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2.6	June 8, 2021	Addressing internal comments and finalization
2.7	June 16, 2021	Updating FIA_AFL.1 TSS section
2.8	July 6, 2021	Updating SFR and TSS section
	August	
2.9	8, 2021	Addressing QA comments
3.0	October 12, 2021	Addressing validator comments

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## **1** Introduction

This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), the Nokia 7x50 SR OS 20.10.R4. This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the TOE environment, a list of threats that the TOE intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements, and the IT security functions provided by the TOE that meet that set of requirements. Administrators of the TOE will be referred to as Security administrators in this document.

### 1.1 Security Target and TOE Reference

This section provides the information needed to identify and control the TOE and the ST.

Category	Identifier
ST Title	Nokia 7x50 SR OS 20.10.R4 for 7750 SR-1, 7750 SR-1s,
	7750 SR- 2s, 7750 SR-7s, 7750 SR-14s, 7950 XRS-20,
	7950 XRS-16c, 7450 ESS, and 7750 SR-1e Security Target
ST Version	3.0
ST Date	October 12, 2021
ST Author	Acumen Security, LLC.
TOE Identifier	Nokia 7x50 SR OS 20.10.R4 for 7750 SR-1, 7750 SR-1s,
	7750 SR- 2s, 7750 SR-7s, 7750 SR-14s, 7950 XRS-20,
	7950 XRS-16c, 7450 ESS, and 7750 SR-1e
TOE Hardware	7750 SR-1, 7750 SR-1s, 7750 SR-2s, 7750 SR-7s, 7750
	SR-14s, 7950 XRS-20, 7950 XRS-16c, 7450 ESS, 7750 SR-
	1e
TOE Software	Nokia SR OS 20.10.R4
TOE Developer	Nokia Corporation
Key Words	Network Device, Nokia, Encryption, SR OS

Table 1 – TOE/ST Identification

### **1.2 TOE Overview**

The Nokia 7x50 SR OS 20.10.R4 for 7750 SR-1, 7750 SR-1s, 7750 SR- 2s, 7750 SR-7s, 7750 SR-14s, 7950 XRS-20, 7950 XRS-16c, 7450 ESS, and 7750 SR-1e (herein referred to as the TOE) is a network device with the high-performance, scale and flexibility supporting service providers, web scale and enterprise networks. The Nokia 7x50 routers utilize Nokia's SR OS technology.

The TOE Description section provides an overview of the TOE architecture, including physical boundaries, security functions, and relevant TOE documentation and references.

### **1.2.1 TOE Product Type**

The TOE is a network device that is composed of hardware and software and offers a scalable solution to the end users. It satisfies all of the criterion to meet the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e [NDcPP v2.2e].

### **1.3 TOE Description**

The TOE portfolio delivers high-performance, scaling and flexibility to support a full array of IP and MPLS services and functions for service provider, web scale and enterprise networks. The 7750 series SRs

includes a wide range of physical platforms that share a mutual architecture and feature set. This allows Nokia customers to select the platform that best addresses their unique business goals and fulfills their scale, density, space, power, and value-added service requirements without compromising on quality or features. The 7750 series are chassis-based routers. The TOE supports a full array of network functions and services, achieving scale and efficiency without compromising versatility. It provides highly available service delivery mechanisms that maximize network stability and minimize service interruptions. Every Nokia 7750 series routing appliance is a whole routing system that provides a variety of high-speed interfaces (only Ethernet is within scope of this evaluation) for various scale of networks and various network applications. The TOE utilizes a common Nokia SR OS firmware, features, and technology for compatibility across all platforms. The SR-1e does support MACsec functionality but the MACsec functionality is not in the scope of this evaluation.

Nokia SR OS firmware is mainly responsible for all the functionalities and services provided by the routers. The routers can be accessed either via a local console or via a network connection that is protected using the SSH protocol. Each time a user accesses the routers, either via local console terminal connection or from the network remotely using SSH, the user must ensure to successfully authenticate itself with the correct credentials.

The TOE is comprised of the models as indicated in Table 2 below:

### Table 2 – TOE Physical Boundary Components

Platform Description	Processors
7450 ESS         # of Cores: 10 Core         Frequency: 1.5Ghz         OS: Nokia SR OS         Image Version: 20.10.R4         Part number: 3HE08432AA         7750 SR-1	Cavium OCTEON II CN6645
# of Cores: 16 Core Frequency: 1.8Ghz OS: Nokia SR OS Image Version: 20.10.R4 Part Number: 3HE12298AA	Cavium OCTEON III CN7360
7750 SR-1s Figure 10 SR-1s # of Cores: 16 Core Frequency: 1.8Ghz OS: Nokia SR OS Image Version: 20.10.R4 Part number: 3HE13809xx	Cavium OCTEON III CN7360

Platform Description	Processors
7750 SR-2s	
# of Cores: 16 Core Frequency: 1.8Ghz OS: Nokia SR OS Image Version: 20.10.R4 Part number: 3HE12379AA	Cavium OCTEON III CN7360
7750 SR-1e # of Cores: 10 Core Frequency: 1.3 Ghz OS: Nokia SR OS Image Version: 20.10.R4 Part number: 3HE10301AA	Cavium OCTEON II CN6645
7750 SR -7s Frequency: 1.5 Ghz OS: Nokia SR OS Image Version: 20.10.R4 Part number: 3HE10301AA	Cavium OCTEON II CN6645

Platform Description	Processors
7750 SR -14s	
# of Cores: 10 Core	Cavium OCTEON II CN6645
Frequency: 1.5 Ghz OS: Nokia SR OS	
Image Version: 20.10.R4	
Part number: 3HE10301AA	
7950 XRS-20	Cavium OCTEON II CN6645
# of Cores: CPM: 20 cores, CPM2: 48 cores Frequency: CPM:1.5GHz, CPM2: 1.8GHz OS: Nokia SR OS Part number: 3HE07113AA	

Figure 1 depicts the TOE boundary:




Figure 1 – TOE Boundary Diagram

### 1.4 TOE Evaluated Configuration

In the evaluated configuration, the TOE consists of the platforms as stated in Section 1.3. The TOE supports secure connectivity with another IT environment device as stated in Table 3:

Components	Required (Y/N)	Usage
Audit server	Yes	The audit server supports HTTP PUT
		requests over TLS v1.2 to receive
		audit files securely from the TOE.
LDAP server	Yes	This server will provide the
		authentication mechanism to
		authenticate users.
Management workstation with Web	Yes	This includes any IT
Browser/SSH client		Environment Management
		workstation with a Web Browser and
		an SSH client.
Certificate Authority server	Yes	The Certificate Authority server is
		used for creation and management
		of X509 certificates to be used with
		the TOE.

### Table 3 - IT Environment Components

### **1.5 Physical Scope of the TOE**

The TOE boundary is the hardware appliance, which is comprised of hardware and software components. It is deployed in an environment that contains the various IT components as depicted in Figure 1 above.

### **1.6 Logical Scope of the TOE**

The TOE implements the following security functional requirements:

- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support

- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE Access
- Trusted Path/Channels

Each of these security functionalities are listed in more detail in the sections below.

### 1.6.1 Security Audit

The TOE generates audit events for all start-up and shut-down functions and all auditable events as specified in Table 13. Audit events are also generated for management actions specified in FAU\_GEN.1. The TOE is capable of storing audit events locally and exporting them to an external audit server using HTTP PUT requests over TLS v1.2 protocol. The TOE uses a cron script to periodically transfer the audit logs to a URL hosted by the external audit server. Each audit record contains the date and time of event, type of event, subject identity, and the relevant data of the event.

### 1.6.2 Cryptographic Support

The TOE provides cryptographic support for the services described in Table 4 below. The related CAVP validation details are provided in Table 5. The operating system is SR OS 20.10.R4. The TOE leverages the OpenSSL v 1.1.1g library for its cryptographic functionality.

The TOE provides cryptographic support for the services described in Table 4 below:

Cryptographic Method	Usage
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation	Cryptographic key generation conforming to FIPS PUB 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Appendix B.3 and FFC Schemes using 'safe-prime' groups that meet the following: "NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography" and RFC 3526.
	RSA Key sizes supported are 2048 bits
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment	RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES- PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1" and FFC Schemes using "safe-prime" groups that meet the following: 'NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, "Recommendation for Pair- Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography" and [groups listed in RFC 3526].
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction	Refer to Table 17 for Key Zeroization details.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	AES encryption and decryption conforming to CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CTR as specified in ISO 10116 and GCM as specified in ISO 19772. AES key size supported is 128 bits and 256 bits AES modes supported are: CBC, CTR and GCM.

### Table 4 - TOE Cryptography Implementation

Cryptographic Method	Usage
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	RSA digital signature algorithm conforming to FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3. RSA key size of 2048 bits.
FCS_COP.1/Hash	Cryptographic hashing services conforming to ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004. Hashing algorithms supported are SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512. Message digest sizes supported are: 160, 256, 384 and 512 bits.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	Keyed-hash message authentication conforming to ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 "MAC Algorithm 2. Keyed-hash algorithm supported are HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC- SHA-384 and HMAC-SHA-512. Key sizes supported are: 160, 256, 384, and 512 bits. Message digest sizes supported are: 160, 256, 384 and 512 bits.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation	Random number generation conforming to ISO/IEC 18031:2011. The TOE leverages CTR_DRBG(AES) CTR_DRBG seeded with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol	The TOE supports HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818. The TOE implements HTTPS protocol using TLS v1.2 in support of audit server.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol	The TOE supports TLS v1.2 protocol for use with X. 509v3 based authentication. The following ciphersuites in the evaluated configuration: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Client Protocol	The TOE supports SSH v2 protocol complaint to the following RFCs: 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 4344, 8268, and 6668. The TOE supports public key and password-based authentication. SSH public-key authentication uses ssh-rsa. SSH transport uses the following encryption algorithms: aes128-ctr, aes128- cbc, aes256-cbc and aes256-ctr. Packets greater than 256K bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped. SSH transport uses the following data integrity MAC algorithms: hmac-sha1, hmac-sha256, and hmac-sha2-512. Key exchange algorithms supported are diffie-hellman-group14-sha256, diffie-hellman-group14- sha1 and diffie-hellman-group16-sha512. The TOE ensures that within SSH connections the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour and no more than one gigabyte of transmitted data.

The related CAVP validation details are provided in Table 5. The operating system is SR OS 20.10.R4. The TOE leverages the OpenSSL v 1.1.1g for its cryptographic functionality.

### Table 5 – CAVP Algorithm Testing References

Cryptographic Algorithms	CAVPS	Implementation Library	Operational Environment (OE)
AES	C2074	Nokia 7x50 SR OS	Cavium OCTEON III CN7360
		Cryptographic Library	

Cryptographic Algorithms	CAVPS	Implementation Library	Operational Environment (OE)
	C2075	Nokia 7x50 SR OS	Cavium OCTEON II CN6645
		Cryptographic Library	
RSA	C2074	Nokia 7x50 SR OS	Cavium OCTEON III CN7360
		Cryptographic Library	
	C2075	Nokia 7x50 SR OS	Cavium OCTEON II CN6645
		Cryptographic Library	
HMAC	C2074	Nokia 7x50 SR OS	Cavium OCTEON III CN7360
		Cryptographic Library	
	C2075	Nokia 7x50 SR OS	Cavium OCTEON II CN6645
		Cryptographic Library	
SHS	C2074	Nokia 7x50 SR OS	Cavium OCTEON III CN7360
		Cryptographic Library	
	C2075	Nokia 7x50 SR OS	Cavium OCTEON II CN6645
		Cryptographic Library	
DRBG	C2074	Nokia 7x50 SR OS	Cavium OCTEON III CN7360
		Cryptographic Library	
	C2075	Nokia 7x50 SR OS	Cavium OCTEON II CN6645
		Cryptographic Library	

### **1.6.3** Identification and Authentication

The TOE supports Role Based Access Control. All users must be authenticated to the TOE prior to carrying out any management actions. The TOE supports password-based authentication and public key-based authentication. Based on the assigned role, a user is granted a set of privileges to access the system.

### **1.6.4 Security Management**

The TOE supports local and remote management of its security functions including:

- Local console CLI administration
- Remote CLI administration via SSHv2
- Timed user lockout after multiple failed authentication attempts
- Password configurations
- Role Based Access Control –Admin and User roles
- Configurable banners to be displayed at login
- Timeouts to terminate administrative sessions after a set period of inactivity
- Protection of secret keys and passwords

#### 1.6.5 TOE Access

Prior to establishing an administration session with the TOE, a banner is displayed to the user. The banner messaging is customizable. The TOE will terminate an interactive session after configurable number of minutes of session inactivity. A user can terminate their local CLI session and remote CLI session by entering the appropriate command at the prompt.

#### 1.6.6 Protection of the TSF

The TOE protects all passwords, pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys from unauthorized disclosure. Pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys are stored in encrypted format. Passwords are stored as a non-reversible hash value as per standard Linux

approach. The TOE executes self-tests during initial start-up to ensure correct operation and enforcement of its security functions. An administrator can install software updates to the TOE. The TOE internally maintains the date and time.

### 1.6.7 Trusted Path/Channels

The TOE supports HTTPS PUT requests over TLS v1.2 for secure communication to the audit server. The TOE supports TLS v1.2 for secure communication to LDAP server for authentication. The TOE supports local CLI and uses SSH v2 for secure remote administration.

### **1.7 Excluded Functionality**

The following interfaces are not included as part of the evaluated configuration:

- NTP server (optional).
- gRPC is disabled.
- telnet is disabled.
- MACsec functionality is not evaluated.
- MPLS is not evaluated
- SNMP is not evaluated.

### **1.8 TOE Documentation**

The table below lists the TOE guidance documentation. The Common Criteria (CC) guidance document and TOE ST are provided in .pdf form on the NIAP portal.

### Table 6 – TOE Documentation

Reference	Title	Version	Date	
[CC]	Nokia 7x50 SROS 20.10.R4 Common Criteria Guidance document	0.7	October 12, 2021	
[ST]	Nokia 7x50 SR OS 20.10.R4 for 7750 SR-1, 7750 SR-1s, 7750 SR- 2s, 7750 SR-7s, 7750 SR-14s, 7950 XRS-20, 7950 XRS- 16c, 7450 ESS, and 7750 SR-1e Security Target	3.0	October 12, 2021	

### **1.9 Other References**

In addition to the TOE documentation, the following references are applied within this ST:

• Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e [NDcPP v2.2e]

## 2 Conformance Claims

This section identifies the TOE conformance claims, conformance rational, and relevant Technical Decisions (TDs).

### 2.1 CC Conformance Claims

This TOE is conformant to the following:

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations Part 1, Version 3.1, Revision 5 April 2017
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations Part 2, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017: Part 2 extended
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations Part 2, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017: Part 3 extended

### 2.2 Protection Profile Conformance

This ST claims exact conformance to the following:

• Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e [NDcPP v2.2e]

### 2.3 Conformance Rationale

This TOE claims exact conformance to NDcPP v2.2e. The security problem definition, security objectives and security requirements in this ST are all taken from the relevant Protection Profile and Extended Package, performing only operations defined there.

### 2.4 Technical Decisions

All NIAP Technical Decisions (TDs) issued to date and applicable to NDcPP v2.2e have been addressed. Table 7 identifies all TDs relevant to NDcPP v2.2e:

Technical Decision Applicable Exclusion Rationale (if applicable)			
	(Y/N)		
TD0592 – NIT Technical Decision for Local	Yes		
Storage of Audit Records	103		
TD0591 – NIT Technical Decision for	No	TOE is not virtual.	
Virtual TOEs and hypervisors			
TD0581 – NIT Technical Decision for	No	TOE does not support ECC certificates.	
Elliptic curve-based key establishment			
and NIST SP 800-56Arev3			
TD0580 – NIT Technical Decision for	Yes		
clarification about use of DH14 in	100		
NDcPPv2.2e			
TD0572: Restricting FTP_ITC.1 to only IP	Yes		
address identifiers			
TD0571: Guidance on how to handle	Yes		
FIA AFL.1.			
	Yes		
TD0569: Session ID Usage Conflict in	No	DTLSS is not claimed.	
FCS DTLSS EXT.1.7			
TD0564: Vulnerability Analysis Search	Yes		
Criteria.			
TD0563: Clarification of audit date	Yes		
information			
TD0556: NIT Technical Decision for RFC	No	TLSS is not claimed .	
5077 guestion			
TD0555: NIT Technical Decision for RFC	No	TLSS is not claimed.	
Reference incorrect in TLSS Test			
TD0547: clarification on developer	Yes		
disclosure of software components as part			
of AVA_VAN.			
TD0546: DTLS - clarification of Application	No	DTLS is not claimed.	
Note 63			
TD0538: Outdated link to allowed-with	Yes		
list			
TD0537: Incorrect reference to	Yes		
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3			
TD0536: Update Verification	Yes		
Inconsistency			
TD0528: Missing EAs for FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4	No	NTP is not claimed.	
TD0527: Updates to Certificate	No	TOE does not support ECC certificates.	
Revocation Testing (FIA_X509_EXT.1			

## **3 Security Problem Definition**

The security problem definition has been taken directly from NDcPP v2.2e and is reproduced here for the convenience of the reader. The security problem is described in terms of the threats that the TOE is expected to address, assumptions about the operational environment, and any organizational security policies (OSPs) that the TOE is expected to enforce.

### 3.1 Threats

The threats included in Table 8 are drawn directly from the [NDcPP v2.2e]:

	e 8 – Threats
ID	Threat
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS	Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the network device by nefarious means such as
	masquerading as an Administrator to the device,
	masquerading as the device to an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected
	portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide access to the administrative session, or
	sessions between network devices. Successfully gaining Administrator access allows malicious actions that
	compromise the security functionality of the device and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY	Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space.
	Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or
	brute force exhaust the key space and give them
	unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate
	and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS	Threat agents may attempt to target network devices that do not use standardized secure tunneling protocols to
	protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take
	advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle
	attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in
	loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical network
	traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the
	network device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS	Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that
	use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints, e.g., a shared password that is guessable or transported as
	plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly
	designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the
	Administrator or another device, and the attacker could
	insert themselves into the network stream and perform a
	man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical network
	traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of
	confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the Network
	Device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE	Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised
	update of the software or firmware which undermines the

Table 8 - Threats

ID	Threat
	security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY	Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality of the network device without Administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise the device and the Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE	Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued access to the network device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials includes replacing existing credentials with an attacker's credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the Administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING	Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to the device provides the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic and may allow them to take advantage of any trust relationships with other Network Devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE	An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or compromised security functionality and might therefore subsequently use or abuse security functions without prior authentication to access, change or modify device data, critical network traffic or security functionality of the device.

### 3.2 Assumptions

The assumptions included in Table 9 are drawn directly from the [NDcPP v2.2e]:

### Table 9 - Assumptions

ID	Assumption
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION	The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security or interfere with the device's physical interconnections and correct operation.
	This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP does not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP does not expect the product to defend against physical access to the device
	that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies to the physical platform on which the VM runs.

ID	Assumption
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY	The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example, the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION	A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the Network Device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the Network Device, destined for another network entity, is not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types of Network Devices (e.g., firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR	The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The network device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device. For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE's trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g., offline verification).
A.REGULAR_UPDATES	The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE	The administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the network device are protected by the platform on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION	The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g., cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.

### 3.3 Organizational Security Policies

The OSPs included in Table 10 are drawn directly from the [NDcPP v2.2e]:

### Table 10 - OSPs

ID	OSP
P.ACCESS_BANNER	The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions
	of use, legal agreements, or any other appropriate
	information to which users consent by accessing the TOE.

## 4 Security Objectives

The security objectives have been taken from NDcPP v2.2e and are reproduced here for the convenience of the reader.

### 4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The security objectives have been taken from NDcPP v2.2e and are reproduced here for the convenience of the reader. The table below describes the Objectives for the Operational Environment:

ID	Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.PHYSICAL	Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE
	and the data it contains, is provided by the environment.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE	There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g.,
	compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other
	than those services necessary for the operation,
	administration and support of the TOE. Note: For vNDs the
	TOE includes only the contents of its own VM, and does not
	include other VMs or the VS.
OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION	The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that
	traverses it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will
	be covered by other security and assurance measures in the
	operational environment.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN	Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all
	guidance documentation in a trusted manner. For vNDs, this
	includes the VS Administrator responsible for configuring
	the VMs that implement ND functionality.
	For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based
	authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are assumed
	to monitor the revocation status of all certificates in the
	TOE's trust store and to remove any certificate from the
	TOE's trust store in case such certificate can no longer be
	trusted.
OE.UPDATES	The TOE firmware and software is updated by an
	Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release
	of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE	The Administrator's credentials (private key) used to access
	the TOE must be protected on any other platform on which
	they reside.
OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION	The Security Administrator ensures that there is no
	unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual
	information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs,
	passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the
	equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment. For vNDs, this applies when the physical
	platform on which the VM runs is removed from its
	operational environment.
	operational environment.

### 4.2 Security Objectives Rationale

The Protection Profiles and Extended Packages to which this ST claims conformance are as follows:

• NDcPP v2.2e, Section 5

### **5** Security Requirements

This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) for the TOE. The SFRs included in this section are derived from Part 2 of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revisions 5, September 2017, and all international interpretations.

Requirement	Description	
FAU_GEN.1	Audit data generation	
FAU GEN.2	User identity association	
FAU_STG_EXT.1	Protected Audit Event Storage	
FCS CKM.1	Cryptographic Key Generation	
FCS CKM.2	Cryptographic Key Establishment	
FCS CKM.4	Cryptographic Key Destruction	
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)	
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)	
FCS_COP.1/Hash	Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)	
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)	
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	HTTPS Protocol	
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	Random Bit Generation	
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	SSH Server Protocol	
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	TLS Client Protocol without Mutual Authentication	
FCS TLSC EXT.2	TLS Client Protocol with Mutual Authentication	
FIA_AFL.1	Authentication Failure Management	
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	Password Management	
FIA_UIA_EXT.1	User Identification and Authentication	
FIA_UAU_EXT.2	Password-based Authentication Mechanism	
FIA_UAU.7	Protected Authentication Feedback	
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	X.509 Certificate Validation	
FIA_X509_EXT.2	Certificate Authentication	
FIA_X509_EXT.3	Certificate Requests	
FMT_MOF.1/Functions	Management of security functions behavior	
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate	Management of security functions behaviour	
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	Management of TSF Data	
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys	Management of TSF data	
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of Management Functions	
FMT_SMR.2	Restrictions on security roles	
FPT_APW_EXT.1	Protection of Administrator Passwords	
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private	
	keys)	
FPT_STM_EXT.1	Reliable Time Stamps	
FPT_TST_EXT.1	TSF Testing	
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Trusted Update	
FTA_SSL_EXT.1	TSF-initiated Session Locking	
FTA_SSL.3	TSF-initiated Termination	
FTA_SSL.4	User-initiated Termination	
FTA_TAB.1	Default TOE Access Banner	
FTP_ITC.1	Inter-TSF trusted channel	
FTP_TRP.1/Admin	Trusted Path	

#### Table 12 – SFRs

### 5.1 Conventions

The CC allows the following types of operations to be performed on the functional requirements: assignments, selections, refinements, and iterations. The following font conventions are used within this document to identify operations defined by CC:

- Assignment: Indicated with italicized text;
- Refinement: Indicated with bold text;
- Selection: Indicated with underlined text;
- Iteration: Indicated by appending the iteration identifier after a slash, e.g., /SigGen.
- Where operations were completed in the PP and relevant EPs/Modules/Packages, the formatting used in the PP has been retained.
- Extended SFRs are identified by the addition of "EXT" after the requirement name.

### 5.2 Security Functional Requirements

This section includes the security functional requirements for this ST.

### 5.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)

### 5.2.1.1 FAU\_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation

### FAU\_GEN.1.1

The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
- b) Auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
- c) All administrative actions comprising.
  - Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user accounts are required for Administrators).
  - Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).
  - Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).
  - Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).
  - [no other actions];
- d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in 13.

### FAU\_GEN.1.2

The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the cPP/ST, *information specified in column three of* Table 13.

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1	None	None
FAU_GEN.2	None	None
FAU_STG_EXT.1	None	None
FCS_CKM.1	None	None
FCS_CKM.2	None	None

### Table 13- Security Functional Requirements and Auditable Events

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents	
FCS CKM.4	None	None	
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	None	None	
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	None	None	
FCS_COP.1/Hash	None	None	
FCS HTTPS EXT.1	Failure to establish a HTTPS Session.	Reason for failure.	
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	Failure to establish a TLS Session	Reason for failure	
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2	None	None	
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	Failure to establish an SSH	Reason for failure	
	session		
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	None	None	
FIA_AFL.1	Administrator lockout due to	None	
	excessive authentication failures		
FMT_MOF.1/Functions	None	None	
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	Unsuccessful attempt to validate a	Reason for failure of certificate	
	certificate	validation	
	Any addition, replacement or	Identification of certificates added,	
	removal of trust anchors in the TOE's		
	trust store	in the TOE's trust store	
FIA_X509_EXT.2	None	None	
FIA_X509_EXT.3	None	None	
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	None	None	
FIA_UIA_EXT.1	All use of identification and	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP	
	authentication mechanism.	address)	
FIA_UAU_EXT.2	All use of identification and	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP	
	authentication mechanism	address)	
FIA_UAU.7	None	None	
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate	Any attempt to initiate a manual	None	
	update	News	
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	None None	None	
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys FMT_SMF.1	None	None	
— —	None	None None	
FMT_SMR.2 FPT APW EXT.1	None		
FPT_APW_EXT.1	None	None	
		None	
FPT_STM.1_EXT.1	Discontinuous changes to time - either Administrator actuated or	For discontinuous changes to time: The old and new values for the time.	
	changed via an automated process.	Origin of the attempt to change time	
	(Note that no continuous changes to	for success and failure (e.g., IP	
	time need to be logged. See also	address).	
	application note on		
	FPT_STM_EXT.1)		
FPT TST EXT.1	None	None	
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Initiation of update; result of the	None	
	update attempt (success		
	or failure)		
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 (if "terminate the	The termination of a local interactive	None	
session is selected)	session by the session locking		
	mechanism.		
FTA_SSL.3	The termination of a remote session	None	
	by the session locking mechanism.		

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents	
FTA_SSL.4	The termination of an interactive	None	
	session.		
FTA_TAB.1	None	None	
FTP_ITC.1	Initiation of the trusted channel. Termination of the trusted channel. Failure of the trusted channel	Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channels establishment attempt.	
	functions.		
FTP_TRP.1/Admin	Initiation of the trusted path.	usted path. None	
	Termination of the trusted path.		
	Failure of the trusted path functions.		

### 5.2.1.2 FAU\_GEN.2 User Identity Association

### FAU\_GEN.2.1

For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

### 5.2.1.3 FAU\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage

### FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP\_ITC.1.

### FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.2

The TSF Shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself. In addition [

• The TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally

].

### FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall [overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: [the oldest log file is overwritten]] when the local storage space for audit data is full.

### 5.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

### 5.2.2.1 FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation

### FCS\_CKM.1.1

The TSF shall generate **asymmetric** cryptographic key in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [

- <u>RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following:</u> <u>FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.3;</u>
- <u>FFC Schemes using 'safe-prime' groups that meet the following: "NIST Special Publication</u> <u>800- 56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using</u> <u>Discrete Logarithm Cryptography" and [RFC 3526].</u>

] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

### 5.2.2.2 FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

### FCS\_CKM.2.1

The TSF shall **perform** cryptographic **key establishment** in accordance with a specified cryptographic key **establishment** method: [

- <u>RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5 as specified in</u> <u>Section 7.2 of RFC 3447, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography</u> <u>Specifications Version 2.1";</u>
- <u>FFC Schemes using "safe-prime" groups that meet the following: 'NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography" and [groups listed in RFC 3526].</u>

] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].

### 5.2.2.3 FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

### FCS\_CKM.4.1

The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method

- For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [single overwrite consisting of [zeroes]];
- For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the invocation of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that [
  - *instructs a part of the TSF to destroy the abstraction that represents the key*]

that meets the following: No Standard

### 5.2.2.4 FCS\_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operations (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)

### FCS\_COP.1.1/DataEncryption

The TSF shall perform *encryption/decryption* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm *AES used in* [CBC, CTR, GCM] *mode* and cryptographic key sizes [<u>128 bits</u>, <u>256 bits</u>] that meet the following: *AES as specified in ISO 18033-3*, [CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CTR as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in ISO 19772].

### 5.2.2.5 FCS\_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)

### FCS\_COP.1.1/SigGen

The TSF shall perform *cryptographic signature services (generation and verification)* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [

• RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [2048 bits]

]

that meet the following: [

• For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1\_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3

].

### 5.2.2.6 FCS\_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operations (Hash Algorithm)

### FCS\_COP.1.1/Hash

The TSF shall perform *cryptographic hashing services* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following: *ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004*.

### 5.2.2.7 FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)

#### FCS\_COP.1.1/KeyedHash

The TSF shall perform *keyed-hash message authentication* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [160 bits, 256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 "MAC Algorithm 2".

### 5.2.2.8 FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol

### FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.

#### FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol using TLS.

#### FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.3

If a peer certificate is presented, the TSF shall [not establish the connection] if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.

#### 5.2.2.9 FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

#### FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [CTR\_DRBG (AES)].

#### FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2

The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [<u>/1] software-based noise source</u>, <u>/1] platform-based noise source</u>] with a minimum of [<u>256 bits</u>] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 "Security Strength Table for Hash Functions", of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

#### 5.2.2.10 FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol in accordance with: RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, [4344, 8268, 6668].

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [password-based].

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [256K] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc, aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr].

### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.5

The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [ssh-rsa] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.

### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.6

The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).

### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.7

The TSF shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1] and [diffie-hellman-group14-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-sha512] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.

### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.8

The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed.

### 5.2.2.11 FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol without Mutual Authentication

### FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement [<u>TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)</u>] and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:

- [
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
- <u>TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 3268</u>
- <u>TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246</u>
- <u>TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC5246</u>

### ] and no other ciphersuites.

### FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches [the reference identifier per RFC 6125 section 6, IPv4 address in SAN, IPv6 address in the SAN].

### FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.3

When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also [

• Not implement any administrator override mechanism

### FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall [not present the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension] in the Client Hello.

### 5.2.2.12 FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2 TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication

### FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall support TLS communication with mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.

<sup>].</sup> 

### 5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

### 5.2.3.1 FIA\_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management

### FIA\_AFL.1.1

The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within [1-64] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to Administrators attempting to authenticate remotely using a password.

### FIA\_AFL.1.2

When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been <u>met</u>, the TSF shall [prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing a remote session using any authentication method that involves a password until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed].

### 5.2.3.2 FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1 Password Management

### FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords:

- a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [ <u>"!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "&", "(", ")", [no other characters]</u>];
- b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [6] and [50] characters.

### 5.2.3.3 FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication

### FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the identification and authentication process:

- Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA\_TAB.1;
- [no other actions].

#### FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.

### 5.2.3.4 FIA\_UAU\_EXT.1 Password-based Authentication Mechanism

### FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall provide a local [password-based, [LDAP]] authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user authentication.

### 5.2.3.5 FIA\_UAU.7.1 Protected Authentication Feedback

#### FIA\_UAU.7.1

The TSF shall provide only *obscured feedback* to the administrative user while the authentication is in progress **at the local console**.

### 5.2.3.6 FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation

#### FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1/Rev

The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation **supporting a minimum path length** of three certificates .

- The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.
- The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
- The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3].
- The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
  - Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extended KeyUsage field.
  - Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsagefield.
  - OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose(id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.

### FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.2/Rev

The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

### 5.2.3.7 FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

#### FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [TLS] and [no additional uses].

#### FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.2

When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall [not accept the certificate].

#### 5.2.3.8 FIA\_X509\_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests

#### FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall generate a Certificate Request as specified by RFC 2986 and be able to provide the following information in the request: public key and [Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, Country].

#### FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.2

The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving the CA Certificate Response.

### 5.2.4 Security Management (FMT)

#### 5.2.4.1 FMT\_MOF.1/Functions Management of Security Functions Behaviour.

#### FMT\_MOF.1.1/Functions

The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection:\_modify the behaviour of] the functions [transmission of audit data to an external IT entity] to Security Administrators.

### 5.2.4.2 FMT\_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of Security Functions Behavior

### FMT\_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate

The TSF shall restrict the ability to <u>enable</u> the function <u>to perform manual updates to Security</u> <u>Administrators</u>.

### 5.2.4.3 FMT\_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data

### FMT\_MTD.1.1/CoreData

The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators.

### 5.2.4.4 FMT\_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF Data

### FMT\_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys

The TSF shall restrict the ability to *manage* the *cryptographic keys* to *Security Administrators*.

### 5.2.4.5 FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

#### FMT\_SMF.1.1

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
- Ability to configure the access banner;
- Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
- Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [hash comparison] capability prior to installing those updates;
- Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA\_AFL.1;
- [
- Ability to start and stop services;
- <u>Ability to configure audit behaviour (e.g. changes to storage locations for audit; changes</u> to behaviour when local audit storage space is full);
- Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
- Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
- Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
- *Ability to configure the reference identifier for the peer;*
- Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as
- o <u>trust anchors;</u>
- Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store
- ].

### 5.2.4.6 FMT\_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles

#### FMT\_SMR.2.1

The TSF shall maintain the roles:

• Security Administrator

#### FMT\_SMR.2.2

The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

#### FMT\_SMR.2.3

The TSF shall ensure that the conditions

- The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
- The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely;

are satisfied.

### 5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

### 5.2.5.1 FPT\_APW\_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords

#### FPT\_APW\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.

#### FPT\_APW\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords.

# 5.2.5.2 FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric, and private keys)

### FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys symmetric keys, and private keys.

### 5.2.5.3 FPT\_STM\_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps

#### FPT\_STM\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.

#### FPT\_STM\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall [allow the Security Administrator to set the time].

### 5.2.5.4 FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 TSF Testing

### FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-up (on power on), periodically at the conditions [BIOS checks, cryptographic library functionality test, and firmware integrity checks]] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [

- Integrity Test
- AES Known Answer Test
- CMAC Known Answer Test
- GCM Known Answer Test
- CCM Known Answer Test
- HMAC-SHA-1/256/384/512 Known Answer Test
- SHA-1/256/512 Known Answer Test
- RSA Signature Known Answer Test
- DRBG Known Answer Test
- Noise Source Health Test
- ].

### 5.2.5.5 FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 Trusted Update

#### FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide *Security Administrators* the ability to query the currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software and [no other TOE firmware/software version].

#### FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall provide *Security Administrators* the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE firmware/software and [no other update mechanism].

### FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a [published hash] prior to installing those updates.

### 5.2.6 TOE Access (FTA)

### 5.2.6.1 FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking

### FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1.1

The TSF Shall, for local interactive sessions, [

• terminate the session]

after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.

### 5.2.6.2 FTA\_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination

### FTA\_SSL.3.1

The TSF shall terminate **a remote** interactive session after a *Security Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity.* 

### 5.2.6.3 FTA\_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination

### FTA\_SSL.4.1

The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator's own interactive session.

### 5.2.6.4 FTA\_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners

### FTA\_TAB.1.1

Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security Administratorspecified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the TOE.

### 5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

### 5.2.7.1 FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

### FTP\_ITC.1.1

The TSF shall be **capable of using** [<u>TLS, HTTPS</u>] **to** provide a trusted communication channel between itself and **authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server,** [<u>authentication</u> <u>server</u>] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from **disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data**.

### FTP\_ITC.1.2

The TSF shall permit **the TSF or the authorized IT entities** to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

### FTP\_ITC.1.3

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [audit server communications and LDAP server].

### 5.2.7.2 FTP\_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path

### FTP\_TRP.1.1/Admin

The TSF shall **be capable of using [SSH] to** provide a trusted communication channel between itself **and authorized** <u>remote</u> **Administrators** that provides confidentiality and integrity, that is, logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from **disclosure and provides detection of modification of the channel data**.

### FTP\_TRP.1.2/Admin

The TSF shall permit <u>remote</u> **Administrators** to initiate communication via the trusted path.

### FTP\_TRP.1.3/Admin

The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for *initial Administrator authentication and all remote administration actions*.

### 5.3 TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale for SFRs

The PP and any relevant EPs/Modules/Packages contain(s) all the requirements claimed in this ST. As such, the dependencies are not applicable since the PP has been approved.

### 5.4 Security Assurance Requirements

The TOE assurance requirements for this ST are taken directly from the PP and any relevant EPs/Modules/Packages, which is/are derived from Common Criteria Version 3.1, Revision 5. The assurance requirements are summarized in the Table 14:

Assurance Class	Assurance Components	Component Description
Security Target	ASE_CLL.1	Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1	ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.1	Security objectives for the operational environment
	ASE_REQ.1	Stated security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1	Security problem definition
Development	ADV_FSP.1	Basic functionality specification
Guidance Documents	AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative user guidance
Life Cycle Support	ALC_CMC.1	Labelling of the TOE
	ALC_CMS.1	TOE CM coverage
Tests	ATE_IND.1	Independent testing – conformance
Vulnerability Assessment	AVA_VAN.1	Vulnerability survey

#### **Table 14 - Security Assurance Requirements**

### 5.5 Assurance Measures

The TOE satisfied the identified assurance requirements. This section identifies the Assurance Measures applied by Nokia to satisfy the assurance requirements. The following table lists the details:

Table 15 - Tol Security Assurance Measures	
SAR Component	How the SAR will be met
ADV_FSP.1	The functional specification describes the external interfaces of the TOE; such as the
	means for a user to invoke a service and the corresponding response of those services.
	The description includes the interface(s) that enforces a security functional requirement,
	the interface(s) that supports the enforcement of a security functional requirement, and
	the interface(s) that does not enforce any security functional requirements. The interfaces

### Table 15 - TOE Security Assurance Measures

SAR Component	How the SAR will be met
	are described in terms of their purpose (general goal of the interface), method of use
	(how the interface is to be used), parameters (explicit inputs to and outputs from an
	interface that control the behavior of that interface), parameter descriptions (tells what
	the parameter is in some meaningful way), and error messages (identifies the condition
	that generated it, what the message is, and the meaning of any error codes).
AGD_OPE.1	The Administrative Guide provides the descriptions of the processes and procedures of
	how the administrative users of the TOE can securely administer the TOE using the
	interfaces that provide the features and functions detailed in the guidance.
AGD_PRE.1	The Installation Guide describes the installation, generation, and startup procedures so
	that the users of the TOE can put the components of the TOE in the evaluated
	configuration.
ALC_CMC.1	The Configuration Management (CM) documents describe how the consumer identifies
ALC_CMS.1	the evaluated TOE. The CM documents identify the configuration items, how those
	configuration items are uniquely identified, and the adequacy of the procedures that are
	used to control and track changes that are made to the TOE. This includes details on what
	changes are tracked and how potential changes are incorporated.
ATE_IND.1	Nokia will provide the TOE for testing
AVA_VAN.1	Nokia will provide the TOE for testing
	Nokia will provide a document identifying the list of software and hardware components.

## **6 TOE Summary Specifications**

This chapter identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified above are met by the TOE.

	Table 16 - TOE Summary Specification SFR Description
TOE SFR	Rationale
FAU_GEN.1	The TOE produces audit events for start-up and shutdown of the audit functions as well as the following: administrative login and logout; password resets; changes to the TOE data related to configuration; the generation, import of, changing, or deletion of cryptographic keys.
	Audit records include the identity of the administrator initiating the cryptography related events such as, key generation (e.g. RSA), import, or deletion. The audit record contains the information such as, the identity of the key (unique name including the size and type), the date and time of the event, type of event, and the outcome of the event.
	Following is an example of an audit record for key generation: 189 2021/03/24 16:26:41.961 UTC MINOR: SECURITY #2231 management admin "admin certificate gen-keypair cf3:/key_1 size 2048 type rsa : success"
	Following is an example of an audit record for key import: 197 2021/03/24 17:35:22.606 UTC MINOR: SECURITY #2232 management admin "admin certificate import type key input cf3:/key_1.pem output key_1.pem format pem : success"
	Following is an example of an audit record for key deletion: 198 2021/03/24 17:36:53.864 UTC MINOR: SECURITY #2234 management admin "File cf3-A:\system-pki\key_1.pem delete : success"
	Only Authorized Administrators can access the audit events and have the ability to clear the audit events. The TOE creates audit records for events and provides contents as required for all SFRs specified in Table 13.
FAU_GEN.2	For audit events that result from actions of identified users, the TOE can associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FAU_STG_EXT.1	The TOE is a standalone TOE that is configured to export audit data to a specified, external audit server. The TOE protects communications with an external audit server via HTTPS over TLS v1.2.
	A cron script can be executed on the TOE to periodically transfer the log files from local storage to the external audit server. The cron job script can be configured from 15 minutes to 1 hour or on a weekly basis. The cron script includes a URL of the external audit sever. The TOE performs the transmission of logs periodically using a cron script. The TOE can rollover from one log file to the next log file based on rollover time. For the TOE to successfully create a log file, the compact flash disk must have a minimum of 10% or 5MB of free space. The TOE is designed to store 6.8 GB records in compact flash drive. When the local storage space for audit data is full, the TOE will overwrite the oldest log file.
	available options to configure such administrators are: "user profile membership", "grant/deny a user access permission for console ftp grpc li netconf or snmp", "restrict user to home directory".

TOE SFR		Rationale	
	Only Authorized Administrators can access the audit events and have the ability to clear		
	the audit events. The TOE do	es not allow non-privileged ac	dministrators to modify the
	audit records that are stored locally on the device.		
FCS_CKM.1	key sizes of 2048-bit that mee (DSS)", Appendix B.3. The TOF the following: "NIST Special I Wise Key Establishment Scher The TOE supports DHG14 and part of SSH.	et the following: FIPS PUB 186- E supports FFC Schemes using Publication 800-56A Revision mes Using Discrete Logarithm d DHG16 key generation in su	pport of DH key exchanges as
	For both TLS and SSH comr signatures.	nunications, the RSA keys ai	re used in support of digital
	The relevant NIST CAVP certil	ficate numbers are listed in Ta	ible 5.
FCS_CKM.2	The TOE performs cryptographic key establishment in accordance with RSA key establishment schemes that are conformant to RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1". The TOE supports FFC Schemes using "sa prime" groups that meet the following: 'NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logari Cryptography" and groups listed in RFC 3526.		
	[ Sebore 2		Convisoo
	Scheme	SFR	Services
	FFC/DHG14/DHG16	FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	Administration
	RSA	FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	Administration
		FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	Audit server LDAP server
		ficate numbers are listed in Ta	
FCS_CKM.4	<ul> <li>For plaintext keys in of zeroes.</li> <li>For all plaintext keys in invocation of an intervolution of an inte</li></ul>		s a single overwrite consisting the TOE destroys keys via the TOE that instructs TOE to the key using the file delete
	is disabled by defaul Please refer to Table 17 TOE	t. Zeroization.	
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryp tion	and ISO 19772.		ing to ISO 18033-3, ISO 10116
		are 128 bits and 256 bits and a TOE provides AES encryption a tions.	

TOE SFR	Rationale					
	The relevant	NIST CAVP c		ers are listed in Tal	ble 5.	
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	The TOE supports cryptographic signature services such as generation and verification using RSA Digital Signature Algorithm that meet the RSA scheme specified in FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5.					
	The RSA key	size supporte	ed is 2048 bits.			
	The relevant	NIST CAVP c	ertificate numb	ers are listed in Tal	ble 5.	
FCS_COP.1/Hash	The TOE sup The hashing	oorts Cryptog algorithms a	graphic hashing		ng to ISO/IEC 10118-	3:2004.
	512.	g hashing alg			A-256, SHA-384, and	SHA-
		-		160, 256, 384, and		
FCS COP.1/KeyedHash				ers are listed in Tal	ccordance with ISO/II	EC 0707
rcs_cop.i/keyeunasi	2:2011, Secti			iuthentication in ac		EC 9797-
	The details on HMAC Algori	-	nd Message Di	gest Size are giver	n below with the re	spective
	HMAC	Hash	Block Size	Key Lengths	MAC Lengths	
	Algorithm	Function		, 0	U U	
	HMAC-	SHA-1	512 bits	160 bits	160 bits	
	SHA-1					
	HMAC- SHA-256	SHA-256	512 bits	256 bits	256 bits	
	HMAC- SHA-384	SHA-384	1024 bits	384 bits	384 bits	
	HMAC- SHA-512	SHA-512	1024 bits	512 bits	512 bits	
		-	-	pport of TLS and S		
				ers are listed in Tal		
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1		•	•	pecified in Section plements HTTPS u	2, of RFC 2818, to p sing TLS.	orovide a
	If a peer cert certificate is			DE will not establis	h the connection if t	the peer
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	The TOE imp 4344, 8268, a		I protocol that	complies with RFC	C(s) 4251, 4252, 425	3, 4254,
	following pu authentication	blic key algo on server whi	orithms are sup	-	d-based authenticat TOE also supports entication.	

TOE SFR	Rationale		
	The TOE ensures that packets greater than 256K bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped as described in RFC 4253. When the TOE detects packets greater than 256K, the connection is disconnected. The TOE supports the following encryption algorithms: aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc aes128-ctr, and aes256-ctr for SSH transport. There are no optional characteristics specified for FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4. This list is identical to those claimed for FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4.		
	The following public key algorithms are supported: ssh-rsa. There are no optional characteristics specified for FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5. This list is identical to those claimed for FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5. The SSH client's public key is compared to an authorized keys file which is stored on the TOE.		
	The TOE supports the following data integrity MAC algorithms: hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2- 256, hmac-sha2-512. This list corresponds to the list in FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6. The TOE supports diffie-hellman-group-14-sha1, diffie-hellman-group-14-sha256 and diffie- hellman-group-16-sha512. This list corresponds to the list in FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7.		
	<ul> <li>The TOE is capable of rekeying. The TOE verifies the following thresholds:</li> <li>No longer than one hour</li> <li>No more than one gigabyte of transmitted data</li> </ul>		
	The TOE continuously checks both conditions. When either of the conditions are met, the TOE will initiate a rekey.		
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2	The TOE implements TLS v1.2 (RFC 5246) and rejects all other TLS and SSL versions. The TOE supports TLS communication with mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates. The TOE supports the following ciphersuites:		
	<ul> <li>TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268</li> <li>TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268</li> <li>TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246</li> <li>TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246</li> </ul>		
	The ciphersuites specified are those listed in FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.		
	The TOE does not present the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension in the Client Hello.		
	TLS is used for HTTPS/TLS for management purposes and to establish encrypted sessions with other instances of the TOE and IT entities to send/receive audit data. The TOE verifies that the presented identifier matches the reference identifiers. The TOE supports reference identifiers according to RFC 6125, Section 6, which includes DNS-ID and CN-ID, IPv4 address in SAN, and IPv6 address in the SAN. The TOE supports wild cards. The TOE does not support certificate pinning. When presented with X509 certificates, the TOE verifies the certificate path and certification validation process by verifying the following rules:		
	<ul> <li>RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation supporting a minimum path length of three certificates. The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.</li> </ul>		

TOE SFR	Rationale
	• The TOE validates a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the
	certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
	• The TOE validates the revocation status of the certificate using a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3, Certificate Revocation
	List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759 Section 5
	<ul> <li>The TOE validates the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:         <ul> <li>Server certificates presented for TLS must have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Client certificates presented for TLS must have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.</li> </ul>
	The TOE will only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
	When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TOE will not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid. The TOE does not implement any administrator override mechanism.
	The use of CRL is configurable and can be used for certificate revocation. If the TOE is unable to establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TOE will
	not accept the certificate.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	The TOE produces all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using CTR_DRBG (AES).
	The TOE uses a deterministic RBG, which is seeded by two entropy sources that accumulate entropy. The sources of entropy are from a software-based noise source and a hardware-based noise sources. The CTR_DRBG is seeded with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy.
FIA_AFL.1	The Security Administrator can configure the maximum number of failed attempts for the CLI interface. The TOE allows the administrator to configure the number of successive failed authentication attempts.
	When a user fails to authenticate a number of times equal to the configured limit, the TOE locks the claimed user identity until the configured time is reached. Once the elapsed time has passed, the user will be able re-login.
	Administrators can configure unsuccessful authentication attempts range between $1 - 64$ within a configurable time limit of 0 to 60 minutes. When the account is locked, the TOE does not permit any further actions until the account is accessible.
	The authentication failures cannot lead to a situation where no administrator access is available. A user would be configured to access the LDAP server which would provide local access to the TOE. The LDAP server is not subject to lockout.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	The TOE provides the following password management capabilities for
	<ul> <li>administrator passwords:</li> <li>a) Passwords can be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "%", "%", "%", "%", "", "(", ")".</li> </ul>

TOE SFR	Rationale
	b) Minimum password length configurable to between 6 to 50 characters.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 FIA_UAU_EXT.2	The TOE does not permit any actions prior to Administrators logging into the TOE. They are able to view the banner at the login prompt.
	The TOE mandates that every user must be authenticated by accessing the local console or by remotely using SSH. Security Administrators can access the console by connecting to the console port using RJ45-DB9 or by remotely connecting to each appliance via SSHv2.
	The TOE supports RSA public key authentication as a server, password-based authentication for remote and local authentication, and LDAP authentication for remote and local users.
	For the password-based authentication, users must provide the correct credentials before accessing the TOE. If the user enters incorrect user credentials, they will not be allowed to access and will be presented the login page again.
FIA_UAU.7	When a user enters their password, the information is obscured. For remote session authentication, the TOE does not echo any characters when they are entered.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	The TOE supports the X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication of external TLS peers.
	<ul> <li>When an X.509 certificate is presented, the TOE verifies the certificate path, and certification validation process by verifying the following rules:</li> <li>RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation supporting a minimum path length of three certificates.</li> <li>The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.</li> <li>The TOE validates a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.</li> <li>The TOE validates the revocation status of the certificate using a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3.</li> <li>The TOE validates the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules: <ul> <li>Server certificates presented for TLS must have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	The TOE will only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE. When the TOE receives a remote certificate during the secure channel establishment, the validity of the remote entity certificate is verified. The TOE also verifies the chain of trust by validating each certificate contained in the chain and verifying that a certificate path consists of trusted CA certificates and verify the validity of the certificates. These checks are done prior to loading the certificates onto the TOE.
	The use of CRL is configurable and can be used for certificate revocation.

TOE SFR	Rationale
	Revocation check is performed on end-entity and intermediate certificates. If the TOE is
	unable to establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TOE will not accept the certificate.
FIA_X509_EXT.2	X.509 certificate can be used to authenticate and establish secure communication channel for LDAP server.
	RSA based certificates: The supported RSA key size shall be 2048 bits.
	When establishing a connection and the TOE cannot determine the validity of a certificate, the TOE will not accept the certificate.
	To validate a peer certificate on the TOE, an authenticated administrator must import its CA certificates and CRLs. CA profiles must be created and enabled for each imported CA certificate and CRL. The administrator must configure at least one trust anchor to limit the list of CA certificates. Furthermore, the administrator can create a client profile to specify the cipher-list and client certificate to use.
FIA_X509_EXT.3	The TOE generates a Certificate Request as specified by RFC 2986 and is be able to provide the following information in the request: public key and Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit and Country.
	The TOE validates the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving the CA Certificate Response. The TOE does not support the "device-specific information" within Certificate Request message.
FMT_MOF.1/Functions	The TOE restricts the ability to modify the behaviour of transmission of audit data to an audit server to Security Administrators.
FMT_MOF.1/ManualU pdate	Security Administrators have the ability to query the current version of the TOE and they are able to perform manual software updates. The currently active version of the TOE can be queried by issuing the "show version" command.
	The TOE provides means to authenticate firmware updates to the TOE using a published hash prior to installing the firmware.
	Customers must log in to https://customer.nokia.com/support/s/ portal to download software updates, and then copy it onto the compact flash. The compact flash is then inserted into the standby CPM. Customers receive a compact flash with the updated software or are instructed to copy a downloaded image onto a compact flash (received out of band).
	The compact flash is inserted into the standby CPM and then plugged into the chassis.
	When the standby CPM boots, its bootloader will extract the published hmac-sha256 hash from a file in the compact flash and compare it with the hmac-sha256 hash computed over the new software binary. If the hashes match, then it will "jump" into or run the new software binary. Otherwise, it will show a FIPS HMAC-SHA256 error on the console, reboot and repeat the cycle. Meanwhile, the active CPM in the same chassis is still running the current software. Once it detects the standby CPM is operational with the new updated software, then the operator has the option to switchover to the standby CPM running the authenticated software. This switchover mechanism provides minimal service interruption during a software upgrade for our customers. The administrator must authorize the switchover to the standby CPM.

TOE SFR	Rationale
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	The TOE implements Role Based Access Control (RBAC). Security Administrative must login before they can access any administrative functions. Only administrators can manage the certificates in TOE's trust store.
	The TOE maintains the following roles: Admin and User. Each role defined has a set of permissions that will grant them access to the TOE data. The only interfaces available to an unauthenticated user are the TOE login prompts. Only authorized security administrators may authenticate to the TOE and interact with TSF data. The TOE prevents non-security administrators from modifying any TSF element or security function.
	There are two types of trust stores in the TOE: Active and Inactive. In volatile memory, the trust store is active, and the other inactive trust store resides on the persistent store inform of files. The Administrator can assign privileges to non-administrative user by configuring the capabilities in specifically user's profile.
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKey s	The Security Administrator has the ability to configure the pre-shared key for MACsec functionality and can modify, generate, and delete the key for SSH.
	The TOE restricts the ability to manage SSH (session keys), TLS (session keys), and any configured X.509 certificates (public and private key pairs) to security administrators via command line.
FMT_SMF.1	The TOE supports the following roles: Administrator. The TOE can be accessed via local CLI and remote SSH.
	<ul> <li>The Administrator can perform the following management functions: <ul> <li>Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely</li> <li>Ability to configure the access banner</li> <li>Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination</li> <li>Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using hash comparison capability prior to installing those updates</li> <li>Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1</li> <li>Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;</li> <li>Ability to configure theresholds for SSH rekeying;</li> <li>Ability to configure the reference identifier for the peer;</li> <li>Ability to configure the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as</li> <li>trust anchors;</li> <li>Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality</li> <li>Ability to configure audit behaviour (e.g. changes to storage locations for audit; changes to behaviour when local audit storage space is full)</li> <li>Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying</li> <li>Ability to configure the reference identifier and the storage space is full)</li> <li>Ability to configure the reference identifier and the storage locations for audit; changes to behaviour when local audit storage space is full)</li> <li>Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying</li> <li>Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality</li> <li>Ability to configure audit behaviour (e.g. changes to storage locations for audit; changes to behaviour when local audit storage space is full)</li> <li>Ability to configure the sholds for SSH rekeying</li> <li>Ability to configure the sholds for SSH rekeying</li> <li>Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality</li> <li>Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality</li> <li>Ability to configure the sholds for SSH rekeying</li> <li>Ability to configure the sholds for SSH rekeying</li> <li>Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality</li> <li>Ability to configure the cryptographic functional</li></ul></li></ul>
FMT_SMR.2	Security Administrators can configure user's privilege that grant or deny access to TSF data and functions.

TOE SFR	Rationale		
	The Security Administrator can also configure the user's profile to set the following		
	restrictions:		
	Functionality	Description	
	cli-session-gr	To Add/remove cli-session-group the profile belongs to	
	combined-max-s	To define Maximum number of concurrent SSH & Telnet sessions	
	default-action	To get Default action for the profile	
	entry	To find the Match criteria entry for the profile	
	grpc	To view the gRPC specific profile	
	netconf	To config the netconf specific profile	
	ssh-max-session	To create Maximum number of concurrent SSH sessions	
	The TOE enables connection.	both local console access and remote access via SSHv2 secure	
FPT_SKP_EXT.1		rivate keys in a secure storage and is not accessible through an	
	interface to adminis		
FPT_APW_EXT.1		ored in a secure directory that is not readily accessible to	
		TOE stores passwords as non-reversible hashes.	
FPT_TST_EXT.1	published HMAC-SH	ne integrity check of the installed firmware by comparing the IA256. If the hash does not match, the inactive CPM will reboot e CF is replaced with an authentic firmware.	
	any component rep appropriate informa forwarding state du system is placed in I	ms self-tests for the cryptographic module during boot up, and if orts failure for the self-test, the system will reboot and display the ation on the local console. All ports are blocked from moving to ring the POST. If all components of all modules pass the POST, the FIPS PASS state and ports are allowed to forward data traffic. When a message is displayed to the local console.	
	<ul> <li>Integrity te the HMAC- storage and not the sar then the de</li> </ul>	the following power-on self-tests: est: For this test, when the CPM boots up, the bootloader calculates SHA256 authentication code of that software image from the d compares it with the known value stored in storage. If the value is me then it will give an error which is present on the console, and evice will reboot. If the values of HMAC-SHA256 matches, then it y executes the software image.	
	are tested	Answer Test -The AES encryption and AES decryption algorithms using test vectors. The results are compared against pre-computed ensure the algorithms are operating properly.	
	generated expected a	wn Answer Test - With this test, the CMAC authentication code is for a known message and respected key. Both are compared to the uthentication code, if they match the test gets passed and if they test get failed. The message is displayed on the console screen.	
		n Answer Test - In this test, A known plaintext is encrypted using with a known 256-bit key, and the computed ciphertext is compared	

TOE SFR	Rationale
	to the expected ciphertext. If they match, then the computed ciphertext is decrypted using the same key, and the recovered plaintext is compared with the original known plaintext. If they do not match, the test fails. If they match, the test passes.
	• CCM Known Answer Test - In this test, the known plain text is encrypted using the AES-CCM with known 192 bits key, and then the computed cipher text is compared against the expected cipher txt . If they match, then the computed ciphertext is decrypted using the same key, and the recovered plaintext is compared with the original known plaintext. If they do not match, the test fails. If they match, the test passes.
	<ul> <li>HMAC-SHA-1/224/256/384/512 Known Answer Test - the HMAC algorithm is tested using test vector. The results are compared against pre-computed results to ensure the algorithm is operating properly.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>SHA-1/256/512 Known Answer Test - the SHA algorithm is tested using test vector. The results are compared against pre-computed results to ensure the algorithm is operating correctly.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>RSA Signature Known Answer Test - the RSA Signature is tested using test vector. The results are compared against pre-computed results to ensure the algorithm is operating properly.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>DRBG Known Answer Test - the DRBG is seeded with a pre-determined entropy and the RNG output is compared with output values expected for the pre-determined seed.</li> </ul>
	• The Software Integrity Test - is run automatically on start-up, and whenever the system images are loaded. These tests are sufficient to verify that the correct version of the TOE software is running as well as that the cryptographic operations are all performing as expected.
	<ul> <li>There is also a Noise Source Health test that is executed as part of the self-test requirements.</li> </ul>
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Security Administrators have the ability to query the current version of the TOE and they are able to perform manual software updates. The currently active version of the TOE can be queried by issuing the "show version" command. The TOE provides means to authenticate firmware updates to the TOE using a published hash prior to installing the firmware.
	Customers must log in to https://customer.nokia.com/support/s/ portal to download software updates, and then copy it onto the compact flash. The compact flash is then inserted into the standby CPM. Customers receive a compact flash with the updated software or are instructed to copy a downloaded image onto a compact flash (received out of band). The compact flash is inserted into the standby CPM and then plugged into the chassis.
	When the standby CPM boots, its bootloader will extract the published hmac-sha256 hash from a file in the compact flash and compare it with the hmac-sha256 hash computed over the new software binary. If the hashes match, then it will "jump" into or run the new software binary. Otherwise, it will show a FIPS HMAC-SHA256 error on the

TOE SFR	Rationale
	console, reboot and repeat the cycle. Meanwhile, the active CPM in the same chassis is still running the current software. Once it detects the standby CPM is operational with the new updated software, then the operator has the option to switchover to the standby CPM running the authenticated software. This switchover mechanism provides minimal service interruption during a software upgrade for our customers. The administrator must authorize the switchover to the standby CPM.
FPT_STM_EXT.1	<ul> <li>The TOE provides reliable time stamps. The clock function is reliant on the system clock provided by the underlying hardware. The clock is utilized for providing reliable time stamps used in the following functions:</li> <li>Audit events</li> <li>Session inactivity</li> <li>X.509 certificate expiration validation.</li> </ul>
FTA_SSL_EXT.1	The TOE will terminate a remote interactive session after a configurable time interval of session inactivity.         A configured inactivity period will be applied to both local and remote sessions in the same procedure. When the interface has been idle for more than the configured period, the session will be terminated and will require authentication to establish a new session.
	If a remote user session is inactive for a configured period of time, the session will be terminated and will require re-identification and authentication to establish a new session. When the user logs back in, the inactivity timer will be activated for the new session. A configured inactivity period will be applied to both local and remote sessions in the same manner. The allowable inactivity timeout range is from 1 to 1440 minutes.
FTA_SSL.4	The Security Administrator is able to terminate their CLI.
FTA_TAB.1	Security Administrator is usic to terminate their cell. Security Administrators can create a customized login banner that will be displayed at the following interfaces: • Local CLI • Remote CLI This banner will be displayed prior to allowing Security Administrator access through those interfaces.
FTP_ITC.1	The TOE supports secure communication to the following IT entities: Audit server and LDAP server. The TOE protects communications with an external audit server using HTTPS over TLS v1.2 protocol. The TOE protects communication with an LDAP server using TLS v1.2 protocol. The TOE uses TLS v1.2 protocol with X.509 certificate-based authentication. The protocols listed are consistent with those specified in the requirement.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin	The TOE supports SSH v2.0 for secure remote administration of the TOE. Each SSH v2.0 session is encrypted using AES encryption to protect confidentiality and uses HMACs to protect the integrity of traffic. The protocols listed are consistent with those specified in the requirement.

# 7 Cryptographic Key Destruction

The table below describes the key zeroization provided by the TOE and as referenced in FCS\_CKM.4:

Table 17- Key Zeroization				
Keys/CSPs	Purpose	Storage Location	Method of Zeroization	
Diffie-Hellman Shared	The shared secret used in	RAM	A single overwrite	
Secret	Diffie-Hellman (DH)		consisting of zeroes.	
	exchange. Created per the			
	Diffie-Hellman Exchange.			
Diffie Hellman private key	The private key used in	RAM	A single overwrite	
	Diffie-Hellman (DH)		consisting of zeroes.	
	Exchange			
SSH Private key	The SSH server host	RAM; Compact Flash if	A single overwrite	
	private key is stored on the local filesystem	preserve-key is enabled.	consisting of zeroes.	
			Non-volatile SSH keys can	
			be zeroized by deleting the	
			key using the file delete	
			command:	
			/file delete <path></path>	
SSH Session Key	These are the session keys	RAM	A single overwrite	
	for SSH.		consisting of zeroes.	
TLS Session Keys	These are the session keys	RAM	A single overwrite	
	for TLS.		consisting of zeroes.	
RNG Seed Key	This is the seed key for the	RAM	A single overwrite	
-	RNG.		consisting of zeroes.	
RNG Seed	This seed is for the RNG.	RAM	A single overwrite	
			consisting of zeroes	

### Table 17- Key Zeroization

## 8 Acronym Table

Acronyms should be included as an Appendix in each document.

Acronym	Table 18- Acronyms Definition		
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard		
ARP	Address Resolution Protocol		
ASCII	American Standard Code for Information Interchange		
BIOS	Basic Input/Output System		
CCRA	Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of IT		
	Security		
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining		
CLI	Command Line Interface		
CRL	Certificate Revocation List		
CSR	Certificate Signing Request		
DH	Diffie-Hellman		
DHE	Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral		
DMI	Device Management Interface		
DNS	Domain Name System		
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator		
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm		
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards		
GCM	Galois Counter Mode		
gRPC	gRPC Remote Procedure Calls		
GUI	Graphical User Interface		
НМАС	Hash Message Authentication Code		
НТТР	Hypertext Transfer Protocol		
HTTPs	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure		
IP	Internet Protocol		
КАТ	Known Answer Test		
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol		
MB	Megabyte		
MPLS	Multiprotocol Label Switching		
NIAP	National Information Assurance Partnership		
NTP	Network Time Protocol		
OSP	Organizational Security Policy		
РСТ	Pairwise Consistency Test		
РР	Protection Profile		
PKCS	Public Key Cryptography Standards		
RAM	Random Access Memory		
RFC	Requests for Comments		
RSA	Rivest-Shamir-Adleman		

#### Table 18- Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
SAML	Security Assertion Markup Language
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SFP	Security Policy Database
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH	Secure Shell
SSO	Single Sign On
ST	Security Target
ТСР	Transmission Control Protocol
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TRRT	Technical Rapid Response Team
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TSFI	TSF Interface
TSS	TOE Summary Specification
UI	User Interface
URI	Uniform Resource Identifier