Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-III C3300/C2200/C2201 DocuCentre-III C3300/C2200/C2201 Series Controller Software for Asia Pacific

Security Target

Version 1.1.1

This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified security target written in Japanese



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1. ST INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes Security Target (ST) Reference, TOE Reference, TOE Overview, and TOE Description.

1.1. ST Reference

This section provides information needed to identify this ST.

ST Title: Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-III C3300/C2200/C2201 DocuCentre-III

C3300/C2200/C2201 Series Controller Software for Asia Pacific Security Target

ST Version: V 1.1.1

Publication Date: January 30, 2009 Author: Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.

1.2. TOE Reference

This section provides information needed to identify this TOE.

The TOE of Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-III C3300, ApeosPort-III C2200, ApeosPort-III C2201, DocuCentre-III C3300, DocuCentre-III C2200 and DocuCentre-III C2201 are identical and identified as the following TOE name and ROM version:

TOE Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-III C3300/C2200/C2201 DocuCentre-III Identification: C3300/C2200/C2201 Series Controller Software for Asia Pacific

Version: Controller ROM Ver. 1.120.5

Manufacturer: Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.

1.3. TOE Overview

1.3.1. TOE Type and Major Security Features

1.3.1.1. TOE Type

This TOE, categorized as an IT product, is the controller software for MFP and has copy, print, and scan functions.

The TOE is provided as the firmware product which controls the whole MFP and protects the following against threats: the document data stored on the internal HDD, the used document data, the security audit log data, the document data exists on the internal network between TOE and the remote, and the TOE setting data. The TOE is stored on the controller ROM which is on the controller board.

1.3.1.2. Function Types

Table 1 shows the types of functions provided by the TOE.

Table 1: Function Types and Capabilities

Function types (Standard /Option)	Function capabilities
Basic Function + Data Security Kit	- CWIS - System Administrator's Security Management - Internal Network Data Protection - User Authentication - Security Audit Log - Copy - Print - Scan - Network Scan - Hard Disk Data Overwrite - Hard Disk Data Encryption - Customer Engineer Operation Restriction
FAX Board (Not included in TOE)	- FAX - Direct FAX, Internet FAX - FAX Flow Security

- To use print, scan, and Direct FAX functions, the following items shall be installed to the external client for general user and that for system administrator: print driver, scan driver, Network Scan Utility, and FAX driver.
- The Data Security Kit, an option, must be used to obtain the security features.

1.3.1.3. Usage and Major Security Features of TOE

The TOE is mainly used to perform the following functions:

- Copy function is to read the original data from IIT and print it out from IOT according to the general user's instruction from the control panel. When more than one copy is ordered for one original, the data read from IIT is first stored into the MFP internal HDD. Then, the stored data is read out from the HDD as needed so that the required number of copies can be made.
- Print function is to decompose and print out the print data transmitted by a general user client.
- CWIS (CentreWare Internet Service) is to retrieve the document data scanned by MFP from Mailbox.
- It also enables a system administrator to refer to and rewrite TOE setting data via Web browser.
- Scan function is to read the original data from IIT and store it into Mailbox within the MFP internal HDD, according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.
 The stored document data can be retrieved via standard Web browser by CWIS or Network Scan Utility.
- Network Scan function is to read the original data from IIT and transmit the document data to

FTP server, SMB server, or Mail server, according to the information set in the MFP. This function is operated according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.

- FAX function is to send and receive FAX data. According to the general user's instruction from the control panel to send a FAX, the original data is read from IIT and then sent to the destination via public telephone line. The document data is received from the sender's machine via public telephone line and then printed out from the recipient's IOT.
- The Internet FAX function is to send and receive FAX data via the Internet, not public telephone line.
- The Direct FAX function is to send data from a user client to the destination via public telephone line. The data is first sent to MFP as a print job and then to the destination without being printed out.

The TOE provides the following security features:

Hard Disk Data Overwrite

To completely delete the used document data in the internal HDD, the data is overwritten with new data after any function of copy, print, scan, etc. is completed.

Hard Disk Data Encryption

The document data and the security audit log data are encrypted before being stored into the internal HDD when operating any function of copy, print, scan, etc. or configuring various security function settings.

User Authentication

Access to the TOE functions is restricted to the authorized user and this function identifies and authenticates users. A user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the print driver, Network Scan Utility, or CWIS of the general user client, or MFP control panel.

- System Administrator's Security Management
 This function allows only the system administrator identified and authorized from the control panel or system administrator client to refer to and change the TOE security function settings.
- Customer Engineer Operation Restriction
 A system administrator can inhibit CE from referring to / changing the TOE security function settings.
- Security Audit Log

The important events of TOE such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are traced and recorded based on when and who operated what function.

Internal Network Data Protection

This function protects the communication data on the internal network such as document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data. (The following general encryption communication- protocols are supported: SSL/TLS, IPSec, SNMP v3, and S/MIME.)

• FAX Flow Security

This function prevents unauthorized access to the TOE or the internal network via FAX board from public telephone line.

1.3.2. Environment Assumptions

This TOE is assumed to be used as an IT product at general office and to be linked to public telephone line, user clients, and the internal network protected from threats on the external network by firewall etc.

Figure 1 shows the intended environment for TOE operation.




Figure 1: Intended Operational Environment

1.3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware and Software

In the operational environment shown in Figure 1, the TOE (controller software) and the following non-TOE hardware/software exist.

(1) MFP:

The MFP is a user interface to provide MFP functions and the hardware for scan/print/copy functions. It includes the control panel, ADF, IIT, IOT, controller board, and FAX board (option).

(2) General user client:

The hardware is a general-purpose PC. When a client is linked to the MFP via the internal network and the print driver, Network Scan Utility, and FAX driver are installed to the client, the general user can request the MFP to print, FAX, and retrieve the document data.

The user can also request the MFP to retrieve the scanned document data via Web browser.

Additionally, the user can change the settings which he/she registered to the MFP: Mailbox name, password, access control, and automatic deletion of document.

When the client is linked to the MFP directly via USB (or IEEE 1284) and print/FAX driver is installed to the client, the user can request the MFP to print/FAX the document data.

(3) System administrator client:

The hardware is a general-purpose PC. A system administrator can refer to and change TOE setting data via Web browser or ApeosWare EasyAdmin.

(4) Mail server:

The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFP sends/receives document data to/from Mail server via mail protocol.

(5) FTP server:

The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFP sends document data to FTP server via FTP.

(6) SMB server:

The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFP sends document data to SMB server via SMB.

(7) FAX board:

The FAX board is connected to external public telephone line and supports G3/G4 protocols. The FAX board is connected to the MFP via USB interface to enable FAX communication.

The OS's of general user client (2) and system administrator client (3) are assumed to be Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows Vista.

1.4. TOE Description

This section describes user assumptions and logical/physical scope of this TOE.

1.4.1. User Assumptions

Table 2 specifies the roles of TOE users assumed in this ST.

<u>Table 2: User Role Assumptions</u>

User	Role Description
Administrator of the	An administrator or responsible official of the organization which
organization	owns and uses TOE.
General user	A user of TOE functions such as copy, print and FAX.
System administrator (Key operator + System Administrator Privilege [SA])	A user who is authorized to manage the device using the system administrator mode. A system administrator can refer to and rewrite the TOE setting for device operation and that for security functions via TOE control panel, ApeosWare EasyAdmin, and Web browser.
Customer engineer (CE)	A user who can configure the TOE operational settings using the interface for CE.

1.4.2. Logical Scope and Boundary

The logical scope of this TOE consists of each function of the programs recorded on the controller ROM.

Figure 2 shows the logical architecture of the MFP.




Figure 2: MFP Units and TOE Logical Scope

1.4.2.1. Basic Functions

The TOE provides the functions of control panel, copy, print, scan, network scan, FAX, Internet FAX, Direct FAX, and CWIS to general user.

Table 3: TOE Basic Functions

Function	Description
Control Panel	Control panel function is a user interface function for general user, CE, and
Function	system administrator to operate MFP functions.
Copy Function	Copy function is to read the original data from IIT and print it out from IOT
	according to the general user's instruction from the control panel
	When more than one copy is ordered for one original, the data read from IIT
	is first stored into the MFP internal HDD. Then, the stored data is read out
	from the HDD as needed so that the required number of copies can be made.
Print Function	Print function is to print out the data according to the instruction from a
	general user client. The print data created via print driver is sent to the MFP
	to be analyzed, decomposed, and printed out from IOT.
	The print function is of two types: the normal print in which the data is
	printed out from IOT directly after decomposed and the Store Print in which
	the bitmap data is temporarily stored in the internal HDD and then printed
	out from IOT according to the general user's instruction from the control
	panel.
Scan Function,	Scan function is to read the original data from IIT and then store it into the
Network Scan	internal HDD according to the general user's instruction from the control
Function	panel.
	A general user can retrieve the stored document data from a general user
	client via CWIS or Network Scan Utility.
	Network scan function is to read the original data from IIT and automatically
	transmit it to a general user client, FTP server, Mail server, or SMB server
	according to the information set in the MFP. A general user can request this
	function from the control panel.
FAX Function	FAX function is to send and receive FAX data. According to the general
	user's instruction from the control panel to send a FAX, the original data is
	read from IIT and sent to the destination via public telephone line. The
	document data is received from the sender's machine via public telephone
	line and printed out from the recipient's IOT.
Direct FAX Function,	Direct FAX function is to directly FAX document data to the destination.
Internet FAX	According to the instruction from a general user client to send a FAX, the
Function	print data created via FAX driver is sent to the MFP, analyzed, and
	decomposed. Then, the data is converted to the format for FAX sending and
	sent to the destination via public telephone line.
	Internet FAX function is to send and receive FAX data as in the normal FAX
	function. According to the general user's instruction from the control panel to
	send a FAX, the original data is read from IIT and sent to the destination via
	the Internet. The document data is received from the sender's machine via the
	Internet and printed out from the recipient's IOT.

CWIS Function	CWIS is to retrieve, from the internal HDD, the scanned document data and
	the received FAX data according to the instruction from Web browser of a
	general user client.
	CWIS also enables System Administrator's Security Management by which a
	system administrator can access and rewrite TOE setting data. For this, a
	system administrator must be authenticated by his/her ID and password
	entered from Web browser of a system administrator client.

1.4.2.2. Security Functions

The security functions provided by the TOE are the following.

(1) Hard Disk Data Overwrite

To completely delete the used document data in the internal HDD, the data is overwritten with new data after each job (copy, print, scan, Network Scan, FAX, Internet FAX, or Direct FAX) is completed. Without this function, the used document data remains and only its management data is deleted.

(2) Hard Disk Data Encryption

Some data such as the security audit log data and the document data in Mail Box remain in the internal HDD even if the machine is powered off. To solve this problem, the document data and security audit log data are encrypted before being stored into the internal HDD when operating any function of copy, print, scan, network scan, FAX, Internet FAX, and Direct FAX, or configuring various security function settings.

(3) User Authentication

Access to the MFP functions is restricted to the authorized user. A general user needs to enter his/her ID and password from MFP control panel, print driver, Network Scan Utility, or CWIS of the user client.

Only the authenticated general user can use the following functions:

a) Functions controlled by the MFP control panel:

Copy, FAX (send), Internet FAX (send), scan, network scan, Mailbox, and print (This print function requires user ID and password preset from print driver. A user must be authenticated from the control panel for print job.)

b) Functions controlled by Network Scan Utility of general user client:

Function to retrieve document data from Mailbox

c) Functions controlled by CWIS:

Display of device condition, display of job status and its log, function to retrieve document data from Mailbox, and print function by file designation

Among the above functions which require user authentication, some particularly act as security functions. The following are the security functions which prevent the unauthorized reading of document data in the internal HDD by an attacker who is impersonating a legitimate user:

• The print function (Private Print function) and the Mailbox function, which require user

authentication from the control panel,

• The function to retrieve document data from Mailbox which requires user authentication from CWIS or Network Scan Utility (Mailbox function), and the Store Print function by file designation from CWIS (Private Print function).

Figure 3 shows the authentication flow of the above functions.




Figure 3: Authentication Flow for Private Print and Mailbox

• Private Print Function (Store Print Function)

To enable this function, the user needs to configure the MFP to "store an authenticated job to Private Print area*" and also needs to preset his/her ID and password from print driver of a general user client. When a general user sends a print request from print driver, the MFP compares the user ID and password against those preset in the MFP. Only when the user is authenticated, the print data is decomposed into bitmap data. Then, the data is classified according to the user ID and temporarily stored in the corresponding Private Print area within the internal HDD. (*Private Print area means the storage area of data for Private Print.)

The user can also enable this function by entering his/her ID and password from CWIS for authentication and by sending a print request with designating the files within a general user client.

To refer to the stored print data, a general user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the control panel. Then, the data on the waiting list corresponding to the user ID is displayed. The user can request print or deletion of the data on the list

• Mailbox Function

The scanned data and received FAX data can be stored into Mailbox from IIT and FAX board which are not shown in Figure 3.

To store the scanned data into Mailbox, a general user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the control panel. Then, the document data can be scanned from IIT and stored into the internal HDD according to the user's instruction from the control panel.

To store the received FAX data into Mailbox, user authentication is not required. Among the received FAX data transmitted over public telephone line, the following data are automatically classified and stored into each corresponding Mailbox: the received FAX data whose corresponding Mailbox is specified by the sender, the received FAX data from a particular sender (the data is classified according to the sender's telephone number), and the received FAX data from an unknown sender.

To refer to, retrieve, print, or delete the stored data in the Personal Mailbox corresponding to the each registered user's ID, user authentication is required; the MFP compares the user ID and password preset in the device against those entered by a general user from the control panel, CWIS, or Network Scan Utility.

(4) System Administrator's Security Management

To accord a privilege to a specific user, this TOE allows only the authenticated system administrator to access the System Administrator mode which enables him/her to refer to and set the following security functions from the control panel:

- Refer to and set Hard Disk Data Overwrite;
- Refer to and set Hard Disk Data Encryption;
- Set the cryptographic seed key for Hard Disk Data Encryption;
- Refer to and set the setting to use the password entered from MFP control panel in user authentication;
- Refer to and set the ID of key operator and set the password (only a key operator is privileged);
- Refer to and set the ID of SA / general user and set the password;
- Refer to the setting of access denial due to system administrator's authentication failures;
- Refer to and set the limit of user password length (for general user and SA);
- Refer to and set the SSL/TLS communication;
- Refer to and set the IPSec communication;
- Refer to and set the S/MIME communication (ApeosPort-III only);
- Refer to and set User Authentication;
- Refer to and set date and time;

Additionally, this TOE allows only the system administrator, who is authenticated from the system administrator client via Web browser using CWIS, to refer to and set the following security functions via CWIS:

- Refer to and set the ID of key operator and set the password (only a key operator is privileged);
- Refer to and set the ID of SA / general user and set the password;

- Refer to the setting of access denial due to system administrator's authentication failures;
- Refer to and set the limit of user password length (for general user and SA);
- Refer to and set Audit Log;
- Refer to and set the SSL/TLS communication;
- Refer to and set the IPSec communication;
- Refer to and set the SNMP v3 communication;
- Refer to and set the SNMP v3 authentication password.
- Refer to and set the S/MIME communication (ApeosPort-III only);
- Create/upload/download an X.509 certificate;
- Refer to and set User Authentication:

Moreover, this TOE allows only the key operator (excluding SA), who is authenticated from the system administrator client via ApeosWare EasyAdmin, to refer to and set the following security functions:

- Refer to and set the ID of key operator and set the password;
- Refer to and set the ID of SA / general user and set the password;
- Refer to and set the setting to use the password entered from MFP control panel in user authentication:
- Refer to and set User Authentication:
- Refer to and set date and time:

(5) Customer Engineer Operation Restriction

This TOE allows only the authenticated system administrator to refer to or enable/disable the Customer Engineer Operation Restriction setting from the control panel and CWIS. For this, CE cannot refer to or change the setting of each function described in (4) System Administrator's Security Management.

(6) Security Audit Log

The important events of TOE such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are traced and recorded based on when and who operated what function. Only a system administrator can supervise or analyze the log data by downloading it in the form of tab-delimited text file via Web browser using CWIS. To download the log data, SSL/TLS communication needs to be enabled.

(7) Internal Network Data Protection

The communication data on the internal network such as document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data are protected by the following general encryption communication-protocols:

- · SSL/TLS
- IPSec
- SNMP v3
- S/MIME (ApeosPort-III only)

(8) FAX Flow Security

A FAX board is an option and is connected to TOE controller board via USB interface. An attacker cannot access the TOE or the internal network from public telephone line via the FAX board.

1.4.3. Physical Scope and Boundary

The physical scope of this TOE is the controller board. Figure 4 shows configuration of each unit and TOE physical scope.




Figure 4: MFP Units and TOE Physical Scope

The MFP consists of the PWB units of controller board and control panel, IIT, and IOT.

The controller board is connected to the control panel via the internal interfaces which transmit control data, to the IIT board and IOT board via the internal interfaces which transmit document data and control data, and to the FAX board via USB interface.

The controller board is a PWB which controls MFP functions of copy, print, scan, and FAX. The board has a network interface (Ethernet) and local interfaces (USB, IEEE 1284) and is connected to the IIT board and IOT board.

The control panel is a panel on which buttons, lamps, and a touch screen panel are mounted to enable MFP functions of copy, scan, and FAX.

The IIT (Image Input Terminal) is a device to scan an original and send its data to the controller board for copy, print, scan, and FAX functions.

The IOT (Image Output Terminal) is a device to output image data which was sent from the controller board.

1.4.4. Guidance

The following are the guidance documents for this TOE.

- ApeosPort-III C3300/C2200/C2201 DocuCentre-III C3300/C2200/C2201 Administrator Guide
- ApeosPort-III C3300/C2200/C2201 DocuCentre-III C3300/C2200/C2201 User Guide
- ApeosPort-III C4400 DocuCentre-III C4400 ApeosPort-III C3300/C2200/C2201 DocuCentre-III C3300/C2200/C2201 Security Function Supplementary Guide

2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS

2.1. CC Conformance Claims

This ST and TOE conform to the following evaluation standards for information security (CC):

- Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Translation revision 1.2, dated March 2007,
- Part 2: Security functional requirements, Version 3.1 Translation revision 2.0, dated March 2008
- Part 3: Security assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Translation revision 2.0, dated March 2008

The security functional requirements of this ST conform to CC Part 2.

The security assurance requirements of this ST conform to CC Part 3.

2.2. PP Claims, Package Claims

2.2.1. PP Claims

There is no applicable Protection Profile.

2.2.2. Package Claims

This ST conforms to EAL3.

2.2.3. Conformance Rationale

There is no applicable PP rationale since this ST does not conform to PP.

3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION

This chapter describes the threats, organizational security policies, and the assumptions for the use of this TOE.

3.1. Threats

3.1.1. Assets Protected by TOE

This TOE protects the following assets (Figure 5):

(1) Right to use MFP functions

The general user's right to use each function of TOE is assumed as an asset to be protected.

(2) Document data stored for job processing

When a general user uses MFP functions of copy, print, FAX, and scan, the document data is temporarily stored in the internal HDD for image processing, transmission, and Store Print. The user can retrieve the stored document data in the MFP from a general user client by CWIS function and Network Scan Utility. The stored data includes general user's confidential information and is assumed as an asset to be protected.

(3) Used document data

When a general user uses MFP functions of copy, print, FAX, and scan, the document data is temporarily stored in the internal HDD for image processing, transmission, and Store Print. When the jobs are completed or canceled, only the management information is deleted but the data itself remains. The residual data includes general user's confidential information and is assumed as an asset to be protected.

(4) Security audit log data

In the function of Security Audit Log, the important events such as device failure, configuration change and user operation are recorded based on when and who operated what function. For preventive maintenance and response to the events and detection of unauthorized access, only a system administrator can retrieve the log data stored in MFP by CWIS function. The log data is assumed as an asset to be protected.

(5) TOE setting data

A system administrator can set TOE security functions from the MFP control panel or system administrator client by the function of System Administrator's Security Management. The setting data stored in the TOE (see Table 4) can be a threat to other assets if used without authorization and is assumed as an asset to be protected.




Figure 5: Assets under and not under Protection

Note) The data stored in a general client and server within the internal network and the general data on the internal network are not assumed as assets to be protected. This is because TOE functions prevent the access to the internal network from public telephone line and it cannot be a threat.

Table 4 categorizes the TOE setting data recorded on NVRAM and SEEPROM of the controller board.

Table 4: Categories of TOE Setting Data

Categories of TOE Setting Data (Note)	
Data on Hard Disk Data Overwrite	
Data on Hard Disk Data Encryption	
Data on use of password entered from MFP control panel in user authentication	
Data on ID and password of system administrator	
Data on access denial due to authentication failures of system administrator	
Data on Customer Engineer Operation Restriction	
Data on Internal Network Data Protection	
Data on Security Audit Log	

Categories of TOE Setting Data (Note)	
Data on Mailbox	
Data on User Authentication	
Data on date and time	

Note: The setting data other than TOE setting data are also stored on NVRAM and SEEPROM. Those setting data, however, are not assumed as assets to be protected because they do not engage in TOE security functions.

3.1.2. Threats

Table 5 identifies the threats addressed by the TOE. An attacker is considered to have public knowledge of how the TOE operates and low-level attack capability.

Table 5: Threats Addressed by the TOE

Threat (Identifier)	Description
	An attacker may remove the internal HDD and connect it to commercial
T.RECOVER	tools so that he/she can read out and leak the document data, used
	document data, security audit log data from the HDD without
	authorization.
	An attacker may access, read, or alter, from control panel or system
T.CONFDATA	administrator client, the TOE setting data which only a system
	administrator is allowed to access.
T.DATA_SEC	An attacker may read document data and security audit log data from
	control panel or Web browser without authorization.
T.COMM_TAP	An attacker may intercept or alter document data, security audit log
	data, and TOE setting data on the internal network.
T.CONSUME	An attacker may access TOE and use TOE functions without
	authorization.

3.2. Organizational Security Policies

Table 6 below describes the organizational security policy the TOE must comply with.

Table 6: Organizational Security Policy

Organizational Policy (Identifier)	Description
P.FAX_OPT	At the behest of the Australian agency, it must be ensured that the internal network cannot be accessed via public telephone line.

3.3. Assumptions

Table 7 shows the assumptions for the operation and use of this TOE.

Table 7: Assumptions

Assumption (Identifier)	Description
Personnel Confidence	
A.ADMIN	A system administrator shall have the necessary knowledge of TOE security functions to perform the given role of managing the TOE and shall not operate it viciously.
Protection Mode	
A.SECMODE	A system administrator shall configure the TOE as follows. Use of password entered from MFP control panel in user authentication: enabled. Length of system administrator password: 9 characters or more Access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator: enabled Allowable number of system administrator's authentication failures before access denial: 5 Customer Engineer Operation Restriction: enabled User authentication setting: enabled (select Local Authentication) Length of user password (for general user and SA): 9 characters or more Private Print setting: store authenticated jobs to Private Print area Audit Log setting: enabled SNMP v3 communication: enabled SNMP v1/v2c communication: disabled Length of authentication password for SNMP v3 communication: 8 characters or more SSL/TLS communication: enabled
	IPSec communication: enabled

Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-III C3300/C2200/C2201 DocuCentre-III C3300/C2200/C2201 Series Controller Software Security Target

Assumption (Identifier)	Description	
	• S/MIME communication: enabled (ApeosPort-III only)	
	SMB communication: NetBEUI disabled	
	Hard Disk Data Overwrite: enabled	
	Hard Disk Data Encryption: enabled	
	 Size of cryptographic seed key for Hard Disk Data Encryption: 12 	
	characters	

4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES

This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and for the environment and the rationale.

4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE

Table 8 defines the security objectives to be accomplished by the TOE.

Table 8: Security Objectives for the TOE

Security Objectives	Description	
(Identifier)		
O.AUDITS	The TOE must provide Security Audit Log and its log data which are	
O.AUDITS	necessary to monitor unauthorized access.	
	The TOE must encrypt the document data, used document data, and	
O.CIPHER	security audit log data to be stored into the HDD so that they cannot be	
	analyzed even if retrieved.	
	The TOE must provide encryption communication function to protect the	
O.COMM SEC	document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the	
O.COMM_SEC	internal network between TOE and the remote from interception and	
	alteration.	
O.FAX_SEC	The TOE must prevent the unauthorized access to the internal network via	
U.FAX_SEC	FAX modem from public telephone line.	
	The TOE must inhibit a general user from accessing TOE setting data. The	
O.MANAGE	TOE allows only the authenticated system administrator to access the	
O.WANAGE	system administrator mode which enables him/her to configure the	
	security functions.	
O.RESIDUAL	The TOE must provide overwrite function to prevent the used document	
O.KESIDUAL	data in the internal HDD from being reproduced or recovered.	
	The TOE must provide the function to identify TOE user and allow only	
O.USER	the legitimate user to store, retrieve, and delete the document data and to	
	change the password.	
O.RESTRICT	The TOE must inhibit an unauthorized user from using the TOE.	

4.2. Security Objectives for the Environment

Table 9 defines the security objectives for the TOE environment.

Table 9: Security Objectives for the Environment

Security Objectives (Identifier)	Description	
OF ADMIN	An organization administrator shall assign an appropriate and reliable	
OE.ADMIN	person for TOE management as a system administrator and train him/her.	
	A system administrator shall configure the TOE security functions as	
	follows.	
	• Use of password entered from MFP control panel in user authentication: enabled	
	 Length of system administrator password: 9 characters or more 	
OE.AUTH	Access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator: enabled	
92	• Allowable number of system administrator's authentication failures before access denial: 5	
	Customer Engineer Operation Restriction: enabled	
	• User authentication setting: enabled (select Local Authentication)	
	• Length of user password (for general user and SA): 9 characters or more	
	Private Print setting: store authenticated jobs to Private Print area	
	A system administrator needs to configure the TOE as follows so that the	
	document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data are protected	
	from interception.	
	SNMP v3 communication: enabled	
	SNMP v1/v2c communication: disabled	
OE.COMMS_SEC	• Length of authentication password for SNMP v3 communication: 8	
	characters or more	
	• SSL/TLS communication: enabled	
	IPSec communication: enabled	
	• S/MIME communication: enabled (ApeosPort-III only)	
	SMB communication: NetBEUI disabled	
	A system administrator shall configure the TOE security functions as	
	follows.	
	Hard Disk Data Overwrite: enabled	
OE.FUNCTION	Hard Disk Data Encryption: enabled	
	• Size of cryptographic seed key for Hard Disk Data Encryption: 12	
	characters	
	Audit Log: enabled	

4.3. Security Objectives Rationale

The security objectives are established to correspond to the assumptions specified in Security Problem Definition, to counter the threats, or to realize the organizational security policies. Table 10 shows the correspondences between the security objectives and the assumptions / threats / organizational security policies. Moreover, Table 11 shows that each defined security problem is covered by the security objectives.

<u>Table 10: Correspondences between Security Objectives and</u>
Assumptions / Threats / Organizational Security Policies

Security Problems Security Objectives	A.ADMIN	A.SECMODE	T.RECOVER	T.CONFDATA	T.COMM_TAP	T.DATA_SEC	T.CONSUME	P.FAX_OPT
O.AUDITS				✓		✓		
O.CIPHER			√					
O.COMM_SEC					✓			
O.FAX_SEC								✓
O.MANAGE				✓		✓		
O.RESIDUAL			✓					
O.USER				✓		✓		
O.RESTRICT							✓	
OE.ADMIN	✓							
OE.AUTH		✓		✓		✓		
OE.COMM_SEC		✓			✓			
OE.FUNCTION		✓	✓	✓		✓		

Table 11: Security Objectives Rationale for Security Problem

Security Problem	Security Objectives Rationale		
	By satisfying the following objective, A.ADMIN can be realized:		
A ADMIN	By OE.ADMIN, an organization person in charge selects a suitable		
A.ADMIN	member for system administrator and provides management and		
	education.		
	By satisfying the following objectives, A.SECMODE can be realized:		
	By OE.AUTH, a system administrator sets an appropriate ID and		
A.SECMODE	password and enables user authentication and Customer Engineer		
	Operation Restriction.		
	By OE.COMMS_SEC, the internal network data (incl. document data,		

Security Problem	Security Objectives Rationale			
	security audit log data, and TOE setting data) are protected from			
	interception.			
	By OE.FUNCTION, Hard Disk Data Overwrite, Hard Disk Data			
	Encryption, and Security Audit Log are enabled, which disables the			
	recovery of the used document data in the internal HDD.			
	By satisfying the following objective, T.RECOVER can be countered:			
	By OE.FUNCTION, it is necessary to enable the TOE security			
	functions (i.e. Hard Disk Data Overwrite and Hard Disk Data			
	Encryption) and disable the reading-out of the document data and			
	security audit log data in the internal HDD as well as the recovery of			
	the used document data. To be specific, this threat can be countered by			
T.RECOVER	the following security objectives: O.CIPHER and O.RESIDUAL.			
	By O.CIPHER, the document data and security audit log data in the			
	internal HDD are encrypted to disable the reference and reading-out of			
	the document data, used document data, and security audit log data.			
	By O.RESIDUAL, the used document data is overwritten and deleted			
	to disable the recovery and reproduction of the used document data			
	stored in the internal HDD.			
	By satisfying the following objective, T.CONFDATA can be			
	countered:			
	By OE.AUTH and OE.FUNCTION, it is necessary to enable the			
	security functions (i.e. User Authentication with Password, System			
	Administrator Password, Access Denial due to System Administrator's			
	Authentication Failures, Customer Engineer Operation Restriction, and			
	Audit Log) and permits only the authenticated system administrator to			
	change the TOE setting data. To be specific, this threat can be			
T.CONFDATA	countered by the following security objectives, O.MANAGE, O.USER,			
	and O.AUDITS:			
	By O.MANAGE, only the authenticated system administrator is			
	allowed to enable/disable the TOE security functions and to refer to /			
	update the TOE setting data.			
	By O.USER, only the legitimate user is allowed to change the			
	password.			
	By O.AUDITS, the audit log function necessary to monitor			
	unauthorized access and the security audit log data are provided.			
	By satisfying the following objective, T.CONSUME can be countered.			
T.CONSUME	By O.RESTRICT, the access to the TOE can be controlled.			
	By satisfying the following objectives, T.COMM_TAP can be			
T.COMM_TAP	countered.			
1.COMMINI_TAF	By O.COMM_SEC, the client/server authentication function of			
	by O.COMMI_SEC, the Chem/server authentication function of			

Security Problem	Security Objectives Rationale		
	encryption communication protocol allows only the legitimate user to		
	send/receive the communication data. Encrypting communication data		
	with encryption function also disables the interception and alteration of		
	the internal network data (incl. document data, security audit log data,		
	and TOE setting data).		
	By OE.COMMS_SEC, the document data, security audit log data, and		
	TOE setting data on the internal network can be protected from		
	interception.		
	By satisfying the following objectives, T.DATA_SEC can be countered.		
	By OE.AUTH and OE.FUNCTION, it is necessary to enable the		
	following passwords, user authentication function, and security audit		
	log function: User Password, System Administrator Password, Local		
	Authentication, Security Audit Log. Then, only the authenticated user		
T.DATA_SEC	is allowed to access the security audit log data and document data.		
I.DAIA_SEC	By O.USER, only the authenticated user is allowed to read out the		
	document data and security audit log data stored in the internal HDD.		
	By O.MANAGE, only the authenticated system administrator is		
	allowed to configure the TOE security functions.		
	By O.AUDITS, the audit log function necessary to monitor		
	unauthorized access and the security audit log data are provided.		
	By satisfying the following objectives, P.FAX_OPT can be observed.		
	By O.FAX_SEC, the access to the internal network via public		
P.FAX_OPT	telephone line is disabled. This realizes P.FAX_OPT.		
	Since the data received from public telephone line is not sent to the		
	internal network, the internal network cannot be accessed.		

5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION

5.1. Extended Components

This ST conforms to CC Part 2 and CC Part 3, and there are no extended components which shall be defined.

6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

This chapter describes the security functional requirements, security assurance requirements, and security requirement rational.

The terms and phrases used in this chapter are defined below.

- Subject

Term/phrase	Definition			
Key Operator Process	Operation at using Mailbox and Store Print with the			
	user authentication of key operator succeeded.			
SA Process	Operation at using Mailbox and Store Print with the			
	user authentication of SA succeeded.			
General User Process	Operation at using Mailbox and Store Print with the			
	user authentication of general user succeeded.			
Receiving information from	To receive the document data from the sender's			
public telephone line	machine via public telephone line, as receiving FAX			
	data.			
Sending information to public	To send the document data to the destination via public			
telephone line	telephone line according to the general user's			
	instruction from the control panel or client PC, as			
	sending FAX data.			
Sending information to the	To send the Network Scan data or the data received by			
internal network-	internet FAX to the destination, a client PC, within the			
	internal network.			
Receiving information from the	To receive the print data or the Direct FAX/Internet			
internal network.	FAX data from the sender, a client PC, within the			
	internal network.			

- Object

Term/phrase	Definition
Mailbox	A logical box created in the MFP internal HDD.
	Mailbox can store the scanned document data or the
	document data received via Fax, categorizing by users
	and senders. Mailbox is categorized into Personal
	Mailbox and Shared Mailbox.
Personal Mailbox	The Mailbox privately used by a general user. Each
	user can create his/her own Personal Mailbox.
Shared Mailbox	The Mailbox shared by any general user. Key operator
	can create the Shared Mailbox.
Store Print	A print function in which bitmap data (decomposed
	print data) is temporarily stored in the MFP internal

	HDD and then printed out according to the
	authenticated general user's instruction from the
	control panel.
Used document data stored in the	The remaining data in the MFP internal HDD even
internal HDD	after deletion. The document data is first stored into the
	internal HDD, used, and then only its file is deleted.
Document data	Document data means all the image data transmitted
	across the MFP when any of copy, print, scan or FAX
	functions is operated by a general user.
Security Audit Log	The chronologically recorded data of important events
	of TOE. The events such as device failure,
	configuration change, and user operation are recorded
	based on when and who caused what event and its
	result.

- Operation

Term/phrase	Definition
Delivery	MFP receives the data from public telephone line for
	FAX function.
Modify	To change the settings of the following information:
	• Use of password entered from MFP control panel in
	user authentication;
	 ID and password of system administrator;
	• Access denial due to authentication failure of system
	administrator;
	Hard Disk Data Overwrite;
	 Hard Disk Data Encryption;
	 Customer Engineer Operation Restriction.

- Data

Term/phrase	Definition			
Data on public telephone line	The data which flows on public telephone line for FAX			
	communication.			

- Security attributes

Term/phrase	Definition	
General User Role	Indicates the authority required for general user to use	
	TOE.	
SA Role	Indicates the authority required for SA to use TOE.	
Key Operator Role	Indicates the authority required for key operator to use	
	TOE.	

General User identity	User ID and password used to authenticate and identify	
	general user.	
SA identity	User ID and password used to authenticate and identify	
	SA.	
Key Operator identity	User ID and password used to authenticate and identify	
	key operator.	
Owner identity of Personal	Data on each Mailbox, incl. permitted user, box name,	
Mailbox (Personal, Shared)	password, conditions for deleting documents, etc.	
Owner identity of Store Print area	Data on Private Print, incl. user ID, password,	
	measures to be taken at authentication failure, etc.	

- Entity outside TOE

Term/phrase	Definition	
System Administrator	This term covers both key operator and SA.	
Key Operator	An authorized user who manages MFP maintenance	
	and makes TOE security function settings.	
System Administrator Privilege	The user(s) who manage MFP maintenance and	
(SA)	configure TOE security functions. SA can be	
	created/registered by key operator or the other SA who	
	is already registered.	
General User	Any person who uses copy, scan, FAX, and print	
	functions of MFP.	

- Other terminology

Term/phrase	Definition	
The Fuji Xerox's standard	The Fuji Xerox's standard algorithm to generate a	
method, FXOSENC	cryptographic key. This is used when MFP is booted.	
AES	The FIPS-standard encryption algorithm used for	
	encryption/decryption of Hard Disk data.	
Access denial due to	When the defined number of unsuccessful	
authentication failure of system	authentication attempts with system administrator ID	
administrator ID	has been met, the control panel does not accept any	
	operation except power cycle, and the web browser	
	does not accept authentication operation until the MFP	
	main unit is powered off/on.	
Data on use of password entered	The data on whether to enable/disable the use of	
from MFP control panel in user	password to be entered from MFP control panel in user	
authentication	authentication. Included in the TOE setting data.	
Data on ID of SA	ID data for SA authentication. Included in the TOE	
	setting data.	

Data on pageword of CA	Decorpord data for CA authorization Included in the	
Data on password of SA	Password data for SA authentication. Included in the	
Data on ID of General User	TOE setting data.	
Data on 1D of General User	ID data for general user authentication. Included in the	
Data on massiviand of Committee	TOE setting data.	
Data on password of General User	Password data for general user authentication. Included	
	in the TOE setting data.	
Data on access denial due to	The data on whether to enable/disable access denial	
authentication failures of system	due to authentication failure of system administrator	
administrator	ID. It also incorporates the data on the allowable	
	number of the failures before access denial. Included in	
	the TOE setting data.	
Data on Security Audit Log	The data on whether to enable/disable the function to	
	trace/ record the important events of TOE such as device	
	failure, configuration change, and user operation, based	
	on when and who operated what function.	
Data on User Authentication	The data on whether to enable/disable the authentication	
	function using the data on user authentication for using	
	copy, scan, FAX, and print functions of MFP. It also	
	incorporates the data on the authentication method.	
Data on Internal Network Data	The data on whether to enable/disable the general	
Protection	encryption communication protocols to protect the	
	communication data on the internal network such as	
	document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting	
	data. It also incorporates the data on the setting.	
Data on Customer Engineer	The data on whether to enable/disable Customer	
Operation Restriction-	Engineer Operation Restriction. Included in the TOE	
	setting data.	
Data on Hard Disk Data	The data on whether to enable/disable the functions	
Encryption	related to Hard Disk Data Encryption. It also	
	incorporates the data on the encryption seed key.	
	Included in the TOE setting data.	
Data on Hard Disk Data	The data on whether to enable/disable the functions	
Overwrite	related to Hard Disk Data Overwrite. It also	
	incorporates the data on the number of pass (overwrite	
	procedure). Included in the TOE setting data.	
Data on date and time	The horologe information to manage log. Included in	
	the TOE setting data.	
Public telephone line	The line/network on which the data flows for FAX	
_	communication.	
	I .	

System Administrator mode	An operation mode that enables a system administrator	
	to refer to and rewrite TOE setting for device operatio	
	and that for security functions according to the	
	operational environment. This mode is distinguished	
	from the operation mode that enables a general user to	
	use the MFP functions.	
Certificate	Defined in the X.509 which is recommended by ITU-T.	
	The data for user authentication (name, identification	
	name, organization where he/she belongs to, etc.), public	
	key, expiry date, serial number, signature, etc.	
Print Driver	Software to convert the data on a general user client into	
	print data written in page description language (PDL), a	
	readable format for MFP. Used on the user client.	
FAX Driver	Software for Direct FAX function, which enables a	
	general user to fax data to the destination directly from a	
	general user client through MFP. The user can send the	
	FAX data just as printing.	
Network Scan Utility	Software for a general user client to retrieve the document	
	data stored in Mailbox of MFP.	

6.1. Security Functional Requirements

Security functional requirements which the TOE offers are described below. The security functional requirements are based on the class and component which are specified by the [CC part 2].

6.1.1. Class FAU: Security audit

(1) FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;

b) All auditable events for the [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] level of audit; and

c) [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events].

[selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified]

- not specified

[assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]

- the actions to be audited (defined by CC) and the corresponding auditable events (events to be recorded as execution log) of TOE.

Showing Table 12

Table 12: Auditable Events of TOE and Individually Defined Auditable Events

Functional	Actions to be audited (defined by CC)	Auditable events of
Requirements		TOE
FAU_GEN.1	None	-
FAU_SAR.1	a) Basic: Reading of information from the audit	Basic: Successful
	records.	download of audit log
		data.
FAU_SAR.2	a) Basic: Unsuccessful attempts to read information	Basic: Unsuccessful
	from the audit records.	download of audit log
		data.
FAU_STG.1	None	-
FAU_STG.4	a) Basic: Actions taken due to the audit storage	None
	failure.	
FCS_CKM.1	a) Minimal: Success and failure of the activity.	None
	b) Basic: The object attribute(s), and object value(s)	
	excluding any sensitive information (e.g. secret or	
	private keys).	

operation on an object covered by the SFP. b) Basic: All requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the SFP. c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used in making an access check. FDP_IFC.1 None FDP_IFF.1 a) Minimal: Decisions to permit requested information flows. b) Basic: All decisions on requests for information flow. c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used in making an information flow enforcement decision. d) Detailed: Some specific subsets of the information that has flowed based upon policy goals (e.g. auditing of downgraded material). FDP_RIP.1 None FIA_AFL.1 a) Minimal: the reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication attempts and the actions (e.g. disabling of a terminal) taken and the subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal state (e.g. re-enabling of a terminal). FIA_ATD.1 None FIA_UAU.2 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism; b) Basic: All use of the authentication mechanism. FIA_UAU.7 None FIA_UID.2 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user identification mechanism, including the user - Minimal> - Continuous			
b) Basic: Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of operation, subject attributes and object attributes. FDP_ACC.1 None FDP_ACF.1 a) Minimal: Successful requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the SFP. b) Basic: All requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the SFP. c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used in making an access check. Weer name, job information, and success/fallure regarding access to Mailbox and execution of Store Print. FDP_IFC.1 None FDP_IFF.1 a) Minimal: Decisions to permit requested information flows. b) Basic: All decisions on requests for information flow. c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used in making an information flow enforcement decision. d) Detailed: Some specific subsets of the information that has flowed based upon policy goals (e.g. auditing of downgraded material). FDP_RIP.1 None FIA_AFL.1 a) Minimal: the reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication attempts and the actions (e.g. disabling of a terminal) taken and the subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal state (e.g. re-enabling of a terminal). FIA_ATD.1 None FIA_ATD.1 None FIA_ATD.1 None FIA_UAU.2 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism; b) Basic: All use of the authentication mechanism. FIA_UAU.7 None FIA_UID.2 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identification failure identification mechanism, including the user identification failure identification mechanism, including the user identification failure identification failure identification mechanism, including the user identification failure identification failure identification mechanism, including the user identification failure identifi	FCS_COP.1		None
operation, subject attributes and object attributes. FDP_ACC.1 None FDP_ACF.1 a) Minimal: Successful requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the SFP. b) Basic: All requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the SFP. c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used in making an access check. FDP_IFC.1 None FDP_IFC.1 None FDP_IFF.1 a) Minimal: Decisions to permit requested information flows. b) Basic: All decisions on requests for information flow. c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used in making an information flow enforcement decision. d) Detailed: Some specific subsets of the information that has flowed based upon policy goals (e.g. auditing of downgraded material). FDP_RIP.1 None FIA_AFL.1 a) Minimal: the reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication attempts and the actions (e.g. disabling of a terminal) taken and the subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal state (e.g. re-enabling of a terminal). FIA_ATD.1 None FIA_ATD.1 None FIA_UAU.2 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism; b) Basic: All use of the authentication mechanism. FIA_UID.2 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identification failure identity provided; b) Basic: All use of the user identification authentication failure authentication failure identity provided; b) Basic: All use of the user identification		cryptographic operation.	
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FDP_IFC.1 None - Annual Decisions to permit requested information flows. b) Basic: All decisions on requests for information flow. c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used in making an information flow enforcement decision. d) Detailed: Some specific subsets of the information that has flowed based upon policy goals (e.g. auditing of downgraded material). FDP_RIP.1 None - Aminimal: the reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication attempts and the actions (e.g. disabling of a terminal) taken and the subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal state (e.g. re-enabling of a terminal). FIA_ATD.1 None - Aminimal: Unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism: b) Basic: All use of the authentication mechanism. FIA_UAU.7 None - Aminimal: Unsuccessful use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identification mechanism, including the user identification failure identity provided; b) Basic: All use of the user identification			Mailbox and execution
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flow. c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used in making an information flow enforcement decision. d) Detailed: Some specific subsets of the information that has flowed based upon policy goals (e.g. auditing of downgraded material). FDP_RIP.1 None FIA_AFL.1 a) Minimal: the reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication attempts and the actions (e.g. disabling of a terminal) taken and the subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal state (e.g. re-enabling of a terminal). FIA_ATD.1 None FIA_UAU.2 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism; b) Basic: All use of the authentication mechanism. FIA_UAU.7 None FIA_UID.2 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identification failure identification f		information flows.	
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state (e.g. re-enabling of a terminal). FIA_ATD.1 None - FIA_UAU.2 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism;		(e.g. disabling of a terminal) taken and the	authentication failures.
FIA_ATD.1 None - FIA_UAU.2 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism;		subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal	
FIA_UAU.2 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism; Continuous authentication failure FIA_UAU.7 None - FIA_UID.2 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identification failure b) Basic: All use of the user identification		state (e.g. re-enabling of a terminal).	
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b) Basic: All use of the authentication mechanism. FIA_UAU.7 None	FIA_UAU.2	a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the authentication	<minimal></minimal>
FIA_UAU.7 None - Continuous identification mechanism, including the user identification failure b) Basic: All use of the user identification - Continuous authentication failure		mechanism;	Continuous
FIA_UID.2 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identity provided; b) Basic: All use of the user identification **Continuous** authentication failure**		b) Basic: All use of the authentication mechanism.	authentication failures.
identification mechanism, including the user identity provided; b) Basic: All use of the user identification Continuous authentication failure	FIA_UAU.7	None	-
identity provided; b) Basic: All use of the user identification authentication failure	FIA_UID.2	a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user	<minimal></minimal>
b) Basic: All use of the user identification		identification mechanism, including the user	Continuous
b) Basic: All use of the user identification		identity provided;	authentication failures.
		b) Basic: All use of the user identification	
		mechanism, including the user identity provided.	
FIA_USB.1 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful binding of user security < Minimal>	FIA_USB.1		<minimal></minimal>
attributes to a subject (e.g. creation of a subject). Continuous		*	Continuous

	b) Basic: Success and failure of binding of user security attributes to a subject (e.g. success or failure to create a subject).	authentication failures.
FMT_MOF.1	a) Basic: All modifications in the behavior of the functions in the TSF.	<basic> Changes in security function configuration.</basic>
FMT_MSA.1	a) Basic: All modifications of the values of security attributes.	<basic> Creation/deletion of Mailbox. User name, job information, and success/failure regarding access to Mailbox and execution of Store Print.</basic>
FMT_MSA.3	a) Basic: Modifications of the default setting of permissive or restrictive rules.b) Basic: All modifications of the initial values of security attributes.	<individually auditable="" defined="" events=""> Successful/unsuccessful authentication of system administrator.</individually>
FMT_MTD.1.	a) Basic: All modifications to the values of TSF data.	<individually auditable="" defined="" events=""> Changes in security function configuration.</individually>
FMT_SMF.1	a) Minimal: Use of the management functions.	<pre><individually auditable="" defined="" events=""> Successful/unsuccessful authentication of system administrator.</individually></pre>
FMT_SMR.1	a) Minimal: modifications to the group of users that are part of a role;b) Detailed: every use of the rights of a role.	<pre><individually auditable="" defined="" events=""> Successful/unsuccessful authentication of system administrator.</individually></pre>
FPT_STM.1	a) Minimal: changes to the time;b) Detailed: providing a timestamp.	<pre><minimal> Changes in time setting.</minimal></pre>
FTP_TRP.1	a) Minimal: Failures of the trusted path functions.b) Minimal: Identification of the user associated with all trusted path failures, if available.c) Basic: All attempted uses of the trusted path functions.	<pre><individually auditable="" defined="" events=""> Creation/deletion of certificates.</individually></pre>

d) Basic: Identification of the user associated with	
all trusted path invocations, if available.	

FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [assignment: other audit relevant information].

[assignment: other audit relevant information].

- none

(2) FAU_SAR.1 Audit review

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to read [assignment: list of audit information] from the audit records.

FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.

[assignment: authorized users]

- system administrator

[assignment: list of audit information]

- all log information

FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.

(3) FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review

FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access.

(4) FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from

unauthorized deletion.

FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect]

unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

[selection, choose one of: prevent, detect]

- prevent

(5) FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss

Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss

Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [selection, choose one of: "ignore audited events",

"prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorized user with

special rights", "overwrite the oldest stored audit records"] and

[assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] if

the audit trail is full.

[selection, choose one of: "ignore audited events", "prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorized user with special rights",

"overwrite the oldest stored audit records"]

- overwrite the oldest stored audit records

[assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure]

- no other actions to be taken

6.1.2. Class FCS: Cryptographic support

(1) FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or

FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_CKM.1.1 TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified

cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of

standards].

[assignment: list of standards]

- none

[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]

- the Fuji Xerox's standard method, FXOSENC

[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]

- 128bits

(2) FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or

FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in

accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of

standards].

[assignment: list of standards]

- FIPS PUB 197

[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]

- AES

[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]

- 128bits

[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]

- encryption of the document data and security audit log data to be stored in the internal HDD and decryption of the document data and security

audit log data retrieved from the internal HDD]

6.1.3. Class FDP: User data protection

(1) FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] on

[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and

objects covered by the SFP].

[assignment: access control SFP]

- MFP access control SFP

[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].

- subjects, objects, and operations between subjects and objects listed in Table 13

Table 13: Operations between Subjects and Objects Covered by MFP Access Control SFP

Subject	Object	Operation
Key operator process	Mailbox	Creation of Personal Mailbox
		Deletion of Personal Mailbox
		Creation of Shared Mailbox
		Deletion of Shared Mailbox
		Storage of document data
		Deletion of all document data
		Retrieval of all document data
	Store Print	Storage of document data
		Deletion of all document data
		Retrieval of all document data
SA process	Mailbox	Creation of Personal Mailbox
		Deletion of Personal Mailbox
		Storage of document data
		Deletion of all document data
		Retrieval of all document data
	Store Print	Storage of document data
		Deletion of all document data
		Retrieval of all document data
General user process	Mailbox	Creation of Personal Mailbox
		Deletion of Personal Mailbox
		Storage of document data
		Deletion of all document data
		Retrieval of all document data
	Store Print	Storage of document data
		Deletion of document data
		Retrieval of document data

(2) FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control

FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization

FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] to objects

based on the following: [assignment: list of subjects and objects

controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].

[assignment: access control SFP]

- MFP access control SFP

[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].

- general user identity corresponding to the general user process, SA identity corresponding to the SA process, Key operator identity corresponding to the Key operator process,
- owner identity corresponding to each Mailbox, owner identity corresponding to each Store Print area
- FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

 [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].

[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].

- the rules, shown in Table 14, for controlling the access of the controlled subjects to the controlled objects for the controlled operations

Table 14: Rules for Access Control

Rules for Mailbox Operation in the General User Process and SA Process

- Creation of Personal Mailbox
 In the general user process and SA process to create Personal Mailbox, the
 Personal Mailbox in which general user identity and SA identity are set as its
 owner is created.
- Deletion of Personal Mailbox
 When the general user identity and SA identity of the general user process and SA
 process match the owner identity of Personal Mailbox, deletion of the
 corresponding Personal Mailbox is allowed.
- Storage, retrieval, and deletion of document data in Personal Mailbox When the general user identity and SA identity of the general user process and SA process match the owner identity of Mailbox, storage, retrieval, and deletion of the document data inside are allowed.
- Storage, retrieval, and deletion of document data in Shared Mailbox

 Storage, retrieval, and deletion of document data in Shared Mailbox are allowed.

Rules for Store Print Operation in the General User Process and SA Process

corresponding Store Print area is also deleted.

- Storage of document data

In the general user process and SA process to store document data, the Store Print area in which general user identity and SA identity is set as its owner is created. The document data is then stored inside.

- Deletion and retrieval of document data
When the general user identity and SA identity of the general user process and SA
process match the owner identity of Store Print area, retrieval and deletion of the
document data inside are allowed. When the document data is deleted, the

Mailbox Operation in the Key Operator Process

- Creation and Deletion of Shared Mailbox
In the key operator process, creation and deletion of Shared Mailbox are allowed.

FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].

[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects].

- the rules, shown in Table 15 for explicitly authorizing access of the subject to an object based on security attributes.

Table 15: Rules for Explicit Access Authorization

Rule for Mailbox Operation in the Key Operator Process

- In the key operator process, deletion of Personal and Shared Mailbox, storage, deletion, and retrieval of the document data inside are allowed.

Rule for Store Print Operation in the Key Operator Process and SA Process

- In the key operator process and SA process, all operations regarding Store Print (i.e. storage, deletion, and retrieval of the document data inside) are allowed.

FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].

[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].

- no rules to explicitly deny the access

(3) FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

FDP_IFC.1.1

The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information flow control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, information, and operations that cause controlled information to flow to and from controlled subjects covered by the SFP].

[assignment: list of subjects, information, and operations that cause controlled information to flow to and from controlled subjects covered by the SFP]

- subjects, information, and operations to cause the information flow, listed in Table 16.

Table 16: Subjects, Information, and Operations to cause the information flow

Subject	Information	Operation
Receiving information from	Data on public	Delivery
public telephone line	telephone line	
Sending information to the		
internal network		

[assignment: information flow control SFP]

- FAX information flow control SFP

(4) FDP_IFF.1

Simple security attributes

Hierarchical to:

No other components

Dependencies:

FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control

FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization

FDP IFF.1.1

The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information flow control SFP] based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [assignment: list of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes].

[assignment: information flow control SFP]

- FAX information flow control SFP [assignment: list of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes]

- none. (Sending information to public telephone line, receiving information from the internal network, and the corresponding data on the public telephone line are not controlled under the FAX information flow control SFP).

FDP_IFF.1.2

The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [assignment: for each operation, the security attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and information security attributes].

[assignment: for each operation, the security attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and information security attributes] - the data received from public telephone line must not be sent to the internal network at any case

FDP_IFF.1.3

The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: additional information flow control SFP rules].

[assignment: additional information flow control SFP rules] - *none*.

FDP_IFF.1.4

The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize information flows].

[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize information flows]

- none.

FDP_IFF.1.5

The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows].

[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows].

- none.

(5) FDP_RIP.1

Subset residual information protection

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

FDP RIP.1.1

The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: [assignment: list of objects].

[assignment: list of objects]

- used document data stored in the internal HDD

[selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from]

- deallocation of the resource from

6.1.4. Class FIA: Identification and authentication

(1) FIA_AFL.1(1) Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer

number], an administrator configurable positive integer within

[assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].

[assignment: list of authentication events]

- system administrator authentication

[selection: [assignment: positive integer number] , an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]

- [assignment: positive integer number][assignment: positive integer number]

- 5

FIA_AFL.1.2 (1) When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has

been [selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of

actions].

[selection: met, surpassed]

- met

[assignment: list of actions]

- never allow the control panel to accept any operation except power cycle. Web browser and ApeosWare EasyAdmin are also inhibited from

accepting authentication operation until the main unit is cycled.

(2) FIA_AFL.1 (2) Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_AFL.1.1 (2) The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer

number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].

[assignment: list of authentication events]

- general user authentication

[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]

- [assignment: positive integer number]

[assignment: positive integer number]

- 1

FIA_AFL.1.2 (2)

When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].

[selection: met, surpassed]

- met

[assignment: list of actions]

- have the control panel to display the message of "authentication was failed" and to require reentry of the user information. The TSF shall also have Web browser, ApeosWare EasyAdmin and Network Scan Utility to reenter the user information

(3) FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging

to individual users: [assignment: list of security attributes].

[assignment: list of security attributes].

- Key Operator Role

- SA Role

- General User Role

(4) FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action

Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

(5) FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [assignment: list of feedback] to the user

while the authentication is in progress.

[assignment: list of feedback]

- display of asterisks ("*") to hide the entered password characters

(6) FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action

Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

Dependencies: No dependencies

FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before

allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

(7) FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition

FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with

subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [assignment: list of user

security attributes].

[assignment: list of user security attributes].

- Key Operator Role

- SA Role

- General User Role

FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of

user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users:

[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes].

[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes].

- none

FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user

security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users:

[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes].

[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes].

- none

6.1.5. Class FMT: Security management

(1) FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behavior of,

disable, enable, modify the behavior of] the functions [assignment: list of

functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

[selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the

behavior of]

- enable, disable, or modify the behavior of

[assignment: list of functions] - for security listed in Table 17

[assignment: the authorized identified roles]

- the roles listed in Table 17

Table 17: List of Security Functions

Security Functions	Behavior	Role
Use of password entered from MFP control	Enable, disable	Key operator, SA
panel in user authentication		
Access denial due to authentication failure	Enable, disable,	Key operator, SA
of system administrator ID	modify	
User Authentication	Enable, disable,	Key operator, SA
	modify	
Security Audit Log	Enable, disable	Key operator, SA
Internal Network Data Protection	Enable, disable,	Key operator, SA
	modify	
Customer Engineer Operation Restriction	Enable, disable	Key operator, SA
Hard Disk Data Encryption	Enable, disable	Key operator, SA
Hard Disk Data Overwrite	Enable, disable,	Key operator, SA
	modify	

(2) FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or

FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection: change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security attributes] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]

- MFP access control SFP to

[selection: change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]

- query, delete,[assignment: other operations][assignment: other operations]

- create

[assignment: list of security attributes]

- user identity, Mailbox owner identity, and Store Print owner identity [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
- the operations and roles listed in Table 18

Table 18: Security Attributes and Authorized Roles

Security Attribute	Operation	Role
Key operator identity	Query	Key operator
SA identity	Query, delete	Key operator, SA
General user identity	Query, delete, create	Key operator, SA
Mailbox owner identity	Query, delete, create	General user , SA
(Personal Mailbox)		
All Mailbox owner identity	Query, delete, create	Key operator
(All of Personal Mailbox)		
Mailbox owner identity	Query, delete, create	Key operator
(Shared Mailbox)		
Store Print owner identity	Query, delete	Key operator,
		SA , General user
All Store Print owner identity	Query, delete	Key operator, SA

(3) FMT MSA.3 Static attribute initialization

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_MSA.3.1

The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]

- MFP access control SFP

[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]

- choose one of: permissive, [assignment: other property] [assignment: other property]]

-none

FMT_MSA.3.2

The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

[assignment: the authorized identified roles]

- none

(4) FMT MTD.1

Management of TSF data

Hierarchical to:

No other components

Dependencies:

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MTD.1.1

The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

[selection: change default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]

- query, modify, delete

[assignment: other operations]]

- none

[assignment: list of TSF data]
- TSF data listed in Table 19

[assignment: the authorized identified roles].

- the operations and roles listed in Table 19

Table 19: Operation of TSF Data

TSF Data	Operation	Role
Data on key operator ID	Query, modify	Key operator
Data on key operator Password	modify	Key operator
Data on SA ID	Query, modify , delete	Key operator, SA
Data on SA Password	modify	Key operator, SA
Data on General user ID	Query, modify, delete	Key operator, SA
Data on General user Password	modify	Key operator,
		SA ,General user
Data on User Authentication	Query, modify	Key operator, SA
Data on use of password entered from	Query, modify	Key operator, SA
MFP control panel in user		
authentication		
Data on Access denial due to	Query, modify	Key operator, SA
authentication failure of system		
administrator		
Data on Security Audit Log	Query, modify	Key operator, SA
Data on Internal Network Data	Query, modify, delete	Key operator, SA
Protection		
Data on Customer Engineer Operation	Query, modify	Key operator, SA
Restriction		
Data on Hard Disk Data Encryption	Query, modify	Key operator, SA
Data on Hard Disk Data Overwrite	Query, modify	Key operator, SA
Data on date and time	Query, modify	Key operator, SA

(5) FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management

functions: [assignment: list of management functions to be provided by

the TSF].

[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]

- Security Management Functions listed in Table 20

Table 20: Security Management Functions Provided by TSF

Functional	Management items defined by CC	Management functions of
requirements		TOE
FAU_GEN.1	There are no management activities	Management of data on
	foreseen.	Security Audit Log

DATE CAR 1	(11)	14
FAU_SAR.1	a) maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of the group of users with read access right to the audit records.	Management of data on system administrator (ID and password)
FAU_SAR.2	None	-
FAU_STG.1	None	-
FAU_STG.4	a) maintenance (deletion, modification,	None
1110_010.	addition) of actions to be taken in case of	Reason: The control
	,	parameter of audit log is
ECG CVM 1	audit storage failure.	fixed and is not managed.
FCS_CKM.1 FCS_COP.1	None None	Management of data on
res_cor.r	None	Hard Disk Data Encryption
FDP_ACC.1	None	-
FDP_ACF.1	a) Managing the attributes used to make	None
	explicit access or denial based decisions.	Reason: Access is managed using user authentication
		information (ID and
		password).
FDP_IFC.1	None	-
FDP_IFF.1	a) Managing the attributes used to make	None
	explicit access based decisions.	Reason: Access is restricted and does not need to be
		managed.
FDP_RIP.1	a) The choice of when to perform residual	Management of data on
	information protection (i.e. upon allocation	Hard Disk Data Overwrite
	or deallocation) could be made configurable within the TOE.	
FIA_AFL.1	a) Management of the threshold for	Management of allowable
	unsuccessful authentication attempts;	number of system
	b) Management of actions to be taken in	administrator's
	the event of an authentication failure.	authentication failures Management of Denial of
		machine operation
FIA_ATD.1	a) if so indicated in the assignment, the	None
	authorized administrator might be able to	Reason: there are no
	define additional security attributes for	additional security attributes and is not managed.
	users.	ana is noi managea.
FIA_UAU.2	a) Management of the authentication data	Management of Data on use
	by an administrator;	of password entered from
	b) Management of the authentication data	MFP control panel in user
	by the user associated with this data.	authentication Management of data on key
		operator, SA, and general
		user (ID and password)
FIA_UAU.7	None	- A C 1 . 1
FIA_UID.2	a) The management of the user identities.	Management of data on key operator, SA, and general
		user (ID and password)
FIA_USB.1	a) an authorized administrator can define	None
	default subject security attributes.	Reason: action and security
	b) an authorized administrator can change	attributes is fixed and is not managed.
	,	типизси.

	subject sequeity ettributes	
	subject security attributes.	
FMT_MOF.1	a) Managing the group of roles that can	Management of data on
	interact with the functions in the TSF;	Customer Engineer
		Operation Restriction
FMT_MSA.1	a) managing the group of roles that can	None
	interact with the security attributes;	Reason: The role group is fixed and is not managed.
	b) management of rules by which security	jinea ana is noi managea.
	attributes inherit specified values.	
FMT_MSA.3	a) managing the group of roles that can	None
	specify initial values;	Reason: The role group is only a system administrator
	b) managing the permissive or restrictive	and is not managed.
	setting of default values for a given access	
	control SFP;	
	c) management of rules by which security	
	attributes inherit specified values.	
FMT_MTD.1.	a) Managing the group of roles that can	Management of data on
	interact with the TSF data.	Customer Engineer
		Operation Restriction
FMT_SMF.1	None	-
FMT_SMR.1	a) Managing the group of users that are	None
	part of a role.	Reason: The role group is
		fixed and is not managed
FPT_STM.1	a) management of the time.	Management of time and data.
FTP_TRP.1	a) Configuring the actions that require	Management of Internal
	trusted path, if supported.	Network Data Protection.

(6) FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: the authorized identified

roles].

[assignment: the authorized identified roles] - system administrator, SA, normal user

FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

6.1.6. Class FPT: Protection of the TSF

(1) FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

6.1.7. Class FTP: Trusted path/channels

(1) FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and

[selection: remote, local] users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from [selection: modification, disclosure, [assignment: other types of integrity or confidentiality

violation]].

[selection: remote, local]

- remote

[selection: modification, disclosure, [assignment: other types of integrity or confidentiality violation]].

- modification, disclosure, [assignment: other types of integrity or confidentiality violation].

[assignment: other types of integrity or confidentiality violation]

- none

FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, local users, remote users] to

initiate communication via the trusted path.

[selection: the TSF, local users, remote users]

- remote users

FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [selection: initial user authentication, [assignment: other services for which trusted path is

required]].

[selection: initial user authentication, [assignment: other services for which trusted path is required]].

- TOE communication service via Web, communication service for print driver, communication service for FAX driver, communication service for network utility, communication service for ApeosWare EasyAdmin and other services which require trusted path

6.2. Security Assurance Requirements

The requirements for the TOE security assurance are described in Table 21.

The evaluation assurance level of TOE is EAL3. All the requirement components for assurance have quoted directly the component of EAL3 specified by [the CC part 3].

Table 21: EAL3 Assurance Requirements

Assurance Requirements	Assurance Component Name	Dependencies		
Class ADV: Dev	velopment	-		
ADV_ARC.1	Security architecture description	ADV_FSP.1, ADV_TDS.1		
ADV_FSP.3	Functional specification with complete summary	ADV_TDS.1		
ADV_TDS.2	Architectural design	ADV_FSP.3		
Class AGD:	Guidance documents			
AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance	ADV_FSP.1,		
AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures	None		
Class ALC:Life-c	ycle support			
ALC_CMC.3	Authorization controls	ALC_CMS.1, ALC_DVS.1		
ALC_CMS.3	Implementation representation CM coverage	None		
ALC_DEL.1	Delivery procedures	None		
ALC_DVS.1	Identification of security measures	None		
ALC_LCD.1	Developer defined life-cycle model	None		
Class ASE: Securi	Class ASE: Security Target evaluation			
ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims	ASE_INT.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_REQ.1		
ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition	None		
ASE_INT.1	ST introduction	None		
ASE_OBJ.2	Security objectives	ASE_SPD.1		
ASE_REQ.2	Derived security requirements	ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_ECD.1		
ASE_SPD.1	Security problem definition	None		
ASE_TSS.1	TOE summary specification	ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.1, ADV_FSP.1		
Class ATE: Tests				
ATE_COV.2	Analysis of coverage	ADV_FSP.2, ATE_FUN.1		
ATE_DPT.1	Testing: basic design	ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.2,		
		ATE_FUN.1		
ATE_FUN.1	Functional testing	ATE_COV.1		
ATE_IND.2	Independent testing - sample	ADV_FSP.2, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.1,		

Assurance Requirements	Assurance Component Name	Dependencies				
		ATE_FUN.1				
Class AVA: Vulner	rability assessment					
		ADV_ARC.1,ADV_FSP.1,				
AVA_VAN.2	Vulnerability analysis	ADV_TDS.1, AGD_OPE.1,				
		AGD_PRE.1				

6.3. Security Requirement Rationale

6.3.1. Security Functional Requirements Rationale

Table 22 lists the correspondences between security functional requirements and security objectives. As shown in this table, each security objective supports at least one TOE security functional requirement. Table 23 shows the rationale demonstrating that each security objective is assured by TOE security functional requirements.

Table 22: Correspondences between Security Functional Requirements and Security Objectives

Security Objectives Security Functional	O.AUDITS	O.CIPHER	O.COMM_SEC	O.FAX_SEC	O.MANAGE	O.RESIDUAL	O.RESTRICT	O.USER
Requirements	<i>✓</i>))))		
FAU_GEN.1 FAU_SAR.1	∨							
FAU_SAR.2	✓							
FAU_STG.1	✓							
FAU_STG.4	✓							
FCS_CKM.1		√						
FCS_COP.1		√						
FDP_ACC.1								√
FDP_ACF.1								✓
FDP_IFC.1				✓				
FDP_IFF.1				✓				
FDP_RIP.1						✓		
FIA_AFL.1 (1)					✓		✓	✓
FIA_AFL.1 (2)							✓	✓
FIA_ATD.1								✓
FIA_UAU.2					✓		✓	✓
FIA_UAU.7					✓		✓	✓

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Security Objectives Security Functional Requirements	O.AUDITS	O.CIPHER	O.COMM_SEC	O.FAX_SEC	O.MANAGE	O.RESIDUAL	O.RESTRICT	O.USER
FIA_UID.2					✓		✓	✓
FIA_USB.1								✓
FMT_MOF.1					✓			
FMT_MSA.1								✓
FMT_MSA.3								✓
FMT_MTD.1					✓			✓
FMT_SMF.1					✓			
FMT_SMR.1					✓			✓
FPT_STM.1	✓							
FTP_TRP.1			✓					

Table 23: Security Objectives to SFR Rationale

O. AUDITS is an objective that provides Security Audit Log and its log data. By satisfying the following security objectives, O.AUDITS can be realized. By FAU_GEN.1, the security audit log data is generated for the auditable events: (However, audit is unnecessary for the following functional requirements for each reason.) - FAU_STG.4: The total number of audit log data events is fixed. The data are stored and updated automatically. - FCS_CKM.1, FSC_COP.1: An encryption failure is monitored as job status. - FDP_IFF.1: The flow is fixed. No event is to be monitored. By FAU_SAR.1, the authorized system administrator can read the security audit log data from an audit log file. By FAU_SAR.2, only the authorized system administrator can access the audit log.
By FAU_STG.1, the security audit log data stored in an audit log file is protected from unauthorized deletion and alteration. By FAU_STG.4, when the audit trail file is full, the oldest stored audit

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements Rationale
	file.
	By FPT_STM.1, the auditable events are recorded with time stamp in the
	audit log, using highly reliable clock of TOE.
	Thus, the functional requirements related to this objective are surely
	conducted.
	O. CIPHER is an objective that encrypts the used document data in the
	internal HDD so that they cannot be analyzed even if retrieved.
	By satisfying the following security objectives, O.CIPHER can be realized.
	By FCS_CKM.1, the cryptographic key is generated in accordance with
O.CIPHER	the specified cryptographic key size (128 bits).
	By FCS_COP.1, the document data and security audit log data to be
	stored into the internal HDD is encrypted and then decrypted when the
	data is read, in accordance with the determined cryptographic algorithm
O.COMM_SEC	and cryptographic key size.
	O.COMM_SEC is an objective that protects the document data, security
	audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal network from
	interception and alteration.
	By satisfying the following security objectives, O.COMM_SEC can be
	realized:
	By FTP_TRP.1, a highly reliable communication path is provided
	through communication data encryption protocol so that the document
	data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal
	network between TOE and the remote can be protected from threats.
	Thus, the functional requirements related to this objective are surely
	conducted.
	O.FAX_SEC is an objective that prevents the unauthorized access to the
	internal network via public telephone line.
	By satisfying the following security objectives, O.FAX_SEC can be
O.FAX_SEC	realized:
	By FDP_IFC.1 and FDP_IFF.1, the internal network to which the TOE is
	connected is prevented from being accessed via public telephone line
	from the communication path of TOE FAX modem.
	O. MANAGE is an objective that allows only an authenticated system
	administrator to access the system administrator mode for security
	function setting and inhibits a general user from accessing the TOE
O.MANAGE	setting data. By satisfying the following security objectives,
	O.MANAGE can be realized:
	By FIA_AFL.1 (1), successive attacks are prevented because the power
	needs to be cycled when the number of system-administrator

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements Rationale
	authentication failures reaches the defined number of times.
	By FIA_UAU.2 and FIA_UID2, user authentication is performed to
	identify a proper system administrator or individual.
	By FIA_UAU.7, illicit leakage of the authentication information
	(password) is prevented because the authentication feedback is protected.
	By FMT_MOF.1, the person who enables/disables TOE security
	functions and makes functional settings is limited to system
	administrator.
	By FMT_MTD.1, the person who can make settings of TOE security
	functions is limited to system administrator. Thus, only system
	administrators can query and modify TSF data.
	By FMT_SMF.1, TOE security management functions are provided for
	system administrator.
	By FMT_SMR.1 (1), the role related to the security is limited to system
	administrator by maintaining the role of system administrator as a user
	who has special authority.
	Thus, the functional requirements related to this objective are surely
	conducted.
	O.RESIDUAL is an objective that disables the reproduction and recovery
	of the used document data in the internal HDD.
O BEGIDITAL	By satisfying the following security objective, O.RESIDUAL can be
O.RESIDUAL	realized:
	By FDP_RIP.1, the previous information of the used document data
	stored in the internal HDD is made unavailable.
	O.RESTRICT is an objective that offers the function to inhibit an
	unauthorized person from using the TOE.
	By satisfying the following security objectives, O.RESTRICT can be
	realized:
	By FIA_AFL.1 (1), successive attacks are prevented because the power
	needs to be cycled when the number of system-administrator
	authentication failures reaches the defined number of times.
O.RESTRICT	By FIA_AFL.1 (2), when user authentication fails, "incorrect password"
	message is displayed, requesting password re-entry.
	By FIA_UIA.2 and FIA_UID.2, user authentication is performed to
	identify a proper general user and system administrator.
	By FIA_UAU.7, illicit leakage of the authentication information
	(password) is prevented because the authentication feedback is protected.
	Thus, the functional requirements related to this objective are surely
	conducted.
O.USER	O.USER is an objective that identifies the TOE user and allows only the

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements Rationale
	authorized user to store, retrieve, and delete the document data and to
	change password.
	By satisfying the following security objectives, O.USER can be realized:
	By FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1, user authentication is performed. Only
	authorized user is allowed to operate the objects.
	By FIA_AFL.1 (1), successive attacks are prevented because the power
	needs to be cycled when the number of system-administrator
	authentication failures reaches the defined number of times.
	By FIA_AFL.1 (2), when user authentication fails, "incorrect password"
	message is displayed, requesting password re-entry.
	By FIA_ATD.1 and FIA_USB.1, each role of key operator, SA, and
	general user is maintained and only the authorized users are associated
	with the subjects.
	By FIA_UAU.2 and FIA_UID.2, user authentication is performed to
	identify a proper general user and system administrator.
	By FIA_UAU.7, illicit leakage of the authentication information
	(password) is prevented because the authentication feedback is protected.
	By FMT_MSA.1, the query, deletion, and creation of security attributes
	are managed.
	By FMT_MSA.3, the suitable default values are managed.
	By FMT_MTD.1, the setting of password for key operator is limited to
	key operator, that for SA is limited to key operator and SA, and that for
	general user is limited to system administrator and the general user
	(when it is his/her own).
	By FMT_SMR.1, the role of general user and system administrator is
	maintained and associated with the general user and system
	administrator.
	Thus, the functional requirements related to this objective are surely
	conducted.

6.3.2. Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements

Table 24 describes the functional requirements that are depended on by security functional requirements and those that are not and the reason why it is not problematic even if dependencies are not satisfied.

Table 24: Dependencies of Functional Security Requirements

Functional Requirement	Dep	endencies of Functional Requirements
Requirement and its name	Requirement that is dependent on	Requirement that is not dependent on and its rationale
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation	FPT_STM.1	-
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review	FAU_GEN.1	-
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review	FAU_SAR.1	-
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage	FAU_GEN.1	-
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss	FAU_STG.1	-
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation	FCS_COP.1	FCS_CKM.4: A cryptographic key is generated when MFP is booted, and stored on DRAM (volatile memory). A cryptographic key does not need to be destructed because this key is lost when the MFP main unit is powered off. Therefore, the dependency on FCS_CKM.4 does not need to be satisfied.
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation	FCS_CKM.1	FCS_CKM.4: A cryptographic key is generated when MFP is booted, and stored on DRAM (volatile memory). A cryptographic key does not need to be destructed because this key is lost when the MFP main unit is powered off.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control	FDP_ACF.1	-
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3	-
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control	FDP_IFF.1	-
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes	FDP_IFC.1	FMT_MSA.3: A static attribute initialization is not required because FAX information flow has no security

Functional Requirement	Dep	endencies of Functional Requirements				
Requirement and its name	Requirement that	Requirement that is not dependent on				
Requirement and its name	is dependent on	and its rationale				
		attribute.				
FDP_RIP.1						
Subset residual	None					
information protection						
		FIA_UAU.1:				
FIA_AFL.1(1)		The dependency on FIA_ UAU.1 is satisfied				
Authentication failure	FIA_UAU.2	because FIA_UAU.2 is the functional security				
handling		requirement that is an upper hierarchy of FIA_				
		UAU.1.				
		FIA_UAU.1:				
FIA_AFL.1(2)		The dependency on FIA_ UAU.1 is satisfied				
Authentication failure	FIA_UAU.2	because FIA_UAU.2 is the functional security				
handling		requirement that is an upper hierarchy of FIA_				
		UAU.1.				
FIA_ATD.1		None				
User attribute definition	None					
		FIA_UID.1:				
FIA_UAU.2		The dependency on FIA_UID.1 is satisfied				
User authentication before	-	because FIA_UID.2 is the functional security				
any action		requirement that is an upper hierarchy of				
		FIA_UID.1.				
		FIA_UAU.1:				
FIA_UAU.7		The dependency on FIA_ UAU.1 is satisfied				
Protected authentication	-	because FIA_UAU.2 is the functional security				
feedback		requirement that is an upper hierarchy of FIA_				
		UAU.1.				
FIA_UID.2						
User identification before		None				
any action						
FIA_USB.1	FIA_ATD.1	_				
User-subject binding						
FMT_MOF.1	FMT_SMF.1					
Management of security	FMT_SMR.1	-				
functions behavior						
FMT_MSA.1	FDP_ACC.1	FDP_IFC.1:				
Management of security	FMT_SMF.1	Management of security attributes is not required				
attributes	FMT_SMR.1	because FAX information flow has no security				
,		attribute.				

Functional Requirement	Dependencies of Functional Requirements					
Requirement and its name	Requirement that	Requirement that is not dependent on				
Requirement and its name	is dependent on	and its rationale				
FMT_MSA.3	FMT_MSA.1					
Static attribute	FMT_SMR.1	-				
initialization	TWIT_SWIK.T					
FMT_MTD.1	FMT_SMF.1	_				
Management of TSF data	FMT_SMR.1	-				
FMT_SMF.1						
Specification of	None					
management functions						
		FIA_UID.1:				
FMT_SMR.1		The dependency on FIA_UID.1 is satisfied				
Security roles	FIA_UID.2	because FIA_UID.2 is the functional security				
Security foles		requirement that is an upper hierarchy of				
		FIA_UID.1.				
FPT_STM.1	None					
Reliable time stamp	None					
FTP_TRP.1		None				
Trusted Path		None				

6.3.3. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

This TOE is for a MFP, a commercial product. The threats are assumed to be caused by a low-level attacker and to include: attack or interception/alteration of data on internal network via a MFP external interface from control panel, Web browser or ApeosWare EasyAdmin of system administrator's client; and reading-out of information by removing the internal HDD and connecting it to a commercial tool. To counter these threats, this TOE is required to provide the security functions which assure security.

Analysis of the security measures of TOE at development phase

(Performing/analyzing systematic tests and evaluating the management of the development environment and the developed products.)

Analysis of whether the sufficient guidance information is included so that the security functions can be used safely. Therefore, EAL 3 is the reasonable evaluation level for this TOE.

7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION

This chapter describes the summary specifications of the security functions provided by this TOE.

7.1. Security Functions

Table 25 shows the correspondences between security functional requirements and TOE security functions.

The security functions described in this section satisfy the TOE security functional requirements that are specified in section 6.1 of this ST.

Table 25: Correspondences between Security Functional Requirements and TOE Security Functions

Security Functions	TSF_IOW	TSF_CIPHER	TSF_USER_AUTH	TSF_FMT	TSF_CE_LIMIT	TSF_FAU	TSF_NET_PROT	TSF_FAX_FLOW
Security Functional Requirements	TSF	TSF	TSF	TSF	TSF	TSF	TSF	TSF
FAU_GEN.1	_	_	_			√	_	_
FAU_SAR.1						√		
FAU_SAR.2						√		
FAU_STG.1						√		
FAU_STG.4						✓		
FCS_CKM.1		✓						
FCS_COP.1		✓						
FDP_ACC.1			✓					
FDP_ACF.1			✓					
FDP_IFC.1								✓
FDP_IFF.1								✓
FDP_RIP.1	✓							
FIA_AFL.1 (1)			✓					
FIA_AFL.1 (2)			✓					
FIA_ATD.1			✓					
FIA_UAU.2			✓					
FIA_UAU.7			✓					
FIA_UID.2			✓					
FIA_USB.1			✓					
FMT_MOF.1				✓	✓			
FMT_MSA.1			✓	✓				
FMT_MSA.3				✓				

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Security Functions								
Security Functional Requirements	TSF_IOW	TSF_CIPHER	TSF_USER_AUTH	TSF_FMT	TSF_CE_LIMIT	TSF_FAU	TSF_NET_PROT	TSF_FAX_FLOW
FMT_MTD.1			✓	✓	✓			
FMT_SMF.1				✓	✓			
FMT_SMR.1			✓	✓	✓			
FPT_STM.1						✓		
FTP_TRP.1							√	

The summary of each TOE security function and the corresponding security functional requirements are described below.

7.1.1. Hard Disk Data Overwrite (TSF IOW)

According to Hard Disk Data Overwrite setting which is configured by a system administrator with the system administrator mode, the used document data in the internal HDD is deleted by either one-or three-pass overwrite procedure on the document data area when each job of copy, print, scan, Network Scan, FAX, Internet FAX, or Direct FAX is completed.

This is because whether to prioritize efficiency or security depends on the usage environment of the MFP.

When efficiency is prioritized, one pass overwrite procedure is applied. When security is prioritized, three pass overwrite procedure is applied. Three pass overwrite has lower processing speed than one pass but can provide more solid overwrite function. Therefore, three pass is an appropriate number of times to overwrite.

(1) FDP_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection

To control the overwrite function conducted after each job, two options are available: one pass (zero) overwrite procedure and three pass (random number / random number / zero) overwrite procedure.

List of the used document data which is to be overwritten and deleted is on the internal HDD. When the existence of the used document data is found in this list at the time of booting the TOE, the overwrite function is performed.

7.1.2. Hard Disk Data Encryption (TSF CIPHER)

According to Hard Disk Data Encryption setting which is configured by a system administrator with the system administrator mode, the document data and security audit log data are encrypted before stored into the internal HDD when operating any function of copy, print, scan, etc. or configuring

various security function settings.

(1) FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation

TOE uses the "hard disk data encryption seed key" configured by a system administrator and generates a 128-bit encryption key at the time of booting through FXOSENC algorithm, which is Fuji Xerox's standard method and a secure algorithm with sufficient complexity. (When the "hard disk data encryption seed key" is the same, the same cryptographic key is generated.)

(2) FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation

Before storing the document data and security audit log data into the internal HDD, TOE encrypts the data using the 128-bit cryptographic key generated at the time of booting (FCS_CKM.1) and the AES algorithm based on FIPS PUBS 197. When reading out the stored data, the TOE decrypts the data also using the 128-bit cryptographic key generated at the time of booting and the AES algorithm.

7.1.3. User Authentication (TSF_USER_AUTH)

Access to the MFP functions is restricted to the authorized user. A user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the print driver / Network Scan Utility / CWIS / ApeosWare EasyAdmin of the user client, or MFP control panel.

Only the authenticated user can use the following functions:

- a) Functions controlled by the MFP control panel Copy, FAX (send), Internet FAX (send), scan, network scan, Mailbox operation, and print (This print function requires the user ID and password preset from print driver. A user must be authenticated from the control panel for print job.)
- b) Functions controlled by Network Scan Utility of user client Function to retrieve document data from Mailbox.
- c) Functions controlled by CWIS
 Display of device condition, display of job status and its log, function to retrieve document data from Mailbox, and print function by file designation
- d) Functions controlled by ApeosWare EasyAdmin (Available for key operator only.)
 Creation, deletion, and setting change of Mailbox

In addition, access to and setting change of the TOE security functions are restricted to the authorized system administrator. A system administrator needs to enter his/her ID and password from MFP control panel or system administrator client.

(1) FIA_AFL.1 (1) Authentication failure handling

The function to handle the authentication failures is provided for the system administrator authentication which is performed before accessing the system administrator mode. When the

number of unsuccessful authentication attempts with system administrator ID reaches 5 times, the control panel does not accept any operation except power cycle, and the web browser and ApeosWare EasyAdmin do not accept authentication operation until the MFP main unit is powered off/on.

(2) FIA_AFL.1 (2) Authentication failure handling

The function to handle the authentication failures is provided for the general user authentication which is performed before using the MFP functions. When the entered password does not match the one set by a legitimate user, the message saying "authentication was failed" is displayed, requesting re-entry of the user information.

Re-entry of user information is also required at Web browser, Network Scan Utility, and ApeosWare EasyAdmin

(3) FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition

The function to define and retain the roles of key operator, SA, and general user.

(4) FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action

TOE requests a user to enter his/her password before permitting him/her to operate the CWIS function via the control panel, ApeoaWare EasyAdmin, or Web browser of a user client. The entered password is verified against the data registered in the TOE setting.

This authentication and the identification (FIA_UID.2) are simultaneously performed, and the operation is allowed only when both of the identification and authentication succeed.

(5) FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback

TOE offers the function to display the same number of asterisks (**`) as the entered-password characters on the control panel, Web browser, or ApeoaWare EasyAdmin in order to hide the password at the time of user authentication.

(6) FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action

TOE requests a user to enter his/her ID before permitting him/her to operate the CWIS function via the control panel, ApeoaWare EasyAdmin, or Web browser of a user client. The entered user ID is verified against the data registered in the TOE setting.

This identification and the authentication (FIA_UAU.2) are simultaneously performed, and the operation is allowed only when both of the identification and authentication succeed.

(7) FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding

With the authenticated ID, TOE associates the roles of key operator, SA, and general user with the subjects.

(8) FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes

With the user authentication function, TOE permits the authenticated user to operate the identities related to each Mailbox and Store Print as shown in Table 26.

Table 26: Management of security attributes

Security Attribute	Operation	Role
Key operator identity	Query	Key operator,
SA identity	Query, delete, create	Key operator, SA
General user identity	Query, delete, create	Key operator, SA
Mailbox owner identity	Query, delete, create	General user, SA
(Personal Mailbox)		
All Mailbox owner identity	Query, delete, create	Key operator,
(All of Personal Mailbox)		
Mailbox owner identity	Query, delete, create	Key operator,
(Shared Mailbox)		
Store Print owner identity	Query, delete	Key operator, SA,
		General user
All Store Print owner	Query, delete	Key operator, SA
identity		

(9) FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

The TOE provides the user interface for setting password only to the authenticated legitimate

The setting of password for key operator is limited to key operator, that for SA is limited to key operator and SA, and that for general user is limited to system administrator and the general user (when it is his/her own).

(10) FMT_SMR.1 Security role

TOE maintains the roles of system administrator and general user and associates these roles to the legitimate users.

(11) FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

With the user authentication function, TOE permits the authenticated user to operate Mailbox and Store Print (Private Print) as shown in Table 27.

Table 27: Access Control

	Personal Mailbox	Shared Mailbox	Store Print
Creation of Mailbox	Available for general	Available for key	-
	user, SA and key	operator	
	operator		
Deletion of Mailbox	Available for	Available for key	-

	registered general	operator	
	user ,SA and key		
	operator		
Storage, Retrieval	Available for	Available for general	Available for general
and Deletion of	registered general	user, SA and key	user, SA and key
document data	user ,SA and key	operator	operator
	operator		
Retrieval and	Available for key	Available for key	Available for SA and
Deletion of all	operator	operator	key operator
document data			

User authentication is performed before accessing Mailbox or Store Print.

a) Private Print Function

To enable this function, the user needs to configure the MFP to "store an authenticated job to Private Print area*" and also needs to preset his/her ID and password from print driver of the user client. When a user sends a print request from print driver, the MFP compares the user ID and password against those preset in the MFP. Only when the user is authenticated, the print data is decomposed into bitmap data. Then, the data is classified according to the user ID and temporarily stored in the corresponding Private Print area within the internal HDD.

To refer to the stored print data, a user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the control panel. Then, the data on the waiting list corresponding to the user ID is displayed. The user can request print or deletion of the data on the list.

b) Mailbox Function

The scanned data and received FAX data can be stored into Mailbox from IIT and FAX board which are not shown in Figure 3.

To store the scanned data into Mailbox, a user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the control panel. Then, the document data can be scanned from IIT and stored into the internal HDD according to the user's instruction from the control panel.

To store the received FAX data into Mailbox, user authentication is not required. Among the received FAX data transmitted over public telephone line, the following data are automatically classified and stored into each corresponding Mailbox: the received FAX data whose corresponding Mailbox is specified by the sender, the received FAX data from a particular sender (the data is classified according to the sender's telephone number), and the received FAX data from an unknown sender.

To refer to, retrieve, print, or delete the stored data in the Personal Mailbox corresponding to each registered user ID, user authentication is required; the MFP compares the user ID and password preset in the MFP against those entered by a general user from the control panel, CWIS, or Network Scan Utility.

- •Mailbox Operation by a General User / SA
- Creation of Personal Mailbox

When a general user / SA operates to create Personal Mailbox, the Personal Mailbox in which general user identity / SA identity is set as its owner is created.

- Deletion of Personal Mailbox
 - When the general user identity / SA identity matches the owner identity of Personal Mailbox, deletion of the corresponding Personal Mailbox is allowed.
- Storage, retrieval, and deletion of document data in Personal Mailbox When the general user identity / SA identity matches the owner identity of Personal Mailbox, storage, retrieval, and deletion of the document data inside are allowed.
- Storage, retrieval, and deletion of document data in Shared Mailbox Storage, retrieval, and deletion of document data in Shared Mailbox are allowed.
- Store Print Operation by a General User / SA
- Storage of document data

When a general user / SA operates to store document data, the Store Print area in which general user identity / SA identity is set as its owner is created. The document data is then stored inside.

- Deletion and retrieval of document data
 When the general user identity / SA identity matches the owner identity of Store Print area,
 retrieval and deletion of the document data inside are allowed. When the document data is
 deleted, the corresponding Store Print area is also deleted.
- Mailbox Operation by the Key Operator
- Creation and deletion of Shared Mailbox, creation and deletion of Personal Mailbox
 Creation and deletion of Shared Mailbox are allowed.
 Creation and deletion of Personal Mailboxes of all the registered users are permitted only if the key operator operates via ApeosWare EasyAdmin.
- Mailbox Operation by the Key Operator
 For all Mailboxes, the key operator's operations to delete Mailbox, and to store, retrieve, and delete the document data inside are allowed.
- Store Print Operation by the Key Operator / SA
 For all the Store Print areas, the key operator's / SA's operations to retrieve and delete the document data inside are allowed.

7.1.4. System Administrator's Security Management (TSF_FMT)

To accord a privilege to a specific user, this function allows only the authorized system administrator to access the system administrator mode which enables him/her to refer to and configure the settings of the following TOE security functions from the control panel or system administrator client.

(1) FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior

FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions

TOE provides a user interface which allows only the authenticated system administrator to refer to / change the TOE setting data related to the following TOE security functions and to make setting whether to enable/disable each function.

With these functions, the required security management functions are provided.

The settings of the following TOE security functions can be referred to and changed from the control panel.

- Refer to the setting of Hard Disk Data Overwrite, enable/disable it, and set the number of pass (overwrite procedure);
- Refer to the setting of Hard Disk Data Encryption and enable/disable it;
- Set the cryptographic seed key for Hard Disk Data Encryption;
- Refer to the setting on the use of password entered from MFP control panel in user authentication, and enable/disable it;
- Refer to the setting of system administrator ID and change the ID and password;
- Refer to the setting of access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator identification, enable/disable it, and set the allowable number of the failures before access denial:
- Refer to the setting of key operator ID and change the ID and password (only a key operator is privileged);
- Refer to the setting of ID of SA and general user and change the ID and password;
- Refer to the setting of access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator, enable/disable it, and set the allowable number of failures;
- Refer to and set the minimum password length (for general user and SA);
- Refer to the setting of SSL/TLS communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of IPSec communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of S/MIME communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details (ApeosPort-III only);
- Refer to the setting of User Authentication and enable/disable Local Authentication;
- Refer to and set date and time:

With CWIS function, the settings of the following TOE security functions can be referred to and changed from a system administrator client via Web browser.

- Refer to the setting of key operator ID and change the ID and password (only a key operator is privileged);
- Refer to the setting of ID of SA and general user and change the ID and password;
- Refer to the setting of access denial due to authentication failures of system administrator, enable/disable it, and set the allowable number of the failures before access denial;

- Refer to and set the minimum password length (for general user and SA);
- Refer to the setting of Security Audit Log and enable/disable it,

 (When Security Audit Log is enabled, security audit log data can be downloaded in the form of tab-delimited text to a system administrator client.);
- Refer to the setting of SSL/TLS communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of IPSec communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of SNMP v3 communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Set the authentication password for SNMPv3 communication;
- Refer to the setting of S/MIME communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details (ApeosPort-III only);
- Download/upload and create an X.509 certificate;
- Refer to the setting of User Authentication and enable/disable Local Authentication;

This TOE allows only the key operator (exc. SA) who is authenticated from system administrator client via ApeosWare EasyAdmin to refer to and set the following security functions.

- Refer to the setting of key operator ID and change the ID and password;
- Refer to the setting of ID of SA and general user and change the ID and password;
- Refer to and set the setting on the use of password entered from MFP control panel in user authentication;
- Refer to the setting of User Authentication and enable/disable Local Authentication;
- Refer to and set date and time;

(2) FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes

TOE restricts the operation of the general user identifier only to a system administrator.

(3) FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization

TOE provides the suitable default value.

(4) FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

The system administrator's role is maintained and the role is associated with a system administrator.

7.1.5. Customer Engineer Operation Restriction (TSF_CE_LIMIT)

A system administrator can restrict CE's operation in the system administrator mode to inhibit CE from referring to / changing the settings related to System Administrator's Security Management (TSF_FMT). This function can prevent setting change by an attacker who is impersonating CE.

(1) FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior

FMT MTD.1 Management of TSF data

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions

TOE provides a user interface which allows only the authenticated system administrator to refer to / change (enable/disable) the TOE settings related to Customer Engineer Operation Restriction from the control panel and CWIS.

With these functions, the required security management functions are provided.

(2) FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

The system administrator's role is maintained and the role is associated with a system administrator.

7.1.6. Security Audit Log (TSF_FAU)

According to Security Audit Log setting which is configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode, the important events of TOE such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are traced and recorded based on when and who operated what function. All of the TOE users are the targets of this audit log.

(1) FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

It is assured that the defined auditable event is recorded in the audit log.

Table 28 shows the details of the audit log data.

Table 28: Details of Security Audit Log Data

The auditable events are recorded with the following fixed size entries:

- Log ID: consecutive numbers as an audit log identifier (1 60000)
- Date: date data (yyyy/mm/dd, mm/dd/yyyy, or dd/mm/yyyy)
- Time: time data (hh:mm:ss)
- Logged Events: event name (arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits)
- User Name: user name (arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits)
- Description: description on events (arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits, see below for details)
- Status: status or result of event processing (arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits, see below for details)
- Optionally Logged Items: additional information recorded to audit log (except common record items)

Logged Events	Description	Status
Change in Device Status		
	Started normally(cold boot)	
System Status	Started normally (warm boot)	-
	Shutdown requested	
	User operation (Local)	Start/End

Logged Events	Description	Status
User Authentication	•	
	Login (Local Access)	Successful, Failed(Invalid
	Logout	UserID), Failed(Invalid
Login/Logout		Password), Failed
	Locked System Administrator	-
	Authentication	(Number of authentication
	Detected continuous Authentication Fail	failures recorded)
Change in Audit Police	У	
Audit Policy	Audit Log	Enable/Disable
Job Status		
	Print	
	Copy	Completed, Completed
	Scan	with Warnings, Canceled
Job Status	Fax	by User, Canceled by
	Mailbox	Shutdown, Aborted,
	Print Reports	Unknown
	Job Flow Service	
Change in Device Set	tings	
	Adjust Time	
	Create Mailbox	Successful/Failed
Device Settings	Delete Mailbox	
	Switch Authentication Mode	Successful
	Change Security Setting	(Setting items recorded)
Access to Data Stored in Device		
	Import Certificate	
	Delete Certificate	
Device Data	Add Address Entry	Successful/Failed
Device Data	Delete Address Entry	Successiui/1 alleu
	Edit Address Entry	
	Export Audit Log	

(2) FAU_SAR.1 Audit review

It is assured that all the information recorded in the audit log can be read.

Security audit log data can be downloaded in the form of tab-delimited text by pressing the button "store as a text file." To download security audit log data, SSL/TLS communication needs to be enabled before using Web browser.

(3) FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review

The person who reads the audit log is limited to the authenticated system administrator. A system

administrator can access the audit log only via Web browser and the access from the control panel is inhibited. Therefore, a system administrator needs to log in from Web browser to access the audit log.

(4) FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

There is no function to delete the audit log, and the audit log data is protected from untrusted alteration and modification.

(5) FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss

When audit trail file is full, the oldest stored audit record is overwritten with the new data so that the new data is not lost but surely recorded.

Auditable events are stored with time stamps into NVRAM. When the number of stored events reaches 50, the 50 logs on NVRAM is stored into one file ("audit log file") within the internal HDD. Up to 15,000 events can be stored. When the number of recorded events exceeds 15,000, the oldest audit log file is overwritten and a new audit event is stored.

(6) FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

The time stamp of TOE's clock function is issued when the defined auditable event is recorded in the audit log file.

By TSF_FMT, only a system administrator is enabled to change the clock setting.

7.1.7. Internal Network Data Protection (TSF_NET_PROT)

Internal Network Data Protection is provided with the following five protocols which are configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode:

(1) FTP TRP.1 Trusted Path

The document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data are protected by the encryption communication protocol that ensures secure data communication between TOE and the remote (communication service via Web, communication service for print driver, communication service for fax driver, communication service for network utility, communication service for ApeosWare EasyAdmin, and other services which require trusted path). This trusted path is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its endpoints and protection of the communication data from modification or disclosure.

a) SSL/TLS

According to the SSL/TLS communication which is configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode, SSL/TLS ensuring secure data transmission is supported. This protects the security of document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal network.

By supporting SSL/TLS, TOE can act as SSL/TLS server or SSL/TLS client. Moreover, SSL/TLS

can protect data transmission between TOE and the remote from interception and alteration. Protection from interception is realized by encrypting transmission data with the following cryptographic keys. A cryptographic key is generated at the time of booting a session and lost at the time of ending the session or powering off the MFP main unit.

Cryptographic key generated as SSLv3/TLSv1 at every session Specifically, one of the cryptographic suites below is adopted:

Cryptographic Suites of SSL/TLS	Cryptographic Method and	Hash Method
	Size of Secret Key	
SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA	RC4 / 128 bits	SHA-1
SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	3-Key Triple-DES / 168 bits	SHA-1
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	AES / 128 bits	SHA-1
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	AES / 256 bits	SHA-1

Protection from the alteration is realized by HMAC (Hashed Message Authentication Code - IETF RFC 2104) of SSL/TLS.

When SSL/TLS communication is enabled on the Web client, requests from the client must be received via HTTPS. The SSL/TLS communication needs to be enabled before IPSec, SNMPv3, or S/MIME is enabled or before security audit log data is downloaded by a system administrator.

b) IPSec

According to the IPSec communication which is configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode, IPSec ensuring secure data transmission is supported. This protects the security of document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal network.

IPSec establishes the security association to determine the parameters (*e.g.* private key and cryptographic algorithm) to be used in the IPSec communication between TOE and the remote. After the association is established, all transmission data among the specified IP addresses is encrypted by the transport mode of IPSec until the TOE is powered off or reset. A cryptographic key is generated at the time of booting a session and lost at the time of ending the session or powering off the MFP main unit.

Cryptographic key generated as IPSec (ESP: Encapsulating Security Payload) at every session Specifically, one of the following combinations between secret-key cryptographic method and hash method is adopted:

Cryptographic Method and Size	Hash Method
of Secret Key	
AES / 128 bits	SHA-1
3-Key Triple-DES /168 bits	SHA-1

c) SNMP v3

According to the SNMP v3 communication which is configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode, SNMP v3 is supported. This is one of the security solutions for the network management protocol, SNMP. As defined in IETF RFC3414, SNMP v3 is used for not only data encryption but also authentication of each SNMP message.

To enable this function, both authentication password and privacy password need to be set up in both TOE and the remote server. Length of both passwords must be 8 characters or more. Authentication of SNMP v3 uses SHA-1 hash function; encryption of the protocol uses CBC-DES. A cryptographic key is generated at the time of booting a session and lost at the time

of ending the session or powering off the MFP main unit.

Cryptographic key generated as SNMP v3 at every session:

Cryptographic Method and Size	Hash Method
of Secret Key	
DES / 56 bits	SHA-1

d) S/MIME (ApeosPort-III only)

According to the S/MIME communication which is configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode, S/MIME ensuring secure mail communication is supported. This protects the security of document data on the internal and external networks.

By S/MIME encrypting mail function, the document data being transmitted to/from the outside by e-mail is protected from interception. By S/MIME signature mail function, the document data is protected from interception and alteration.

A cryptographic key is generated at the time of starting mail encryption and lost at the time of completion of the encryption or powering off the MFP main unit.

Cryptographic key generated as S/MIME for every mail

Specifically, one of the following combinations between secret-key cryptographic method and hash method is adopted:

Cryptographic Method and Size of Secret Key	Hash Method
RC2 / 128 bits	SHA-1
3-Key Triple-DES / 168 bits	SHA-1

7.1.8. FAX Flow Security (TSF_FAX_FLOW)

This function inhibits unauthorized access to the TOE via the FAX board, which is connected to the controller board via USB interface, at any case. The data on public telephone line is not delivered to the internal network.

(1) FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control

FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

The data on public telephone line is not delivered to the internal network.

8. ACRONYMS AND TERMINOLOGY

8.1. Acronyms

The following acronyms are used in this ST:

Acronym	Definition
ADF	Auto Document Feeder
CC	Common Criteria
CE	Customer Engineer / Customer Service Engineer
CWIS	Centre Ware Internet Service
DC	Digital Copier
DRAM	Dynamic Random Access Memory
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
IIT	Image Input Terminal
IOT	Image Output Terminal
IT	Information Technology
IP	Internet Protocol
MFP	Multi Function Peripheral
NVRAM	Non Volatile Random Access Memory
PDL	Page Description Language
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SEEPROM	Serial Electronically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory
SF	Security Function
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SMTP	Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SOF	Strength of Function
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSC	TSF Scope of Control
TSF	TOE Security Function
TSFI	TSF Interface

8.2. Terminology

The following terms are used in this ST:

Term	Definition
User	Any entity outside TOE who interacts with the TOE: <i>i.e.</i> general user, system administrator, and CE.
System Administrator Privilege (SA)	A user authorized by key operator to manage MFP maintenance and configure TOE security functions.
System Administrator	An authorized user who manages MFP maintenance and configures TOE security functions. This term covers both key operator and SA.
Customer Engineer (CE)	Customer service engineer, an engineer who maintains and repairs MFP.
Attacker	A malicious user of TOE
Control Panel	A panel of MFP on which buttons, lamps, and a touch screen panel are mounted to operate the MFP
General User Client	A client for general user.
System Administrator	A client for system administrator. An administrator can refer to and rewrite
Client	TOE setting data of MFP via Web browser and ApeosWare EasyAdmin.
CentreWare Internet	A service to retrieve the document data scanned by MFP from Mailbox.
Service	It also enables a system administrator to refer to and rewrite TOE setting
(CWIS)	data via Web browser.
ApeosWare EasyAdmin	Software for a key operator to conduct settings and management to multiple MFPs from the system administrator client. EasyAdmin enables reference and editing of registration information such as user information, access restriction, mailbox, address book, and job flow, and also the basic device information in a list.
System Administrator Mode	An operation mode that enables a system administrator to refer to and rewrite TOE setting for device operation and that for security functions according to the operational environment. This mode is distinguished from the operation mode that enables a general user to use the MFP functions.
FAX Driver	Software for Direct FAX function, which enables a general user to FAX data to the destination directly from a general user client through MFP. The user can send the FAX data just as printing
Network Scan Utility	Software for a general user client to retrieve the document data stored in Mailbox of MFP.
Print Driver	Software to convert the data on a general user client into print data written in page description language (PDL), a readable format for MFP. Used on the user client.
Print Data	The data written in PDL, a readable format for MFP, which is to be converted into bitmap data by TOE decompose function.
Control Data	The data that is transmitted by command and response interactions. This is

Term	Definition	
	one type of data transmitted between MFP hardware units.	
Bitmap Data	The decomposed data of the data read by copy function and the print data transmitted from a user client to MFP. Bitmap data is stored into the internal HDD after being compressed in the unique process.	
Decompose Function	A function to analyze and convert the print data written in PDL into bitmap data.	
Decompose	To analyze and convert the data written in PDL into bitmap data by decompose function.	
Print Function	A function to decompose and print out the print data transmitted by a user client.	
Original	Texts, images and photos to be read from IIT in copy function.	
Document Data	Document data means all the image data transmitted across the MFP when any of copy, print, scan or FAX functions is operated by a general user. The document data includes: Bitmap data read from IIT and printed out from IOT (copy function), Print data sent by general user client and its decomposed bitmap data (print function), Bitmap data read from IIT and then stored into the internal HDD (scan function), Bitmap data read from IIT and sent to the FAX destination and the bitmap data faxed from the sender's machine and printed out from the recipient's IOT (FAX function).	
Used Document Data	The remaining data in the MFP internal HDD even after deletion. The document data is first stored into the internal HDD, used, and then only its file is deleted.	
Security Audit Log Data	The chronologically recorded data of important events of TOE. The events such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are recorded based on when and who caused what event and its result.	
Internally Stored Data	The data which is stored in a general user client or in the general client and server, but does not include data regarding TOE functions.	
General Data	The data on the internal network. The general data does not include data regarding TOE functions.	
TOE Setting Data	The data which is created by TOE or for TOE and may affect TOE operations. Specifically, it includes the information regarding the functions of Hard Disk Data Overwrite, Hard Disk Data Encryption, System Administrator's Security Management, Customer Engineer Operation Restriction, Use of password entered from MFP control panel in user authentication, ID and password of system administrator, access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator, Internal Network Data Protection, Security Audit Log, Mailbox, and User Authentication.	

Term	Definition
General Client and Server	Client and server which do not directly engage in TOE operations
Deletion from the Internal Hard Disk Drive (HDD)	Deletion from the internal HDD means deletion of the management information. When deletion of document data from the internal HDD is requested, only the management information corresponding to the data is deleted. Therefore, user cannot access the document data which was logically deleted. However, the document data itself is not deleted but remains as the used document data until new data is written in the same storage area.
Overwrite	To write over the area of the document data stored in the internal HDD when deleting the data.
Cryptographic Seed Key	The 12 alphanumeric characters to be entered by a user. When data in the internal HDD can be encrypted, a cryptographic key is generated based on the cryptographic seed key.
Cryptographic Key	The 128-bit data which is automatically generated based on the cryptographic seed key. Before the data is stored into the internal HDD, it is encrypted with the cryptographic key.
Network	A general term to indicate both external and internal networks.
External Network	The network which cannot be managed by the organization that manages TOE. This does not include the internal network.
Internal Network	Channels between MFP and highly reliable remote server / client PC. The channels are located in the network of the organization, the owner of TOE, and are protected from the security risks coming from the external network.
User Authentication	A function to limit the accessible TOE functions by identifying the user before he/she uses each TOE function.
Local Authentication	A mode to manage user authentication of TOE using the user information registered in the MFP.

9. REFERENCES

The following documentation was used to prepare this ST.

Short Name	Document Title
	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1
[CC Part 1]	Part 1: Introduction and general model, dated September 2006, CCMB-2006-09-001
[CC Part 1]	(Translation version 1.2, dated March 2007,
	translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan)
	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1
[CC Part 2]	Part 2: Security functional requirements, dated September 2007, CCMB-2007-09-002
[CC Fait 2]	(Translation version 2.0, dated March 2008,
	translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan)
	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1
[CC Part 3]	Part 3: Security assurance requirements, dated September 2007, CCMB-2007-09-003
[CC Part 3]	(Translation version 2.0, dated March 2008,
	translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan)
	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1
[CEM]	Evaluation Methodology, dated September 2007, CCMB-2007-09-004
	(Translation version 2.0, dated March 2008,
	translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan)