


National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme



Validation Report

for

**Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update
with Surface Book**

Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10715-2016
Dated: June 23, 2016
Version: 1.0

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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1 Executive Summary

This report is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification agent for that end-user to determine the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product in their environment. End-users should review the Security Target (ST), (which is where specific security claims are made) as well as this Validation Report (VR) (which describes how those security claims were evaluated, tested, and any restrictions that may be imposed upon the evaluated configuration) to help in that determination. Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 4 and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.

This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the evaluation of Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and as documented in the ST.

The evaluation of Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book was performed by Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, Maryland, in the United States and was completed in June 2016. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Common Criteria and Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 3.1, revision 4 and the assurance activities specified in the Protection Profile for Mobility Device Fundamentals, version 2.0. The evaluation was consistent with NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) policies and practices as described on their web site (www.niap-ccevs.org).

The Leidos evaluation team determined that Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book is conformant to the claimed Protection Profile (PP) and, when installed, configured and operated as specified in the evaluated guidance documentation, satisfied all of the security functional requirements stated in the ST. The information in this VR is largely derived from the publically available Assurance Activities Report (AAR) and the associated proprietary test report produced by the Leidos evaluation team.

The TOE is a hardware and software solution that consists of Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update Operating System editions running on the following devices:

- **Microsoft Surface Book**, Windows 10 November 2015 Update Pro, 64-bit
- **Microsoft Surface Book**, Windows 10 November 2015 Update Enterprise, 64-bit

The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, examined evaluation evidence, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the evaluation results produced by the evaluation team. The validation team found that the evaluation results showed that all assurance activities specified in the claimed PP had been completed successfully and that the product satisfied all of the security functional and assurance requirements as stated in the ST. Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.

Table 1: Evaluation Details

Item	Identifier
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Item	Identifier
Evaluated Product	Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update Enterprise and Windows 10 November 2015 Update Pro, 64-bit, with Surface Book
Sponsor & Developer	Michael Grimm Microsoft Corporation
CCTL	Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory 6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive Columbia, MD 21046
Completion Date	June 2016
CC	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
Interpretations	There were no applicable interpretations used for this evaluation.
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
PP	Protection Profile for Mobility Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0
Evaluation Class	None
Disclaimer	The information contained in this Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update mobile device by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update mobile device is either expressed or implied.
Evaluation Personnel	Gregory Beaver Gary Grainger Kevin Steiner
Validation Personnel	Herb Ellis, Validator Trainee Stelios Melachrinoudis, Lead Validator Ken Stutterheim, Senior Validator

2 Identification

The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.

The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliant List (PCL).

The following table identifies the evaluated Security Target and TOE.

Table 2: ST and TOE Identification

Name	Description
ST Title	Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update Security Target
ST Version	1.0
Publication Date	June 10, 2016
Vendor and ST Author	Microsoft
TOE Reference	Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
TOE Hardware Models	Microsoft Surface Book (Windows 10 November 2015 Update Pro 64-bit) Microsoft Surface Book (Windows 10 November 2015 Update Enterprise 64-bit)
TOE Software Version	Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update 64-bit Pro edition Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update 64-bit Enterprise edition
Keywords	Mobility Device

2.1 Threats

The ST identifies the following threats that the TOE and its operational environment are intended to counter:

- An attacker is positioned on a wireless communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between the Mobile Device and other endpoints.
- An attacker is positioned on a wireless communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may initiate communications with the Mobile Device or alter communications between the Mobile Device and other endpoints in order to compromise the Mobile Device. These attacks include malicious software update of any applications or system software on the device. These attacks also include malicious web pages or email attachments which are usually delivered to devices over the network.
- The loss or theft of the Mobile Device may give rise to loss of confidentiality of user data including credentials. These physical access threats may involve attacks which attempt to access the device through external hardware ports, through its user interface, and also through direct and

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possibly destructive access to its storage media. The goal of such attacks is to access data from a lost or stolen device which is not expected to return to its user.

- Applications loaded onto the Mobile Device may include malicious or exploitable code. This code could be included intentionally by its developer or unknowingly by the developer, perhaps as part of a software library. Malicious apps may attempt to exfiltrate data to which they have access. They may also conduct attacks against the platform's system software which will provide them with additional privileges and the ability to conduct further malicious activities. Malicious applications may be able to control the device's sensors (GPS, camera, microphone) to gather intelligence about the user's surroundings even when those activities do not involve data resident or transmitted from the device. Flawed applications may give an attacker access to perform network-based or physical attacks that otherwise would have been prevented.
- Persistent access to a device by an attacker implies that the device has lost integrity and cannot regain it. The device has likely lost this integrity due to some other threat vector, yet the continued access by an attacker constitutes an on-going threat in itself. In this case the device and its data may be controlled by an adversary at least as well as by its legitimate owner.

2.2 Organizational Security Policies

There are no Organizational Security Policies for the Mobile Device protection profile.

3 Architectural Information

The TOE is a hardware and software solution that consists of Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update Operating System editions running on the following devices:

- **Microsoft Surface Book**, Windows 10 November 2015 Update Pro, 64-bit, Intel Core i7, Marvell 8897 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Bluetooth 4.0, Bluetooth LE, Intel TPM 2.0
- **Microsoft Surface Book**, Windows 10 November 2015 Update Enterprise, 64-bit, Intel Core i7, Marvell 8897 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Bluetooth 4.0, Bluetooth LE, Intel TPM 2.0

The Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update editions are preemptive multitasking, multiprocessor, and multi-user operating systems. In general, operating systems provide users with a convenient interface to manage underlying hardware. They control the allocation and manage computing resources such as processors, memory, and Input/Output (I/O) devices. Windows 10 November 2015 Update also referred to as “Windows”, expands these basic operating system capabilities to controlling the allocation and managing higher level IT resources such as security principals (user or machine accounts), files, printing objects, services, window station, desktops, cryptographic keys, network ports traffic, directory objects, and web content. Multi-user operating systems such as Windows keep track of which user is using which resource, grant resource requests, account for resource usage, and mediate conflicting requests from different programs and users.

The TOE includes the following variants of Windows:

- Windows 10 November 2015 Update 64-bit Pro
- Windows 10 November 2015 Update 64-bit Enterprise

The TOE includes both physical and logical boundaries. Its operational environment is that of a networked environment with IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) and Bluetooth networks.

4 Assumptions

The ST identifies the following assumptions about the use of the product:

- It is assumed that the TOE's security functions are configured correctly in a manner to ensure that the TOE security policies will be enforced on all applicable network traffic flowing among the attached networks.
- It is assumed that the mobile user will immediately notify the administrator if the Mobile Device is lost or stolen.
- It is assumed that the mobile user exercises precautions to reduce the risk of loss or theft of the Mobile Device.

4.1 Clarification of Scope

All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:

1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified in the claimed PPs and performed by the evaluation team).
2. This evaluation covers only the specific device models, operating system editions, and software versions identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process. For example, functionality that is offered in Windows 10 Home edition was not evaluated.
3. The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the product were not covered by this evaluation. Any additional non-security related functional capabilities of the product, even those described in the ST, were not covered by this evaluation.
4. Accordingly, the functionality offered by applications other than Universal Windows Applications running in Application Containers was not tested. The MDFPP has requirements it places on TOE system services that applications can leverage and this evaluation used only Universal Windows Applications, which may be obtained from the Windows Store. In particular, users and administrators should install only Universal Windows Applications, otherwise the device will be outside the evaluated configuration.
5. Biometric, PIN-based, and other secondary authentication mechanisms, such as picture password, PIN, and Windows Hello, were not tested, and are therefore out of scope.
6. At the time of this evaluation, the native IPsec functionality provided by Windows 10 November 2015 Update had not been evaluated against the VPN Client Protection Profile. This evaluation makes no statements about the future success or failure of such an evaluation. The native IPsec client is included in the TOE as distributed and is utilized to meet IPsec requirements mandated by the MDFPP, but the TOE has not been evaluated as a VPN Client. Sponsors and customers needing an evaluated VPN Client should look for a separate evaluation of that functionality.
7. Device manufacturers, OS developers, and mobile carriers provide many applications that provide capabilities outside of what is required in the MDF PP. AVA_VAN.1 in Section 6.6 of MDFPP V2.0 limits the scope of vulnerability search activities. Hence, identifying and inspecting data collected and transmitted by applications is beyond the scope of MDFPP V2.0.

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8. This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
9. Per the Operational Guidance, many configurations described for the IT Administrator role are applied to the device through a Mobile Device Management (MDM) solution. The specific steps to perform a configuration through the MDM are solution-specific and are not described. As such, examples of possible configuration option text are provided but not guaranteed to match any specific MDM solution.

5 Security Policy

The TOE enforces the following security policies as described in the ST.

5.1 Security Audit

Windows has the ability to collect audit data, review audit logs, protect audit logs from overflow, and restrict access to audit logs. Audit information generated by the system includes the date and time of the event, the user identity that caused the event to be generated, and other event specific data. Authorized administrators can review audit logs and have the ability to search and sort audit records. Authorized Administrators can also configure the audit system to include or exclude potentially auditable events to be audited based on a wide range of characteristics. In the context of this evaluation, the protection profile requirements cover generating audit events, selecting which events should be audited, and providing secure storage for audit event entries.

5.2 Cryptographic Support

Windows provides CAVP validated cryptographic functions that support encryption/decryption, cryptographic signatures, cryptographic hashing, cryptographic key agreement, and random number generation. The TOE additionally provides support for public keys, credential management and certificate validation functions and provides support for the National Security Agency's Suite B cryptographic algorithms. Windows also provides extensive auditing support of cryptographic operations, and a key isolation service designed to limit the potential exposure of secret and private keys. In addition to using cryptography for its own security functions, Windows offers access to the cryptographic support functions for user-mode and kernel-mode programs. Public key certificates generated and used by Windows to authenticate users and machines as well as protect both user and system data in transit.

- *Software-based disk encryption:* Windows implements BitLocker to provide encrypted data storage for fixed and removable volumes and protects the disk volume's encryption key with one or more intermediate keys and authorization factor.
- *IPsec:* Windows implements IPsec to provide protected, authenticated, confidential, and tamper-proof networking between two peer computers.

5.3 User Data Protection

In the context of this evaluation, Windows protects user data at rest and provides secure storage of X.509v3 certificates.

5.4 Identification and Authentication

In the context of this evaluation, Windows provides the ability to use, store, and protect X.509 certificates that are used for TLS and authenticates the user to their mobile device.

5.5 Security Management

Windows includes several functions to manage security policies. Policy management is controlled through a combination of access control, membership in administrator groups, and privileges.

5.6 Protection of the TSF

Windows provides a number of features to ensure the protection of TOE security functions. For applications and processes within the scope of this evaluation, Windows protects against unauthorized

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data disclosure and modification by using a suite of Internet standards. Windows ensures process isolation security for all processes through private virtual address spaces, execution context, and security context. The Windows data structures defining process address space, execution context, memory protection, and security context are stored in protected kernel-mode memory. Windows includes self-testing features that ensure the integrity of executable program images and its cryptographic functions. Finally, Windows provides a trusted update mechanism to update Windows binaries itself.

Like TSF processes, user processes also are provided a private address space and process context, and therefore are protected from each other. Additionally, the TSF has the ability to protect memory pages using Data Execution Prevention (DEP) which marks memory pages in a process as non-executable unless the location explicitly contains executable code. When the processor is asked to execute instructions from a page marked as data, the processor will raise an exception for the OS to handle.

The Windows kernel, user-mode applications, and all Windows Store Applications implement Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) in order to load executable code at unpredictable base addresses. The base address is generated using a pseudo-random number generator that is seeded by high quality entropy sources when available which provides at least 8 random bits for memory mapping.

5.7 Session Locking

Windows provides the ability for a user to lock their session either immediately or after a defined interval. Windows constantly monitors the mouse, keyboard, and touch display for activity and locks the computer after a set period of inactivity. Windows allows an authorized administrator to configure the system to display a logon banner before the logon dialog.

5.8 Trusted Path/Channels

Windows uses a suite of protocols to provide a Virtual Private Network Connection (VPN) between itself, acting as a VPN client, and a VPN gateway in addition to providing protected communications for HTTPS and TLS.

6 Documentation

Microsoft offers a number of guidance documents along with a CC-specific supplemental document describing the installation process for the TOE as well as guidance for subsequent use and administration of the applicable security features.

The guidance documentation examined during the course of the evaluation and delivered with the TOE is as follows:

- *Microsoft Windows 10 Mobile Device Operational Guidance*, Version 1.0, May 13, 2016.

The above document is considered to be part of the evaluated TOE. Any additional customer documentation delivered with the TOE or made available through electronic downloads should not be relied upon for using the TOE in its evaluated configuration.

The Security Target used is:

- *Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update Security Target*, Version 1.0, June 10, 2016

7 Independent Testing

This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team. It is derived from information contained in the following proprietary documents:

- *Surface Book with Windows 10 November 2015 Update Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures for Mobility Device Fundamentals PP*, Version 1.0, June 13, 2016

A non-proprietary version of the tests performed and samples of the evidence that was generated is summarized in the following document:

- *Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book Common Criteria Assurance Activities Report*, Version 1.0, June 13, 2016

The purpose of the testing activity was to confirm the TOE behaves in accordance with the TOE security functional requirements as specified in the ST for a product claiming conformance to PP MDF v2.0.

The evaluation team devised a Test Plan based on the Testing Assurance Activities specified in PP MDF. The Test Plan described how each test activity was to be instantiated within the TOE test environment. The evaluation team executed the tests specified in the Test Plan and documented the results in the team test report listed above.

Independent testing took place primarily at the Leidos CCTL location in Columbia, Maryland. The evaluation team performed limited testing at Microsoft facilities in Redmond, Washington.

The evaluators received the TOE in the form that normal customers would receive it, installed and configured the TOE in accordance with the provided guidance, and exercised the Team Test Plan on equipment configured in the testing laboratory.

Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the testing requirements for PP MDF v2.0 were fulfilled.

8 Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated version of the TOE consists of the following software and hardware device combinations.

TOE Software Identification: The following Windows Operating System editions are included in the evaluation:

- Microsoft Windows 10 Pro November 2015 Update edition (64-bit version) on Microsoft Surface Book
- Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update Enterprise edition (64-bit version) on Microsoft Surface Book

The following security updates must be applied to the above Windows 10 products:

- All critical updates as of May 31, 2016

TOE Hardware Identification: The following hardware devices and components are included in the evaluation:

- **Microsoft Surface Book**, Windows 10 Pro November 2015 Update, 64-bit, Intel Core i7, Marvell 8897 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Bluetooth 4.0, Bluetooth LE, Intel TPM 2.0
- **Microsoft Surface Book**, Windows 10 Enterprise November 2015 Update, 64-bit, Intel Core i7, Marvell 8897 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Bluetooth 4.0, Bluetooth LE, Intel TPM 2.0

The TOE must be deployed as described in section 4 Assumptions of this document and be configured in accordance with the *Microsoft Windows 10 Mobile Device Operational Guidance*, Version 1.0, May 13, 2016.

Per Policy Letter #22, user installation of vendor-delivered bug fixes and security patches is encouraged between completion of the evaluation and the Assurance Maintenance Date; with such updates properly installed, the product is still considered by NIAP to be in its evaluated configuration.

9 Results of the Evaluation

The evaluation was conducted based upon the assurance activities specified in Protection Profile for Mobility Device Fundamentals Version 2.0, in conjunction with version 3.1, revision 4 of the CC and the CEM. A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements.

The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the assurance activities in the claimed PPs, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.

The details of the evaluation are recorded in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), which is controlled by the Leidos CCTL. The security assurance requirements are listed in the following table.

Table 3: TOE Security Assurance Requirements

Assurance Component ID	Assurance Component Name
ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1	ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.1	Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_REQ.1	Stated security requirements
ASE_SPD.1	Security Problem Definition
ASE_TSS.1	TOE summary specification
ADV_FSP.1	Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1	Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1	TOE CM coverage
ALC_TSU_EXT.1	Timely Security Updates
ATE_IND.1	Independent testing – conformance
AVA_VAN.1	Vulnerability survey

10 Validator Comments/Recommendations

The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality implemented by the SFR's within the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality provided by Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book, to include software that was not part of the evaluated configuration, needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.

For Surface Book, evaluators discovered that Windows displays the following warning when the user is about to surpass the policy for failed authentication attempts:

“If you keep entering the wrong password, you’ll be locked out to help protect your data. To unlock, you’ll need a BitLocker recovery key.”

It is important for users, customers, and sponsors to understand that until an update is issued to modify this warning to one that better reflects the evaluated configuration, the warning must be disregarded as of the completion of this evaluation. There is no BitLocker recovery key created, utilized, or transmitted anywhere when Windows 10 is in its evaluated configuration, including as a recovery mechanism. Consequently, when the maximum number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been surpassed, the user is not “locked out” but instead the user and organizational data on the device is wiped.

According to the Operational Guidance, the cipher suite selection and priority may be configured on the server side of a connection. Cipher suite selection is made according to the default order for Windows 10. Additionally, Windows 10 devices may be configured to trust a Certificate Authority by using policy pushed to the device by an MDM. The TOE comes preloaded with root certificates for various Certificate Authorities. Additional Certificate Authorities may be managed on the Windows 10 device using workplace enrollment and an MDM.

While there is traditionally an option to disable or enable location services on an MDM system or by a local Windows 10 administrator on a Windows 10 device, Surface Book does not have a GPS radio. Instead, it determines the location from available network information. In addition, the Surface Book does not have the ability to initiate or receive phone calls and so the device does not contain a dialer or any USSD or MMI codes. As such, GPS and telephony capabilities are out of scope.

11 Annexes

Not applicable.

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12 Security Target

Name	Description
ST Title	Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update Security Target
ST Version	1.0
Publication Date	June 10, 2016

13 Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACE	Access Control Entry
ACL	Access Control List
ACP	Access Control Policy
AD	Active Directory
ADAM	Active Directory Application Mode
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
AGD	Administrator Guidance Document
AH	Authentication Header
ALPC	Advanced Local Process Communication
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
API	Application Programming Interface
APIC	Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller
BTG	BitLocker To Go
CA	Certificate Authority
CBAC	Claims Basic Access Control, see DYN
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CC	Common Criteria
CD-ROM	Compact Disk Read Only Memory
CIFS	Common Internet File System
CIMCPP	Certificate Issuing and Management Components For Basic Robustness Environments Protection Profile, Version 1.0, April 27, 2009
CM	Configuration Management; Control Management
COM	Component Object Model
CP	Content Provider
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CryptoAPI	Cryptographic API
CSP	Cryptographic Service Provider
DAC	Discretionary Access Control
DACL	Discretionary Access Control List
DC	Domain Controller
DEP	Data Execution Prevention
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DHCP	Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DFS	Distributed File System
DMA	Direct Memory Access
DNS	Domain Name System
DS	Directory Service
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
DYN	Dynamic Access Control
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB	Electronic Code Book
EFS	Encrypting File System
ESP	Encapsulating Security Protocol

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FEK	File Encryption Key
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
FRS	File Replication Service
FSMO	Flexible Single Master Operation
FTP	File Transfer Protocol
FVE	Full Volume Encryption
GB	Gigabyte
GC	Global Catalog
GHz	Gigahertz
GPC	Group Policy Container
GPO	Group Policy Object
GPOSPP	US Government Protection Profile for General-Purpose Operating System in a Networked Environment
GPT	Group Policy Template
GPT	GUID Partition Table
GUI	Graphical User Interface
GUID	Globally Unique Identifiers
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS	Secure HTTP
I/O	Input / Output
I&A	Identification and Authentication
IA	Information Assurance
ICF	Internet Connection Firewall
ICMP	Internet Control Message Protocol
ICS	Internet Connection Sharing
ID	Identification
IDE	Integrated Drive Electronics
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IFS	Installable File System
IIS	Internet Information Services
IKE	Internet Key Exchange
IP	Internet Protocol
IPv4	IP Version 4
IPv6	IP Version 6
IPC	Inter-process Communication
IPI	Inter-process Interrupt
IPsec	IP Security
ISAPI	Internet Server API
IT	Information Technology
KDC	Key Distribution Center
LAN	Local Area Network
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LPC	Local Procedure Call
LSA	Local Security Authority
LSASS	LSA Subsystem Service
LUA	Least-privilege User Account
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MB	Megabyte
MMC	Microsoft Management Console

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MSR	Model Specific Register
NAC	(Cisco) Network Admission Control
NAP	Network Access Protection
NAT	Network Address Translation
NIC	Network Interface Card
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NLB	Network Load Balancing
NMI	Non-maskable Interrupt
NTFS	New Technology File System
NTLM	New Technology LAN Manager
OS	Operating System
PAE	Physical Address Extension
PC/SC	Personal Computer/Smart Card
PIN	Personal Identification Number
PKCS	Public Key Certificate Standard
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PP	Protection Profile
RADIUS	Remote Authentication Dial In Service
RAID	Redundant Array of Independent Disks
RAM	Random Access Memory
RAS	Remote Access Service
RC4	Rivest's Cipher 4
RID	Relative Identifier
RNG	Random Number Generator
RPC	Remote Procedure Call
RSA	Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
RSASSA	RSA Signature Scheme with Appendix
SA	Security Association
SACL	System Access Control List
SAM	Security Assurance Measure
SAML	Security Assertion Markup Language
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SAS	Secure Attention Sequence
SD	Security Descriptor
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SID	Security Identifier
SIP	Session Initiation Protocol
SIPI	Startup IPI
SF	Security Functions
SFP	Security Functional Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SMB	Server Message Block
SMI	System Management Interrupt
SMTP	Simple Mail Transport Protocol
SP	Service Pack
SPI	Security Parameters Index
SPI	Stateful Packet Inspection
SRM	Security Reference Monitor
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer

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SSP	Security Support Providers
SSPI	Security Support Provider Interface
ST	Security Target
SYSVOL	System Volume
TCP	Transmission Control Protocol
TDI	Transport Driver Interface
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TPM	Trusted Platform Module
TSC	TOE Scope of Control
TSF	TOE Security Functions
TSS	TOE Summary Specification
UART	Universal Asynchronous Receiver / Transmitter
UI	User Interface
UID	User Identifier
UNC	Universal Naming Convention
US	United States
UPN	User Principal Name
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
USB	Universal Serial Bus
USN	Update Sequence Number
v5	Version 5
VDS	Virtual Disk Service
VPN	Virtual Private Network
VSS	Volume Shadow Copy Service
WAN	Wide Area Network
WCF	Windows Communications Framework
WebDAV	Web Document Authoring and Versioning
WebSSO	Web Single Sign On
WDM	Windows Driver Model
WIF	Windows Identity Framework
WMI	Windows Management Instrumentation
WSC	Windows Security Center
WU	Windows Update
WSDL	Web Service Description Language
WWW	World-Wide Web
X64	A 64-bit instruction set architecture

14 Bibliography

The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:

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- [3] *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security Assurance Components*, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
- [4] *Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology*, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
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