


National Information Assurance Partnership

Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme



Validation Report

**Cigent PBA Software with Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4
Self-Encrypting Drive (SED)**

Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11629-2025

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1 Executive Summary

This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Cigent PBA Software with Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 Self-Encrypting Drive (SED) solution provided by Cigent Technology, Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.

The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was completed in November 2025. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 (FDEAAcPP20E), and collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 (FDEEEcPP20E).

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Cigent PBA Software with Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 Self-Encrypting Drive (SED).

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.

The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.

The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Cigent PBA Software with Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 Self-Encrypting Drive (SED) Security Target, version 1.3, November 11, 2025 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.

2 Identification

The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called

Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.

The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Validated Products List.

Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:

- The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
- The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
- The conformance result of the evaluation.
- The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
- The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.

Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers

Item	Identifier
Evaluation Scheme	United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE	Cigent PBA Software with Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 Self-Encrypting Drive (SED) (Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 (FDEAAcPP20E) • collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 (FDEEEcPP20E)
ST	Cigent PBA Software with Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 Self-Encrypting Drive (SED) Security Target, version 1.3, November 11, 2025
Evaluation Technical Report	Evaluation Technical Report for Cigent PBA Software with Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 Self-Encrypting Drive (SED), version 0.2, November 11, 2025
CC Version	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, rev 5
Conformance Result	CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor	Cigent Technology, Inc.
Developer	Cigent Technology, Inc.
Common Criteria Testing Lab (CCTL)	Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc. Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators	Jerome Myers, Ph.D., Mike Quintos, Farid Ahmed, Ph.D.

3 Architectural Information

Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security Target.

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Cigent PBA Software version 2.0 with Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 Self-Encrypting Drive (SED). Cigent offers the M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 in several different capacities (128GB-1TB) and two different form factors (BGA or M.2). No matter the capacity or form factor, the Cigent SED operates in the same manner, providing the same encryption, key management, and security. Irrespective of whether the SED comes in the Ball Grid Array (BGA) form factor, meant to be soldered to a computing system's motherboard or whether the SED has an M.2 form factor (which allows a user to remove or upgrade an M.2 SED within their laptop), the below SEDs all provide identical security features and provide hardware full drive encryption.

Controller	Firmware	Capacity	Form Factor	Model Name
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	64GB	M.2	CGN-0C3014_064G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	128GB	M.2	CGN-0C3014_128G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	256GB	M.2	CGN-0C3014_256G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	512GB	M.2	CGN-0C3014_512G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	1TB	M.2	CGN-0C3014_001T
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	64GB	M.2	CGN-0C1014_064G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	128GB	M.2	CGN-0C1014_128G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	256GB	M.2	CGN-0C1014_256G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	512GB	M.2	CGN-0C1014_512G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	1TB	M.2	CGN-0C1014_001T
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	64GB	M.2	CGN-0C2014_064G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	64GB	M.2	CGN-0C2014_064G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	128GB	M.2	CGN-0C2014_128G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	256GB	M.2	CGN-0C2014_256G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	512GB	M.2	CGN-0C2014_512G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	1TB	M.2	CGN-0C2014_001T
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	64GB	M.2	CGN-0C2014_064G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	128GB	M.2	CGN-9C3014_128G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	256GB	M.2	CGN-9C3014_256G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	512GB	M.2	CGN-9C3014_512G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	1TB	M.2	CGN-9C3014_001T
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	64GB	BGA	CGN-0C3304_064G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	128GB	BGA	CGN-0C3304_128G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	256GB	BGA	CGN-0C3304_256G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	512GB	BGA	CGN-0C3304_512G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	1TB	BGA	CGN-0C3304_001T

3.1 TOE Description

The TOE consists of software that provides pre-boot authentication (PBA) and a hardware M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 self-encrypting drive (SED).

The TOE's Pre-Boot user Authentication (PBA) for Opal 2.0 compliant SEDs supporting MBR Shadowing has been tested on a Dell Precision 3591 laptop with an Intel Core Ultra 7 155H (Series 1/Meteor Lake) CPU with the Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 SED as a coupled system to deliver secure Data-At-Rest (DAR) encryption.

The TOE's PBA software is installed on a 128MB read-only Shadow partition on the M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 SED. After installation, the PBA allows the user to authenticate, which unlocks the SED and boots to the protected OS environment.

The Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 SED provides encrypted storage to protect data until the SED has successfully received the Border Encryption Validation (BEV) from an Authorization Acquisition component (like Cigent's PBA). Cigent's M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4, by nature of its Opal 2.0 compliance with support for MBR Shadowing, can interoperate with any pre-boot authentication software designed to interact with Opal 2.0 SEDs supporting MBR Shadowing and FDE AA certified.

The Cigent PBA Software acts as an Authorization Acquisition component that supplies the Border Encryption Validation (BEV) to an Encryption Engine component (like Cigent's M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4). The PBA software can interoperate with any FDE EE certified SSD supporting Opal 2.0 and MBR shadowing.

3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms

Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.

3.3 TOE Architecture

The TOE is composed of two components. The first, Cigent's PBA software, provides Authorization Acquisition software that runs on any computer with an x86 compatible CPU. The PBA presents a user with a graphic interface to enter the password and/or access a physical token (smartcard, FIDO2 security key, or USB drive) or a combination of password and a physical token. The second component, Cigent's M2. 2230 Self Encryption Drive (SED), provides the Encryption Engine as well as solid state storage to securely house the user's entire operating system and data files. The SED only allows drive access to the separate Shadow partition area (that stores the PBA software) until the SED receives a valid secret value (the BEV). The PBA provides this BEV value after deriving the BEV from operator provided authorization factor(s). After validating the BEV, the SED uses the BEV to derive keys to cryptographically unlock the drive, allowing the user access (enabling the user to boot to the protected OS as well as allowing the user to access data files and applications).

3.4 Physical Boundaries

The TOE's PBA component is purely software that one installs onto the drive within an x86-based computer. The TOE's SED component is a secure, solid state storage device in an M.2 or BGA form factor.

4 Security Policy

This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:

1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Security management
4. Protection of the TSF

4.1 Cryptographic support

The TOE includes cryptographic functionality for key management, user authentication, and block-based encryption including: symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing, keyed-hash message authentication, and password-based key derivation. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to encrypt Data-At-Rest (including the generation and protection of keys and key encryption keys) used by the TOE.

4.2 User data protection

The TOE performs Full Drive Encryption on all visible (the SED maintains the Shadow partition in plaintext prior to authentication) partitions on the drive (so that no plaintext exists) and does so without user intervention.

4.3 Security management

The TOE provides each of required management services to manage the full drive encryption using a graphical user interface.

4.4 Protection of the TSF

The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects key and key material, and includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an operational mode.

5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope

Assumptions

The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following documents:

- collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 (FDEAAcPP20E)
- collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 (FDEEEcPP20E)

That information has not been reproduced here and the FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E should be consulted if there is interest in that material.

The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.

Clarification of scope

All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:

- As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified in the Full Drive Encryption Protection Profiles and performed by the evaluation team).
- This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
- Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific Full Drive Encryption models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
- This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
- The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.

6 Documentation

The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:

- Cigent Single and Multidrive PBA Installation Guide and User Manual, June 2025, PBA Version 2.0.0

Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.

To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.

7 IT Product Testing

This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Cigent PBA Software with Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 Self-Encrypting Drive (SED), Version 0.2, November 11, 2025 (DTR), as summarized in the evaluation Assurance Activity Report (AAR).

7.1 Developer Testing

No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.

7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing

The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification document and ran the tests specified in the FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E including the tests associated with optional requirements. Section 1 of the AAR identifies the tested device, and a diagram of the test environment with a list of test tools is provided in Section 3.4.

8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE's PBA component was tested on a Dell Precision 3591 laptop with an Intel Core Ultra 7 155H (Series 1/Meteor Lake) CPU) using a CGN-0C3014_256G SED Model. The evaluated configuration includes the following SED Models:

<u>Controller</u>	<u>Firmware</u>	<u>Capacity</u>	<u>Form Factor</u>	<u>Model Name</u>
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	64GB	M.2	CGN-0C3014_064G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	128GB	M.2	CGN-0C3014_128G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	256GB	M.2	CGN-0C3014_256G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	512GB	M.2	CGN-0C3014_512G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	1TB	M.2	CGN-0C3014_001T
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	64GB	M.2	CGN-0C1014_064G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	128GB	M.2	CGN-0C1014_128G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	256GB	M.2	CGN-0C1014_256G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	512GB	M.2	CGN-0C1014_512G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	1TB	M.2	CGN-0C1014_001T
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	64GB	M.2	CGN-0C2014_064G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	64GB	M.2	CGN-0C2014_064G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	128GB	M.2	CGN-0C2014_128G

<u>Controller</u>	<u>Firmware</u>	<u>Capacity</u>	<u>Form Factor</u>	<u>Model Name</u>
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	256GB	M.2	CGN-0C2014_256G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	512GB	M.2	CGN-0C2014_512G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	1TB	M.2	CGN-0C2014_001T
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	64GB	M.2	CGN-0C2014_064G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	128GB	M.2	CGN-9C3014_128G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	256GB	M.2	CGN-9C3014_256G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	512GB	M.2	CGN-9C3014_512G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	1TB	M.2	CGN-9C3014_001T
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	64GB	BGA	CGN-0C3304_064G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	128GB	BGA	CGN-0C3304_128G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	256GB	BGA	CGN-0C3304_256G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	512GB	BGA	CGN-0C3304_512G
PS5021-E21T	ELFCI0C.1	1TB	BGA	CGN-0C3304_001T

9 Results of the Evaluation

The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.

A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the PBA Software with Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 Self-Encrypting Drive (SED) TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E.

9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)

The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the Cigent PBA Software with Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 Self-Encrypting Drive (SED) products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)

The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the

Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator performed the assurance activities specified in the FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)

The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)

The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE was identified.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)

The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the assurance activities in the FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)

The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a public search for vulnerabilities. The search was performed on November 10, 2025, and a

summary is included in Section 3.5 of the AAR. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any residual vulnerability.

The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database (<https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search>), Vulnerability Notes Database (<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/>), and cve.org CVE Database (<https://www.cve.org/>) with the following search terms: “Cigent”, “Cigent PBA Software”, “Drive encryption”, “Disk encryption”, “Key destruction”, “Key sanitization”, “Key caching”, “Self Encrypting Drive (SED)”, “OPAL 2.0”, “PS5021-E21T”, “Opal management software”, “SED management software”, and “Password caching”.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results

The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.

The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.

10 Validator Comments/Recommendations

The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being configured per the guidance document listed in Section 6. The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product were not assessed as part of this evaluation.

For this evaluation, the TOE was tested on the hardware specified in the ST and in Section 8 of this report. No other versions of the TOE, either earlier or later, were evaluated.

All other items and scope issues have been sufficiently addressed in other sections of this document.

11 Annexes

Not applicable

12 Security Target

The Security Target is identified as: *Cigent PBA Software with Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 Self-Encrypting Drive (SED) Security Target, Version 1.3, November 11, 2025.*

13 Glossary

The following definitions are used throughout this document:

- **Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL).** An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
- **Conformance.** The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
- **Evaluation.** The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
- **Evaluation Evidence.** Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
- **Feature.** Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
- **Target of Evaluation (TOE).** A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
- **Validation.** The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
- **Validation Body.** A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.

14 Bibliography

The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
- [2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
- [3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
- [4] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019. (FDEAAcPP20E)
- [5] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019. (FDEEEcPP20E)

- [6] Cigent PBA Software with Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 Self-Encrypting Drive (SED) Security Target, Version 1.3, November 11, 2025 (ST).
- [7] Assurance Activity Report for Cigent PBA Software with Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 Self-Encrypting Drive (SED), Version 0.2, November 11, 2025 (AAR).
- [8] Detailed Test Report for Cigent PBA Software with Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 Self-Encrypting Drive (SED), Version 0.2, November 11, 2025 (DTR).
- [9] Evaluation Technical Report for Cigent PBA Software with Cigent M.2 2230 PCIe Gen 4 Self-Encrypting Drive (SED), Version 0.2, November 11, 2025 (ETR).
- [10] Cigent Single and Multidrive PBA Installation Guide and User Manual, June 2025, PBA Version 2.0.0 (AGD).