



Certification Report

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Target of Evaluation

Application date/ID	May 12, 2006 (ITC-6078)		
Certification No.	C0049		
Sponsor	TOSHIBA TEC CORPORATION		
Name of TOE	System Software for e-STUDIO2500c/3500c/3510c		
Version of TOE	V1.0		
PP Conformance	None		
Conformed Claim	EAL3		
TOE Developer	TOSHIBA TEC CORPORATION		
Evaluation Facility	Electronic Commerce Security Technology		
,	Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center		

This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE is certified as follows.

June 26, 2006

Haruki Tabuchi, Technical Manager Information Security Certification Office IT Security Center Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan

Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following criteria prescribed in the "General Requirements for IT Security Evaluation Facility".

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999)
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 1.0
- CCIMB Interpretations (as of 01 December 2003)

Evaluation Result: Pass

"System Software for e-STUDIO2500c/3500c/3510c V1.0" has been evaluated in accordance with the provision of the "IT Security Certification Procedure" by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met the specified assurance requirements.

Notice:

This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme.

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1. Executive Summary

1.1 Introduction

This Certification Report describes the content of certification result in relation to IT Security Evaluation of "System Software for e-STUDIO2500c/3500c/3510c V1.0" (hereinafter referred to as "the TOE") conducted by Electronic Commerce Security Technology Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center (hereinafter referred to as "Evaluation Facility"), and it reports to the sponsor, TOSHIBA TEC CORPORATION.

The reader of the Certification Report is advised to read the corresponding ST and manuals (please refer to "1.5.9 Documents Attached to Product" for further details) attached to the TOE together with this report. The assumed environment, corresponding security objectives, security functional and assurance requirements needed for its implementation and their summary specifications are specifically described in ST. The operational conditions and functional specifications are also described in the document attached to the TOE.

Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on assurance requirements conformed to the TOE, and does not certify individual IT product itself.

Note: In this Certification Report, IT Security Evaluation Criteria and IT Security Evaluation Method prescribed by IT Security Evaluation and

Certification Scheme are named CC and CEM, respectively.

1.2 Evaluated Product

1.2.1 Name of Product

The target product by this Certificate is as follows:

Name of Product: System Software for e-STUDIO2500c/3500c/3510c

Version: V1.0

Developer: TOSHIBA TEC CORPORATION

1.2.2 Product Overview

This product is the system software of the digital multi function device "e-STUDIO2500c/3500c/3510c" (hereafter referred to collectively as the "MFP") manufactured by TOSHIBA TEC CORPORATION.

The system software provides general functions as a MFP as well as the function of data overwrite and permanently erase on the user document data deleted from the $e-STUDIO2500c/3500c/3510c\ HDD$.

The function of data overwrite and permanently erase includes the function to collectively and completely delete all user document data from the HDD before the HDD is disposed or replaced. This function also prevents unauthorized restore of data.

1.2.3 Scope of TOE and Overview of Operation

The TOE is the control software of MFP. Figure 1-2 depicts the relation to each part of MFP. As shown in Figure 1-1 below, MFP is used as a terminal to send/receive data to/from facsimiles, a terminal to send Email to Email servers, and a remote printer for

remote PCs in network environments as well as they are installed in general offices as a standalone copier.




Figure 1-1 Typical operating environment of the TOE

The MFP is a digital copier which inputs, processes, and outputs user documents. Its output processes are copy, print, scan, and fax reception and fax transmission. After each process completes, user document data is deleted by the file delete function provided by the operation system, except for the cases when the MFP user stores his/her user document data stored in temporally area(*) in the HDD.

User document data stored in temporally area in the HDD are managed by each MFP user based on importance and confidentiality of the user document data and deleted using the operation system's file delete function as necessary.

Actually, the operation system's file delete function only clears a pointer managed by the operation system which points to the file. This means, an entity of the user document data still exists in the HDD, while the user believes the user document data no longer exists there.

The TOE provides a function to permanently erase user document data deleted by the operation system's file delete function and a function to collectively and permanently erase residual user document data in the HDD before the HDD is disposed of or replaced.

*Caution) In this report, "e-Filing Box" and a shared folder are called temporally area in the HDD.

1.2.4 TOE Functionality

The TOE has normal mode where MFP users operate these models in ordinary cases, and self-diagnostic mode where service engineers perform maintenance services.

1.2.4.1 Normal Mode

Figure 1-2 shows the configuration of the MFP in normal mode.




Figure 1-2 Product Configuration in Normal Mode

This section describes the functionality of the TOE.

1) Process of GP-1060 Installation Information

This process checks whether or not the GP-1060 is installed.

In order to make the MFP users aware that the Data Delete Function is available, the TOE name and TOE version are displayed on the LCD display of the control panel.

2) Copy process

This process scans user document data using the scanner and writes the scanned data in the HDD work area.

Then, this process reads the user document data in the work area and performs both or either of the following processes, "Outputs the user document data to the printer" and "Saves the user document data in the HDD temporary area specified by the MFP user"

3) Print process

This process receives user document data from PC or reads a USB, and writes the data in the HDD work area.

Then, this process reads the user document data in the work area and performs both or either of the following processes, "Outputs the user document data to the printer" and "Saves the user document data in the HDD temporary area specified by the MFP user.

4) Scan process

This process scans user document data using the scanner and performs both or either of the following processes, "Saves the user document data in the HDD temporary area or a USB memory specified by the MFP user" and "Sends Email to a destination specified by the MFP user".

5) Fax transmission process

This process scans user document data using the scanner and writes the scanned data in the HDD work area.

Then, this process reads the user document data in the work area and sends the data to facsimile(s). The data can also be saved in the HDD temporary area specified by the MFP user

6) Fax reception process

This process receives user document data from a facsimile and writes the data in the

HDD work area.

Then, this process reads the user document data in the work area and performs both or either of the following processes, "Outputs the user document data to the printer" and "Saves the user document data in the HDD temporary area specified by the MFP user".

7) HDD temporary Data delete process

This process deletes user document data saved in the HDD temporary area by operating the control panel or PC.

8) Data Overwrite process (Security Function)

This process permanently erases followings:

- the user document data which has been deleted, by reason that the MFP user didn't command to save the data in the HDD temporary area when each process of above 1)..6) was finished.
- the user document data which has been deleted by above 7).

While this process is being executed, the message "ERASING DATA" is displayed on the control panel. The MFP users check the message on the control panel when collecting printout from the MFP and confirm the area was permanently erased.

1.2.4.2 Self-diagnostic Mode

Figure 1-3 shows the configuration of the MFP in self-diagnostic mode.




Figure 1-3 Product Configuration in Self-diagnostic Mode

This section describes the functionality of the TOE.

1) Process of GP-1060 Installation Information

This process checks whether or not the GP-1060 is installed.

In order to make the MFP users aware that the Data Delete Function is available, the TOE name and TOE version are displayed on the LCD display of the control panel.

2) Forcible Data Overwrite process (Security Function)

When HDD is disposed or replaced, this process overwrites all HDD areas where user document data are saved in the HDD temporary area.

The service engineer operates forcible Data Overwrite function upon request from the MFP administrator.

1.3 Conduct of Evaluation

Based on the IT Security Evaluation/Certification Program operated by the Certification Body, TOE functionality and its assurance requirements are being evaluated by evaluation facility in accordance with those publicized documents such as "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme"[2], "IT Security Certification Procedure"[3] and "Evaluation Facility Approval Procedure"[4].

Scope of the evaluation is as follow.

- Security design of the TOE shall be adequate;
- Security functions of the TOE shall be satisfied with security functional requirements described in the security design;
- This TOE shall be developed in accordance with the basic security design;
- Above mentioned three items shall be evaluated in accordance with the CC Part 3 and CEM.

specific, the evaluation facility examined "System More Software e-STUDIO2500c/3500c/3510c Security Target Ver 1.0" as the basis design of security functions for the TOE (hereinafter referred to as "the ST")[1], the evaluation deliverables in relation to development of the TOE and the development, manufacturing and shipping sites of the TOE. The evaluation facility evaluated if the TOE is satisfied both Annex C of CC Part 1 (either of [5], [8], [11] or [14]) and Functional Requirements of CC Part 2 (either of [6], [9], [12] or [15]) and also evaluated if the development, manufacturing and shipping environments for the TOE is also satisfied with Assurance Requirements of CC Part 3 (either of [7], [10], [13] or [16]) as its rationale. Such evaluation procedure and its result are presented in "System Software for e-STUDIO2500c/3500c/3510c V1.0 Evaluation Technical Report" (hereinafter referred to as "the Evaluation Technical Report")[22]. Further, evaluation methodology should comply with the CEM Part 2 (either of [17], [18] or [19]). In addition, the each part of CC and CEM shall include contents of interpretations (either of [20] and [21]).

1.4 Certification

The Certification Body verifies the Evaluation Technical Report prepared by the evaluation facility and evaluation evidence materials, and confirmed that the TOE evaluation is conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Certification review is also prepared for those concerns found in the certification process. Evaluation is completed with the Evaluation Technical Report dated June, 2006 submitted by the evaluation facility and those problems pointed out by the Certification Body are fully resolved and confirmed that the TOE evaluation is appropriately conducted in accordance with CC and CEM. The Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on the Evaluation Technical Report submitted by the evaluation facility and concluded fully certification activities.

1.5 Overview of Report

1.5.1 PP Conformance

There is no PP to be conformed.

1.5.2 EAL

Evaluation Assurance Level of TOE defined by this ST is EAL3 conformance.

1.5.3 SOF

This ST claims "SOF-basic" as its minimum strength of function.

Although this TOE is utilized by being installed at generic offices and it is assumed that attackers' attack capabilities are low. For this reason, the appropriate minimum SOF is SOF-basic.

1.5.4 Security Functions

Security functions of the TOE are as follow.

SF.TEMPDATA_OVERWRITE

In normal mode, by completely overwriting the area in which user document data to be deleted from the HDD are stored, the TOE permanently erase the area.

SF.STOREDATA_OVERWRITE

In self-diagnostic mode, by collectively and completely overwriting all areas of the HDD, the TOE permanently erase the all areas of the HDD.

1.5.5 Threat

This TOE assumes such threats presented in Table 1-1 and provides functions for countermeasure to them.

Table 1-1 Assumed Threats

Identifier	Threat
T.TEMPDATA_ACCESS	By using off-the-shelf tools and by means of reverse engineering to the areas where residual user document data exists, a malicious e-STUDIO user or non-privileged user may attempt to recover or decode user document data, deleted from the HDD of the e-STUDIO2500c/3500c/3510c by the operation system's file delete function. Other case, after turning power off during "Data Overwrite process" and suspending "Data Overwrite process", by means of reverse engineering to the areas where residual user document data exists, a malicious e-STUDIO user or non-privileged user may attempt to recover or decode user document data, deleted from the HDD of the e-STUDIO2500c/3500c/3510c by the
T CTO DED ATTA A CCECC	operation system's file delete function.
T.STOREDATA_ACCESS	Using off-the-shelf tools, a malicious e-STUDIO user or non-privileged user may attempt to recover or decode the areas in the HDD of the e-STUDIO2500c/3500c/3510c where user document data had existed and were deleted when all files were deleted collectively by the operation system's file delete function.

1.5.6 Organisational Security Policy

There are no organisational security policies required for using the TOE.

1.5.7 Configuration Requirements

This TOE is the System Software installed on the TOSHIBA TEC CORPORATION's digital copier.

This operating environment of the TOE is indicated below.

• Installing on e-STUDIO2500c / e-STUDIO 3500c / e-STUDIO 3510c with GP-1060.

1.5.8 Assumptions for Operational Environment

No assumptions required in environment using this TOE presents.

1.5.9 Documents Attached to Product

Documents attached to the TOE are listed below.

- Operator's Manual [Common], OMJ06000100 00
- Operator's Manual for Basic Function <North America>, OME06000200 00
- Operator's Manual for Basic Function < Europe >, OME06000300 00
- GP-1060 Data Overwrite Kit, OMM050034C0 03
- Quick Start Guide e-STUDIO2500c/3500c/3510c [Japanese], OMJ06000700 00
- Quick Start Guide e-STUDIO2500c/3500c/3510c, OME06001000 00

2. Conduct and Results of Evaluation by Evaluation Facility

2.1 Evaluation Methods

Evaluation was conducted by using the evaluation methods prescribed in CEM Part 2 in accordance with the assurance requirements in CC Part 3. Details for evaluation activities are report in the Evaluation Technical Report. It described the description of overview of the TOE, and the contents and verdict evaluated by each work unit prescribed in CEM Part 2.

2.2 Overview of Evaluation Conducted

The history of evaluation conducted was present in the Evaluation Technical Report as follows.

Evaluation has started on May, 2006 and concluded by completion the Evaluation Technical Report dated June, 2006. The evaluation facility received a full set of evaluation deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by developer, and examined the evidences in relation to a series of evaluation conducted.

During an evaluation of another TOE, assurance level of which is same as the TOE, the evaluation facility directly visited the development and manufacturing sites on October and November, 2005 and examined procedural status conducted in relation to each work unit for configuration management, delivery and operation and lifecycle by investigating records and staff hearing. The evaluation facility confirmed that same procedure is applied to the TOE. Therefore, the result of the examination on October and November, 2005 was regarded as result of examination of procedural status of the TOE

Further, the evaluation facility executed sampling check of conducted testing by developer and evaluator testing by using developer testing environment at developer site on May, 2006.

As for concerns indicated during evaluation process by the Certification Body, the certification review was sent to the evaluation facility. These were reflected to evaluation after investigation conducted by the evaluation facility and the developer.

2.3 Product Testing

Overview of developer testing evaluated by evaluator and evaluator testing conducted by evaluator are as follows.

2.3.1 Developer Testing

1) Developer Test Environment

Test configuration performed by the developer is shown in the Table 2-1.

Table 2-1: Developer test configuration

Table 2-1. Developer test configuration				
TOE	Version			
TOE V1.0	Item	Japanese	English	
	ROM	T380SY0J050	T380SY0U050,	
			T380SY0E050	
	System	VTK12.600	VTK12.600	
	Software			
	UI data frame	V016.000 0	V016.000 0	
Equipments	Speciation			
Digital Multi Function	e-STUDIO3510c			
Peripheral (MFP)				
Option of MFP	GP-1060			
PC for the tests	DELL OPTIPLEX GX100			
Mail server	SuperMicro 5013C-MT Model P4SCT+			
Circuit board for debug,	Circuit board for serial communications connecting			
Serial cable	with logic circuit board of digital multifunction			
	peripheral			
	6LA70328000 PWB-F-SERIAL-IF-360 and DSUB9			
	pin serial cross c	able		
FAX	e-STUDIO350 with SuperG3 FAX			
Telephone exchange emulator	AVM TLE101III			

2) Outlining of Developer Testing

Outlining of the testing performed by the developer is as follow.

a. Test configuration

Developer testing was performed at the same TOE testing environment with the TOE configuration identified in ST.

b. Testing Approach

For the testing, following approach was used.

- 1. Operating from the control panel and monitoring status of the program processing.
 - Operating the keys on the control panel and observing the result displayed.
 - Further, attaching specialized hardware to the circuit board in the MFP and connecting terminal to the specialized hardware via RS-232C.
 - Only the developer can prepare this configuration. This configuration provides various analysis functions, then status of the program processing can be monitored. Specifically, creating, moving and overwriting file on the HDD can be monitored.
- 2. Operation from the remote PC and monitoring status of the program processing.
 - Operating from WEB browser on the remote PC and observing the result (e.g. receiving FAX, E-mail).
 - Further, attaching specialized hardware to the circuit board in the MFP

and connecting terminal to the specialized hardware via RS-232C. Only the developer can prepare this configuration. This configuration provides various analysis functions, then status of the program processing can be monitored. Specifically, creating, moving and overwriting file on the HDD can be monitored.

c. Scope of Testing Performed

Testing is performed about 104 items by the developer.

The coverage analysis is conducted and examined to testing satisfactorily all of the security functions described in the functional specification and the external interface. Then, the depth analysis is conducted and examined to testing satisfactorily all the subsystems described in the high-level design and the subsystem interfaces.

d. Result

The evaluator confirmed consistencies between the expected test results and the actual test results provided by the developer. The Evaluator confirmed the developer testing approach performed and legitimacy of items performed, and confirmed consistencies between the testing approach described in the test plan and the actual test results.

2.3.2 Evaluator Testing

1) Evaluator Test Environment

The evaluator used the same test configuration as the test configuration used by the developer, plus an additional tool for penetration testing against the developer test configuration.

2) Outlining of Evaluator Testing

Outlining of testing performed by the evaluator is as follow.

a. Test configuration

Test configuration performed by the evaluator is shown in the Table 2-1. Evaluator testing was performed at the same TOE testing environment with the TOE configuration identified in ST.

b. Testing Approach

The same testing approaches as those of the developer testing were used.

c. Scope of Testing Performed

Total of 27 items of testing; namely 5 items from testing devised by the evaluator and 22 items from testing from sampling of developer testing was conducted. As for selection of the test subset, the following factors are considered.

- 1. Covering all scenarios including the test items of the developer testing.
- 2. Including one more tests in the test items for each interface at least.

The penetration testing comprised 4 tests to confirm that there were no obvious vulnerabilities that the developer was not considering existed.

d. Result

The evaluator successfully completed all the tests and observed the behavior of the TOE security functions. The evaluator confirmed that the actual test results match the expected test results, and that there are no obvious exploitable vulnerabilities in the TOE.

2.4 Evaluation Result

The evaluator had the conclusion that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in CEM Part 2 by submitting the Evaluation Technical Report.

3. Conduct of Certification

The following certification was conducted based on each materials submitted by evaluation facility during evaluation process.

- 1. Evidential materials submitted were sampled, its contents were examined, and related work units shall be evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
- 2. Rationale of evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall be adequate.
- 3. The Evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall conform to the CEM.

Concerns found in certification process were prepared as certification review, which were sent to evaluation facility.

The Certification Body confirmed such concerns pointed out in certification review were solved in the ST and the Evaluation Technical Report.

4. Conclusion

4.1 Certification Result

The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report and the related evaluation evidential materials submitted and confirmed that all evaluator action elements required in CC Part 3 are conducted appropriately to the TOE. The Certification Body verified the TOE is satisfied the EAL3 assurance requirements prescribed in CC Part 3.

4.2 Recommendations

None

5. Glossary

The abbreviations used in this report are listed below.

CC: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security

Evaluation

CEM: Common Methodology for Information Technology Security

Evaluation

EAL: **Evaluation Assurance Level**

PP: Protection Profile

SOF: Strength of Function

ST: Security Target

TOE: Target of Evaluation

TSF: **TOE Security Functions**

The glossaries used in this report are listed below.

MFP (Multi Function Peripherals): Digital copier:

A single multi-functional peripheral device which integrates several functions such as copy, print, and fax.

e-STUDIO: MFPs where the TOE is installed.

> (e-STUDIO2500c, e-STUDIO2500c/3500c/3510c

e-STUDIO3500c, and e-STUDIO3510c).

HDD. Hard Disk Drive

User document data:

e-STUDIO user's document data digitized by utilizing the e-STUDIO General Functions. Note that data received by the e-STUDIO using its fax function is not user document data of the e-STUDIO users but the data of a person who has sent it.

e-Filing Box, Shared folder:

A temporary area where the e-STUDIO users stores and refers their user document data. The e-STUDIO users delete user document data stored by themselves. Such user document data is automatically deleted from an area after a specified effective period expires and this data is no longer recognized as assets to

be protected.

GP-1060: A product installed in the e-STUDIO2500c/3500c/3510c to enable

the Data Overwrite Function, a security function of the System

Software

Users: Users who utilize the e-STUDIO General Functions

Administrators:

Administrators make each setting of the e-STUDIO General Functions (including copy, network, and fax settings) and ask service engineers to execute the forcible Data Overwrite function to the HDD.

Service Engineers:

Service engineers perform service maintenance operations such as installation of the e-STUDIO (including installation of the GP-1060).

6. Bibliography

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- [4] Evaluation Facility Approval Procedure, July 2005, Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan EC-05
- [5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and general model Version 2.1 August 1999 CCIMB-00-031
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- [15] JIS X 5070-2: 2000 Security techniques Evaluation criteria for IT security Part 2: Security functional requirements
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- [19] JIS TR X 0049: 2001 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
- [20] CCIMB Interpretations (as of 01 December 2003)
- [21] CCIMB Interpretations (as of 01 December 2003) (Translation Version 1.0 August 2004)
- [22] System Software for e-STUDIO2500c/3500c/3510c V1.0 Evaluation Technical Report Version 1.0, June 14, 2006, Electronic Commerce Security Technology Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center



Surveillance Report

Issue Date: 2012-08-17

Document No.: SRP-C0049-01

This is to report that surveillance has been conducted on the following Target of Evaluation (hereinafter referred to as "TOE"), based on IT Security Certification Procedure (CCM-02) 8.1. It is recommended to use as a reference along with the Certification Report.

TOE:

Certification No.	C0049
Sponsor	TOSHIBA TEC CORPORATION
Name of the TOE	System Software for e-STUDIO2500c/3500c/3510c
Version of the TOE	V1.0
PP Conformance	None
Assurance Package	EAL3
Developer	TOSHIBA TEC CORPORATION
Evaluation Facility	Electronic Commerce Security Technology Laboratory Inc.
	Evaluation Center

Surveillance Number: JISEC-SV12-001

Report on Surveillance Conducted:

Surveillance Result

In regard to this surveillance, it is confirmed by the Evaluation Facility that consumers are able to safely use the TOE; therefore, it is concluded that the certification of this TOE is maintained.

Surveillance Summary

As for the contents of the following "Announcement", which was released by the developer regarding this TOE, surveillance has been conducted from 2012-04 to 2012-07 in order to determine whether it is appropriate to maintain its certification.

http://www.toshibatec.co.jp/page.jsp?id=2330

Translation notes: English information can be found at: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-1239

JÍSEC

According to the "Announcement", there is a possibility that the administrator page of the web-based management utility "TopAccess" site could be accessed without passwords by using the released vulnerability.

As a result of surveillance, it was verified in the previous evaluation under the responsibility of the Evaluation Facility that the access to the administrator page of "TopAccess" does not affect the security functions of the TOE.

The details are described as follows;

From the administrator page of "TopAccess", it is possible to change the time and date of MFP clock as well as the expiration date for storing user document data, etc. The previous evaluation did not examine whether it is possible to change those by using the released vulnerability when accessing the administrator page of "TopAccess".

Although the TOE has a function to automatically delete the stored user document data after passing the expiration date, it specifies that user document data which was past its expiration date is no longer recognized as an asset to be protected.

As with other functions which can be used from the administrator page of "TopAccess", it is reported that the previous evaluation by the Evaluation Facility verified there was no effect on the security functions of the Target of Evaluation.