

Certification Report

SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.1 – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key Import (SSCD)

Sponsor: ***Infineon Technologies AG***
Am Campeon 1-15
85579 Neubiberg
Germany

Developer: ***cv cryptovision GmbH***
Munscheidstr. 14
45886 Gelsenkirchen
Germany

Evaluation facility: ***SGS Brightsight B.V.***
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands

Report number: **NSCIB-CC-2500019-01-CR**

Report version: **1**

Project number: **NSCIB-2500019-01**

Author(s): **Alireza Rohani**

Date: **16 February 2026**

Number of pages: **13**

Number of appendices: **0**

Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.

CONTENTS

Foreword	3
Recognition of the Certificate	4
International recognition	4
European recognition	4
1 Executive Summary	5
2 Certification Results	7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation	7
2.2 Security Policy	7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope	8
2.3.1 Assumptions	8
2.3.2 Clarification of scope	8
2.4 Architectural Information	8
2.5 Documentation	8
2.6 IT Product Testing	8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth	8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing	9
2.6.3 Test configuration	9
2.6.4 Test results	9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results	10
2.8 Evaluated Configuration	10
2.9 Evaluation Results	10
2.10 Comments/Recommendations	10
3 Security Target	11
4 Definitions	11
5 Bibliography	12

Foreword

The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.

Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and testing laboratories”.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.

The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the (site) security target.

Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.

Recognition of the Certificate

Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating nations.

International recognition

The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.

For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

European recognition

The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS MRA in December 2010.

For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see <https://www.sogis.eu>.

1 Executive Summary

This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.1 – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key import (SSCD). The developer of the SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.1 – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key import (SSCD) is cv cryptovision GmbH located in Gelsenkirchen, Germany and Infineon Technologies AG was the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.

The TOE is a Java Card (SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.1) configured to provide a secure signature creation device (SSCD) with key import for the creation of legally binding qualified electronic signatures and qualified electronic seals as defined in the eIDAS regulation [EU-REG]. To allow secure access to the signature functionality over the contactless interface, it provides an optional PACE mechanism to build up a secure channel for the signature PIN.

The TOE was previously evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was certified under the accreditation of TÜV Rheinland Nederland on 13 July 2021 (NSCIB-CC-21-0189594). The current evaluation of the TOE has also been conducted by SGS Brightsight B.V. and was completed on 16 February 2026 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].

The major changes from previous evaluations are: the update of underlying java card OS and hardware platform.

The certification took into account that the security evaluation reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up-to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.1 – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key import (SSCD), the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.1 – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key import (SSCD) are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]¹ for this product provide sufficient evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical Vulnerability analysis). The composite evaluation package (COMP) is also claimed in the TOE.

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM:2022 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CC:2022 [CC].

TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the product as evaluated.

¹ The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not available for public review.

TrustCB B.V., as the Dutch eIDAS-Designated Body responsible in The Netherlands for the assessment of the conformity of qualified electronic signature and qualified electronic seal creation devices declares that the evaluation meets the conditions for eIDAS certification for listing on the EU eIDAS compiled list of Qualified Signature/Seal Creation Devices.

2 Certification Results

2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.1 – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key import (SSCD) from cv cryptovision GmbH located in Gelsenkirchen, Germany.

The TOE is comprised of the following main components:

Delivery item type	Identifier	Version
Hardware	Hardware Platform	IFX_CCI_000010
Firmware	Firmware	80.102.06.1
Software	Asymmetric Crypto Library (ACL), including Base, RSA4096, EC, and Toolbox libraries	2.09.002
	Symmetric Crypto Library (SCL)	2.04.002
	Hardware Support Library (HSL)	03.12.8812
	Embedded OS SECORA™ ID X (v1.1)	1521
	Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH	internal version 3.5.1

To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.1 – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key import (SSCD) For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.

2.2 Security Policy

The TOE provides the following TOE security functionalities:

- TSF_Access manages the access to objects (files, directories, data and secrets) stored in the applet’s file system. It also controls write access of initialization, pre-personalization and personalization data.
- TSF_Admin manages the storage of manufacturing data, pre-personalization data and personalization data.
- TSF_Secret ensures secure management of secrets such as cryptographic keys. This covers secure key storage, access to keys as well as secure key deletion. These mechanisms are mainly provided by TSF_OS.
- TSF_Crypto performs high level cryptographic operations. The implementation is mainly based on the Security Functionalities provided by TSF_OS.
- TSF_SecureMessaging realizes a secure communication channel.
- TSF_Auth realizes two authentication mechanisms: PIN verification and alternatively authentication with the PACE protocol.
- TSF_Integrity protects the integrity of internal applet data like the Access control lists.
- TSF_OS contains all security functionalities provided by the certified platform (IC, Javacard operation system). The cryptographic operations needed for this TOE are provided by the platform:

- Electronic signature-generation with RSA and key sizes of 1976 up to 4096 bit with CRT and 2048 bit without CRT, or ECDSA with key sizes of 224, 256, 320, 384, 512, 521 bit.
- Secure messaging with AES (128, 192 or 256 bit key length).
- PACE authentication with key lengths of 224, 256, 384, 512, 521 bit (ECC).

2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

2.3.1 Assumptions

The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 3.2 of the [ST].

2.3.2 Clarification of scope

The evaluation did not reveal any threat to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security functions of the product.

2.4 Architectural Information

The TOE consists of an applet and the certified Java Card platform (SECORA™ ID X (SLJ52GxAyyyzX)) that can be configured to be used as configured to provide a secure signature creation device (SSCD) with key import for the creation of legally binding qualified electronic signatures and qualified electronic seals as defined in the eIDAS regulation [EU-REG].

2.5 Documentation

The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:

Identifier	Version
Secora ID X Applet Collection v1.1 with cryptovision ePasslet Suite v3.5 – Java Card Applet Suite providing Electronic ID Documents applications. Guidance Manual.	Document Version 1.2.4, 2025-11-10.
Secora ID X Applet Collection v1.1 with cryptovision ePasslet Suite v3.5 – Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device application with on-chip key generation / key import - Preparation Guidance (AGD_PRE).	Document Version 1.4.1, 2026-01-26.
Secora ID X Applet Collection v1.1 with cryptovision ePasslet Suite v3.5 – Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device application with on-chip key generation / key import - Operational Guidance (AGD_OPE).	Document Version 1.3.1, 2026-01-28.

2.6 IT Product Testing

Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the developer's testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities.

2.6.1 Testing approach and depth

The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-enforcing module level. All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were used extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.

The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations, because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements are met.

During the first recertification the developer tests were performed on an actual TOE sample in its evaluated configuration. The repeated (witnessed) tests are performed on samples with an older OS build (1519), but the results are valid for this current version of the TOE.

2.6.2 Independent penetration testing

The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps: When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.

For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE. During this attack oriented analysis the protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge gained from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of (additional) potential vulnerabilities. For this analysis will be performed according to the attack methods in [JIL-AP] and [JIL-AM]. An important source for assurance in this step is the technical report [plat-ETRFc] of the underlying platform.

All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate

In total 0 physical attacks, 0 tests covering overcoming sensors and filters, 1 perturbation attacks, 0 attacks retrieving keys with FA, 0 side-channel attacks, 0 attacks exploiting test features, 0 attacks on the RNG, 0 attacks applying ill-formed applets, 1 software attack and 0 attacks on application isolation were performed, for a total of 2 weeks. During the recertification, only logical tests were performed, defined as part of ATE & AVA.

2.6.3 Test configuration

The TOE was tested in the following configurations:

TOE configured in initialization stage (configuration 1)

TOE personalized as MRTD (BAC and EAC) (configuration 2)

TOE personalized as SSCD (configuration 3)

During the first recertification, the ATE_IND tests (both the witnessed tests, and the independent evaluator tests) have been executed on a TOE version that is not the final one (OS build 1519, instead of 1521). This is considered acceptable, as build 1519 contains the majority of code changes with security and functional impact (code changes meant to address requirements of the updated HW crypto library). The only difference between build 1519 of the OS and 1521 is the change of a SCL parameter value in the OS code, meant to address the following HW security guidance update:

Improved SCP configuration to increase DFA protection.

This has no negative security impact towards the TOE, as it consists of a security improvement for DFA protection. Furthermore, the Applet TOE follows all the guidance of the OS platform, which in turn follows the guidance of the IC platform.

2.6.4 Test results

The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.

The developer's tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.

No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.

2.7 Reused Evaluation Results

This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.

There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and production of the TOE, by use of several site certificate and Site Technical Audit Reports.

No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.

The EUCC certificate [HW-CERT] of the underlying HW, issued by the SOGIS CB BSI, has been reused, using the same standards, methodology, and interpretations.

2.8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.1 – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key import (SSCD).

2.9 Evaluation Results

The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.

The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.

Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.1 – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key import (SSCD), to be **CC Part 2 Conformant, CC Part 3 conformant**, and to meet the requirements of **EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5**. The composite evaluation package (COMP) is also claimed in the TOE. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].

The Security Target claims strict conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].

2.10 Comments/Recommendations

The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.

In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols and implementations: None.

Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a “high attack potential”, appropriate cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

3 Security Target

The SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.1 – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key Import (SSCD) – Security Target, version 2.14, 2026-01-28 [ST] is included here by reference.

Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and verified according to [ST-SAN].

4 Definitions

This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:

BAC	Basic Access Control
DCAP	eIDAS Dutch Conformity Assessment Process
EAC	Extended Access Control
eMRTD	electronic MRTD
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL	Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB	Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PACE	Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP	Protection Profile
QSCD	Qualified Signature/Seal Creation Device
TOE	Target of Evaluation

5 Bibliography

This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this report.

- [CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts 1 to 5, CC:2022 Revision 1, November 2022
- [CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM:2022 Revision 1, November 2022
- [Plat-CERT] Certificate SECORA™ ID X v1.2 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX), NSCIB-CC-2400127-01, 12 February 2026
- [Plat-ETRFc] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “SECORA™ ID X v1.2 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX)” – EAL5+/6+, 25-RPT-569, v7.0
- [Plat-ST] SECORA™ ID X v1.2 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX), Revision 3.0, 2026-01-08
- [COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, Version 1.6, April 2024
- [eIDAS-REP] Assessment Reporting Sheet “SECORA™ ID X v1.2 Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH” QSCD PP0075, 25-RPT-1713, version 2.0, 30 January 2026
- [ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “SECORA™ ID X v1.2 Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH” – EAL4+/EAL5+, 25-RPT-1204, version 2.0, 30 January 2026
- [EU-REG] REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC, and
REGULATION (EU) 2024/1183 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation(EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework
- [HW-CERT] Certification Report EUCC-3087-2025-12-0001, Administration ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V6-2025 for Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h, IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah, IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the design step G12 from Infineon Technologies AG
- [HW-ST] Public Security Target IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h, IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah, IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch; G12 Including optional Software Libraries Flash Loader – 3x ACL – 2xHSL – 2xSCL – HCL - CCL – NRG; Author: Infineon Technologies AG, Revision: 3.7
- [JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2.1, February 2024
- [JIL-AMS] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.5, May 2022 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
- [JIL_QSCD] Security Evaluation and Certification of Qualified, Electronic Signature/Seal Creation Devices, JIL Interpretations for Security Certification according to eIDAS Regulation 910/2014, Version 1.0, July 2022
- [NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6, 02 August 2022

- [PP_0075] EN 419 211-3:2013, Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 3: Device with key import, V1.0.2, 2012-07-24, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0075-2012-MA-01
- [ST] SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.1 – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key Import (SSCD) – Security Target, version 2.14, 2026-01-28
- [ST-lite] SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.1 – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key Import (SSCD) – Security Target, version 2.14, 2026-01-29
- [ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006

(This is the end of this report.)