# Certification Report

# ID-One Cosmo X², version 09A111

| | |
|---|---|
| Sponsor and developer: | **IDEMIA Smart Identity**<br>**2 place Samuel de Champlain**<br>**92400, Courbevoie**<br>**France** |
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## Foreword

The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.

Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 "General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and testing laboratories".

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.

The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the (site) security target.

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## Recognition of the Certificate

Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating nations.

### International recognition

The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.

For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.

### European recognition

The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS MRA in December 2010.

For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.

## 1 Executive Summary

This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the ID-One Cosmo $X^2$, version 09A111. The developer of the ID-One Cosmo $X^2$, version 09A111 is IDEMIA Smart Identity located in Courbevoie, France and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.

The ID-One Cosmo $X^2$ Platform on IDEMIA chip is a dual Java Card platform based, compatible with multi-application ID-One Cosmo product family. This ID-One Cosmo $X^2$ platform includes specific PACE APIs for electronic passport and eID. This ID-One Cosmo $X^2$ platform is able to receive and manage different types of applications, Basic and Sensitive ones.

All the platform code including GP Java application called card manager are loaded in the FLASH memory. The TOE allows the loading of optional code and loading Javacard applications:

- Optional code can be loaded to upgrade the TOE (platform) at any time of product life cycle, this function is named JPatch.

- Optional code (CodOp) can be loaded to upgrade an applet at any time of product life cycle.

- Applications can be loaded on the flash memory, at pre-personalisation, personalisation or use phase.

However, the Card Issuer can forbid each of these operations before or after the issuance of the card.

The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft , The Netherlands. The evaluation was completed on 11 July 2025 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the ID-One Cosmo $X^2$, version 09A111, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the ID-One Cosmo $X^2$, version 09A111 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] [1] for this product provide sufficient evidence that the TOE meets the EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.3 (Systematic Flaw remediation).

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).

TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the product as evaluated.

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[1] The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not available for public review.

## 2 Certification Results

### 2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the ID-One Cosmo $X^2$, version 09A111 from IDEMIA Smart Identity located in Courbevoie, France.

The TOE is comprised of the following main components:

| Delivery item type | Identifier | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Software | ID-One Cosmo $X^2$ Platform | 09A111 |
| Hardware | SCR404U | B |

To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the ID-One Cosmo $X^2$, version 09A111. For details, see section 2.5 "Documentation" of this report.

For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.11.

### 2.2 Security Policy

The main goal of the TOE is to provide a sound and secure execution environment to critical assets that need to be protected against unauthorized disclosure and/or modification. The TOE with its security function has to protect itself and protect applets from bypassing, abuse or tampering of its services that could compromise the security of all sensitive data.

The TOE has the following features (see [ST] section 1.9 for the full list including details):

- Atomic Transactions
- Card Management Environment
- Cardholder Verification
- DAP Verification
- Encryption and Decryption
- Entity authentication/secure Channel
- Secure Messaging (SM)
- Firewall
- GP_Dispatcher
- Key Management functionalities
- Manufacturer Authentication
- Message Digest
- Pre-personalisation and Patching functionalities
- JPatch at use phase and CodOp for applets
- Random Number
- Resident Application dispatcher
- Runtime Verifier
- Signature
- CRC 32
- PACE

In addition, several security mechanisms are implemented to ensure proper operation as well as integrity and confidentiality of stored data.

## 2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

### 2.3.1 Assumptions

The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2 of the *[ST] or the section "*Security Objectives for the operational Environment*" in [ST-lite]*.

### 2.3.2 Clarification of scope

The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security functions of the product.

## 2.4 Architectural Information

The TOE is a dual Java Card platform based, compatible with multi-application ID-One Cosmo product family. This ID-One Cosmo $X^2$ platform includes specific PACE APIs for electronic passport and eID. The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST] of the TOE can be depicted as follows:

## 2.5 Documentation

The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:

| Identifier | Version |
|---|---|
| Public Security Target ID-One Cosmo $X^2$, FQR *151007-243* | 3 |
| ID-One Cosmo $X^2$ on SCR404U, Applet Security Recommendations, FQR 110 A333 | 2 |
| ID-One Cosmo $X^2$, Reference Guide, FQR 110 A334 | 2 |
| D-One Cosmo $X^2$, Pre-Perso Guide, FQR 110 A335 | 2 |
| ID-One Cosmo $X^2$, Application Loading Protection Guidance, FQR 110 A336 | 1 |
| ID-One Cosmo $X^2$ Javadoc, FQR 110 A337 | 1 |
| Biometry on ID-One Cosmo$X^2$ (SCR404U), FQR 110 A338 | 1 |

| JCVM Patch, FQR 110 8805 | 4 |
| Global Privacy Framework, FQR 110 9567 | 3 |
| IDEMIA Platform Flash Generation, FQR 110 9402 | 1 |
| Secure acceptance and delivery of sensitive elements, FQR 110 8921 | 1 |

## 2.6   IT Product Testing

Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the developer's testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities.

### 2.6.1   Testing approach and depth

The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-enforcing module level. All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were used extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.

The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations, because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements are met.

For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment. The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases designed by the evaluator.

### 2.6.2   Independent penetration testing

The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:

- When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.

- For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE. During this attack-oriented analysis, the protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge gained from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of (additional) potential vulnerabilities. This analysis will be performed according to the attack methods in [JIL-AM]. An important source for assurance in this step is the technical report [HW-ETRfC] of the underlying platform.

- All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.

The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 15.2 man-weeks in total for testing and reporting. During that test campaign, 25% (19 man-days) of the total time was spent perturbation attacks, 7.5% (5 man-days) retrieving keys with FA, 62% (47 man-days) side-channel attacks, and 7.5% (5 man-days) ill-formed Java Card application and application isolation penetration tests.

### 2.6.3   Test configuration

The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was the same as described in the *[ST]*.

### 2.6.4   Test results

The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are summarised in the *[ETR]*, with references to the documents containing the full details.

The developer's tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its *[ST]* and functional specification.

No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.

The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.

The algorithmic security level exceeds 100 bits for all evaluated cryptographic functionality as required for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).

The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities.

For composite evaluations, please consult the *[ETRfC]* for details.

## 2.7 Reused Evaluation Results

There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and production of the TOE, by use of 9 Site Technical Audit Reports.

No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.

## 2.8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number ID-One Cosmo $X^2$, version 09A111. See the [ST] and guidance for how to verify the TOE and its version.

## 2.9 Evaluation Results

The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the *[ETR]*, which references an ASE Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to *[COMP]* a derived document *[ETRfC]* was provided and approved. This document provides details of the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite evaluation.

The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is "**Pass**".

Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the ID-One Cosmo $X^2$, version 09A111, to be **CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant**, and to meet the requirements of **EAL 6 augmented with ALC_FLR.3**. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target *[ST]*.

The Security Target claims 'demonstrable' conformance to the Protection Profile *[PP]*.

## 2.10 Comments/Recommendations

The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 "Documentation" contains necessary information about the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE's security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.

In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols and implementations: none.

Not all key sizes specified in the *[ST]* have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5 "high attack potential". To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

## 3   Security Target

The Security Target  ID-One Cosmo X$^2$, FQR 110 A328 , Ed 8, 30/06/2025 *[ST]* is included here by reference.

Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version *[ST-lite]* has been created and verified according to *[ST-SAN]*.

## 4   Definitions

This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:

| | |
|---|---|
| AES | Advanced Encryption Standard |
| ECC | Elliptic Curve Cryptography |
| IT | Information Technology |
| ITSEF | IT Security Evaluation Facility |
| JIL | Joint Interpretation Library |
| MRTD | Machine Readable Travel Document |
| NSCIB | Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security |
| PACE | Password Authenticated Connection Establishment |
| PP | Protection Profile |
| RNG | Random Number Generator |
| RSA | Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm |
| TOE | Target of Evaluation |

# 5  Bibliography

This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this report.

| | |
|---|---|
| [CC] | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017 |
| [CEM] | Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017 |
| [COMP] | Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018 |
| [ETR] | Evaluation Technical Report "ID-One Cosmo X2 09A111" – EAL6+, 24-RPT-1357, Version 7.0, 1 July 2025 |
| [ETRfC] | Evaluation Technical Report for Composition "ID-One Cosmo X2 09A111" – EAL6+, 24-RPT-1358, Version 3.0, 1 July 2025 |
| [HW-CERT] | CERTIFICAT ANSSI-CC-2023/37-R01 SCR404U (Version B), 12/02/2025 |
| [HW-ETRfC] | Serma Safety & Security, Evaluation Technical Report Lite for Composition, DEOUS2 Project, référence  DEOUS2_ETR_Lite, Version 1.0, 06/11/2024 . Product configuration SCR404U rev B |
| [HW-ST] | SCR404U, Security Target Lite, référence SEC222, version 1.5, 22 octobre 2024 |
| [JIL-AAPS] | JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2.1, February 2024 |
| JIL-AMS] | Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.5, May 2022 (sensitive with controlled distribution) |
| [NSCIB] | Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6, 02 August 2022 |
| [PP] | Java Card System – Open Configuration Protection Profile, Version 3.0.5 December 2017, BSI-CC-PP-0099-2017 |
| [ST] | Security Target  ID-One Cosmo  $X^2$, FQR 110 A328 , Ed 8, 30/06/2025 |
| [ST-lite] | Public Security Target ID-One Cosmo $X^2$, FQR *151007-243* [Public ST], Revision 3, 30/06/2025 |
| [ST-SAN] | ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006 |

(This is the end of this report.)