.

Role	Description
Crypto User (Partition CU)	– User partition role – Partition role authorised to use the key objects within the partition (e.g., sign, encrypt/decrypt). Note that the Partition CU can only use key objects if he/she can also successfully authenticate as the Key Owner.
Key Owner	Implicit role used to authenticate the owner of a key through verification of the related key authorisation data.

On a User Partition the Partition CO, Partition Limited CO, Partition CU, and Key Owner can communicate with the TOE for cryptographic operations using [PKCS#11 Base] which is part of the IT Environment. The HSM SO and Administrator can do it as well on the Admin Partition.

The HSM SO and Partition SO use a separate Command Line Interface (CLI), which is part of the IT Environment, to send command data to perform HSM configuration, to make security policy setting changes and to perform user creation/deletion. The CLI can also be used by the Partition CO to initiate the transfer of cryptographic objects between distinct TOEs or between the TOE and a compatible Trusted IT Product via a Trusted Channel. The network channels used to provide access to the CLI are a requirement of the IT environment.

The TOE allows for the creation of multiple users in the Partition CO, Partition Limited CO and Partition CU roles. Each user is created within a cryptographically separated partition in the Luna PCI-E cryptographic module. Each partition *must* have a user assigned to the Partition CO role (a maximum of one user assigned to the Partition CO role is permitted). A partition *may* optionally assign a distinct user to the Partition Limited CO and/or Partition CU role.

Table 1-4 provides the mapping between the roles supported by the TOE and the subjects defined in the PP [CEN EN 419221-5].

**Table 1-4 – Mapping between HSM roles and PP-defined subjects**

Function		HSM Role(s)	Related PP subject
Initialisation, configuration		HSM SO, Partition SO	S.Admin
Audit Log Configuration		Audit User	S.Admin
Key Management		Partition CO (for User partitions) HSM SO, Administrator (for Admin partition)	S.Admin
Client Application Authentication		STC User	S.Application
Key Use	Session authentication	Partition CO, Partition Limited CO, Partition CU (for User partitions, and depending on the configuration of TOE and deployment goals) HSM SO, Administrator (for Admin partition)	S.User

Function		HSM Role(s)	Related PP subject
	Key usage	Key Owner	

Note: According to [CEN EN 419221-5], the subject S.Application represents “a client application, or process acting on behalf of a client application and that communicates with the TOE over a local or external interface”. In the above table, it can be directly mapped to the HSM implicit role “STC User” when the Secure Trusted Channel (STC) is enforced between the client application and the TOE. As mentioned in Section 7.5 “Trusted Channel”, usage of the STC is mandatory for remote client applications and optional for local ones. In the latter case, when STC is not used, S.Application is not mapped to any specific role supported by the TOE, and the first authentication step occurs at the session level.

### 1.4.8 Authentication/Authorisation

The TOE implements separate authentication or authorisation<sup>12</sup> for all categories of subjects:

- > Administrators of the TOE (S.Admin)
- > Application users of TOE cryptographic functions (S.Application)
- > Users of secret keys<sup>13</sup> (S.User).

External Client applications (S.Application) communicate with the TOE over a secure channel and are authenticated through the verification of a digital certificate.

Two models for authentication are supported for all other roles (except the Key Owner):

- > **Token based authentication** – where authentication data is provided by means of a trusted PIN Entry Device (PED). The PED can be connected locally through a separate port to the TOE (local PED) or remotely (remote PED). The PED and software required to operate it are the responsibility of the IT Environment.
- > **Password based authentication** – where authentication is based on a configurable length password.

The model of authentication to be used is determined during HSM manufacturing and this model is used for all roles.

The Key Owner is authenticated based on a shared secret presented to the TOE over a secure channel protecting against access to the shared secret by any other roles authenticated to the HSM.

Authorisation as the Key Owner is always separately required before a key can be actually used in a cryptographic function (or exported), regardless of any other authorisation that may have been established for administrators (S.Admin) or client applications (S.Application). This requirement reflects the distinct activities that are being authorised in each case:

<sup>12</sup> In this Security Target, ‘authentication’ implies that the user is specifically identified, whereas ‘authorisation’ implies that the authority of the user to use the key is established but the identity of the individual may not be known (e.g. where a single key is available to a number of individuals using a shared passphrase). As noted elsewhere, it is the responsibility of client applications to ensure that they use the correct mechanism for the context of the relevant keys and cryptographic functions.

<sup>13</sup> Which in at least some cases need to have their use limited to a certain natural person or legal person. More details of these requirements and the definitions of natural and legal persons can be found in [Regulation].

- > Authorisation to act as an administrator is an authorisation to carry out management activities on the TOE, but not to use keys (in fact the requirement to be able to support sole control of a signature key means that in such cases an administrator must not be able to use the key nor to access its value unless the administrator happens also to demonstrate authorisation as the owner of that key).
- > Client applications are authorised to connect to the TOE in order to invoke cryptographic functions, but the ownership of keys used in such functions must be separately verified, as the client application may e.g. supply a signature service to a number of different users.

Moreover, a cryptographic function will only be carried out by the TOE if authorisation is obtained for use with a key that can be used with that cryptographic function. Thus, a request by a client to use a specific cryptographic function will fail if the attributes of the key supplied do not allow its use for that operation.

### 1.4.9 Cryptographic functions

The TOE provides the following cryptographic functions:

- > Digital signature generation and verification
- > Message digest generation
- > Message authentication code generation and verification
- > Encryption and decryption (symmetric and asymmetric)
- > Key generation
- > Key derivation
- > Generation of shared secret values
- > Cryptographic support for one time password and other non-PKI based authentication mechanisms
- > Random number generation.

These functions may also be used to support TSP system functions to create electronic seals and electronic timestamps. From the perspective of this security target, specific cryptographic purposes such as electronic signatures and electronic seals are not distinguished: they both consist of a series of cryptographic functions (such as creating message digests, or encrypting data) using specific keys<sup>14</sup>.

Note that only algorithms and algorithm parameters (e.g. key length) approved for the identified purpose shall be used by the TOE to carry out cryptographic operations. Supported algorithms and key sizes have been selected to be consistent with a subset of options permitted in [TS 119 312] or [SOG-IS-Crypto].

Where the HSM is deployed in order to meet a national requirement, the end-user should only use algorithms compliant to local regulations as applicable – e.g. as may apply to a TSP within a specific region as part of future legislation.

### 1.4.10 Key management

The TOE supports the secure management of cryptographic keys necessary for its implemented cryptographic functions, including:

<sup>14</sup> Some cryptographic operations, such as creating message digests, do not require keys.

- > Key establishment (including key generation)
- > Protection of keys held within the TOE and held externally (for use by the TOE)
- > Control of access and use of keys by the cryptographic functions within the TOE
- > Deletion of keys within the TOE.

The TOE supports the following techniques for establishing keys:

- > Generation of cryptographic keys using a random number generator and implementing the key generation algorithms depending on the intended use of the keys
- > Import of cryptographic keys in encrypted form or cryptographic key components using split-knowledge procedures
- > Key agreement protocols establishing common secrets with external entities
- > Derivation of keys from shared knowledge.

Secret keys are associated with attributes that determine their use, and the correct association between the key and its attributes is protected against unauthorised modification. The attributes maintained by the TOE include<sup>15</sup>:

- > The identifier of the key (this enables it to be linked by an application to a particular owner)
- > The type of the key (e.g. whether the key is a secret key of a symmetric cryptographic algorithm or the secret (commonly called private) key of an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm)
- > Authorisation data that enables access to the key (required only for secret keys)
- > Re-authorisation conditions such as determining a time period or number of uses of a key that are enabled by a single presentation of the correct authorisation data for the key, after which the authorisation will have to be re-presented in order to authorise any further uses of the key (required only for secret keys)
- > Key usage constraints that determine which cryptographic functions can use the key (e.g. encryption or signature)
- > Whether the key is allowed to be exported
- > Whether the key is an Assigned Key
- > Integrity protection data that protects the integrity of the key value, the values of the key attributes, and the binding of the key to its attributes.

Authorisation to change the attributes of a key is, in general, distinct from authorisation to use the key for cryptographic functions. For example, a signature key may need to require that some or all of its attributes cannot be changed after initial definition (e.g. because such changes might enable subjects beyond the signatory alone to access the key, or might allow the permitted use of the key to be changed) – this is supported by the definition of an ‘Assigned Key’ which cannot be imported or exported, for which the re-authorisation conditions and key usage cannot be changed, and for which the authorisation data can only be changed on successful validation of the current authorisation data.

<sup>15</sup> These attributes are sufficient to allow a secret key to be identified as one that is used to produce qualified electronic signatures and qualified electronic seals that meet the requirements of [Regulation]

Keys can leave the TOE in the following situations:

> **External storage of keys**

The TOE allows external storage of keys for later use by the TOE (or another instance of the TOE within the same authorised security infrastructure operated by a TSP). This reflects the fact that when dealing with large numbers of keys, a cryptographic module may not have sufficient internal storage to hold them all internally. Keys stored in this way correspond to 'external stored TOE data' in Figure 1-3, and the form in which the key is stored is sufficient to ensure the confidentiality (for at least secret keys) and integrity of the key and the binding of the key to its attributes.

> **Export of keys**

The TOE allows export of keys for use by authorised client applications, provided that they are not Assigned Keys, that other key attributes do not prohibit export, and that the correct authorisation data for the key has been supplied. Although the TOE checks key attributes to determine whether to allow export, the appropriate values to use for the key attributes will depend on the application context in which the key is used, and the security measures (technical, physical and procedural) that apply to that context. Keys that are exported are not included in the 'external stored TOE data' in Figure 1-3.

Keys might be imported or exported as part of providing general cryptographic functions (e.g. in support of client applications that use the TOE to support their own authentication mechanisms), but the TOE also allows individual secret keys to be identified as non-exportable. Assigned keys cannot be imported or exported, and represent a more strongly controlled type of key that is intended to be used only within the TOE for operations such as electronic signature or electronic seal generation.

### 1.4.11 Self-protection

The cryptographic module ensures it always remains in a secure state, even when under attack or facing abnormal conditions. For that purpose, the module implements:

- > Self-tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the Random Number Generator (RNG) and of the cryptographic algorithms, as well as the verification of the firmware integrity and authenticity
- > Protection against physical attacks through the monitoring of voltage and temperature (and abortion of any operation if voltage or temperature are outside the expected range)
- > Protection against physical attacks by means of a passive epoxy-coated shield (for K7 card) or electrically wired active shield (for K7+ card)
- > Protection against power loss.

### 1.4.12 Audit

The cryptographic module is assumed to be part of a larger system that manages audit data for the system as a whole (integrating audit records from a number of individual components). The TOE therefore logs audit records for its own actions, and typically exports these audit data to a separate audit server which is assumed to be monitored and controlled by the System Auditor.

An auditor role (Audit User) is defined for the TOE as a subset of the 'administrator', whose responsibility is limited to configuring the audit system of the TOE and not for managing the complete log which is assumed to be the role of System Auditor in the larger system.



### 1.4.13 Usage and major security features of the TOE

The TOE is a separate component with its own hardware and software, communicating via a well-defined physical and logical interface with the client application. The main TOE physical interface is the PCI-E bus with multiple logical interfaces supported on-top of the physical layer.

Several instances of a TOE may be combined in a single domain under a common infrastructure, but the nature of this combination and common infrastructure is beyond the scope of this Security Target.

The threat environment the TOE is designed for is one of high threat of network compromise, and low threat of physical compromise (for example, a Certification Authority facility with a high degree of physical protection, but an operational requirement to be connected to an untrusted network such as the internet).

The environment is assumed to prevent prolonged unauthorised physical access to the TOE (including theft). The TOE provides physical protection mechanisms to deter undetected compromise of its security functions by low attack potential individuals that do have physical access to the TOE (for example disgruntled employees with legitimate access to the TOE).

The TOE is responsible for protecting the keys against logical attacks that would result in disclosure, compromise and unauthorised modification, and for ensuring that the TOE services are only used in an authorised way.

Client applications request cryptographic functions from the TOE, typically using a key managed by the TOE<sup>16</sup>, once the appropriate authorisation has been provided.

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<sup>16</sup> All cryptographic operations in the scope of this Protection Profile are carried out using keys managed by the TOE, and therefore any use of other keys is outside the scope of the Security Target.

## 2 Conformance Claim

**Common Criteria version:** This ST conforms to CC Version 3.1 Release 5 [CC1] [CC2] [CC3].

**Conformance to CC part 2 and 3:**

- > This ST is CC part 2 extended with FCS\_RNG.1 (Generation of Random Numbers) and FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 (Basic TSF Self Testing). All the other SFRs have been drawn from the catalogue of requirements in CC part 2 [CC2].
- > This ST is CC part 3 conformant. It means that all SARs in that ST are based only upon assurance components in CC part 3 [CC3].

**Assurance package conformance:** EAL4 augmented (EAL4+)

This ST conforms to the assurance package EAL4 augmented by ALC\_FLR.2 and AVA\_VAN.5.

**Protection Profile (PP) conformance claim:** This ST claims strict conformance to the [CEN EN 419221-5] protection profile.

## 3 Security Problem Definition

### 3.1 Assets

The assets that need to be protected by the TOE are identified below:

- > **R.SecretKey**: secret keys used in symmetric cryptographic functions and private keys used in asymmetric cryptographic functions, managed and used by the TOE in support of the cryptographic services that it offers. This includes user keys, owned and used by specific users, and support keys used in the implementation and operation of the TOE. The asset also includes copies of such keys made for external storage and/or backup purposes. The confidentiality and integrity of these keys shall be protected.
- > **R.PubKey**: public keys managed and used by the TOE in support of the cryptographic services that it offers (including user keys and support keys). This asset includes copies of keys made for external storage and/or backup purposes. The integrity of these keys shall be protected.
- > **R.ClientData**: data supplied by a client for use in a cryptographic function. Depending on the context, this data may require confidentiality and/or integrity protection.
- > **R.RAD**: reference data held by the TOE that is used to authenticate an administrator (hence to control access to privileged administrator functions such as TOE backup, export of audit data) or to authorise a user for access to secret and private keys (R.SecretKey). This asset includes copies of authentication/authorisation data made for external storage and/or backup purposes. The integrity of the RAD shall be protected; its confidentiality shall also be protected unless the authentication method used means that the RAD is public data (such as a public key).

### 3.2 Subjects

The types of subjects identified in this ST are:

- > **S.Application**: a client application, or process acting on behalf of a client application and that communicates with the TOE over a local or external interface. Client applications will in some situations be acting directly on behalf of end users (see S.User).
- > **S.User**: an end user of the TOE who can be associated with secret keys and authentication/authorisation data held by the TOE. An end user communicates with the TOE by using a client application (S.Application).
- > **S.Admin**: an administrator of the TOE. Administrators are responsible for performing the TOE initialization, TOE configuration and other TOE administrative functions.

Each type of subject may include many individual members, for example a single TOE will generally have many users who are all included as members of the type S.User.

## 3.3 Threats

The following threats are defined for the TOE. The attacker (i.e. the 'threat agent') described in each of the threats is a subject who is not authorised for the relevant action, but who may present themselves as either a completely unknown user, or as one of the subjects in Section 3.2 (but in this case the attacker will not have access to the authentication or authorisation data for the subject).

### T.KeyDisclose      Unauthorised disclosure of secret/private key

An attacker obtains unauthorised access to the plaintext form of a secret key (R.SecretKey), enabling either direct reading of the key or other copying into a form that can be used by the attacker as though the key were their own. This access may be gained during generation, storage, import/export, use of the key, or backup if supported by the TOE.

### T.KeyDerive      Derivation of secret/private key

An attacker derives a secret key (R.SecretKey) from publicly known data, such as the corresponding public key or results of cryptographic functions using the key or any other data that is generally available outside the TOE.

### T.KeyMod      Unauthorised modification of a key

An attacker makes an unauthorised modification to a secret or public key (R.SecretKey or R.PubKey) while it is stored in, or under the control of, the TOE, including export and backups if supported. This includes replacement of a key as well as making changes to the value of a key, or changing its attributes such as required authorisation, usage constraints or identifier (changing the identifier to the identifier used for another key would allow unauthorised substitution of the original key with a key known to the attacker). The threat therefore includes the case where an attacker is able to break the binding between a key and its critical attributes<sup>17</sup>.

### T.KeyMisuse      Misuse of a key

An attacker uses the TOE to make unauthorised use of a secret key (R.SecretKey) that is managed by the TOE (including the unauthorised use of a secret key for a cryptographic function that is not permitted for that key<sup>18</sup>), without necessarily obtaining access to the value of the key.

### T.KeyOveruse      Overuse of a key

An attacker uses a key (R.SecretKey) that has been authorised for a specific use (e.g. to make a single signature) in other cryptographic functions that have not been authorised.

<sup>17</sup> See OT.KeyIntegrity in Section 4.1 for further discussion of critical attributes of a key.

<sup>18</sup> This therefore means that the threat includes unauthorised use of a cryptographic function that makes use of a key.

### T.DataDisclose                      Disclosure of sensitive client application data

An attacker gains access to data that requires protection of confidentiality (R.ClientData, and possibly R.RAD) supplied by a client application during transmission to or from the TOE or during transmission between physically separate parts of the TOE.

### T.DataMod                              Unauthorised modification of client application data

An attacker modifies data (R.ClientData such as DTBS/R, authentication/authorisation data, or a public key (R.PubKey) supplied by a client application during transmission to the TOE or during transmission between physically separate parts of the TOE, so that the result returned by the TOE (such as a signature or public key certificate) does not match the data intended by the originator of the request.

### T.Malfunction                          Malfunction of TOE hardware or software

The TOE may develop a fault that causes some other security property to be weakened or to fail. This may affect any of the assets and could result in any of the other threats being realized. Particular causes of faults to be considered are:

- > Environmental conditions (including temperature and power)
- > Failures of critical TOE hardware components (including the RNG)
- > Corruption of TOE software.

## 3.4 Organisational Security Policies

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### P.Algorithms                              Use of approved cryptographic algorithms

The TOE offers key generation functions and other cryptographic functions provided for users that are endorsed by recognized authorities as appropriate for use by TSPs.

#### Application Note 1

*The relevant authorities and endorsements are determined by the context of the client applications that use the TOE. For digital signatures within the European Union this is as indicated in [Regulation] and an exemplary list of algorithms and parameters is given in [TS 119 312] or [SOG-IS-Crypto] (see also Section 1.4.9).*

### P.KeyControl                              Support for control of keys

The life cycle of the TOE and any secret keys that it manages (where such keys are associated with specific entities, such as the signature creation data associated with a signatory or the seal creation data associated with a seal creator<sup>19</sup>), shall be implemented in such a way that the secret keys can be reliably protected by the legitimate owner against use by others, and in such a way that the use of the secret keys by the TOE can be confined to a set of authorised cryptographic functions.

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<sup>19</sup> A seal creator may be a *legal person* (see [Regulation]) rather than a *natural person*, and seal creation data may therefore be authorised for use by a number of natural persons, depending on the nature and requirements of the trust service provided.

**Application Note 2**

*This policy is intended to ensure that the TOE can be used for qualified electronic seals and qualified electronic signatures as in [Regulation], but recognizes that not all keys are used for such purposes. Therefore, although the TOE needs to be able to support the necessary strong controls over keys in order to create such seals and signatures, not all keys need the same level and type of control.*

**P.RNG                      Random Number Generation**

The TOE is required to generate random numbers that meet a specified quality metric, for use by client applications. These random numbers shall be suitable for use as keys, authentication/authorisation data, or seed data for another random number generator that is used for these purposes.

**P.Audit                      Audit trail generation**

The TOE is required to generate an audit trail of security-relevant events, recording the event details and the subject associated with the event.

**Application Note 3**

*The cryptographic module TOE is assumed to be part of a larger system that manages audit data. The TOE therefore logs audit records, and it is assumed that these are collected, maintained and reviewed in the larger system. Hence there is no separate auditor role within the cryptographic module TOE, but the role of System Auditor is assumed to exist in the larger system – cf. A.AuditSupport in Section 3.5.*

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## 3.5 Assumptions

**A.ExternalData                      Protection of data outside TOE control**

Where copies of data protected by the TOE are managed outside of the TOE, client applications and other entities shall provide appropriate protection for that data to a level required by the application context and the risks in the deployment environment.

In particular, any backups of the TOE and its data are maintained in a way that ensures appropriate controls over making backups, storing backup data, and using backup data to restore an operational TOE. The number of sets of backup data does not exceed the minimum needed to ensure continuity of the TSP service. The ability to restore a TOE to an operational state from backup data requires at least dual person control (i.e. the participation and approval of more than one authenticated administrator).

**A.Env                      Protected operating environment**

The TOE operates in a protected environment that limits physical access to the TOE to authorised Administrators. The TOE software and hardware environment (including client applications) is installed maintained by Administrators in a secure state that mitigates against the specific risks applicable to the deployment environment.

**A.DataContext                      Appropriate use of TOE functions**

Any client application using the cryptographic functions of the TOE will ensure that the correct data are supplied in a secure manner (including any relevant requirements for authenticity, integrity and

confidentiality). For example, when creating a digital signature over a DTBS the client application will ensure that the correct (authentic, unmodified) DTBS/R is supplied to the TOE, and will correctly and securely manage the signature received from the TOE; and when certifying a public key the client application will ensure that necessary checks are made to prove possession of the corresponding private key. The client application may make use of appropriate secure channels provided by the TOE to support these security requirements. Where required by the risks in the operational environment a suitable entity (possibly the client application) performs a check of the signature returned from the TOE, to confirm that it relates to the correct DTBS.

Client applications are also responsible for any required logging of the uses made of the TOE services, such as signing (or sealing) events.

Similar requirements apply in local use cases where no client application need be involved, but in which the TOE and its user data (such as keys used for signatures) need to be configured in ways that will support the need for security requirements such as sole control of signing keys.

Appropriate procedures are defined for the initial creation of data and continuing operation of the TOE according to the specific risks applicable to the deployment environment and the ways in which the TOE is used.

## **A.UAuth**                      **Authentication of application users**

Any client application using the cryptographic services of the TOE will correctly and securely gather identification and authentication/authorisation data from its users and securely transfer it to the TOE (protecting the confidentiality of the authentication/authorisation data as required) when required to authorise the use of TOE assets and services.

## **A.AuditSupport**                      **Audit data review**

The audit trail generated by the TOE will be collected, maintained and reviewed by a System Auditor according to a defined audit procedure for the TSP.

### **Application Note 4**

*As noted for P.Audit in Section 3.4, the TOE is assumed to exist as part of a larger system and the System Auditor is a role within this larger system.*

## **A.AppSupport**                      **Application security support**

Procedures to ensure the ongoing security of client applications and their data will be defined and followed in the environment, and reflected in use of the appropriate TOE cryptographic functions and parameters, and appropriate management and administration actions on the TOE. This includes, for example, any relevant policies on algorithms, key generation methods, key lengths, key access, key import/export, key usage limitations, key activation, cryptoperiods and key renewal, and key/certificate revocation.



## 4 Security Objectives

This section identifies and defines the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment.

Security objectives reflect the stated intent and counter the identified threats, as well as comply with the identified organisational security policies and assumptions.

### 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

The following security objectives describe security functions to be provided by the TOE.

#### OT.PlainKeyConf      Protection of confidentiality of plaintext secret keys

The plaintext value of secret keys is not made available outside the TOE (except where the key has been exported securely in the manner of OT.ImportExport). This includes protection of the keys during generation, storage (including external storage), and use in cryptographic functions, and means that even authorised users of the keys and administrators of the TOE cannot directly access the plaintext value of a secret key.

#### OT.Algorithms      Use of approved cryptographic algorithms

The TOE offers key generation functions and other cryptographic functions provided for users that are endorsed by recognized authorities as appropriate for use by TSPs. This ensures that the algorithms used do not enable publicly known data to be used to derive secret keys.

#### Application Note 5

*See note under P.Algorithms (Section 3.4) on relevant references for digital signatures within the European Union.*

#### OT.KeyIntegrity      Protection of integrity of keys

The value and critical attributes of keys (secret or public) have their integrity protected by the TOE against unauthorised modification (unauthorised modifications include making unauthorised copies of a key such that the attributes of the copy can be changed without the same authorisation as for the original key).

Critical attributes in this context are defined to be those implementation-level attributes of a key that could be used by an attacker to cause the equivalent of a modification to the key value by other means (e.g. including changing the cryptographic functions for which a key can be used, the users with access to the key, or the identifier of the key). This objective includes protection of the keys during generation, storage (including external storage), and use.

#### OT.Auth      Authorisation for use of TOE functions and data

The TOE carries out an authentication/authorisation check on all subjects before allowing them to use the TOE. The following types of entity are distinguished for the purposes of authorisation (i.e. each type has a distinct method of authorisation):

- > Administrators of the TOE
- > Users of TOE cryptographic functions (client applications using secure channels)
- > Users of secret keys.

In particular, the TOE always requires authorisation before using a secret key.

### Application Note 6

*Local client applications within a suitable security environment (such as client applications that are connected to the TOE by a channel such as a PCIe bus within the same hardware appliance) do not require authentication to communicate with the TOE, as noted in Section 1.4.3. However, use of a secret key always requires prior authorisation.*

## OT.KeyUseConstraint Constraints on use of keys

Any key (secret or public) has an unambiguous definition of the purposes for which it can be used, in terms of the cryptographic functions or operations (e.g. encryption or signature) that it is permitted to be used for. The TOE rejects any attempt to use the key for a purpose that is not permitted. The TOE also has an unambiguous definition of the subjects that are permitted to access the key (and the purposes for which this access can be used) and allows this to be set to the granularity of an individual subject – these access constraints apply to use of the key even where the key value is not accessible. This objective means that the TOE also prevents unauthorised use of any cryptographic functions that use a key.

## OT.KeyUseScope Defined scope for use of a key after authorisation

The TOE is required to define and apply clearly stated limits on when authorisation and re-authorisation are required in order for a secret key to be used<sup>20</sup>. For example the TOE may allow secret keys to be used for a specified time period or number of uses after initial authorisation, or for may allow the key to be used until authorisation is explicitly rescinded. As another example, the TOE may implement a policy that requires re-authorisation before every use of a secret key.

### Application Note 7

*Such limits on the use of a key after initial authorisation are termed “re-authorisation conditions” in this ST. A wide range of policies and re-authorisation conditions are allowed, and different policies may be applied to different types of secret key, but the re-authorisation conditions for all types of secret key shall be unambiguously defined in the Security Target. The decision to use supported re-authentication conditions is made on the basis of the application context. Making appropriate use of re-authorisation conditions supports client applications in meeting their requirements for OE.DataContext and OE.AppSupport.*

## OT.DataConf Protection of confidentiality of sensitive client application data

The TOE provides secure channels to client applications that can be used to protect the confidentiality of sensitive data (such as authentication/authorisation data) during transmission between the client

<sup>20</sup> Any attempt to use the key in cryptographic functions that are not permitted for that key is addressed by OT.KeyUseConstraint.

application and the TOE, or during transmission between separate parts of the TOE where that transmission passes through an insecure environment.

### Application Note 8

*Protection of secret keys (as a specific type of sensitive data) is also subject to additional protection specified in other TOE objectives. Any requirements for secure storage and control of access to other types of client application data within the TOE rely on the client application using appropriate interfaces and cryptographic functions to protect it, as required by OE.DataContext and OE.AppSupport. For example, if a client application uses the TOE to perform cryptographic functions on data that represent a passphrase value and the passphrase value is to be stored on the TOE, then the client application would need to use an appropriate encryption function before storing the data on the TOE.*

## OT.DataMod                      Protection of integrity of client application data

The TOE provides secure channels to client applications that can be used to protect the integrity of sensitive data (such as data to be signed, authentication/authorisation data or public key certificates) during transmission between the client application and the TOE.

### Application Note 9

*Any requirements for integrity protection of client application data within the TOE rely on the client application using appropriate interfaces and cryptographic functions to protect it, as required by OE.DataContext and OE.AppSupport.*

## OT.ImportExport              Secure import and export of keys

The TOE allows import and export of secret keys only by using a secure method that protects the confidentiality and integrity of the data during transmission – in particular, secret keys shall be exported only in encrypted form (it is not sufficient to rely on properties of a secure channel to provide the protection: the key itself shall be encrypted). The TOE also allows individual secret keys under its control to be identified as non-exportable, in which case any attempt to export them will be rejected automatically. Public keys may be imported and exported in a manner that protects the integrity of the data during transmission.

Assigned keys cannot be imported or exported.

## OT.Backup                      Secure backup of user data

Any method provided by the TOE for backing up user data, including secret keys, preserves the security of the data and is controlled by authorised Administrators. The secure backup process preserves the confidentiality and integrity of the data during creation, transmission, storage and restoration of the backup data. Backups also preserve the integrity of the attributes of keys.

## OT.RNG                      Random number quality

Random numbers generated and provided to client applications for use as keys, authentication/authorisation data, or seed data for another random number generator that is used for these purposes shall meet a defined quality metric in order to ensure that random numbers are not predictable and have sufficient entropy.

### OT.TamperDetect      Tamper Detection

The TOE shall provide features to protect its security functions against tampering. In particular the TOE shall make any physical manipulation within the scope of the intended environment (adhering to OE.Env) detectable for the administrators of the TOE.

### OT.FailureDetect      Detection of TOE hardware or software failures

The TOE detects faults that would cause some other security property to be weakened or to fail, including:

- > Environmental conditions outside normal operating range (including temperature and power)
- > Failures of critical TOE hardware components (including the RNG)
- > Corruption of TOE software.

On detection of a fault, the TOE takes action to maintain its security and the security of the data that it contains and controls.

### OT.Audit      Generation of audit trail

The TOE creates audit records for security-relevant events, recording the event details and the subject associated with the event. The TOE ensures that the audit records are protected against accidental or malicious deletion or modification of records by providing tamper protection (either prevention or detection) for the audit log.

## 4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

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The following security objectives relate to the TOE environment. This includes client applications as well as the procedure for the secure operation of the TOE.

### OE.ExternalData      Protection of data outside TOE control

Where copies of data protected by the TOE are managed outside of the TOE, client applications and other entities shall provide appropriate protection for that data to a level required by the application context and the risks in the deployment environment. This includes protection of data that is exported from, or imported to, the TOE (such as audit data and encrypted keys).

In particular, any backups of the TOE and its data shall be maintained in a way that ensures appropriate controls over making backups, storing backup data, and using backup data to restore an operational TOE. The number of sets of backup data shall not exceed the minimum needed to ensure continuity of the TSP service. The ability to restore a TOE to an operational state from backup data shall require at least dual person control (i.e. the participation and approval of more than one authenticated administrator).

### OE.Env      Protected operating environment

The TOE shall operate in a protected environment that limits physical access to the TOE to authorised Administrators. The TOE software and hardware environment (including client applications) shall be installed and maintained by Administrators in a secure state that mitigates against the specific risks applicable to the deployment environment, including (where applicable):

- > Protection against loss or theft of the TOE or any of its externally stored assets
- > Inspections to deter and detect tampering (including attempts to access side-channels, or to access connections between physically separate parts of the TOE, or parts of the hardware appliance)
- > Protection against the possibility of attacks based on emanations from the TOE (e.g. electromagnetic emanations) according to risks assessed for the operating environment
- > Protection against unauthorised software and configuration changes on the TOE and the hardware appliance
- > Protection to an equivalent level of all instances of the TOE holding the same assets (e.g. where a key is present as a backup in more than one instance of the TOE).

## OE.DataContext      Appropriate use of TOE functions

Any client application using the cryptographic functions of the TOE shall ensure that the correct data are supplied in a secure manner (including any relevant requirements for authenticity, integrity and confidentiality). For example, when creating a digital signature over a DTBS the client application shall ensure that the correct (authentic, unmodified) DTBS/R is supplied to the TOE, and shall correctly and securely manage the signature received from the TOE; and when certifying a public key the client application shall ensure that necessary checks are made to prove possession of the corresponding private key. The client application may make use of appropriate secure channels provided by the TOE to support these security requirements. Where required by the risks in the operational environment a suitable entity (possibly the client application) shall perform a check of the signature returned from the TOE, to confirm that it relates to the correct DTBS.

Client applications shall be responsible for any required logging of the uses made of the TOE services, such as signing (or sealing) events.

Similar requirements shall apply in local use cases where no client application need be involved, but in which the TOE and its user data (such as keys used for signatures) need to be configured in ways that will support the need for security requirements such as sole control of signing keys.

Appropriate procedures shall be defined for the initial creation of data and continuing operation of the TOE according to the specific risks applicable to the deployment environment and the ways in which the TOE is used.

## OE.Uauth      Authentication of application users

Any client application using the cryptographic services of the TOE shall correctly and securely gather identification and authentication/authorisation data from its users and securely transfer it to the TOE (protecting the confidentiality of the authentication/authorisation data as required) when required to authorise the use of TOE assets and services.

## OE.AuditSupport      Audit data review

The audit trail generated by the TOE will be collected, maintained and reviewed by a System Auditor according to a defined audit procedure for the TSP.

**Application Note 10**

*As noted for P.Audit in Section 3.4, the TOE is assumed to exist as part of a larger system and the System Auditor is a role within this larger system.*

**OE.AppSupport      Application security support**

Procedures to ensure the ongoing security of client applications and their data shall be defined and followed in the environment, and reflected in use of the appropriate TOE cryptographic functions and parameters, and appropriate management and administration actions on the TOE. This includes, for example, any relevant policies on algorithms, key generation methods, key lengths, key access, key import/export, key usage limitations, key activation, cryptoperiods and key renewal, and key/certificate revocation.

# 5 Extended Components Definition


## 5.1 Generation of random numbers (FCS\_RNG)

This family describes the functional requirements for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes.

**Family behavior:**

This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.

**Component levelling:**



**Management:** FCS\_RNG.1

There are no management activities foreseen.

**Audit:** FCS\_RNG.1

There are no actions defined to be auditable.

FCS_RNG.1	Generation of random numbers
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1	The TSF shall provide a [selection: <i>physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid physical, hybrid deterministic</i> ] random number generator that implements: [assignment: <i>list of security capabilities</i> ].
FCS_RNG.1.2	The TSF shall provide [selection: <i>bits, octets of bits, numbers</i> ] [assignment: <i>format of the numbers</i> ] that meet [assignment: <i>a defined quality metric</i> ].

**Application Note 11**

A *physical random number generator (RNG)* produces the random number by a noise source based on physical random processes. A *non-physical true RNG* uses a noise source based on non-physical random processes like human interaction (key strokes, mouse movement). A *deterministic RNG* uses a random seed to produce a pseudorandom output. A *hybrid RNG* combines the principles of physical and deterministic RNGs where a hybrid physical RNG produces at least the amount of entropy the RNG output may contain and the internal state of a hybrid deterministic RNG output contains fresh entropy but less than the output of RNG may contain.



## 5.2 Basic TSF Self Testing (FPT\_TST\_EXT.1)

The extended component defined here is a simplified version of FPT\_TST.1 in [CC2]

**Family behavior:**

Components in this family address the requirements for self-testing the TSF for selected correct operation.

**Component levelling:**



**Management:** FPT\_TST\_EXT.1

There are no management activities foreseen.

**Audit:** FPT\_TST\_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- > Indication that TSF self test was completed.

FPT_TST_EXT.1	Basic TSF Self Testing
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1	The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [selection: <i>during initial start-up (on power on), periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-tests should occur]</i> ] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [assignment: <i>list of self-tests run by the TSF</i> ].

## 6 Security Requirements

This chapter gives the security functional requirements (SFR) and the security assurance requirements (SAR) for the TOE and the environment.

### 6.1 Typographical Conventions

The following conventions are used in the definitions of the SFRs:

- > Refinements are denoted in one of two ways, depending on whether they add detail to an SFR ('explanatory refinements') or update the text of an SFR element ('element refinements'). Explanatory refinements follow the SFR that they update and are marked by the word "**Refinement**" in bold followed by text describing the refinement. Element refinements are indicated by **bold text** within an SFR element, with the original text indicated in a footnote.
- > Selections and assignments that have already been made in the [CEN EN 419221-5] Protection Profile are *italicized*, and the original text on which the selection or assignment has been made is not reminded.
- > Selections and assignments made in this ST are underlined, and the PP original text on which the selection or assignment has been made is indicated in a footnote.
- > Iteration operations on SFR components are denoted by showing a slash "/" and the iteration indicator after the SFR component identifier.

### 6.2 SFR Architecture

#### 6.2.1 SFR Relationships

Figure 6-1 and Figure 6-2 give a graphical presentation of the connections between the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) from Section 6.3 below and the underlying functional areas and operations that the TOE provides. The diagrams provide a context for SFRs that relates to their use in the TOE, whereas Section 6.3 defines the SFRs grouped by the abstract class and family groupings in [CC2].

Figure 6-1: Architecture of Key Protection SFRs





Figure 6-2: Architecture of User, TSF Protection &amp; Audit SFRs




### 6.2.2 SFRs and the Key Lifecycle

The generic lifecycle for a key is illustrated in Figure 6-3. This shows the methods by which a key may arrive in the TOE (import, generation or restore from backup), resulting in binding of a set of attributes to

the key and storage of the key, and finally the ways in which a stored key may then be processed (export, use in a cryptographic function, backup, or destruction). The SFRs related to each of these aspects are then described below Figure 6-3.

**Figure 6-3: Generic Key Lifecycle and Related SFRs**



#### **Import:**

- > FDP\_IFF.1/KeyBasics requires a secure channel (FTP\_TRP.1) and import in encrypted form or by using at least two components
- > FAU\_GEN.1 requires audit of import

#### **Generate:**

- > FCS\_CKM.1 requires approved algorithms
- > FCS\_RNG.1 defines requirements on random number generation
- > FMT\_MSA.3/Keys defines requirements on key attribute initialization
- > FAU\_GEN.1 requires audit of generation (and of failure of RNG)

#### **Restore:**

- > FDP\_ACF.1/Backup requires only an Administrator can restore from a backup, all backups shall preserve confidentiality and integrity of keys (as appropriate to key type) and their attributes, and any restore shall be under dual person control
- > FAU\_GEN.1 requires auditing of a restore (or of any integrity failure during a restore attempt)

#### **Attributes bound to key:**

- > FMT\_MSA.3/Keys defines requirements on key attribute initialization
- > FDP\_ACF.1/KeyUsage, FMT\_MSA.1/GenKeys and FMT\_MSA.1/AKeys define requirements on key attribute modification
- > FAU\_GEN.1 requires audit of changes to key attributes

#### **Stored key:**

- > FDP\_IFF.1/KeyBasics requires no plaintext access
- > FDP\_SDI.2 requires protection of the integrity of keys and their attributes
- > FAU\_GEN.1 requires audit of integrity errors detected

**Export:**

- > FDP\_IFF.1/KeyBasics requires a secure channel (FTP\_TRP.1), authorisation before export, no export of Assigned Keys, export controlled by the export flag attribute, and export in encrypted form
- > FAU\_GEN.1 requires audit of export

**Use:**

- > FIA\_AFL.1 requires blocking of access to a key on reaching an authorisation failure threshold (FDP\_IFF.1/KeyBasics and FMT\_MTD.1/Unblock define requirements on unblocking)
- > FDP\_ACF.1/KeyUsage requires authorisation before use of a key and that the key can only be used as identified in its Key Usage attribute
- > FIA\_UAU.6/KeyAuth requires authorisation before initial use of a key and describes any additional requirements for re-authorisation conditions such as expiry of a time period or number of uses of a key (or when the authorisation period has been explicitly ended)
- > FDP\_RIP.1 requires protection of authorisation data on deallocation
- > FDP\_IFF.1/KeyBasics requires no access to intermediate values in any operation using a secret key
- > FCS\_COP.1 requires the use of approved algorithms
- > FAU\_GEN.1 requires audit of authorisation failure (and blocking or unblocking)

**Backup:**

- > FDP\_ACF.1/Backup requires only Administrator can make a backup; all backups must preserve confidentiality and integrity of keys (as appropriate to key type) and their attributes
- > FAU\_GEN.1 requires auditing of a backup

**Destroy:**

- > FDP\_RIP.1 requires key to be protected on deallocation
- > FCS\_CKM.4 requires key zeroisation on deallocation
- > FAU\_GEN.1 requires audit of key destruction

## 6.3 Security Functional Requirements

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The individual security functional requirements are specified in the sections below.

### 6.3.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

<b>FCS_CKM.1</b>	<i>Cryptographic key generation</i>
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Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]

FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

**FCS\_CKM.1.1** The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Key Generation Support Table and

Table 6-2: Key Derivation Support Table<sup>21</sup> and specified cryptographic key sizes Key Generation Support Table and Key Derivation Support Table<sup>22</sup> that meet the following: Key Generation Support Table and Key Derivation Support Table<sup>23</sup>.

**Table 6-1: Key Generation Support Table**

Key Generation Algorithm	Key Sizes	Applicable Standards
RSA Key Generation	Modulus length 2048, 3072, 4096	FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] Appendix B.3.3 and B.3.6 with primality tests from C.3.
ECC Key Generation	NIST curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B409, B-571  Brainpool curves: brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP160t1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP192t1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP224t1, brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP256t1, brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP320t1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP384t1, brainpoolP512r1, brainpoolP512t1	FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] Appendix B.4.1 and B.4.2, Appendix D  RFC- 5639 [IETF RFC Brainpool]
DSA Domain Parameter Generation	Modulus length 2048 and 3072	FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] chapter 2.1 and Appendix A.1.1.2
DSA Key-Pair Generation	Modulus length 2048 and 3072	FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] Section A.2.1
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Domain Parameter Generation	Modulus length 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits	FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] Appendix A.1
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key-Pair Generation	Modulus length 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits	FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] Appendix A.2.1
AES	128,192 and 256 bits	FIPS Pub 197 [FIPS 197] chapters 3.1 and 6
Generic Secret	128 – 4096 bits (in increments of 8 bits)	N/A

<sup>21</sup> [assignment: *cryptographic key generation algorithm*]

<sup>22</sup> [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*]

<sup>23</sup> [assignment: *list of standards*]

Table 6-2: Key Derivation Support Table

Key Derivation Algorithm	Key Sizes	Supported PRF / Hashing Function / Cipher	Applicable Standards
Counter Mode KDF	128,192 and 256 bits when AES is cipher.  128 - 4096 bits when HMAC PRF is used	AES-CMAC, HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA512.	Counter Mode KDF from FIPS SP 800-108 [SP800-108] Chapter 4 and 5.1 with FIPS Pub 197 [FIPS 197] for supported cipher.
Single-step KDF	None	SHA-512	[SP800-56C] Chapter 4
EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement	Curve P-224	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512.	ECC - Ephemeral Unified, One Pass DH from NIST Special Pub 800-56A [SP800-56A]
EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement	Curve P-256	SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512.	ECC - Ephemeral Unified, One Pass DH from NIST Special Pub 800-56A [SP800-56A]
EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement	Curve P-384	SHA-384, SHA-512.	ECC - Ephemeral Unified, One Pass DH from NIST Special Pub 800-56A [SP800-56A]
EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement	Curve P521	SHA-512.	ECC - Ephemeral Unified, One Pass DH and Full Unified from NIST Special Pub 800-56A [SP800-56A]
EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement	brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP160t1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP192t1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP224t1, brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP256t1, brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP320t1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP384t1, brainpoolP512r1, brainpoolP512t1	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512.	ECC - Ephemeral Unified, One Pass DH from NIST Special Pub 800-56A [SP800-56A]  RFC- 5639 [IETF RFC Brainpool]
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement	Modulus 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512.	FFC - dhHybrid1, dhEphem, dhHybrid1Flow and dhOneFlow from NIST Special Pub 800-56A [SP800-56A]



## Application Note 12

- > Key generation is linked to the setting of security attributes of a key (including the link to a subject who owns the key, via the setting of authorisation data) as in FMT\_MSA.1/GenKeys and FMT\_MSA.1/AKeys.
- > The internal RNG of the TOE (see FCS\_RNG.1/DRG.4) is used in the key generation process

### FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

**FCS\_CKM.4.1** The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method *zeroisation* that meets the following: action taken according to the Key Zeroisation Table<sup>24</sup>.

**Table 6-3: Key Zeroisation Table**

Key deletion method (KDM)	Action taken	Context in which the KDM is used
KDM1	Overwrite of memory	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Applies to user keys stored in HSM partitions, which can be erased by means of ICD commands.</li> <li>&gt; Applies to some HSM support keys as well, that can be erased by means of ICD commands.</li> </ul>
KDM2	RAM reset	Resetting of RAM causes the erasure of all RAM resident keys
KDM3	Erasure of entire memory sectors	HSM wipe-out, which can be called from the bootloader, or triggered by the active tamper detection on K7+ TOE. All user keys and HSM support keys are erased.
KDM4	Erasure of the encrypting keys	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Any user key stored in a HSM partition is encrypted with a chain of HSM support keys. Erasure of any of these support keys is equivalent to erasing the user key.</li> </ul>

<sup>24</sup> [assignment: *list of standards*]

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; The same applies to user keys stored externally, which are encrypted with a HSM support key.</li> <li>&gt; The same applies to many 'intermediate' HSM support keys which are encrypted by other HSM support keys.</li> </ul>
KDM5	Erasure of HSE-BBRAM in response to a tamper /decommission event	Decommission signal (on K7 and K7+ TOEs) or active tamper detection (on K7+ TOE) trigger the erasure of the HSE-BBRAM, which contains the 'top-level' HSM support keys that encrypt the other HSM support keys.

### Application Note 13

*All user keys and all HSM support keys are covered by one or several destruction methods from the above table. As required by the ADV\_ARC refinement in Section 6.4.1, the ADV\_ARC document includes a table listing all the HSM support keys; this table indicates which destruction method(s) (among the five) is/are available for each HSM support key.*

<b>FCS_COP.1/SigGen_Main</b>	<i>Cryptographic operation – Digital Signature Generation (Main)</i>
------------------------------	--

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

**FCS\_COP.1.1/SigGen\_Main** The TSF shall perform digital signature generation<sup>25</sup> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm as shown in the Digital Signature Generation Algorithm Support Table<sup>26</sup> and cryptographic key sizes as shown in the Digital Signature Generation Algorithm Support Table<sup>27</sup> that meet the following: standards as shown in the Digital Signature Generation Algorithm Support Table<sup>28</sup>.

<sup>25</sup> [assignment: *list of cryptographic operations*]

<sup>26</sup> [assignment: *cryptographic algorithm*]

<sup>27</sup> [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*]

<sup>28</sup> [assignment: *list of standards*].

**Table 6-4: Digital Signature Generation Algorithm Support Table**

<b>Signature Generation Algorithm</b>	<b>Key Sizes</b>	<b>Hash Algorithm</b>	<b>Applicable Standards</b>
RSA	Modulus length 2048 and 3072 bits	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	RSASSA-PSS and RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 from PKCS #1 [PKCS#1] chapters 8.1.1 and 8.2.1
RSA	Modulus length 4096 bits	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	RSASSA-PSS and RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 from PKCS #1 [PKCS#1] chapters 8.1.1 and 8.2.1
RSA	Modulus length 2048 and 3072 bits	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	ANSI X9.31 Signature Generation as covered under FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] chapter 5.4
RSA	Modulus length 4096 bits	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	ANSI X9.31 Signature Generation as covered under FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] chapter 5.4
DSA	Modulus length 2048 and 3072 bits	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] chapter 4.6

Signature Generation Algorithm	Key Sizes	Hash Algorithm	Applicable Standards
ECDSA	<p>NIST curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B409, B-571</p> <p>Brainpool curves:  brainpoolP160r1,  brainpoolP160t1,  brainpoolP192r1,  brainpoolP192t1,  brainpoolP224r1,  brainpoolP224t1,  brainpoolP256r1,  brainpoolP256t1,  brainpoolP320r1,  brainpoolP320t1,  brainpoolP384r1,  brainpoolP384t1,  brainpoolP512r1,  brainpoolP512t1</p>	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	<p>FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] chapter 6.4 and Appendix D</p> <p>RFC- 5639 [IETF RFC Brainpool]</p>

<b>FCS_COP.1/SigVer_Main</b>	<i>Cryptographic operation – Digital Signature Verification (Main)</i>
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Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

**FCS\_COP.1.1/SigVer\_Main** The TSF shall perform digital signature verification<sup>29</sup> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm as shown in the Digital Signature Verification Algorithm Support Table<sup>30</sup> and cryptographic key sizes as shown in the Digital Signature Verification Algorithm Support Table<sup>31</sup> that meet the following: standards as shown in the Digital Signature Verification Algorithm Support Table<sup>32</sup>.

<sup>29</sup> [assignment: *list of cryptographic operations*]

<sup>30</sup> [assignment: *cryptographic algorithm*]

<sup>31</sup> [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*]

<sup>32</sup> [assignment: *list of standards*].

**Table 6-5: Digital Signature Verification Algorithm Support Table**

Signature Verification Algorithm	Key Sizes	Hash Algorithm	Applicable Standards
RSA	Modulus length 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	RSASSA-PSS and RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 from PKCS #1 [PKCS#1] chapters 8.1.2 and 8.2.2
RSA	Modulus length 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	ANSI X9.31 Signature Generation as covered under FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] chapter 5.4
DSA	Modulus length 1024, 2048 and 3072 bits	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] chapter 4.7
ECDSA	<p>NIST curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B409, B-571</p> <p>Brainpool curves:  brainpoolP160r1,  brainpoolP160t1,  brainpoolP192r1,  brainpoolP192t1,  brainpoolP224r1,  brainpoolP224t1,  brainpoolP256r1,  brainpoolP256t1,  brainpoolP320r1,  brainpoolP320t1,  brainpoolP384r1,  brainpoolP384t1,  brainpoolP512r1,  brainpoolP512t1</p>	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	<p>FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] chapter 6.4 and Appendix D</p> <p>RFC- 5639 [IETF RFC Brainpool]</p>

**FCS\_COP.1/SigVer\_Bootloader***Cryptographic operation – Signature Verification (Bootloader)*

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or

FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

**FCS\_COP.1.1/SigVer\_Bootloader** The TSF shall perform digital signature verification<sup>33</sup> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA<sup>34</sup> and cryptographic key sizes 4096 bits with SHA-384<sup>35</sup> that meet the following: RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 from [PKCS#1] chapter 8.2.2<sup>36</sup>.

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*This iteration covers the signature verification algorithm contained within the Bootloader used to verify the authenticity (including integrity) of the main cryptographic module firmware on power-on in support of FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.*

*This function is used to verify both the signature on the stored firmware ahead of execution alongside to validate the associated certificate chain back to the Thales root certificate.*

<b>FCS_COP.1/Digest_Main</b>	<i>Cryptographic operation – Digest (Main)</i>
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Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

**FCS\_COP.1.1/Digest\_Main** The TSF shall perform message digest<sup>37</sup> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm as shown in the Message Digest Algorithm Support Table<sup>38</sup> and cryptographic key sizes as shown in the Message Digest Algorithm Support Table<sup>39</sup> that meet the following: standards as shown in Message Digest Algorithm Support Table<sup>40</sup>.

**Table 6-6: Message Digest Algorithm Support Table**

Message Digest Algorithm	Key Sizes	Applicable Standards
SHA-224	None	FIPS Pub 180-4 [FIPS 180-4] chapter 6.3
SHA-256	None	FIPS Pub 180-4 [FIPS 180-4] chapter 6.2

<sup>33</sup> [assignment: *list of cryptographic operations*]

<sup>34</sup> [assignment: *cryptographic algorithm*]

<sup>35</sup> [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*]

<sup>36</sup> [assignment: *list of standards*].

<sup>37</sup> [assignment: *list of cryptographic operations*]

<sup>38</sup> [assignment: *cryptographic algorithm*]

<sup>39</sup> [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*]

<sup>40</sup> [assignment: *list of standards*]

Message Digest Algorithm	Key Sizes	Applicable Standards
SHA-384	None	FIPS Pub 180-4 [FIPS 180-4] chapter 6.5
SHA-512	None	FIPS Pub 180-4 [FIPS 180-4] chapter 6.4
SHA3-224	None	FIPS Pub 202 FIPS 202, chapter 5.2 and 6.1
SHA3-256	None	FIPS Pub 202 FIPS 202, chapter 5.2 and 6.1
SHA3-384	None	FIPS Pub 202 FIPS 202, chapter 5.2 and 6.1
SHA3-512	None	FIPS Pub 202 FIPS 202, chapter 5.2 and 6.1

<b>FCS_COP.1/Sym_Enc_Dec</b> <i>Cryptographic operation – Symmetric Encrypt/Decrypt</i>
---

Hierarchical to:    No other components.

Dependencies:    [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
                           FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
                           FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
                           FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

**FCS\_COP.1.1/Sym\_Enc\_Dec**    The TSF shall perform symmetric encryption and decryption<sup>41</sup> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm as shown in the Symmetric Algorithm Support Table<sup>42</sup> and cryptographic key sizes as shown in the Symmetric Algorithm Support Table<sup>43</sup> that meet the following: standards as shown in the Symmetric Algorithm Support Table<sup>44</sup>.

**Table 6-7: Symmetric Algorithm Support Table**

Symmetric Algorithm	Key Sizes	Supported Mode	Applicable Standards
AES	128, 192 and 256 bits	ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB8, CFB128, CTR	FIPS Pub 197 [FIPS 197] chapter 5 and NIST SP 800-38A [SP800-38A] chapter 6
AES	128, 192 and 256 bits	GCM with 128-bit tag	FIPS Pub 197 [FIPS 197] chapter 5 and NIST SP 800-38D [SP800-38D] chapter 7

<sup>41</sup> [assignment: *list of cryptographic operations*]

<sup>42</sup> [assignment: *cryptographic algorithm*]

<sup>43</sup> [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*]

<sup>44</sup> [assignment: *list of standards*]

Symmetric Algorithm	Key Sizes	Supported Mode	Applicable Standards
AES	128 and 256 bits	XTS-AES	FIPS Pub 197 [FIPS 197] chapter 5 and NIST SP 800-38E [SP800-38E]
AES	128, 192 and 256 bits	AES-KW and AES-KWP	FIPS Pub 197 [FIPS 197] chapter 5 and NIST SP 800-38F [SP800-38F] chapter 6

<b>FCS_COP.1/ASym_Enc_Dec</b> <i>Cryptographic operation – Asymmetric Encrypt/Decrypt</i>
---

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

**FCS\_COP.1.1/ASym\_Enc\_Dec** The TSF shall perform asymmetric encryption and decryption<sup>45</sup> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA<sup>46</sup> and cryptographic key sizes 2048-4096<sup>47</sup> that meet the following: RSAPES-OAEP from PKCS #1 v2.1 and KTS-OAEP-basic from NIST SP800-56B [SP800-56B] chapter 9.2 and KAS-1 basic from NIST SP800-56B [SP800-56B] chapter 8.2<sup>48</sup>.

<b>FCS_COP.1/MAC</b> <i>Cryptographic operation – Message Authentication Code (MAC)</i>
---

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

**FCS\_COP.1.1/MAC** The TSF shall perform message authentication code generation and verification<sup>49</sup> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm as shown in the Message Authentication Code Algorithm Support Table<sup>50</sup> and cryptographic key sizes as shown in the Message Authentication Code Algorithm Support Table<sup>51</sup> that meet the following: standards as shown in Message Authentication Code Algorithm Support Table<sup>52</sup>.

<sup>45</sup> [assignment: *list of cryptographic operations*]

<sup>46</sup> [assignment: *cryptographic algorithm*]

<sup>47</sup> [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*]

<sup>48</sup> [assignment: *list of standards*].

<sup>49</sup> [assignment: *list of cryptographic operations*]

<sup>50</sup> [assignment: *cryptographic algorithm*]

<sup>51</sup> [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*]

<sup>52</sup> [assignment: *list of standards*]



Table 6-8: Message Authentication Code Algorithm Support Table

MAC Algorithm	Key Sizes	Supported PRF / Hashing Function	Applicable Standards
HMAC	128 – 4096 bits (in increments of 8 bits)	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	FIPS Pub 198-1 [FIPS 198-1]
AES CMAC	128, 192 and 256 bits	N/A	NIST SP 800-38B [SP800-38B] chapter 6
AES GMAC	128, 192 and 256 bits	N/A	NIST SP 800-38D [SP800-38D] chapter 7

**FCS\_RNG.1/PTG.2**      *Generation of random numbers (PTG.2)*

Hierarchical to:      No other components.

Dependencies:      No dependencies

**FCS\_RNG.1.1/PTG.2**      The TSF shall provide a physical<sup>53</sup> random number generator that implements [AIS31] PTG.2 security capabilities:

(PTG.2.1) A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy source immediately when the RNG has started. When a total failure is detected, no random numbers will be output.

(PTG.2.2) If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while the RNG is being operated, the RNG prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw random numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source.

(PTG.2.3) The online test shall detect non-tolerable statistical defects of the raw random number sequence (i) immediately when the RNG has started, and (ii) while the RNG is being operated. The TSF must not output any random numbers before the power-up online test has finished successfully or when a defect has been detected.

(PTG.2.4) The online test procedure shall be effective to detect non-tolerable weaknesses of the random numbers soon.

(PTG.2.5) The online test procedure checks the quality of the raw random number sequence. It is triggered continuously. The online test is suitable for detecting non-tolerable statistical defects of the statistical properties of the raw random numbers within an acceptable period of time.<sup>54</sup>

**FCS\_RNG.1.2/PTG.2**      The TSF shall provide octets of bits<sup>55</sup> that meet [AIS31] PTG.2 quality metric:

(PTG.2.6) Test procedure A and none does not distinguish the internal random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG.

(PTG.2.7) The average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.997.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>53</sup> [selection: *physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid physical, hybrid deterministic*]

<sup>54</sup> [assignment: *list of security capabilities*]

<sup>55</sup> [selection: *bits, octets of bits, numbers* [assignment: *format of the numbers*]]

<sup>56</sup> [assignment: *a defined quality metric*]

**FCS\_RNG.1/DRG.4** *Generation of random numbers (DRG.4)*

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FCS\_RNG.1.1/DRG.4** The TSF shall provide a hybrid deterministic<sup>57</sup> random number generator that implements [AIS31] DRG.4 security capabilities:

(DRG.4.1) The internal state of the RNG shall use PTRNG of class PTG.2 as random source.

(DRG.4.2) The RNG provides forward secrecy.

(DRG.4.3) The RNG provides backward secrecy even if the current internal state is known.

(DRG.4.4) The RNG provides enhanced forward secrecy:

- On demand,
- On condition: after  $2^{32}$  generate requests or  $2^{32}$  bits generated, whichever comes first
- After 10 seconds.

(DRG.4.5) The internal state of the RNG is seeded by a PTRNG of class PTG.2.<sup>58</sup>

**FCS\_RNG.1.2/DRG.4** The TSF shall provide octets of bits<sup>59</sup> that meet [AIS31] DRG.4 quality metric:

(DRG.4.6) The RNG generates output for which  $k > 2^{34}$  strings of bit length 128 are mutually different with probability  $1 - \epsilon$ , with  $\epsilon < 2^{-16}$ .

(DRG.4.7) Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish the random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG. The random numbers must pass test procedure A and NIST SP 800-22 test suite<sup>60</sup>.

## 6.3.2 Identification and authentication (FIA)

**FIA\_UID.1/STC\_User** *Timing of identification*

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FIA\_UID.1.1/STC\_User** The TSF shall allow:

1. Self test according to FPT\_TST\_EXT.1
2. The following list of additional actions:
  - a. Submit bootloader commands for:
    - i. Diagnostics and status information

<sup>57</sup> [selection: *physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid physical, hybrid deterministic*]

<sup>58</sup> [assignment: *list of security capabilities*]

<sup>59</sup> [selection: *bits, octets of bits, numbers* [assignment: *format of the numbers*]]

<sup>60</sup> [assignment: *a defined quality metric*]

- ii. HSM wipe-out
- iii. Completing the boot process by passing the execution control to the Firmware
- iv. Instructing the Firmware to delete FM applications stored in the TOE's flash memory
- b. query HSM status, authenticated identity of the HSM, configuration and licenses
- c. query container configuration
- d. PED configuration and communication requests
- e. query log status and submit external log messages for addition to secure audit log
- f. STC management operations (request public key, activate channel, open and close channel)
- g. request state of HSM roles
- h. Submit public requests to embedded FM applications <sup>61</sup>

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

**FIA\_UID.1.2/STC\_User** The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

### Application Note 15

*'HSM wipe-out' means that all HSM content (user information, user keys, HSM keys and certificates, firmware) are erased. Note that the bootloader still remains.*

#### **FIA\_UAU.1/STC\_User** *Timing of authentication*

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification.

**FIA\_UAU.1.1/STC\_User** The TSF shall allow:

1. *Self-test according to FPT\_TST\_EXT.1,*
2. *Identification of the user by means of TSF required by FIA\_UID.1 / STC\_User*
3. The following list of additional actions:
  - a. Submit bootloader commands for:
    - i. Diagnostics and status information
    - ii. HSM wipe-out
    - iii. Completing the boot process by passing the execution control to the Firmware
    - iv. Instructing the Firmware to delete FM applications stored in the TOE's flash memory
  - b. query HSM status, authenticated identity of the HSM, configuration and licenses
  - c. query container configuration
  - d. PED configuration and communication requests
  - e. query log status and submit external log messages for addition to secure audit log

<sup>61</sup> [assignment: list of additional TSF-mediated actions]

- f. STC management operations (request public key, activate channel, open and close channel)
- g. request state of HSM roles
- h. Submit public requests to embedded FM applications <sup>62</sup>

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

**FIA\_UAU.1.2/STC\_User** The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

### Application Note 16

- *Identification and authentication are done at the same time, which explains that the list of allowed actions is the same for FIA\_UID.1/STC\_User and FIA\_UAU.1/STC\_User.*
- *'HSM wipe-out' means that all HSM content (user information, user keys, HSM keys and certificates, firmware) are erased. Note that the bootloader still remains.*

#### FIA\_UID.1/HSM\_Roles *Timing of identification*

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FIA\_UID.1.1/HSM\_Roles** The TSF shall allow:

1. *Self-test according to FPT\_TST\_EXT.1*
2. The following list of additional actions:
  - a. Submit bootloader commands for:
    - i. Diagnostics and status information
    - ii. HSM wipe-out
    - iii. Completing the boot process by passing the execution control to the Firmware
    - iv. Instructing the Firmware to delete FM applications stored in the TOE's flash memory
  - b. query HSM status, authenticated identity of the HSM, configuration and licenses
  - c. query container configuration
  - d. PED configuration and communication requests
  - e. query log status and submit external log messages for addition to secure audit log
  - f. request state of HSM roles
  - g. query container object identify (from known OUID or object handle)
  - h. session management functions (i.e. open, close, close all, clean access, get session info)
  - i. Login requests
  - j. HSM deactivation
  - k. Zeroize the HSM

<sup>62</sup> [assignment: *list of additional TSF-mediated actions*]

- l. Request new initialization of HSM
- m. create, modify, destroy and get attributes of public partition objects
- n. Submit public requests to embedded FM applications<sup>63</sup>

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

**FIA\_UID.1.2/HSM\_Roles** The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

### Application Note 17

- *This SFR applies to the HSM explicit roles (i.e. HSM SO, Partition SO, Administrator, Audit User, Partition CO, Partition Limited CO and Partition CU).*
- *‘Public partition objects’ mentioned in this SFR are limited to Data Objects (i.e. Class=CKO\_DATA) stored in the partition areas.*
- *‘HSM zeroisation’ means that all user information and user key material are erased. The bootloader, firmware and HSM own data (HSM keys and certificates) are not erased.*
- *‘HSM wipe-out’ means that all HSM content (user information, user keys, HSM keys and certificates, firmware) are erased. Note that the bootloader still remains.*

<b>FIA_UAU.1/HSM_Roles</b>	<i>Timing of authentication</i>
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Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification.

**FIA\_UAU.1.1/HSM\_Roles** The TSF shall allow:

1. *Self-test according to FPT\_TST\_EXT.1,*
2. *Identification of the user by means of TSF required by FIA\_UID.1 / HSM\_Roles*
3. The following list of additional actions:
  - a. Submit bootloader commands for:
    - i. Diagnostics and status information
    - ii. HSM wipe-out
    - iii. Completing the boot process by passing the execution control to the Firmware
    - iv. Instructing the Firmware to delete FM applications stored in the TOE's flash memory
  - b. query HSM status, authenticated identity of the HSM, configuration and licenses
  - c. query container configuration
  - d. PED configuration and communication requests
  - e. query log status and submit external log messages for addition to secure audit log
  - f. request state of HSM roles

<sup>63</sup> [assignment: list of additional TSF-mediated actions]

- g. query container object identify (from known OUID or object handle)
- h. session management functions (i.e. open, close, close all, clean access, get session info)
- i. Login requests
- j. HSM deactivation
- k. Zeroize the HSM
- l. Request new initialization of HSM
- m. create, modify, destroy and get attributes of public partition objects
- n. Submit public requests to embedded FM applications<sup>64</sup>

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

**FIA\_UAU.1.2/HSM\_Roles** The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

### Application Note 18

- *This SFR applies to the HSM explicit roles (i.e. HSM SO, Partition SO, Administrator, Audit User, Partition CO, Partition Limited CO and Partition CU). Moreover, Identification and authentication are done at the same time, which explains that the list of allowed actions is the same for FIA\_UID.1/HSM\_Roles and FIA\_UAU.1/HSM\_Roles.*
- *'Public partition objects' mentioned in this SFR are limited to Data Objects (i.e. Class=CKO\_DATA) stored in the partition areas.*
- *'HSM zeroisation' means that all user information and user key material are erased. The bootloader, firmware and HSM own data (HSM keys and certificates) are not erased.*
- *'HSM wipe-out' means that all HSM content (user information, user keys, HSM keys and certificates, firmware) are erased. Note that the bootloader still remains.*

<b>FIA_UID.1/Key_Owner</b> <i>Timing of identification</i>
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Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FIA\_UID.1.1/Key\_Owner** The TSF shall allow:

1. Self-test according to FPT\_TST\_EXT.1
2. Any operation except for:
  - a. Cryptographic operation using an Assigned Key or a General Key
  - b. Export operation of a General Key
  - c. Modification of the authorisation data of an Assigned Key or a General Key<sup>65</sup>

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

<sup>64</sup> [assignment: list of additional TSF-mediated actions]

<sup>65</sup> [assignment: list of additional TSF-mediated actions]

**FIA\_UID.1.2/Key\_Owner** The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

<b>FIA_UAU.1/Key_Owner</b>	<i>Timing of authentication</i>
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Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification.

**FIA\_UAU.1.1/Key\_Owner** The TSF shall allow:

1. *Self-test according to FPT\_TST\_EXT.1,*
2. *Identification of the user by means of TSF required by FIA\_UID.1 / Key\_Owner*
3. Any operation except for:
  - a. Cryptographic operation using an Assigned Key or a General Key
  - b. Export operation of a General Key
  - c. Modification of the authorisation data of an Assigned Key or a General Key<sup>66</sup>

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

**FIA\_UAU.1.2/Key\_Owner** The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

## Application Note 19

*Identification and authentication are done at the same time, which explains that the list of allowed actions is the same for FIA\_UID.1/Key\_Owner and FIA\_UAU.1/Key\_Owner.*

<b>FIA_AFL.1</b>	<i>Authentication failure handling</i>
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Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

**FIA\_AFL.1.1** The TSF shall detect when the number as specified in Table 6-9<sup>67</sup> unsuccessful authentication **or authorisation** attempts occur related *to consecutive failed authentication or authorisation attempts*.

**FIA\_AFL.1.2** When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication **or authorisation** attempts has been met<sup>68</sup>, the TSF shall *block access to the functionality specified in Table 6-9<sup>69</sup> until the unblocking condition as specified in Table 6-9 is met<sup>70</sup>*.

<sup>66</sup> [assignment: list of additional TSF-mediated actions]

<sup>67</sup> [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]]

<sup>68</sup> [selection: met, surpassed]

<sup>69</sup> [assignment: description of the relevant functionality]

<sup>70</sup> [selection: unblocked by [assignment: identification of the authorised subject or role], a time period [assignment: time period] has elapsed]

Table 6-9: Handling of authentication/authorisation failures

Role	Number of consecutive authentication/authorisation failures (as considered in FIA_AFL.1.1)	Functionality being blocked (as considered in FIA_AFL.1.2)	Unblocking condition (as considered in FIA_AFL.1.2)
HSM SO	A positive integer within the range [1 to 3], configurable by the HSM SO	All HSM functionalities except HSM re-initialization.	None. HSM is totally zeroized.
Partition SO	A positive integer within the range [1 to 10], configurable by the Partition SO	All the functionalities of the related partition	None. Partition is totally zeroized
Administrator	Same number as for the HSM SO	Administrator role is locked out.	<p>If the module policy "Partition SO can reset PIN" is enabled, the HSM SO can unlock the Administrator role by resetting its authentication data.</p> <p>Otherwise, there is no unblocking capability, and the Administrator role must be re-initialized.</p>
Audit User	Same number as for the HSM SO.	Audit user login and related capabilities (role is locked out)	After a 60 seconds time period has elapsed
Partition CO	Same number as for the partition SO	Partition CO, Partition Limited CO and Partition CU roles are locked out.	<p>If the module policy "Partition SO can reset PIN" is enabled, the Partition SO can unlock the Partition CO role by resetting its authentication data.</p> <p>Otherwise, there is no unblocking capability. All user keys contained in the partition are lost and the partition CO role must be re-initialized.</p>



Role	Number of consecutive authentication/authorisation failures (as considered in FIA_AFL.1.1)	Functionality being blocked (as considered in FIA_AFL.1.2)	Unblocking condition (as considered in FIA_AFL.1.2)
Partition Limited CO	Same number as for the partition SO	Partition Limited CO role is locked out. Partition CO and Partition CU roles are still functional.	The Partition CO can unlock the Partition Limited CO role by resetting its credentials.
Partition CU	Same number as for the partition SO	Partition CU role is locked out. Partition CO and Partition Limited CO roles are still functional.	The Partition CO can unlock the Partition CU role by resetting its credentials.
Key Owner	3	The related key is blocked: all operations on that key or using that key are forbidden (cryptographic operations, export, change of authorisation data)	The Partition CO can unblock the key by setting the number of failed authorisations to any integer value in the range [0...2], or by resetting the key authorisation data for General Keys.
STC User	1	Blocking of STC authentication mechanism for the identified STC client	After a 30 second time period has elapsed

## Application Note 20

*'Zeroisation' (applied to the HSM or to a partition) means that all user information and user key material are erased.*

### FIA\_UAU.6/KeyAuth Re-authenticating

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FIA\_UAU.6.1/KeyAuth** The TSF shall **authorise and re-authorise**<sup>71</sup> the user **for access to a secret key** under the conditions

1. Authorisation in order to be granted initial access to the key; and

<sup>71</sup> re-authenticate

2. Re-authorisation of both General Keys and Assigned keys under the following conditions: after explicit rescinding of previous authorisation for access to the secret key<sup>72</sup>

### Application Note 21

It is the responsibility of the client application to make appropriate use of any re-authentication conditions according to the application context (cf. *OE.DataContext* and *OE.AppSupport*).

## 6.3.3 User data protection (FDP)

### FDP\_IFC.1/KeyBasics Subset information flow control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

**FDP\_IFC.1.1/KeyBasics** The TSF shall enforce the *Key Basics SFP* on:

1. *subjects: all*
2. *information: keys*
3. *operations: all*

### FDP\_IFF.1/KeyBasics Simple security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control  
FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

**FDP\_IFF.1.1/KeyBasics** The TSF shall enforce the *Key Basics SFP* based on the following types of subject and information security attributes:

1. whether a key is a secret or a public key
2. whether a secret key is an Assigned Key
3. whether channels selected to export keys are secure
4. the value of the Export Flag of a key

<sup>72</sup> [selection:

- Re-authorisation of [assignment: identification of secret keys that are subject to re-authorisation conditions below] both General Keys and Assigned keys under the following conditions: [selection:
  - o after expiry of the time period (as specified in the secret key's attributes) for which the secret key was last authorised;
  - o after the number of uses of the secret key (as specified in the secret key's attributes) for which the secret key was last authorised has already been made;
  - o after explicit rescinding of previous authorisation for access to the secret key];
- [assignment: list of other conditions under which authorisation and re-authorisation for access to secret keys is required]
- Authorisation on every subsequent access to the key]

**FDP\_IFF.1.2/KeyBasics**

The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold:

1. Export of secret keys shall only be allowed provided that the secret key is not an Assigned Key, that the secret key is encrypted, and that a secure channel (providing authentication and integrity protection) is used for the export
2. Public keys shall always be exported with integrity protection of their key value and attributes
3. Keys shall only be imported over a secure channel (providing authentication and integrity protection)
4. A secret key can only be imported if it is a non-Assigned key
5. Secret keys shall only be imported in encrypted form or using split-knowledge procedures requiring at least two key components to reconstruct the key, with key components supplied by at least two separately authenticated users
6. Unblocking access to a key shall not allow any subject other than those authorised to access the key at the time when it was blocked.

**FDP\_IFF.1.3/KeyBasics**

**control rules:** none

The TSF shall enforce **the following additional information flow**

**FDP\_IFF.1.4/KeyBasics**

following rules: none.

The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the

**FDP\_IFF.1.5/KeyBasics**

following rules:

The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the

1. No subject shall be allowed to access the plaintext value of any secret key directly.
2. No subject shall be allowed to export a secret key in plaintext.
3. No subject shall be allowed to export an Assigned Key.
4. No subject shall be allowed to export a secret key without submitting the correct authorisation data for the key
5. No subject shall be allowed to access intermediate values in any operation that uses a secret key
6. A key with an Export Flag value marking it as non-exportable shall not be exported

**Application Note 22**

*A secure channel for export of keys in FDP\_IFF.1.2/KeyBasics (1) or for import of keys in FDP\_IFF.1.2/KeyBasics (3) is one that meets the requirements of FTP\_TRP.1/Local or FTP\_TRP.1/External.*

*The encrypted form required for keys imported or exported over a secure channel requires encryption of the key itself, in addition to any encryption provided by the secure channel.*

*Unblocking a key as in FDP\_IFF.1.2/KeyBasics (6) is intended only to restore the ability of subjects to authorise for access to a key by presenting the correct authorisation data. As noted for FMT\_MTD.1/Unblock, the subject who unblocks the key shall not be able also to use the key as a result of the unblocking (unless of course they are able to supply the correct authorisation data). This is a part of ensuring that sole control of secret keys can be achieved.*

## Application Note 23

This SFR is supported by the following FCS\_COP iterations:

- Encryption of keys for External Key Storage: FCS\_COP.1/Sym\_Enc\_Dec with AES-256-GCM.
- Encryption of keys for Key Export/Import: FCS\_COP.1/Sym\_Enc\_Dec with AES 128, 192, 256 bits, (ECB, CBC, CTR, GCM, KW, KWP) and FCS\_COP.1/ASym\_Enc\_Dec (all algorithms and parameters)

### **FDP\_ACC.1/KeyUsage** *Subset access control*

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

**FDP\_ACC.1.1/KeyUsage** The TSF shall enforce the Key Usage SFP on:

1. subjects: all
2. objects: keys
3. operations: all

### **FDP\_ACF.1/KeyUsage** *Security attribute based access control*

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control  
FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

**FDP\_ACF.1.1/KeyUsage** The TSF shall enforce the *Key Usage SFP* to objects based on the following:

1. whether the subject is currently authorised to use the secret key
2. whether the subject is currently authorised to change the attributes of the secret key
3. the cryptographic function that is attempting to use the secret key.

**FDP\_ACF.1.2/KeyUsage** The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

1. Attributes of a key shall only be changed by an authorised subject, and only as permitted in the Key Attributes Modification Table
2. Only subjects with current authorisation for a specific secret key shall be allowed to carry out operations using the plaintext value of that key
3. Only cryptographic functions permitted by the secret key's Key Usage attribute shall be carried out using the secret key

**FDP\_ACF.1.3/KeyUsage** The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: *none*

**FDP\_ACF.1.4/KeyUsage** The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: *none*.

### Application Note 24

*Whether a subject is currently authorised for access to a secret key is determined by whether the subject has submitted the correct authorisation data for the key, and whether this authorisation is yet subject to one or more of the re-authorisation conditions in FIA\_UAU.6/KeyAuth.*

*Whether a subject is currently authorised to change the attributes of a secret key is determined by the iterations of FMT\_MSA.1*

### Application Note 25

*FDP\_ACF.1.2/KeyUsage (1) refers to controls over changing attributes that are specified in more detail in the iterations of FMT\_MSA.1.*

*FDP\_ACF.1.2/KeyUsage (2) requires that a key can only be used when the relevant subject has been authorised either by presenting the correct authorisation data for the key as part of the request for the operation or else the authorisation has previously been presented by the subject and the current use of the key does not yet require re-authorisation according to FIA\_UAU.6/KeyAuth (meaning that the current usage is therefore within the usage constraints for time and number of uses since the last authorisation of use of the key). The reference to use of the plaintext value of the key does not imply that a subject has access to that value, only that it can be used to carry out operations within the TOE – reference to operations of this sort are thus distinguished from operations that may use an encrypted form of a secret key (e.g. for external storage of keys) and that are not necessarily restricted in this way.*

### Application Note 26

*The requirements of FDP\_ACF.1/KeyUsage apply regardless of how the key is stored by the TOE, including when the key is externally stored.*

<b>FDP_ACC.1/Backup</b>	Subset access control
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Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

**FDP\_ACC.1.1/Backup** The TSF shall enforce the *Backup SFP* on:

1. subjects: all
2. objects: keys
3. operations: backup, restore

### Application Note 27

*This SFR is trivially met as no backup facility is provided by the TOE.*

<b>FDP_ACF.1/Backup</b>	Security attribute based access control
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Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control

## FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

**FDP\_ACF.1.1/Backup** The TSF shall enforce the *Backup SFP* to objects based on the following:

1. whether the subject is an administrator

**FDP\_ACF.1.2/Backup** The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

1. Only authorised administrators shall be able to perform any backup operation provided by the TSF to create backups of the TSF state or to restore the TSF state from a backup
2. Any restore of the TSF shall only be possible under at least dual person control, with each person being an administrator
3. Any backup and restore shall preserve the confidentiality and integrity of the secret keys, and the integrity of public keys
4. Any backup and restore operations shall preserve the integrity of the key attributes, and the binding of each set of attributes to its key

**FDP\_ACF.1.3/Backup** The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: *none*.

**FDP\_ACF.1.4/Backup** The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: *none*.

**Application Note 28**

*This SFR is trivially met as no backup facility is provided by the TOE.*

**FDP\_SDI.2** *Stored data integrity monitoring and action*

Hierarchical to: FDP\_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FDP\_SDI.2.1** The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for *integrity errors* on all **keys (including security attributes)**<sup>73</sup>, based on the following attributes: *integrity protection data*.

**FDP\_SDI.2.2** Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall:

1. prohibit the use of the altered data
2. notify the error to the user

**Application Note 29**

This SFR is supported by FCS\_COP.1/Digest\_Main with SHA-256 algorithm.

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<sup>73</sup> objects

<b>FDP_RIP.1</b>	<b>Subset residual information protection</b>
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Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FDP\_RIP.1.1** The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the *deallocation of the resource* from the following objects:

- authorisation data
- secret keys

### 6.3.4 Trusted path/channels (FTP)

<b>FTP_TRP.1/Local/Embedded</b>	<i>Trusted Path</i>
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Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FTP\_TRP.1.1/Local/Embedded** The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and *local embedded FM applications*<sup>74</sup> that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured **authentication**<sup>75</sup> of its end points and protection of the communicated data from *modification and disclosure*.

**FTP\_TRP.1.2/Local/Embedded** The TSF shall permit local embedded FM applications<sup>76</sup> to initiate communication via the trusted path.

**FTP\_TRP.1.3/Local/Embedded** The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for all services provided by the TOE to the local embedded FM applications<sup>77</sup>.

#### Application Note 30

*Local embedded FM applications are located within the TOE physical boundary (i.e. inside the PCI-e card). As stated in application note 29 of the PP, the local trusted path is mapped to the physical configuration, and no additional authentication or cryptographic protection are required (because of the physical security assumed in the appliance environment).*

<b>FTP_TRP.1/Local/Appliance</b>	<i>Trusted Path</i>
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Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

<sup>74</sup> Refinement: 'local client applications' is refined to 'local embedded FM applications' to distinguish them from local client applications stored within the appliance.

<sup>75</sup> identification

<sup>76</sup> [Selection: the TSF, local client applications]. Moreover, 'local client applications' is refined to 'local embedded FM applications' to distinguish them from local client applications stored within the appliance.

<sup>77</sup> [assignment: services for which trusted path is required]

**FTP\_TRP.1.1/Local/Appliance** The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and local client applications<sup>78</sup> that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured **authentication**<sup>79</sup> of its end points and protection of the communicated data from *modification and disclosure*.

**FTP\_TRP.1.2/Local/Appliance** The TSF shall permit local client applications<sup>80</sup> to initiate communication via the trusted path.

**FTP\_TRP.1.3/Local/Appliance** The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for all security-related services offered to local client applications stored within the appliance, including:

- Cryptographic operations
- Operations on keys
- Authentication operations<sup>81</sup>.

### Application Note 31

*Local client applications are located within the physical boundary of the same hardware appliance (either the generic server in which the TOE is inserted, or the Thales Luna Network HSM). Therefore, as stated in application note 29 of the PP, the local trusted path is mapped to the physical configuration, and no additional authentication or cryptographic protection are required (because of the physical security assumed in the appliance environment).*

<b>FTP_TRP.1/External</b> <i>Trusted Path</i>
---

Hierarchical to:    No other components

Dependencies:    No dependencies

**FTP\_TRP.1.1/External** The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and remote external client applications<sup>82</sup> that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured **authentication**<sup>83</sup> of its end points and protection of the communicated data from *modification and disclosure*.

**FTP\_TRP.1.2/External** The TSF shall permit remote external client applications<sup>84</sup> to initiate communication via the trusted path.

**FTP\_TRP.1.3/External** The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for all security-related services offered to remote external client applications, including:

- Cryptographic operations
- Operations on keys

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<sup>78</sup> users

<sup>79</sup> identification

<sup>80</sup> [selection: the TSF, local client applications]

<sup>81</sup> [assignment: services for which trusted path is required]

<sup>82</sup> users

<sup>83</sup> identification

<sup>84</sup> [selection: the TSF, remote external client applications]



- Authentication operations<sup>85</sup>

### Application Note 32

*This SFR is supported by the following FCS\_COP iterations:*

*FCS\_CKM.1 (ECDH P-521)*

*FCS\_COP.1/Sym\_Enc\_Dec (AES-256 GCM or CTR)*

*FCS\_COP.1/MAC (HMAC-SHA-512)*

## 6.3.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

<b>FPT_STM.1</b>	<i>Reliable time stamps</i>
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Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FPT\_STM.1.1** The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

### Application Note 33

*The TOE must provide timestamps suitable for supporting the time in an audit record for FAU\_GEN.1.*

<b>FPT_TST_EXT.1</b>	<i>Basic TSF Self Testing</i>
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Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests *during initial start-up (or power-on) and periodically during normal operation, at the conditions: on demand*<sup>86</sup> to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF:

- > At initial start-up (or power-on):
  - Software/firmware integrity test
  - Cryptographic algorithm tests
  - Random number generator tests
- > Periodically during normal operation: Random number generator tests
- > On demand:
  - Cryptographic algorithm tests

<sup>85</sup> [assignment: services for which trusted path is required]

<sup>86</sup> [selection: periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-tests should occur]]

- Software/firmware integrity test
- Random number generator tests<sup>87</sup>.

**FPT\_PHP.1** Passive detection of physical attack

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FPT\_PHP.1.1** The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might compromise the TSF.

**FPT\_PHP.1.2** The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.

**FPT\_PHP.3/K7** Resistance to physical attack

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FPT\_PHP.3.1/K7** The TSF shall resist the physical tampering scenarios listed in Table 6-10<sup>88</sup> to the TSF elements listed in Table 6-10<sup>89</sup> by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

**Table 6-10: List of physical tampering scenarios for K7 hardware variants**

Physical tampering scenario	TSF element
Modification of the voltage and temperature outside the normal operating range	PCB

### Application Note 34

*This SFR applies specifically to the K7 hardware variants whose PCB is protected by a passive epoxy coating shield: 808-000048-002, 808-000048-003, 808-000073-001, 808-000073-002 and 808-000066-001.*

**FPT\_PHP.3/K7+** Resistance to physical attack

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

<sup>87</sup> [assignment: list of additional self-tests run by the TSF]

<sup>88</sup> [assignment: physical tampering scenarios]

<sup>89</sup> [assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]

**FPT\_PHP.3.1/K7+** The TSF shall resist the physical tampering scenarios listed in Table 6-11<sup>90</sup> to the TSF elements listed in Table 6-11<sup>91</sup> by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

**Table 6-11: List of physical tampering scenarios for K7+ hardware variants**

Physical tampering scenario	TSF element
Modification of the voltage and temperature outside the normal operating range	PCB
Unauthorised physical access to the PCB components protected by the active shield. In that scenario, the objective of the attacker is to perform direct physical probing on the security chip(s) to get unauthorised access to internal signals.	All components under the active shield
Unauthorised physical access to the PCB components protected by the active shield. In that scenario, the objective of the attacker is to modify the underlying circuitry in order to cause TSF malfunctions.	All components under the active shield

### Application Note 35

*This SFR applies specifically to the two K7+ hardware variants whose PCB is protected by an active shield: 808-000069-001 and 808-000070-001.*

#### **FPT\_FLS.1** *Failure with preservation of secure state*

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FPT\_FLS.1.1** The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:

1. Self-test according to FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 fails
2. Environmental conditions are outside normal operating range (including temperature and power)
3. Failures of critical TOE hardware components (including the RNG) occur
4. Corruption of TOE software occurs
5. None<sup>92</sup>.

<sup>90</sup> [assignment: physical tampering scenarios]

<sup>91</sup> [assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]

<sup>92</sup> [assignment: list of other types of failures in the TSF]

### 6.3.6 Security management (FMT)

For the purposes of specifying a minimum set security attributes of keys, and the constraints on initialisation and modification of these attributes in FMT\_MSA.1 and FMT\_MSA.3, two separate types of keys are defined: Assigned Keys (defined and recognized by having their 'Assigned Flag' attribute set to 'assigned'), and general keys (keys that have their 'Assigned Flag' attribute set to 'non-assigned').

Assigned Keys represent a type of key that can be more easily mapped to requirements for sole control because changes to some of their attributes are more tightly controlled (see FMT\_MSA.1/AKeys, and the description of attributes below) and, since they are intended for use within the TOE, because they cannot be imported or exported<sup>93</sup>. In particular, an Administrator cannot avoid the need to provide the current authorisation data in order to use such a key, nor can an Administrator change the authorisation data (which would then allow use of the key by the Administrator). This enables a key to be generated and then to be made an Assigned Key at the point where it is assigned to an individual signatory or, in the case of a key used for the creation of electronic seals, to a group of key users<sup>94</sup>.

In the FMT\_MSA SFRs specified for keys below, the permitted values of assignments have been restricted to identify a minimum set of attributes that shall be mapped to their implementation in a TOE, and to specify a minimum set of constraints on their initialization and subsequent modification. Additional notes regarding these attributes are as follows:

- > Key identifier: this must be sufficient to uniquely identify the key within the system of which the TOE is a part
- > Key type: this identifies at a minimum whether the key is a secret key of a symmetric cryptographic algorithm or the secret (commonly called private) key of an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm
- > Authorisation data: value of data that allows the key to be used for cryptographic operations according to the rules in other SFRs such as FDP\_IFF.1/KeyBasics, FDP\_ACF.1/KeyUsage, and FDP\_ACF.1/Backup. Authorisation data is required only for secret keys
- > Re-authorisation conditions: the constraints on uses of the key that can be made before re-authorisation is required according to FIA\_UAU.6/KeyAuth, and which determines whether a subject is currently authorised to use a key as in FDP\_ACF.1/KeyUsage. The types of secret key to which re-authorisation conditions apply, and the details of the re-authorisation conditions for a specific TOE are described in FIA\_UAU.6/KeyAuth in Section 6.3.2
- > Key usage: the cryptographic functions that are allowed to use the key as in FDP\_ACF.1/KeyUsage
- > Export flag: indicates whether the key is allowed to be exported (cf. FDP\_IFF.1/KeyBasics); allowed values are referred to in the PP as 'true' (meaning export is allowed) and 'false' (meaning export is not allowed) but may be mapped to other suitable binary values in TOE implementations
- > Assigned flag: indicates whether the key has currently been assigned. Once a key has been assigned by an Administrator then its authorisation data can only be changed on successful validation of the current authorisation data – it cannot be changed or reset by an Administrator – and the re-authorisation conditions and key usage attributes cannot be changed; allowed values are referred to in

<sup>93</sup> Assigned Keys may be stored externally in a form that protects the confidentiality and integrity of the key and the binding of the key to its attributes (in particular the requirements of the SFRs FDP\_IFF.1/KeyBasics and FDP\_SDI.1 apply to externally stored keys), as discussed in section 1.

<sup>94</sup> Secure operating procedures will be needed in order to ensure that the process from generation to assignment is suitable for maintaining any requirements for non-repudiation that may apply to the application context for use of the key (cf. OE.DataContext and the refinement to AGD\_OPE.1 in section 6.4.1).

the PP as 'assigned' and 'non-assigned' but may be mapped to other suitable binary values in TOE implementations.

#### FMT\_SMR.1 *Security roles*

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

**FMT\_SMR.1.1** The TSF shall maintain the roles **HSM SO**, **Partition SO**, **Administrator**, **Audit User**, **Partition CO**<sup>95</sup>, **STC User**<sup>96</sup>, **Key Owner**<sup>97</sup>, Partition Limited CO, Partition CU<sup>98</sup>.

**FMT\_SMR.1.2** The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

### Application Note 36

All the roles mentioned in this SFR are described in Section 1.4.6.

#### FMT\_SMF.1 *Security management functions*

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FMT\_SMF.1.1** The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

1. Unblock of access due to authentication or authorisation failures
2. Modifying attributes of keys
3. Export and deletion of the audit data, which can take place only under the control of the **Audit User**<sup>99</sup> role
4. No backup and restore functions<sup>100</sup>
5. Key import function<sup>101</sup>
6. Key export function<sup>102</sup>

<sup>95</sup> Refinement: HSM SO, Partition SO, Administrator, Audit User and Partition CO replace the generic wording 'Administrator' mentioned in the protection profile. These are the actual HSM administrative roles, as described in section 1.4.6.

<sup>96</sup> Refinement: as described in section 1.4.6, STC\_User is the implicit role used to authenticate local and external client applications, both of which are supported by the TOE. Note that authentication through the STC is mandatory for external client applications, and optional for local client applications, as mentioned in section 7.5 "Trusted path".

<sup>97</sup> Refinement: as described in section 1.4.6, Key Owner is the implicit role that corresponds to the Key User role mentioned in the protection profile.

<sup>98</sup> [assignment: list of additional authorised identified roles]

<sup>99</sup> Refinement of the 'Administrator' initial wording, as Audit User is the only HSM administrative role to control the export and deletion of audit data.

<sup>100</sup> [selection: backup and restore functions, no backup and restore functions]

<sup>101</sup> [selection: key import function , no key import function]

<sup>102</sup> [selection: key export function , no key export function]

**7. Firmware updates<sup>103</sup>****8. Loading of embedded FM applications<sup>104</sup>****FMT\_MTD.1/Unblock** *Management of TSF data*

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

**FMT\_MTD.1.1/Unblock** The TSF shall restrict the ability to *unlock* the TSF data listed in table 6-12<sup>105</sup> to the administrators listed in Table 6-12<sup>106</sup>.

**Table 6-12: Unlocking of TSF data by administrators**

Blocked TSF data	Administrator which can unlock the TSF data
Administrator account	HSM SO <u>provided that the module policy "Partition SO can reset PIN" is enabled</u> . Otherwise, there is no unblocking capability.
Partition CO account	Partition SO <u>provided that the module policy "Partition SO can reset PIN" is enabled</u> . Otherwise, there is no unblocking capability.
Partition Limited CO account	Partition CO
Partition CU account	Partition CO
Any User Key (whether General or Assigned)	<u>Case of a User Partition</u> : Partition CO <u>Case of the Admin Partition</u> : HSM SO

**Application Note 37**

*There is a distinction between administrators authorised to unblock a key and users authorised to use the key. When unblocking a secret key, the unblocking process shall not allow a subject to use the key other than a subject who is authorised by presentation of the current authorisation data. For example, an administrator who is able to unblock the key cannot then **use** the key as a result of the unblocking (so the unblocking process does not itself allow the key to be used, nor does it enable the authorisation data to be changed without proving knowledge of the previous authorisation data). This is a part of ensuring that sole control of secret keys can be achieved.*

**FMT\_MTD.1/AuditLog** *Management of TSF data*

Hierarchical to: No other components

<sup>103</sup> Refinement to the PP (to add the firmware update capability)

<sup>104</sup> Refinement to the PP (to add the FM loading capability)

<sup>105</sup> [assignment: list of TSF data]

<sup>106</sup> [assignment: the authorised identified administrative roles]

Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

**FMT\_MTD.1.1/AuditLog** The TSF shall restrict the ability to *control export and deletion* of the *audit log records* to the **Audit User**<sup>107</sup> role.

### Application Note 38

*The control of export and deletion of the audit log records helps to ensure their protection against accidental or malicious deletion (deletion should normally occur only after the records have been exported and preserved outside the TOE). Note that this does not require the Audit User to carry out these export or delete operations manually as long as the actions are controlled by the Audit User.*

<b>FMT_MTD.1/FW_update</b>	<i>Management of TSF data</i>
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Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

**FMT\_MTD.1.1/FW\_update** The TSF shall restrict the ability to update<sup>108</sup> the HSM firmware<sup>109</sup> to the HSM SO<sup>110</sup> role.

### Application Note 39

*This SFR iteration is an addition to [CEN EN 419221-5] to support the firmware update capability mentioned as a refinement in FMT\_SMF.1.*

<b>FMT_MTD.1/FM_loading</b>	<i>Management of TSF data</i>
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Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

**FMT\_MTD.1.1/FM\_loading** The TSF shall restrict the ability to load<sup>111</sup> the embedded FM applications<sup>112</sup> to the HSM SO<sup>113</sup> role.

<sup>107</sup> Refinement of the 'Administrator' initial wording, as Audit User is the only HSM administrative role to control the export and deletion of audit data.

<sup>108</sup> [selection: change\_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]

<sup>109</sup> [assignment: list of TSF data]

<sup>110</sup> [assignment: the authorised identified roles].

<sup>111</sup> [selection: change\_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]

<sup>112</sup> [assignment: list of TSF data]

<sup>113</sup> [assignment: the authorised identified roles].

## Application Note 40

This SFR iteration is an addition to [CEN EN 419221-5] to support the FM loading capability mentioned as a refinement in FMT\_SMF.1.

### FMT\_MSA.1/GenKeys Management of security attributes (General Keys)

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

**FMT\_MSA.1.1/GenKeys** The TSF shall enforce the *Key Usage SFP* to restrict the ability to *modify* the security attributes listed in Table 6-13<sup>114</sup> to the conditions and actors specified in Table 6-13<sup>115</sup>.

**Table 6-13: Key Attributes Modification Table, instantiated for K7 General Keys**

Key attribute	Mapping to PP category / naming	Modification conditions
CKA_OUID	Key ID	Cannot be modified
CKA_CLASS	Key type	Cannot be modified
CKA_KEY_TYPE	Key type	Cannot be modified
CKA_AUTH_DATA	Authorisation Data	<p>Case of a User Partition: the attribute can be modified by Key Owner only when modification operation includes successful validation of current (pre-modification) authorisation data, or by Partition CO.</p> <p>Case of the Admin Partition: the attribute can be modified by Key Owner only when modification operation includes successful validation of current (pre-modification) authorisation data, or by the HSM SO.</p>

<sup>114</sup> [assignment: list of security attributes, to include attributes as specified in the Key Attributes Modification Table]

<sup>115</sup> [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and General Keys, to include at least the constraints specified in the Key Attributes Modification Table]



Key attribute	Mapping to PP category / naming	Modification conditions
CKA_ENCRYPT	Key Usage	<p>Case of a User Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p>Case of the Admin Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>
CKA_DECRYPT	Key Usage	<p>Case of a User Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p>Case of the Admin Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>
CKA_WRAP	Key Usage	<p>Case of a User Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p>Case of the Admin Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>

Key attribute	Mapping to PP category / naming	Modification conditions
CKA_UNWRAP	Key Usage	<p>Case of a User Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p>Case of the Admin Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>
CKA_SIGN	Key Usage	<p>Case of a User Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p>Case of the Admin Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>
CKA_VERIFY	Key Usage	<p>Case of a User Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p>Case of the Admin Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>

Key attribute	Mapping to PP category / naming	Modification conditions
CKA_DERIVE	Key Usage	<p>Case of a User Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p>Case of the Admin Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>
CKA_EXTRACTABLE	Export Flag	<p>Case of a User Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p>Case of the Admin Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>
CKA_ASSIGNED	Assigned Flag	<p>Case of a User Partition: the attribute can be modified only by Partition CO, and only to change from non-assigned to assigned</p> <p>Case of the Admin Partition: the attribute can be modified only by the HSM SO, and only to change from non-assigned to assigned</p>

Key attribute	Mapping to PP category / naming	Modification conditions
CKA_MODIFIABLE	-	<p>Case of a User Partition: The attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well, and only to change from modifiable to non-modifiable.</p> <p>Case of the Admin Partition: The attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well, and only to change from modifiable to non-modifiable.</p>
CKA_FAILED_KEY_AUTH_COUNT	-	<p>Case of a User Partition: the attribute can be modified only by Partition CO</p> <p>Case of the Admin Partition: the attribute can be modified only by the HSM SO or by the Administrator.</p>
CKA_KEYRING (Firmware 7.7.2 onwards)	-	<p>Case of a User Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p>Case of the Admin Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>

Key attribute	Mapping to PP category / naming	Modification conditions
CKA_KEYRING_OIUD (Firmware 7.7.2 onwards)	-	<p>Case of a User Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p>Case of the Admin Partition: If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>

### Application Note 41

*'Integrity protection data' is maintained automatically by the TSF on key objects (as stated in FDP\_SDI.2). However, it is not implemented as a security attribute, which is the reason why it is not listed in table 6-12.*

*The same applies to 're-authorisation conditions'. According to FIA\_UAU.6, re-authorisation is required after explicit rescinding of previous authorisation. As there is no other option, no dedicated security attribute is needed here.*

### FMT\_MSA.1/AKeys Management of security attributes (Assigned Keys)

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

**FMT\_MSA.1.1/AKeys** The TSF shall enforce the *Key Usage SFP* to restrict the ability to *modify* the security attributes listed in Table 6-14<sup>116</sup> to the conditions and actors specified in Table 6-14<sup>117</sup>.

**Table 6-14: Key Attributes Modification Table, instantiated for K7 Assigned Keys**

<sup>116</sup> [assignment: list of security attributes, to include attributes as specified in the Key Attributes Modification Table]

<sup>117</sup> [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and Assigned Keys to include at least the constraints specified in the Key Attributes Modification Table]

Key attribute	Mapping to PP category / naming	Modification conditions
CKA_OUID	Key ID	Cannot be modified
CKA_CLASS	Key type	Cannot be modified
CKA_KEY_TYPE	Key type	Cannot be modified
CKA_AUTH_DATA	Authorisation Data	Can be modified by Key Owner only when modification operation includes successful validation of current (pre-modification) authorisation data.
CKA_ENCRYPT	Key Usage	Cannot be modified
CKA_DECRYPT	Key Usage	Cannot be modified
CKA_WRAP	Key Usage	Cannot be modified
CKA_UNWRAP	Key Usage	Cannot be modified
CKA_SIGN	Key Usage	Cannot be modified
CKA_VERIFY	Key Usage	Cannot be modified
CKA_DERIVE	Key Usage	Cannot be modified
CKA_EXTRACTABLE	Export Flag	Cannot be modified
CKA_ASSIGNED	Assigned Flag	Cannot be modified
CKA_MODIFIABLE	-	Cannot be modified
CKA_FAILED_KEY_AUTH_COUNT	-	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> the attribute can be modified only by Partition CO.</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> the attribute can be modified only by the HSM SO.</p>

Key attribute	Mapping to PP category / naming	Modification conditions
CKA_KEYRING (Firmware 7.7.2 onwards)	Authorisation Data	Cannot be modified
CKA_KEYRING_OIUD (Firmware 7.7.2 onwards)	Authorisation Data	Cannot be modified

### Application Note 42

- ‘Integrity protection data’ is maintained automatically by the TSF on key objects (as stated in FDP\_SDI.2). However, it is not implemented as a security attribute, which is the reason why it is not listed in table 6-13.
- The same applies to ‘re-authorisation conditions’. According to FIA\_UAU.6, re-authorisation is required after explicit rescinding of previous authorisation. As there is no other option, no dedicated security attribute is needed here.

<b>FMT_MSA.3/Keys</b>	<i>Static attribute initialisation</i>
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Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes

FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

**FMT\_MSA.3.1/Keys** The TSF shall enforce the *Key Usage SFP* to provide restrictive<sup>118</sup> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

**FMT\_MSA.3.2/Keys** The TSF shall allow the authorised identified roles, according to Table 6-15<sup>119</sup> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

**Table 6-15: Key Attributes Initialisation Table, instantiated for K7 Keys**

Key Attribute	Initialization rules (Assigned Key)	Initialization rules (General Key)
CKA_OUID	Initialized by generation process.	

<sup>118</sup> [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]

<sup>119</sup> [assignment: the authorised identified roles, according to the constraints in the Key Attributes Initialisation Table]

Key Attribute	Initialization rules (Assigned Key)	Initialization rules (General Key)
CKA_CLASS	Initialized by generation process.	
CKA_KEY_TYPE	Initialized by generation process.	
CKA_AUTH_DATA	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO during generation (no default value).</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation (no default value).</p>	
CKA_ENCRYPT	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false.</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.</p>	
CKA_DECRYPT	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false.</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.</p>	
CKA_WRAP	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false.</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.</p>	
CKA_UNWRAP	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false.</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.</p>	
CKA_SIGN	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false.</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.</p>	
CKA_VERIFY	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false.</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.</p>	
CKA_DERIVE	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false.</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.</p>	



Key Attribute	Initialization rules (Assigned Key)	Initialization rules (General Key)
CKA_EXTRACTABLE	Set to false.	<u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false.  <u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.
CKA_ASSIGNED	Set to true.	Set to false.
CKA_MODIFIABLE	Set to false.	<u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is true.  <u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is true.
CKA_FAILED_KEY_AUTH_COUNT	Set to 0.	Set to 0.
CKA_KEYRING (Firmware 7.7.2 onwards)	<u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false. <u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.	
CKA_KEYRING_OUID (Firmware 7.7.2 onwards)	<u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO during generation (no default value). <u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation (no default value).	

### Application Note 43

*Regarding key import, The TOE will assign the default values specified above to imported general keys, for the attributes that are missing from the imported key (if any).*

## 6.3.7 Security audit data generation (FAU)

### FAU\_GEN.1 Audit data generation

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FPT\_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

**FAU\_GEN.1.1** The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions
- b. All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
- c. Startup of the TOE;
- d. Shutdown of the TOE
- e. Cryptographic key generation (FCS\_CKM.1);
- f. Cryptographic key destruction (FCS\_CKM.4);
- g. Failure of the random number generator (FCS\_RNG.1);
- h. Authentication and authorisation failure handling (FIA\_AFL.1): all unsuccessful authentication or authorisation attempts, the reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication or authorisation attempts and the blocking actions taken;
- i. All attempts to import or export keys (FDP\_IFF.1/KeyBasics);
- j. All modifications to attributes of keys (FDP\_ACF.1/KeyUsage, FMT\_MSA.1/GenKeys and FMT\_MSA.1/AKeys);
- k. Backup and restore (FDP\_ACF.1/Backup): use of any backup function, use of any restore function, unsuccessful restore because of detection of modification of the backup data;
- l. Integrity errors detected for keys (FDP\_SDI.2);
- m. Failures to establish secure channels (FTP\_TRP.1/Local, FTP\_TRP.1/External);
- n. Self-test completion (FPT\_TST\_EXT.1);
- o. Failures detected by the TOE (FPT\_FLS.1);
- p. All administrative actions (FMT\_SMF.1, FMT\_MSA.1 (all iterations), FMT\_MSA.3/Keys,);
- q. Unblocking of access (FMT\_MTD.1/Unblock);
- r. Modifications to audit parameters (affecting the content of the audit log) (FAU\_GEN.1)
- s. None<sup>120</sup>.

**FAU\_GEN.1.2** The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST: none<sup>121</sup>.

<sup>120</sup> [Assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]

<sup>121</sup> [Assignment: other audit relevant information]

**FAU\_GEN.2 User identity association**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FAU\_GEN.1 Audit data generation  
FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

**FAU\_GEN.2.1** For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

**FAU\_STG.2 Guarantees of audit data availability**

Hierarchical to: FAU\_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

Dependencies: FAU\_GEN.1 Audit data generation

**FAU\_STG.2.1** The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.

**FAU\_STG.2.2** The TSF shall be able to detect<sup>122</sup> unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

**FAU\_STG.2.3** The TSF shall ensure that *all* stored audit records will be maintained when the following conditions occur: *audit storage exhaustion*.

<sup>122</sup> [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect]

## 6.4 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirement level is **EAL4** augmented with **ALC\_FLR.2** and **AVA\_VAN.5**. The assurance components are identified in the table below (with augmentations in bold). It is noted that due to the physically protected environment in which the TOE operates (as expressed in OE.Env), the scope for physical attacks is limited.

**Table 6-16: Security Assurance Requirements**

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Security Target (ASE)	ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
	Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
	Security problem definition (ASE_SPD.1)
	Security objectives (ASE_OBJ.2)
	Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
	Derived security requirements (ASE_REQ.2)
	TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV)	Security architecture description (ADV_ARC.1)
	Complete functional specification (ADV_FSP.4)
	Basic modular design (ADV_TDS.3)
	Implementation representation of the TSF (ADV_IMP.1)
Guidance documents (AGD)	Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
	Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life cycle support (ALC)	Production support, acceptance procedures and automation (ALC_CMC.4)
	Problem tracking CM coverage (ALC_CMS.4)
	Delivery procedures (ALC_DEL.1)
	Identification of security measures (ALC_DVS.1)
	Developer defined life-cycle model (ALC_LCD.1)
	Well-defined development tools (ALC_TAT.1)
	<b>Flaw Reporting Procedures (ALC_FLR.2)</b>
Tests (ATE)	Functional testing (ATE_FUN.1)
	Analysis of coverage (ATE_COV.2)

	Testing: basic design (ATE_DPT.1)
	Independent testing – sample (ATE_IND.2)
Vulnerability assessment (AVA)	<b>Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN.5)</b>

### 6.4.1 Refinements of Security Assurance Requirements

The following refinements are made to selected assurance requirements in Table 6-16:

#### **ADV\_ARC.1** *Security architecture description*

##### **Refinement:**

The following specific topics shall be addressed as part of ADV\_ARC.1 for this Protection Profile. It is acceptable for references to deliverables supplied for other assurance families, such as ADV\_FSP, to be used to meet these requirements, provided that the relationship of the relevant interface specifications to the concepts in the Protection Profile is clear. Note that in some cases, the requirement for description of these particular aspects under ADV\_ARC is intended to make clear any differences between the full capabilities of the product and the scope of the Security Target.

1. In general cryptographic modules will make use of 'support keys' as part of their implementation of protection mechanisms, where these keys are generally not held on behalf of specific users<sup>123</sup> or client applications, but are used by the TOE to carry out its normal operations and as part of the implementation mechanism other SFRs and to protect the TSF itself. These support keys may be used for a variety of purposes (including aspects such as authentication, authorisation, secure channels, security of external storage, or internal data protection). For the purposes of this PP, support keys used by the TOE are treated as TSF data, and require a specific security rationale to be included as part of the ADV\_ARC.1 deliverables. This rationale shall include a description of the key architecture, identifying all support keys used by the TOE (at least in its evaluated configuration), their method of generation and storage, their purpose in TOE operation, and the ways in which they are protected so as to support the requirements of FDP\_IFF.1/KeyBasics and FDP\_ACF.1/KeyUsage (noting that the mechanisms used for support keys may differ from those used for user keys). Examples would be keys used for wrapping user keys in order to allow secure storage of the user keys, keys used to implement secure channels, and keys used to protect backups. The description shall demonstrate that sufficient entropy has been used in the generation of each support key, and the source of that entropy. The rationale shall demonstrate that these support keys cannot be exported/imported in a way that threatens the secure operation of the TOE. The evaluator shall include the description of the support keys in their analysis of the protection of user data (e.g. to confirm that it does not introduce vulnerabilities in the implementation of the SFRs).
2. If updates to the TOE software or firmware are supported then the ADV\_ARC.1 deliverables must describe how the TOE is protected against unauthorised updates, by using digital signatures. This shall be confirmed by evaluator testing (if updates are supported) to confirm that updates with invalid signatures are rejected without being executed. The digital signature algorithms used to protect updates shall be included in the scope of FCS\_COP.1 signature SFR(s).

<sup>123</sup> Some support keys may be seen as being held on behalf of administrators, but the main intention of distinguishing support keys and user keys is for the ADV\_ARC.1 deliverables to describe all the different types of key available, their properties, and their relationship to the SFRs in this Protection Profile.

3. The ADV\_ARC.1 deliverables shall in particular describe:

- a. Any use that the TOE makes of an audit server
- b. The locations used for any externally stored keys and the structure and format of the externally stored keys including the cryptographic structures that protect the keys in their externally stored form, and that bind them to their attributes (support keys are separately addressed by the description required in item 1 above)
- c. All key import and/or export functions and the secure channels that they use
- d. The secure channels supported by the TOE and the authentication mechanisms that they use (cf. FTP\_TRP.1/Local & FTP\_TRP.1/External)
- e. All local and external interfaces used for communications with users, client applications, audit data, and stored TOE data (cf. Figure 1-3)
- f. The specific key attributes supported, their method of representation (e.g. the relevant data structures and permitted values) and the method by which they are bound to the corresponding key value (cf. FMT\_MSA.1). This also includes identifying the types of keys (if any) that support re-authorisation conditions described in FIA\_UAU.6/KeyAuth
- g. The user types and roles supported, the interfaces by which they interact with the TOE (e.g. a local administrator console or an externally available API), the authentication methods used (cf. FIA\_UAU.1), and any privileges available to the user type/role
- h. All of the cryptographic functions provided and whether any non-endorsed cryptographic algorithms and/or cryptographic functions are available (cf. FCS\_COP.1)
- i. The authorisation methods used for keys (cf. FIA\_UAU.6/KeyAuth & FDP\_ACC.1/KeyUsage)
- j. Description of the way in which the TOE ensures that it only holds authorisation data for the minimum time possible before deallocating it according to FDP\_RIP.1
- k. If the TOE provides backup operations then the ADV\_ARC deliverables shall describe the use of support keys by the backup and restore processes (cf. FDP\_ACF.1/Backup), and in particular shall describe the ways in which confidentiality and integrity of the backup are provided, and the way in which the TOE rejects an attempt to carry out a restore process using backup data that has been modified
- l. Any mechanisms that the TOE uses to support dual person control (cf. FDP\_ACF.1/Backup).

<b>AGD_OPE.1</b> <i>Operational user guidance</i>
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**Refinement:**

The following specific topics shall be addressed as part of the Operational Guidance for the TOE:

- 1. The specific ways in which the TOE needs to be configured and used in order to provide qualified electronic signatures and qualified electronic seals that meet the requirements of [Regulation]. This includes ways in which the TOE can ensure that the signatory can, with high level of confidence, have sole control over the use of the secret key that acts as his/her signature creation data. Thus, for example, it may be necessary for client applications to use TOE interfaces according to certain guidance in order to correctly implement the requirements on attributes of keys as described in this ST. It may be necessary for the TOE to define ways in which secret keys to be used for signing

purposes can be created in a way that does not allow subsequent modification of some or all of their attributes, e.g. by an administrator, before they are assigned to the signatory (cf. FMT\_MSA.1/AKeys). The intention of this aspect of the operational user guidance documentation is to identify the configuration and secure use required for a particular TOE, and how it is necessary to connect this with other aspects such as procedural controls and client applications in the operational environment.

The evaluators shall test the identified ways of using the TOE for qualified electronic signatures and qualified electronic seals to demonstrate that the description in the Operational Guidance is suitably complete, and that the keys produced by following the Operational Guidance do indeed meet the requirements of requirements of [Regulation], Annex II & Annex III] for qualified electronic signatures and qualified electronic seals.

2. The use of trusted channels (cf. FTP\_TRP.1/Local & FTP\_TRP.1/External).
3. The available key attributes, their possible values, and the meaning of each of these values (cf. FMT\_MSA.1/GenKeys and FMT\_MSA.1/AKeys, including their use to constrain the period and number of uses that are enabled by authorisation of a key (cf. FIA\_UAU.6/KeyAuth).
4. Identification of any non-endorsed cryptographic algorithms and/or cryptographic functions that are available (cf. FCS\_COP.1).
5. Identification of any other cryptographic algorithms and operations that are not included in the scope of the Security Target.
6. Possible errors from the self-test process and the actions that should be taken in response to each (cf. FPT\_TST\_EXT.1).
7. Specific failures detected by the TOE (cf. FPT\_FLS.1).
8. Audit functions and their configuration (including specification of the available audit records), along with any other actions that are associated with audit functions (e.g. archiving or viewing audit records, or use of an external audit server) (cf. FAU\_GEN.1, FAU\_STG.2, FMT\_MTD.1/AuditLog).
9. Any configuration and operation requirements for dual-control operations (cf. FDP\_ACF.1/Backup).
10. If backup is provided by the TOE (cf. FDP\_ACF.1/Backup), then the Operational Guidance shall describe the backup and restore functions, and the administrator roles that are required to carry them out.
11. If key import is provided by the TOE, then the Operational Guidance shall describe how attributes are defined for any imported keys (cf. FMT\_MSA.3/Keys). The evaluators shall test the import process to demonstrate that the description in the Operational Guidance is suitably complete, and that the keys imported have attributes appropriately defined. Similarly if key export is provided by the TOE then the Operational Guidance shall describe whether attributes are exported with keys (and if so, then how the attributes are represented and associated with the exported key), and the evaluators shall test the export process to demonstrate that the description in the Operational Guidance is suitably complete, and that the handling of attributes is as described.

#### **ATE\_IND.2** *Independent testing – sample*

##### **Refinement:**

The following specific topics shall be addressed as part of the independent testing of the TOE:

1. The evaluator shall execute the electronic signature and electronic seal operations provided by the TOE and shall confirm that the signatures and seals returned by the TOE correspond to the correct DTBS.

2. If software and/or firmware updates are supported by the TOE then the evaluator shall carry out tests to ensure that only updates with valid digital signatures can be installed on the TOE.

**AVA\_VAN.5** *Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis***Refinement:**

Regarding the protection of the TOE against physical attacks: because of the requirement for a physically secure environment with regular inspections (cf. OE.Env), the level of protection (and hence resistance to attack potential) that is required by the implementation of FPT\_PHP.1 and FPT\_PHP.3 for this TOE is equivalent to the level of assessment in Section 7.7.2 Physical security general requirements and Section 7.7.3 Physical security requirements for each physical security embodiment in ISO/IEC 19790:2012 [ISO 19790] for Security Level 3.



# 7 TOE Summary Specification

## 7.1 Initialization, partitions, sessions and roles

### 7.1.1 Initialization

Before the module can be used to perform any cryptographic or key management functions, it must first be initialized. Initialisation causes the HSM to be zeroized<sup>124</sup> and creates the HSM Security Officer role (HSM SO) in the Admin Partition. The HSM SO must then set the configurable policies at the cryptographic module level and can create User Partitions with associated roles, to make the cryptographic module ready for use.

### 7.1.2 Admin and User Partitions

Cryptographic keys are stored and managed inside containers called partitions. The TOE supports two types of partitions:

- > The Admin partition is mandatory. Its primary purpose is to support administrative tasks at the HSM level. Specific roles are defined in the Admin partition and there can be only one Admin partition inside the TOE.
- > User partitions are optional. The primary purpose of a User partition (also called Application partition) is to group all keys belonging to a same entity or application in a dedicated container isolated from the other partitions. Specific roles are supported at the user partition level, which are different from the roles defined in the Admin partition.

Any type of partition (Admin partition or User partition) can contain cryptographic keys. For a given partition, the management and usage of the related key material is restricted to the roles assigned to that partition, therefore enforcing a strict isolation between the different partitions managed inside the TOE.

### 7.1.3 Sessions

Any user must access the module through a session. Sessions are initially opened as Public sessions and may remain Public or become Private (authenticated) following a successful user authentication. Session states are kept separate based on the user authentication state stored by the module. The module allows multiple user identities to be authenticated at a time. Once authenticated, a session becomes bound to the user identity and has access to all cryptographic operations appropriate to the user's role and may access private objects generated on behalf of the user in previous sessions. Although there may be many users authenticated to the cryptographic module, there is effectively only one thread of execution within the module and, therefore, only one command being executed from request through to response at any given time.

<sup>124</sup> 'HSM zeroisation' means that all user information and user key material are erased. The bootloader, firmware and HSM own data (HSM keys and certificates) are not erased.

## 7.1.4 Roles

The following roles are explicitly or implicitly enforced by the module:

**Table 7-1: Module roles**

Role	Description
<b>HSM Security Officer (HSM SO)</b>	<p>– Admin partition role –</p> <p>Authorised to install and configure the TOE, set and maintain global HSM security policies, create and delete application partitions.</p> <p>The HSM SO can also create the Administrator role and reset the Administrator password (configuration dependent).</p> <p>The HSM SO can also perform key management tasks and cryptographic operations for the Admin partition. Note that the HSM SO can only use key objects if he/she can also successfully authenticate as the Key Owner.</p> <p>The TOE can have only one HSM SO.</p>
<b>Administrator</b>	<p>– Admin partition role –</p> <p>Optional Admin partition role, performs key management tasks and cryptographic operations for the Admin partition, without having privileges to unblock keys / assign keys / reset key authentication data.</p> <p>Note that the Administrator can only use key objects if he/she can also successfully authenticate as the Key Owner.</p>
<b>Audit User</b>	<p>– Admin partition role –</p> <p>Initializes the Audit container containing the secret key used to generate Message Authentication Code (MAC) for secure audit messages alongside configuring logging levels for the HSM.</p>
<b>Application Partition Security Officer (Partition SO)</b>	<p>– User partition role –</p> <p>Creates partition level roles, activates partition, sets and changes partition-level policies, option to reset Crypto Officer password (configuration dependent).</p>
<b>STC User</b>	<p>Implicit role whose main purpose is to authenticate remote client connections from outside the TOE hardware appliance boundary<sup>125</sup>.</p>

<sup>125</sup> Usage of the STC is mandatory to authenticate remote client applications. Note that local client applications can be authenticated through the STC as well, although this is not mandatory - as explained in section 7.5 “Trusted Channel”.

Role	Description
<b>Application Partition Crypto Officer (Partition CO)</b>	<p>– User partition role –</p> <p>Partition role authorised to create, use, destroy and transfer key objects for a given partition. Can optionally create the Partition Limited CO and Partition CU and perform initial assignment of key authorisation data.</p> <p>Note that the Partition CO can only use key objects if he/she can also successfully authenticate as the Key Owner.</p>
<b>Application Partition Limited Crypto Officer (Partition Limited CO)</b>	<p>– User partition role –</p> <p>Optional partition role authorised to create, use and delete key objects, and perform initial assignment of key authorisation data without having privileges to create Partition Limited CO or CU / reset login credentials.</p> <p>Note that the Partition Limited CO can only use and delete key objects if he/she can also successfully authenticate as the Key Owner.</p>
<b>Crypto User (Partition CU)</b>	<p>– User partition role –</p> <p>Partition role authorised to use the key objects within the partition (e.g., sign, encrypt/decrypt). Note that the Partition CU can only use key objects if he/she can also successfully authenticate as the Key Owner.</p>
<b>Key Owner</b>	<p>Implicit role used to authenticate the owner of a key through verification of the related key authorisation data.</p>

HSM SO, Administrator, Partition SO, Audit User, Partition CO, Partition Limited CO and Partition CU are explicit roles supported by the HSM. These roles are enforced at the session level.

STC User is an implicit role used to authenticate local and external client applications, both of which are supported by the TOE. Note that authentication through the STC is mandatory for external client applications, and optional for local client applications, as mentioned in Section 7.5 “Trusted path”. When the STC is used, the prior authentication of the client application and the subsequent establishment of the STC secure channel are mandatory steps before the application can send cryptographic operations or key management commands to the module.

Key Owner is also an implicit role used to authenticate the owner of a key (through verification of the related key authorisation data).

The following table indicates (at a high-level) which activities can be performed by each role. It also provides a link to the subjects defined in the Protection Profile.

**Table 7-2: Module roles mapped to function.**

Function		HSM Role(s)	Related PP subject
Initialisation, configuration		HSM SO, Partition SO	S.Admin
Audit Log Configuration		Audit User	S.Admin
Key Management		Partition CO (for User partitions) HSM SO, Administrator (for Admin partition)	S.Admin
Client Application Authentication		STC User	S.Application
Application Key Use	Session authentication	Partition CO, Partition Limited CO, Partition CU (for User partitions, and depending on configuration of TOE and deployment goals) HSM SO, Administrator (for Admin partition)	S.User
	Key usage	Key Owner	

Note: as defined in [CEN EN 419221-5], the subject S.Application represents “a client application, or process acting on behalf of a client application and that communicates with the TOE over a local or external interface”. In the above table, it can be directly mapped to the HSM implicit role “STC User” when the Secure Trusted Channel (STC) is enforced between the client application and the TOE. As mentioned previously, usage of the STC is mandatory for remote client applications and optional for local ones. In the latter case, when STC is not used, S.Application is not mapped to any specific role supported by the TOE, and the first authentication step occurs at the session level.

## 7.2 Authentication

### 7.2.1 Authentication methods

STC User (e.g. remote client application) is authenticated through the verification of a digital certificate during the establishment of the STC secure channel between the application and the module.

Two models for authentication are supported for all the roles supported at the session level:

- > **Token based authentication** - where authentication data is provided by means of a trusted PIN Entry Device (PED). The PED can be connected locally through a separate port to the TOE (local PED) or remotely (remote PED). The PED and software required to operate it are the responsibility of the IT Environment.
- > **Password based authentication** – where authentication is based on a configurable length password.

The model of authentication to be used is determined during HSM manufacturing and this model is used for all roles.

Key Owner is authenticated through the verification of the key authorisation data associated to each key (whatever it is a General Key or an Assigned Key). Authorisation as the Key Owner is always separately required before a key can be actually used in a cryptographic function (or exported), regardless of any other authorisation that may have been established.

## 7.2.2 Allowed operations before authentication

For all roles, identification and authentication are done simultaneously. The operations/commands that can be executed prior authentication depend on the considered role as listed below.

**Table 7-3 Allowed operations before authentication by role.**

Role	Operations/commands allowed before authentication
STC User	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; HSM self-tests</li> <li>&gt; Submit bootloader commands for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Diagnostics and status information</li> <li>• HSM wipe-out</li> <li>• Completing the boot process by passing the execution control to the Firmware</li> <li>• Instructing the Firmware to delete FM applications stored in the TOE's flash memory</li> </ul> </li> <li>&gt; Query HSM status, authenticated identity of the HSM, configuration and licenses</li> <li>&gt; Query container configuration</li> <li>&gt; PED configuration and communication requests</li> <li>&gt; Query log status and submit external log messages for addition to secure audit log</li> <li>&gt; STC management operations (request public key, activate channel, open and close channel)</li> <li>&gt; Request state of HSM roles</li> <li>&gt; Submit public requests to embedded FM applications</li> </ul>

Role	Operations/commands allowed before authentication
All session roles (HSM SO, Partition SO, Administrator, Audit User, Partition CO, Partition Limited CO and Partition CU)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; HSM self-tests</li> <li>&gt; Submit bootloader commands for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Diagnostics and status information</li> <li>• HSM wipe-out</li> <li>• Completing the boot process by passing the execution control to the Firmware</li> <li>• Instructing the Firmware to delete FM applications stored in the TOE's flash memory</li> </ul> </li> <li>&gt; Query HSM status, authenticated identity of the HSM, configuration and licenses</li> <li>&gt; Query container configuration</li> <li>&gt; PED configuration and communication requests</li> <li>&gt; Query log status and submit external log messages for addition to secure audit log</li> <li>&gt; Request state of HSM roles</li> <li>&gt; Query container object identify (from known OUID or object handle)</li> <li>&gt; Session management functions (i.e. open, close, close all, clean access, get session info)</li> <li>&gt; Login requests</li> <li>&gt; HSM deactivation</li> <li>&gt; Zeroize the HSM</li> <li>&gt; Request new initialization of HSM</li> <li>&gt; Create, modify, destroy and get attributes of public partition objects</li> <li>&gt; Submit public requests to embedded FM applications</li> </ul>
> Key Owner	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; HSM Self-tests</li> <li>&gt; Any operation except for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cryptographic operation using an Assigned Key or a General Key</li> <li>• Export operation of a General Key</li> <li>• Modification of the authorisation data of an Assigned Key or a General Key</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

Any other operation/command requires authentication of the considered role.

Note: 'HSM zeroisation' means that all user information and user key material are erased. The bootloader, firmware and HSM own data (HSM keys and certificates) are not erased. 'HSM wipe-out' means that all HSM content (user information, user keys, HSM keys and certificates, firmware) are erased; the bootloader still remains.

### 7.2.3 Authentication failure handling

For all roles, after a defined number of consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts is met, the module blocks some functionalities until an unblocking condition is satisfied. The functionalities being blocked, as well as the unblocking condition, depend on the considered role according to Table 7-4:

**Table 7-4: Summary table for authentication failure handling.**

Role	Number of consecutive authentication/authorisation failures (as considered in FIA_AFL.1.1)	Functionality being blocked (as considered in FIA_AFL.1.2)	Unblocking condition (as considered in FIA_AFL.1.2)
HSM SO	A positive integer within the range [1 to 3], configurable by the HSM SO.  Note: the default value is 3 and can be changed by the HSM SO once authenticated.	All HSM functionalities except HSM re-initialization.	None. HSM is totally zeroized.
Partition SO	A positive integer within the range [1 to 10], configurable by the Partition SO.  Note: the default value is 10 and can be changed by the Partition SO once authenticated	All the functionalities of the related partition	None. Partition is totally zeroized
Administrator	Same number as for the HSM SO	Administrator role is locked out.	If the module policy "Partition SO can reset PIN" is enabled, the HSM SO can unlock the Administrator role by resetting its authentication data.  Otherwise, there is no unblocking capability, and the Administrator role must be re-initialized.

<b>Role</b>	<b>Number of consecutive authentication/authorisation failures (as considered in FIA_AFL.1.1)</b>	<b>Functionality being blocked (as considered in FIA_AFL.1.2)</b>	<b>Unblocking condition (as considered in FIA_AFL.1.2)</b>
Audit User	Same number as for the HSM SO.	Audit user login and related capabilities (role is locked out)	After a 60 seconds time period has elapsed
Partition CO	Same number as for the partition SO	Partition CO, Partition Limited CO and Partition CU roles are locked out.	<p>If the module policy "Partition SO can reset PIN" is enabled, the Partition SO can unlock the Partition CO role by resetting its authentication data.</p> <p>Otherwise, there is no unblocking capability. All user keys contained in the partition are lost and the partition CO role must be re-initialized.</p>
Partition Limited CO	Same number as for the partition SO	Partition Limited CO role is locked out. Partition CO and Partition CU roles are still functional.	The Partition CO can unlock the Partition Limited CO role by resetting its credentials.
Partition CU	Same number as for the partition SO	Partition CU role is locked out. Partition CO and Partition Limited CO roles are still functional.	The Partition CO can unlock the Partition CU role by resetting its credentials.
Key Owner	3	The related key is blocked: all operations on that key or using that key are forbidden (cryptographic operations, export, change of authorisation data)	The Partition CO can unblock the key by setting the number of failed authorisations to any integer value in the range [0...2], or by resetting the key authorisation data for General Keys.



Role	Number of consecutive authentication/authorisation failures (as considered in FIA_AFL.1.1)	Functionality being blocked (as considered in FIA_AFL.1.2)	Unblocking condition (as considered in FIA_AFL.1.2)
STC User	1	Locking of STC authentication mechanism	After a 30 second time period has elapsed

Note: 'Zeroisation' (applied to the HSM or to a partition) means that all user information and user key material are erased.

## 7.2.4 Re-authentication conditions

As mentioned in Section 7.2.1, the Key Owner is granted access to a secret key after presentation of the correct key authorisation data. The authentication remains valid until an explicit rescinding of previous authorisation for access to the secret key.

# 7.3 Cryptography

## 7.3.1 Cryptographic key generation

The following Key Generation and Key Derivation algorithms are supported by the module and considered within the present security evaluation:

**Table 7-5: Key generation methods.**

Key Generation Algorithm	Key Sizes	Applicable Standards
RSA Key Generation	Modulus length 2048, 3072, 4096	FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] Appendix B.3.3 and B.3.6 with primality tests from C.3
ECC Key Generation	<p>NIST curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B409, B-571</p> <p>Brainpool curves: brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP160t1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP192t1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP224t1, brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP256t1, brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP320t1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP384t1, brainpoolP512r1, brainpoolP512t1</p>	<p>FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] Appendix B.4.1 and B.4.2, Appendix D</p> <p>RFC- 5639 [IETF RFC Brainpool]</p>
DSA Domain Parameter Generation	Modulus length 2048 and 3072	FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] chapter 2.1 and Appendix A.1.1.2

Key Generation Algorithm	Key Sizes	Applicable Standards
DSA Key-Pair Generation	Modulus length 2048 and 3072	FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] Section A.2.1
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Domain Parameter Generation	Modulus length 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits	FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] Appendix A.1
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key-Pair Generation	Modulus length 2048,3072 and 4096 bits	FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] Appendix A.2.1
AES	128,192 and 256 bits	FIPS Pub 197 [FIPS 197] chapters 3.1 and 6
Generic Secret	128 – 4096 bits (in increments of 8 bits)	N/A

**Table 7-6 Key derivation methods.**

Key Derivation Algorithm	Key Sizes	Supported PRF / Hashing Function / Cipher	Applicable Standards
Counter Mode KDF	128,192 and 256 bits when AES is cipher.  128 - 4096 bits when HMAC PRF is used	AES-CMAC, HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512..	Counter Mode KDF from FIPS SP 800-108 [SP800-108] chapter 4 and 5.1 with FIPS Pub 197 [FIPS 197] for supported cipher.
Single-step KDF	None	SHA-512	[SP800-56C] chapter 4
EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement	Curve P-224	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512.	ECC - Ephemeral Unified, One Pass DH from NIST Special Pub 800-56A [SP800-56A]
EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement	Curve P-256	SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512.	ECC - Ephemeral Unified, One Pass DH from NIST Special Pub 800-56A [SP800-56A]
EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement	Curve P-384	SHA-384, SHA-512.	ECC - Ephemeral Unified, One Pass DH from NIST Special Pub 800-56A [SP800-56A]
EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement	Curve P521	SHA-512.	ECC - Ephemeral Unified, One Pass DH and Full Unified from NIST Special Pub 800-56A [SP800-56A]

Key Derivation Algorithm	Key Sizes	Supported PRF / Hashing Function / Cipher	Applicable Standards
EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement	brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP160t1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP192t1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP224t1, brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP256t1, brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP320t1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP384t1, brainpoolP512r1, brainpoolP512t1	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512.	ECC - Ephemeral Unified, One Pass DH from NIST Special Pub 800-56A [SP800-56A]  RFC- 5639 [IETF RFC Brainpool]
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement	Modulus 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512.	FFC - dhHybrid1, dhEphem, dhHybrid1Flow and dhOneFlow from NIST Special Pub 800-56A [SP800-56A]

### 7.3.2 Cryptographic operations

The following cryptographic algorithms are supported by the module and considered within the present security evaluation.

**Table 7-7: Digital signature generation**

Signature Generation Algorithm	Key Sizes	Hash Algorithm	Applicable Standards
RSA	Modulus length 2048 and 3072 bits	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	RSASSA-PSS and RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 from PKCS #1 [PKCS#1] chapters 8.1.1 and 8.2.1
RSA	Modulus length 4096 bits	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	RSASSA-PSS and RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 from PKCS #1 [PKCS#1] chapters 8.1.1 and 8.2.1
RSA	Modulus length 2048 and 3072 bits	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	ANSI X9.31 Signature Generation as covered under FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] chapter 5.4

Signature Generation Algorithm	Key Sizes	Hash Algorithm	Applicable Standards
RSA	Modulus length 4096 bits	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	ANSI X9.31 Signature Generation as covered under FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] chapter 5.4
DSA	Modulus length 2048 and 3072 bits	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] chapter 4.6
ECDSA	<p>NIST curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B409, B-571</p> <p>Brainpool curves:  brainpoolP160r1,  brainpoolP160t1,  brainpoolP192r1,  brainpoolP192t1,  brainpoolP224r1,  brainpoolP224t1,  brainpoolP256r1,  brainpoolP256t1,  brainpoolP320r1,  brainpoolP320t1,  brainpoolP384r1,  brainpoolP384t1,  brainpoolP512r1,  brainpoolP512t1</p>	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	<p>FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] chapter 6.4 and Appendix D</p> <p>RFC- 5639 [IETF RFC Brainpool]</p>

Table 7-8: Digital signature verification

Signature Verification Algorithm	Key Sizes	Hash Algorithm	Applicable Standards
RSA	Modulus length 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	RSASSA-PSS and RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 from PKCS #1 [PKCS#1] chapters 8.1.2 and 8.2.2

Signature Verification Algorithm	Key Sizes	Hash Algorithm	Applicable Standards
RSA	Modulus length 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	ANSI X9.31 Signature Generation as covered under FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] chapter 5.4
DSA	Modulus length 1024, 2048 and 3072 bits	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] chapter 4.7
ECDSA	<p>NIST curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B409, B-571</p> <p>Brainpool curves: brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP160t1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP192t1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP224t1, brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP256t1, brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP320t1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP384t1, brainpoolP512r1, brainpoolP512t1</p>	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	<p>FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS 186-4] chapter 6.4 and Appendix D</p> <p>RFC- 5639 [IETF RFC Brainpool]</p>

Table 7-9: Hash algorithms

Message Digest Algorithm	Key Sizes	Applicable Standards
SHA-224	None	FIPS Pub 180-4 [FIPS 180-4] chapter 6.3
SHA-256	None	FIPS Pub 180-4 [FIPS 180-4] chapter 6.2
SHA-384	None	FIPS Pub 180-4 [FIPS 180-4] chapter 6.5
SHA-512	None	FIPS Pub 180-4 [FIPS 180-4] chapter 6.4
SHA3-224	None	FIPS Pub 202 FIPS 202, chapter 5.2 and 6.1
SHA3-256	None	FIPS Pub 202 FIPS 202, chapter 5.2 and 6.1

Message Digest Algorithm	Key Sizes	Applicable Standards
SHA3-384	None	FIPS Pub 202 FIPS 202, chapter 5.2 and 6.1
SHA3-512	None	FIPS Pub 202 FIPS 202, chapter 5.2 and 6.1

Table 7-10: Symmetric encrypt/decrypt

Symmetric Algorithm	Key Sizes	Supported Mode	Applicable Standards
AES	128, 192 and 256 bits	ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB8, CFB128, CTR	FIPS Pub 197 [FIPS 197] chapter 5 and NIST SP 800-38A [SP800-38A] chapter 6
AES	128, 192 and 256 bits	GCM with 128-bit tag	FIPS Pub 197 [FIPS 197] chapter 5 and NIST SP 800-38D [SP800-38D] chapter 7
AES	128 and 256 bits	XTS-AES	FIPS Pub 197 [FIPS 197] chapter 5 and NIST SP 800-38E [SP800-38E]
AES	128, 192 and 256 bits	AES-KW and AES-KWP	FIPS Pub 197 [FIPS 197] chapter 5 and NIST SP 800-38F [SP800-38F] chapter 6

Table 7-11: Asymmetric encrypt/decrypt

Asymmetric Algorithm	Key Sizes	Applicable Standards
RSA	Modulus length 2048 to 4096 bits	RSAES-OAEP from PKCS #1 v2.1 KTS-OAEP-basic from NIST SP800-56B [SP800-56B] chapter 9.2 KAS1-basic from NIST SP800-56B [SP800-56B] chapter 8.2

**Table 7-12: Message Authentication Code (MAC)**

MAC Algorithm	Key Sizes	Supported PRF / Hashing Function	Applicable Standards
HMAC	128 – 4096 bits (in increments of 8 bits)	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.	FIPS Pub 198-1 [FIPS 198-1]
AES CMAC	128, 192 and 256 bits	N/A	NIST SP 800-38B [SP800-38B] chapter 6
AES GMAC	128, 192 and 256 bits	N/A	NIST SP 800-38D [SP800-38D] chapter 7

### 7.3.3 Random number generation

The module provides a physical random number generator (PTRNG) that meets [AIS31] PTG.2 requirements.

RNG characteristics consistent with PTG.2 are:

- > A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy source immediately when the RNG has started. When a total failure is detected, no random numbers are output.
- > If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while the RNG is being operated, the RNG prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw random numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source.
- > The online test detects non-tolerable statistical defects of the raw random number sequence (i) immediately when the RNG has started, and (ii) while the RNG is being operated. The TSF does not output any random numbers before the power-up online test has finished successfully or when a defect has been detected.
- > The online test procedure is effective to detect non-tolerable weaknesses of the random numbers soon.
- > The online test procedure checks the quality of the raw random number sequence. It is triggered continuously. The online test is suitable for detecting non-tolerable statistical defects of the statistical properties of the raw random numbers within an acceptable period of time.
- > Test procedure A (as defined in the testing procedures for [AIS31]) does not distinguish the internal random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG.
- > The average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.997.

The module also provides a hybrid deterministic random number generator (RNG) that meets [AIS31] DRG.4 requirements. RNG characteristics are:

- > The internal state of the RNG uses the PTRNG of class PTG.2 as random source.
- > The RNG provides forward secrecy.

- > The RNG provides backward secrecy even if the current internal state is known.
- > The RNG provides enhanced forward secrecy:
  - On demand,
  - On condition: after  $2^{32}$  generate requests or  $2^{32}$  bits generated, whichever comes first
  - After 10 seconds.
- > The internal state of the RNG is seeded by the PTRNG of class PTG.2.
- > The RNG generates output for which  $k > 2^{34}$  strings of bit length 128 are mutually different with probability  $1 - \epsilon$ , with  $\epsilon < 2^{-16}$ .
- > Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish the random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG. The random numbers pass test procedure A (as defined in the testing procedures for [AIS31]) and NIST SP 800-22 test suite.

## 7.4 User data protection

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### 7.4.1 Flow control policy

The following flow control rules are enforced by the module:

- > Export of secret keys is only allowed provided that the secret key is not an Assigned Key, that the secret key is encrypted, and that a secure channel (providing authentication and integrity protection) is used for the export.
- > Public keys are always exported with integrity protection of their key value and attributes.
- > Keys are only imported over a secure channel (providing authentication and integrity protection).
- > A secret key can only be imported if it is a non-Assigned key.
- > Keys are only imported in encrypted form.
- > Unblocking access to a key does not allow any subject other than those authorised to access the key at the time when it was blocked.
- > No subject is allowed to access the plaintext value of any secret key directly.
- > No subject is allowed to export a secret key in plaintext.
- > No subject is allowed to export an Assigned Key.
- > No subject is allowed to export a secret key without submitting the correct authorisation data for the key.
- > No subject is allowed to access intermediate values in any operation that uses a secret key.
- > A key with an Export Flag value marking it as non-exportable shall not be exported.

### 7.4.2 Access control policy

The following access control rules are enforced by the module:



- > Attributes of a key can only be changed by an authorised subject, and only as permitted in the Key Attributes Modification Table.
- > Only subjects with current authorisation for a specific secret key are allowed to carry out operations using the plaintext value of that key.
- > Only cryptographic functions permitted by the secret key's Key Usage attribute can be carried out using the secret key.

### 7.4.3 Stored data integrity protection

The module enforces integrity protection on all keys using SHA-256. The integrity mechanism protects both the key value and its security attributes. It consists of a MAC value calculated over the whole key object (key value + security attributes), which is verified prior allowing any operation on (or with) the key. Should the MAC verification fail, the module prohibits the targeted operation and returns an error message. The event is also notified through a record in the audit log.

### 7.4.4 Handling of residual data

The module ensures that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource from the following objects:

- > Authorisation data
- > Secret keys

## 7.5 Trusted Channel

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The module implements a secure channel (called STC) between itself and external (remote) client applications. The STC enforces authentication of its end points and protects all information communicated over the channel from unauthorised modification and disclosure. It is required to use the STC for all security-related services, including:

- > Cryptographic operations
- > Operations on keys
- > Authentication operations

Note that the communication with local client applications (within the same local server or appliance boundary) does not require the STC, since the local environment provides sufficient protection. However, the STC can be used for such communication as well.

The inter-process communication channel between the TOE and the embedded FM applications (stored within the PCI-e card) is considered as a trusted path as well: as for the local client applications, the local environment provides sufficient protection.

## 7.6 Key Management

### 7.6.1 Key security attributes

The following security attributes are associated to any General or Assigned Key to enforce the access control and flow control policies:

**Table 7-13 Summary key attributes used by the module to support claims in this ST.**

Key attribute	Mapping to PP category / naming
CKA_OUID	Key ID
CKA_CLASS	Key type
CKA_KEY_TYPE	Key type
CKA_AUTH_DATA	Authorisation Data
CKA_ENCRYPT	Key Usage
CKA_DECRYPT	Key Usage
CKA_WRAP	Key Usage
CKA_UNWRAP	Key Usage
CKA_SIGN	Key Usage
CKA_VERIFY	Key Usage
CKA_DERIVE	Key Usage
CKA_EXTRACTABLE	Export Flag
CKA_ASSIGNED	Assigned Flag
CKA_MODIFIABLE	-
CKA_FAILED_KEY_AUTH_COUNT	-
CKA_KEYRING (Firmware 7.7.2 onwards)	-
CKA_KEYRING_OUID (Firmware 7.7.2 onwards)	-

The TSF enforces the following modifications rules on security attributes of General Keys:

**Table 7-14: Summary of key attribute modification rules for General Keys.**

Key attribute	Mapping to PP category / naming	Modification conditions
CKA_OUID	Key ID	Cannot be modified
CKA_CLASS	Key type	Cannot be modified
CKA_KEY_TYPE	Key type	Cannot be modified
CKA_AUTH_DATA	Authorisation Data	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> the attribute can be modified by Key Owner only when modification operation includes successful validation of current (pre-modification) authorisation data, or by Partition CO.</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> the attribute can be modified by Key Owner only when modification operation includes successful validation of current (pre-modification) authorisation data, or by the HSM SO.</p>
CKA_ENCRYPT	Key Usage	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>

Key attribute	Mapping to PP category / naming	Modification conditions
CKA_DECRYPT	Key Usage	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>
CKA_WRAP	Key Usage	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>
CKA_UNWRAP	Key Usage	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>

Key attribute	Mapping to PP category / naming	Modification conditions
CKA_SIGN	Key Usage	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>
CKA_VERIFY	Key Usage	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>
CKA_DERIVE	Key Usage	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>

Key attribute	Mapping to PP category / naming	Modification conditions
CKA_EXTRACTABLE	Export Flag	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> If (CKA_MODIFIABLE == true), the attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well. Cannot be modified if (CKA_MODIFIABLE == false).</p>
CKA_ASSIGNED	Assigned Flag	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> the attribute can be modified only by Partition CO, and only to change from non-assigned to assigned</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> the attribute can be modified only by the HSM SO, and only to change from non-assigned to assigned</p>
CKA_MODIFIABLE	-	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> The attribute is modifiable by Partition CO or Partition Limited CO provided he/she is the Key Owner as well, and only to change from modifiable to non-modifiable.</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> The attribute is modifiable by HSM SO or by Administrator provided he/she is the Key Owner as well, and only to change from modifiable to non-modifiable.</p>
CKA_FAILED_KEY_AUTH_COUNT	-	<p><u>Case of a User Partition:</u> the attribute can be modified only by Partition CO</p> <p><u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> the attribute can be modified only by the HSM SO or by the Administrator.</p>
CKA_KEYRING (Firmware 7.7.2 onwards)	-	Cannot be modified
CKA_KEYRING_OUID (Firmware 7.7.2 onwards)	-	Cannot be modified

The TSF enforces the following modifications rules on security attributes of Assigned Keys:

**Table 7-15: Summary of key attribute modification rules for Assigned Keys.**

Key attribute	Mapping to PP category / naming	Modification conditions
CKA_OUID	Key ID	Cannot be modified
CKA_CLASS	Key type	Cannot be modified
CKA_KEY_TYPE	Key type	Cannot be modified
CKA_AUTH_DATA	Authorisation Data	Can be modified by Key Owner only when modification operation includes successful validation of current (pre-modification) authorisation data
CKA_ENCRYPT	Key Usage	Cannot be modified
CKA_DECRYPT	Key Usage	Cannot be modified
CKA_WRAP	Key Usage	Cannot be modified
CKA_UNWRAP	Key Usage	Cannot be modified
CKA_SIGN	Key Usage	Cannot be modified
CKA_VERIFY	Key Usage	Cannot be modified
CKA_DERIVE	Key Usage	Cannot be modified
CKA_EXTRACTABLE	Export Flag	Cannot be modified
CKA_ASSIGNED	Assigned Flag	Cannot be modified
CKA_MODIFIABLE	-	Cannot be modified
CKA_FAILED_KEY_ AUTH_COUNT	-	<u>Case of a User Partition:</u> the attribute can be modified only by Partition CO  <u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> the attribute can be modified only by the HSM SO.
CKA_KEYRING (Firmware 7.7.2 onwards)	-	Cannot be modified

Key attribute	Mapping to PP category / naming	Modification conditions
CKA_KEYRING_OUID (Firmware 7.7.2 onwards)	-	Cannot be modified

The TSF enforces the following initialization rules on the attributes:

**Table 7-16: Summary of initialization rules for key attributes.**

Key Attribute	Initialization rules (Assigned Key)	Initialization rules (General Key)
CKA_OUID	Initialized by generation process	
CKA_CLASS	Initialized by generation process	
CKA_KEY_TYPE	Initialized by generation process	
CKA_AUTH_DATA	<u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO during generation (no default value). <u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation (no default value).	
CKA_ENCRYPT	<u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false. <u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.	
CKA_DECRYPT	<u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false. <u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.	
CKA_WRAP	<u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false. <u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.	
CKA_UNWRAP	<u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false. <u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.	
CKA_SIGN	<u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false. <u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.	
CKA_VERIFY	<u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false. <u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO	



Key Attribute	Initialization rules (Assigned Key)	Initialization rules (General Key)
	or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.	
CKA_DERIVE	<u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false. <u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.	
CKA_EXTRACTABLE	Set to false.	<u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false. <u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.
CKA_ASSIGNED	Set to true.	Set to false
CKA_MODIFIABLE	Set to false.	<u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is true. <u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is true.
CKA_FAILED_KEY_AUTH_COUNT	Set to 0	Set to 0
CKA_KEYRING (Firmware 7.7.2 onwards)	<u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO or by Partition Limited CO during generation. Default value is false. <u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation. Default value is false.	
CKA_KEYRING_OUID (Firmware 7.7.2 onwards)	<u>Case of a User Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by Partition CO during generation (no default value). <u>Case of the Admin Partition:</u> Initialized by Key Owner or by the HSM SO or by the Administrator during generation (no default value).	

Note related to key import: The TSF will assign the default values specified above to imported general keys, for the attributes that are missing from the imported key (if any).

## 7.6.2 Key destruction

The module performs zeroisation to destroy cryptographic keys. Zeroisation is achieved through the following means:

**Table 7-17: Summary key destruction methods.**

Key deletion method (KDM)	Action taken	Context in which the KDM is used
KDM1	Overwrite of memory	Applies to user keys stored in HSM partitions, which can be erased by means of ICD commands. Applies to some HSM support keys as well, that can be erased by means of ICD commands.
KDM2	RAM reset	Resetting of RAM causes the erasure of all RAM resident keys.
KDM3	Erasure of entire memory sectors	HSM wipe-out, which can be called from the bootloader, or triggered by the active tamper detection on K7+ TOE. All user keys and HSM support keys are erased.
KDM4	Erasure of the encrypting keys	Any user key stored in a HSM partition is encrypted with a chain of HSM support keys. Erasure of any of these support keys is equivalent to erasing the user key. The same applies to user keys stored externally, which are encrypted with a HSM support key. The same applies to many 'intermediate' HSM support keys which are encrypted by other HSM support keys.
KDM5	Erasure of HSE-BBRAM in response to a tamper/decommission event	Decommission signal (on K7 and K7+ TOEs) or active tamper detection (on K7+ TOE) trigger the erasure of the HSE-BBRAM, which contains the 'top-level' HSM support keys that encrypt the other HSM support keys.

### 7.6.3 External key storage

User keys (i.e. General Keys and Assigned Keys) can be stored within the module, or externally. This latter case may be necessary when too many user keys have to be handled, making it impossible to store them all inside the module's memories. Key objects are externally stored in the form of "key blobs" including both the key value (in encrypted form) and the key security attributes. Integrity is ensured on the entire key objects (value and attributes) through the mechanism described in Section 7.4.3.

## 7.7 Self-protection

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### 7.7.1 Self-tests

The module runs a suite of the following self-tests during initial start-up (or power-on), periodically during normal operation and on demand to demonstrate correct operation:

- > **At initial start-up (or power-on):**
  - Software/firmware integrity test
  - Cryptographic algorithm tests
  - Random number generator tests
- > **Periodically during normal operation:** Random number generator tests
- > **On demand:**
  - Cryptographic algorithm tests
  - Software/firmware integrity test
  - Random number generator test

The module preserves itself in a secure state in the event of failures detected during the self-tests.

Note: the software/firmware integrity test is done through the verification of the firmware cryptographic signature (which establishes firmware authenticity as well). This verification is done during self-tests and also prior to the installation of any new version of the firmware.

Involved algorithms for firmware signature verification are RSA 4096 bits with SHA-384 hash.

### 7.7.2 Protection against physical attacks (K7 card)

The K7 printed circuit board (PCB) is coated with an epoxy shield that enables passive detection of any attempt to physically compromise the underlying electronic circuits and components. The physical compromise can be detected by a visual inspection of the K7 PCB. Note that any attempt to remove the epoxy coating has a very high probability to destroy the underlying components, thus making the module inoperable.

The K7 PCB also embeds voltage and temperature sensors which cause the module to reject any command while outside of the expected voltage and temperature range.

### 7.7.3 Protection against physical attacks (K7+ card)

The K7+ printed circuit board (PCB) is coated with an electrically wired shield that enables both active and passive detection of any attempt to physically compromise the underlying electronic circuits and components, and triggers the erasure of all support and user keys.

The K7+ PCB also embeds voltage and temperature sensors, which cause the module to reject any command while outside of the expected voltage and temperature range. Moreover, the module triggers the erasure of all support and user keys if the voltage or temperature are below or above critical thresholds.

### 7.7.4 Power loss

If power is lost to the module for whatever reason, permanent objects (private keys, etc.) are preserved and remain cryptographically protected; session objects are cleared from the module. The module can be placed back into operation without compromise of its functionality or permanently stored data. In case of power failure in the host IT environment, host system restart or other circumstances that do not affect the module's operational capability, the module will ensure continued protection of sensitive material and will permit recovery from the last logged in state.

## 7.8 Audit

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The module generates an audit record of the following auditable events:

- > Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions
- > Startup of the TOE
- > Shutdown of the TOE
- > Cryptographic key generation
- > Cryptographic key destruction
- > Failure of the random number generator
- > Authentication and authorisation failure handling: all unsuccessful authentication or authorisation attempts, the reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication or authorisation attempts and the blocking actions taken
- > All attempts to import or export keys
- > All modifications to attributes of keys
- > Integrity errors detected for keys
- > Failures to establish secure channels
- > Self-test completion
- > Failures detected by the TOE
- > All administrative actions
- > Unblocking of access
- > Modifications to audit parameters (affecting the content of the audit log)

The module records within each audit record the following information:

- > Date and time of the event
- > Type of event
- > Subject identity (if applicable)
- > Outcome (success or failure) of the event

For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the module associates each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

The module provides reliable time stamps to support the audit capability.

Audit records are automatically exported by the module to an audit server in the IT environment. The path to the audit server has to be configured by the Audit User role. If the link to the audit server is lost, the module stores the audit records internally until the connection to the audit server is back or the module memory is full. In this latter case, (memory is full), the module rejects any command that would have triggered an additional audit record.

The module implements an integrity protection mechanism on audit records. Once exported to the audit server, the integrity of the records can be verified by the module through a request sent by the System Auditor.

## 7.9 Firmware updates

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The module supports firmware updates. The HSM SO is the only role authorised to load a new version of the firmware within the TOE. The new firmware must be signed with a Thales support key, and the TOE performs a verification of that signature to allow or reject the loading.

The firmware signature (and related verification) is done with RSA-4096 algorithm. The signature is applied to a SHA-384 hash of the firmware.

## 7.10 Embedded FM application loading

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The module supports the loading of FM applications. The HSM SO is the only role authorised to load FM applications on top of the TOE. Any new FM application must be hashed with SHA-512 algorithm and signed with RSA-2048, 3072 or 4096 algorithm. The TOE performs a verification of that signature to allow or reject the loading.

## 8 Rationales

### 8.1 Security Objectives Rationale

#### 8.1.1 Security Objectives Coverage

The table below shows the mapping of Threats, Organizational Security Policies and Assumptions to Security Objectives for the TOE and for the TOE Environment.

**Table 8-1: Security Problem Definition mapping to Security Objectives**

	OT.PlainKeyConf	OT.Algorithms	OT.KeyIntegrity	OT.Auth	OT.KeyUseConstraint	OT.KeyUseScope	OT.DataConf	OT.DataMod	OT.ImportExport	OT.Backup	OT.RNG	OT.TamperDetect	OT.FailureDetect	OT.Audit	OE.ExternalData	OE.Env	OE.DataContext	OE.AppSupport	OE.Uauth	OE.AuditSupport
T.KeyDisclose	X		X				X		X	X		X			X	X				
T.KeyDerive		X									X									
T.KeyMod			X						X	X		X								
T.KeyMisuse				X	X															
T.KeyOveruse						X														
T.DataDisclose							X										X	X		
T.DataMod								X									X	X		
T.Malfunction													X							
P.Algorithms		X																		
P.KeyControl	X	X		X	X	X			X	X										
P.RNG											X									
P.Audit														X						
A.ExternalData															X					
A.Env																X				
A.DataContext																	X			
A.AppSupport																		X		
A.UAuth																			X	
A.AuditSupport																				X

## 8.1.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency

The following paragraphs describe the rationale for the sufficiency of the Security Objectives relative to the Threats, OSPs and Assumptions.

### 8.1.2.1 Threats

T.KeyDisclose is addressed by the requirement in OT.PlainKeyConf to keep plaintext secret keys unavailable, and this is supported in terms of controls over key attributes (which might threaten the confidentiality of the key if modified) in OT.KeyIntegrity. The confidentiality of secret keys that are exported is protected partly by the use of a secure channel as described in OT.DataConf and the requirements for import and export in OT.ImportExport (including the requirement to export secret keys only in encrypted form, or to be able to exclude the export of a key entirely). Physical tamper protection of the keys is provided by OT.TamperDetect (supported by an appropriate inspection procedure as required in OE.Env). Protection of secret key confidentiality during backup is ensured by OT.Backup. The environment also contributes to maintaining secret key confidentiality by protecting any versions of a secret key that may exist outside the TOE, as in OE.ExternalData, and by protecting the operation of the TOE itself by providing a secure environment, as in OE.Env.

T.KeyDerive is addressed by the choice of algorithms that have been endorsed for the appropriate purposes, and this is described in OT.Algorithms. Where keys are generated by the TOE then the use of a suitable random number generator is required by OT.RNG in order to mitigate the risk that an attacker can guess or deduce the key value.

T.KeyMod is addressed by requiring integrity protection of secret and public keys, and their critical attributes in OT.KeyIntegrity, and by requiring use of secure channels that protect integrity if a key is imported or exported (OT.ImportExport). Protection of key integrity during backup is ensured by OT.Backup. Physical tamper protection of the keys is provided by OT.TamperDetect (supported by an appropriate inspection procedure as required in OE.Env).

T.KeyMisuse raises the possibility of a secret key being used for an unintended and unauthorised purpose, and is addressed by the requirement in OT.Auth for the TOE to carry out an authorisation check before using a secret key. OT.KeyUseConstraint expands on this to set out requirements for the granularity of authorisation.

T.KeyOveruse is concerned with the possibility that more uses may be made of an authorised key than were intended, and this is addressed by the requirements of OT.KeyUseScope which requires controls to be specified and enforced for any re-authorisation conditions that the TOE allows a user to define.

T.DataDisclose is concerned with the transmission of data between client applications and the TOE, or between separate parts of the TOE where the transmission passes through an insecure environment. This is addressed by OT.DataConf, which requires the TOE to provide secure channels to protect such communications. The appropriate use of such channels is a requirement for the environment as expressed in OE.DataContext, as is the use of appropriate procedures in OE.AppSupport.

T.DataMod is concerned with the possibility of unauthorised modification of data transmitted between a client application and the TOE, and this is addressed by OT.DataMod which requires that the TOE provides secure channels that can be used to protect the integrity of data that they carry. As with T.DataDisclose, the appropriate use of such channels is a requirement for the environment as expressed in OE.DataContext, as is the use of appropriate procedures in OE.AppSupport.

T.Malfunction is addressed by the requirement in OT.FailureDetect for the TOE to detect certain types of fault.

### 8.1.2.2 Organisational Security Policies

P.Algorithms requires the use of key generation and other cryptographic functions that are endorsed by appropriate authorities, and this is addressed by OT.Algorithms.

P.KeyControl requires that the TOE can provide controls and support a key lifecycle to ensure that secret keys can be reliably protected against use by those other than the owner of the key, and that the keys can be confined to use for certain cryptographic functions. This is addressed by a combination of TOE objectives as follows:

- > OT.PlainKeyConf protects the value of the secret key to prevent the possibility of it being used by unauthorised subjects
- > OT.Algorithms ensures that endorsed algorithms that employ and support suitable properties and procedures are provided by the TOE
- > OT.Auth, OT.KeyUseConstraint and OT.KeyUseScope ensure that the TOE can provide well-defined limits on the use of a key when it is authorised (as described above for T.KeyMisuse and T.KeyOveruse)
- > OT.ImportExport and OT.Backup ensure protection of keys when they are transmitted outside the TOE to client applications or for backup purposes, including the prevention of export of Assigned Keys.

P.Audit requires the TOE to provide an audit trail and this is addressed directly by OT.Audit (which includes protection of the audit records).

### 8.1.2.3 Assumptions

Each of the Assumptions in Section 3.5 is directly matched by a security objective for the operational environment in Section 4.2. The wording of each objective for the operational environment includes the wording of each assumption, and no further rationale is therefore given here.



## 8.2 Security Requirements Rationale

### 8.2.1 Security Requirements Coverage

The table below summarizes the mapping of Security Objectives for the TOE to SFRs.

**Table 8-2: TOE Security Objectives mapping to SFRs.**

	OT.PlainKeyConf	OT.Algorithms	OT.KeyIntegrity	OT.Auth	OT.KeyUseConstraint	OT.KeyUseScope	OT.DataConf	OT.DataMod	OT.ImportExport	OT.Backup	OT.RNG	OT.TamperDetect	OT.FailureDetect	OT.Audit
FCS_CKM.1		X												
FCS_CKM.4	X													
FCS_COP.1		X												
FCS_RNG.1											X			
FIA_UID.1				X										
FIA_UAU.1				X										
FIA_AFL.1				X										
FIA_UAU.6/KeyAuth				X		X								
FDP_IFC.1/KeyBasics	X				X				X					
FDP_IFF.1/KeyBasics	X		X		X				X					
FDP_ACC.1/KeyUsage					X	X								
FDP_ACF.1/KeyUsage					X	X								
FDP_ACC.1/Backup										X				
FDP_ACF.1/Backup										X				
FDP_SDI.2			X											
FDP_RIP.1	X				X									
FTP_TRP.1/Local			X	X			X	X	X					
FTP_TRP.1/External			X	X			X	X	X					
FPT_STM.1														X
FPT_TST_EXT.1													X	
FPT_PHP.1												X		
FPT_PHP.3												X		
FPT_FLS.1													X	
FMT_SMR.1				X										X

	OT.PlainKeyConf	OT.Algorithms	OT.KeyIntegrity	OT.Auth	OT.KeyUseConstraint	OT.KeyUseScope	OT.DataConf	OT.DataMod	OT.ImportExport	OT.Backup	OT.RNG	OT.TamperDetect	OT.FailureDetect	OT.Audit
FMT_SMF.1				X										X
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock				X										
FMT_MTD.1/AuditLog														X
FMT_MSA.1/GenKeys					X									
FMT_MSA.1/AKeys					X									
FMT_MSA.3/Keys					X									
FAU_GEN.1														X
FAU_GEN.2														X
FAU_STG.2														X

OT.PlainKeyConf is addressed by the requirements in the Key Basics SFP defined in FDP\_IFC.1/KeyBasics and FDP\_IFF.1/KeyBasics (especially FDP\_IFF.1.5/KeyBasics). Secure destruction of keys according to FCS\_CKM.4 protects the key value at the end of its lifetime. FDP\_RIP.1 protects secret keys from being accessed after they have been deallocated.

OT.Algorithms is addressed by the need to use endorsed standards for FCS\_COP.1 (cf. Application Note 14) and the use of an appropriate random number generator in FCS\_CKM.1. Note that the refinements to assurance components in Section 6.4.1 also specify requirements that ensure clear documentation of endorsed and non-endorsed algorithms and functions provided by the TOE.

OT.KeyIntegrity is addressed primarily by FDP\_SDI.2, which requires integrity protection of keys and their attributes by the TOE. FDP\_IFF.1/KeyBasics requires that any importing or exporting of keys use secure channels and integrity protection (cf. the requirement for an integrity-protected channel as part of FTP\_TRP.1/Local and FTP\_TRP.1/External, which is linked to the Key Basics SFP by Application Note 20 under FDP\_IFF.1/KeyBasics).

OT.Auth is addressed by FIA\_UID.1, FIA\_UAU.1 and FIA\_AFL.1 for administrator authentication (with FMT\_MTD.1/Unblock and its dependencies on FMT\_SMR.1 and FMT\_SMF.1 ensuring that appropriate roles and unblocking for authorisation and authentication failures are also provided). Authorisation for external client applications is provided by the requirements for authentication of endpoints in FTP\_TRP.1/Local and FTP\_TRP.1/External. Authorisation for the use of secret keys is addressed by FIA\_UAU.6/KeyAuth.

OT.KeyUseConstraint is addressed by the requirements for well-defined (and securely initialized) key attributes in FMT\_MSA.1/GenKeys, FMT\_MSA.1/AKeys, and FMT\_MSA.3/Keys, and the application of the attributes to operate constraints on the use of keys in FDP\_IFC.1/KeyBasics, FDP\_IFF.1/KeyBasics, FDP\_ACC.1/KeyUsage and FDP\_ACF.1/KeyUsage. FDP\_RIP.1 protects

authorisation data (which enables a key to be used) from being accessed after it has been deallocated.

OT.KeyUseScope is addressed by the Key Usage SFP in FDP\_ACC.1/KeyUsage and FDP\_ACF.1/KeyUsage and by the re-authorisation conditions for use of a secret key specified in FIA\_UAU.6/KeyAuth.

OT.DataConf is addressed by the authentication and confidentiality requirements for secure channels in FTP\_TRP.1/Local and FTP\_TRP.1/External.

OT.DataMod is addressed by the authentication and integrity requirements for secure channels in FTP\_TRP.1/Local and FTP\_TRP.1/External.

OT.ImportExport is addressed by the requirements for the use of secure import/export through a secure channel and restrictions on how keys are imported and exported to protect confidentiality and integrity in the Key Basics SFP in FDP\_IFC.1/KeyBasics and FDP\_IFF.1/KeyBasics, and by the requirements on the secure channels themselves in FTP\_TRP.1/Local and FTP\_TRP.1/External.

OT.Backup separates out the requirements for any backup and restore properties that the TOE may provide and is addressed directly by the Backup SFP in FDP\_ACC.1/Backup and FDP\_ACF.1/Backup.

OT.RNG is addressed by the requirement in FCS\_RNG.1 for a random number generator of an appropriate type, which meets appropriate randomness metrics.

OT.TamperDetect is addressed by the requirement for passive tamper detection in FPT\_PHP.1 and the tamper response mechanisms in FPT\_PHP.3.

OT.FailureDetect is addressed by the self-test requirements of FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 and secure failure requirements of FPT\_FLS.1.

OT.Audit is addressed in terms of basic creation of audit records by the requirements for audit record generation in FAU\_GEN.1 and FAU\_GEN.2 and provision of timestamps for use in audit records in FPT\_STM.1. Protection of the audit trail is ensured by FAU\_STG.2, FMT\_MTD.1/AuditLog and FMT\_SMF.1. Support for the Administrator role that controls export and deletion of audit records from the TOE is required by FMT\_SMR.1.

## 8.2.2 SFR Dependencies

The dependencies between SFRs are addressed as shown in Table 8-3. Where a dependency is not met in the manner defined in [CC2] then a rationale is provided for why the dependency is unnecessary or else met in some other way.

**Table 8-3: SFR Dependencies Rationale**

Requirement	Dependencies	Fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1	[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] FCS_CKM.4	FCS_COP.1 FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	FCS_CKM.1 See also note below on key attributes during import or export.

Requirement	Dependencies	Fulfilled by
FCS_COP.1	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.4 See also note below on key attributes during import or export.
FCS_RNG.1	No dependencies	-
FIA_UID.1	No dependencies	-
FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.1
FIA_AFL.1	FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.6/KeyAuth	No dependencies	-
FDP_IFC.1/KeyBasics	FDP_IFF.1	FDP_IFF.1/KeyBasics
FDP_IFF.1/KeyBasics	FDP_IFC.1 FMT_MSA.3	FDP_IFC.1/KeyBasics FMT_MSA.3/Keys
FDP_ACC.1/KeyUsage	FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1/KeyUsage
FDP_ACF.1/KeyUsage	FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3	FDP_ACC.1/KeyUsage FMT_MSA.3/Keys
FDP_ACC.1/Backup	FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1/Backup
FDP_ACF.1/Backup	FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3	FDP_ACC.1/Backup The dependency on FMT_MSA.3 is not relevant in this case since the attribute used in FDP_ACF.1/Backup is determined by the ability of the user to authenticate as an administrator according to FIA_UAU.1.
FDP_SDI.2	No dependencies	-
FDP_RIP.1	No dependencies	-
FTP_TRP.1/Local	No dependencies	-
FTP_TRP.1/External	No dependencies	-
FPT_STM.1	No dependencies	-
FPT_TST_EXT.1	No dependencies	-
FPT_FLS.1	No dependencies	-
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.1
FMT_SMF.1	No dependencies	-

Requirement	Dependencies	Fulfilled by
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock	FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/AuditLog	FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/GenKeys	[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1	FDP_ACC.1/KeyUsage FDP_IFC.1/KeyBasics FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/AKeys	[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1	FDP_ACC.1/KeyUsage FDP_IFC.1/KeyBasics FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.3/Keys	FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1	FMT_MSA.1/GenKeys, FMT_MSA.1/AKeys FMT_SMR.1
FAU_GEN.1	FPT_STM.1	FPT_STM.1
FAU_GEN.2	FAU_GEN.1 FIA_UID.1	FAU_GEN.1 FIA_UID.1
FAU_STG.2	FAU_GEN.1	FAU_GEN.1

Key attributes during import or export: the TOE may allow import or export of keys according to the rules in FDP\_IFF.1/KeyBasics. For keys that may be imported or exported, the TOE does not place any specific requirements on whether attributes are imported and exported with keys. However, the refinement to AGD\_OPE.1 in Section 6.4.1 requires that the behavior of the TOE in this situation is described in documentation, and that the evaluators confirm the behavior that is documented. Application Note 41 (for FMT\_MSA.1) also requires that the initialization of any attributes on import is described in the Security Target.

### 8.2.3 Rationale for SARs

The assurance level for this protection profile is **EAL4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2 and AVA\_VAN.5**.

EAL4 allows a developer to attain a reasonably high assurance level without the need for highly specialized processes and practices. It is considered the highest level that could be applied to an existing product line without undue expense and complexity. As such, EAL4 is appropriate for commercial products that can be applied to moderate to high security functions.

The TOE described in this protection profile is just such a product. Augmentation results from the selection of **ALC\_FLR.2** alongside **AVA\_VAN.5**. All the dependencies of AVA\_VAN.5 are satisfied by other assurance components in the EAL4 assurance package. ALC\_FLR.2 has no dependencies.

The augmentation of including ALC\_FLR.2 is in response to existing company practice that has been implemented to meet customer requirements for flaw reporting and fixing.

#### 8.2.4 AVA\_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis

The TOE generates uses and manages the highly sensitive data in the form of secret keys, at least some of which may be used as signature creation data. The protection of these keys and associated security of their attributes and use in cryptographic operations can only be ensured by the TOE itself. While the TOE environment is intended to protect against physical attacks, a high level of protection against logical attacks (especially those that might be carried out remotely) is also necessary, and is therefore addressed by augmenting vulnerability analysis to deal with High attack potential.

## 8.3 Mapping of SFRs to TSS

SFR	Link to TSS
FCS_CKM.1	Addressed in Section 7.3.1 "Cryptographic key generation"
FCS_CKM.4	Addressed in Section 7.6.2 "Key destruction"
FCS_COP.1/SigGen_Main	Addressed in Section 7.3.2 "Cryptographic operations"
FCS_COP.1/SigVer_Main	Addressed in Section 7.3.2 "Cryptographic operations"
FCS_COP.1/SigVer_Bootloader	Addressed in Section 7.7.1 "Self- tests"
FCS_COP.1/Digest_Main	Addressed in Section 7.3.2 "Cryptographic operations"
FCS_COP.1/Sym_Enc_Dec	Addressed in Section 7.3.2 "Cryptographic operations"
FCS_COP.1/ASym_Enc_Dec	Addressed in Section 7.3.2 "Cryptographic operations"
FCS_COP.1/MAC	Addressed in Section 7.3.2 "Cryptographic operations"
FCS_RNG.1/DRG.4	Addressed in Section 7.3.2 "Cryptographic operations"
FIA_UID.1/STC_User	Addressed in Section 7.2.2 "Allowed operations before authentication"
FIA_UAU.1/STC_User	Addressed in Section 7.2.2 "Allowed operations before authentication"
FIA_UID.1/HSM_Roles	Addressed in Section 7.2.2 "Allowed operations before authentication"
FIA_UAU.1/HSM_Roles	Addressed in Section 7.2.2 "Allowed operations before authentication"

SFR	Link to TSS
FIA_UID.1/Key_Owner	Addressed in Section 7.2.2 “Allowed operations before authentication”
FIA_UAU.1/Key_Owner	Addressed in Section 7.2.2 “Allowed operations before authentication”
FIA_AFL.1	Addressed in Section 7.2.3 “Authentication failure handling”
FIA_UAU.6/KeyAuth	Addressed in Section 7.2.4 “Re-authentication conditions”
FDP_IFC.1/KeyBasics	Addressed in Section 7.4.1 “Flow control policy”
FDP_IFF.1/KeyBasics	Addressed in Section 7.4.1 “Flow control policy”
FDP_ACC.1/KeyUsage	Addressed in Section 7.4.2 “Access control policy”
FDP_ACF.1/KeyUsage	Addressed in Section 7.4.2 “Access control policy”
FDP_ACC.1/Backup	No link, the SFR is trivially met as the functionality is not supported
FDP_ACF.1/Backup	No link, the SFR is trivially met as the functionality is not supported
FDP_SDI.2	Addressed in Section 7.4.3 “Stored data integrity protection”
FDP_RIP.1	Addressed in Section 7.4.4 “Handling of residual data”
FTP_TRP.1/Local/Embedded	Addressed in Section 7.5 “Trusted Channel”
FTP_TRP.1/Local/Appliance	Addressed in Section 7.5 “Trusted Channel”
FTP_TRP.1/External	Addressed in Section 7.5 “Trusted Channel”
FPT_STM.1	Addressed in Section 7.8 “Audit”
FPT_TST_EXT.1	Addressed in Section 7.7.1 “Self-tests”



SFR	Link to TSS
FPT_PHP.1	Addressed in Section 7.7.2 "Protection against physical attacks (K7 card)" and in Section 7.7.3 "Protection against physical attacks (K7+ card)"
FPT_PHP.3/K7	Addressed in Section 7.7.2 "Protection against physical attacks (K7 card)"
FPT_PHP.3/K7+	Addressed in Section 7.7.3 "Protection against physical attacks (K7+ card)"
FPT_FLS.1	Addressed in Section 7.7.4 "Power loss"
FMT_SMR.1	Addressed in Section 7.1.4 "Roles"
FMT_SMF.1	Addressed in Section 7.2.3 "Authentication failure handling", Section 7.6.1 "Key security attributes", Section 7.8 "Audit", Section 7.4.1 "Flow control policy", Section 7.9 "Firmware updates" and Section 7.10 "Embedded FM application loading".
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock	Addressed in Section 7.2.3 "Authentication failure handling"
FMT_MTD.1/AuditLog	Addressed in Section 7.8 "Audit"
FMT_MTD.1/FW_update	Addressed in Section 7.9 "Firmware updates"
FMT_MTD.1/FM_loading	Addressed in Section 7.10 "Embedded FM application loading"
FMT_MSA.1/GenKeys	Addressed in Section 7.6.1 "Key security attributes"
FMT_MSA.1/AKeys	Addressed in Section 7.6.1 "Key security attributes"
FMT_MSA.3/Keys	Addressed in Section 7.6.1 "Key security attributes"
FAU_GEN.1	Addressed in Section 7.8 "Audit"

SFR	Link to TSS
FAU_GEN.2	Addressed in Section 7.8 "Audit"
FAU_STG.2	Addressed in section 7.8 "Audit"

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